Hessey-Tenny & Anor v Jones

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Hessey-Tenny & Anor v Jones [2018] QCATA 131

PARTIES:

RICHARD HESSEY-TENNY
SADIE HESSEY-TENNY
(applicants/appellants)

v

HEATH JONES

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL094-18

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:

MCDT339/17

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

20 September 2018

HEARING DATE:

On the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Justice Daubney, President

ORDERS:

The application for a stay of the learned Magistrate’s decision of 4 April 2018 be refused.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL – PROCEDURE – QUEENSLAND – STAY OF PROCEEDINGS – GENERAL PRINCIPLES AS TO GRANT OR REFUSAL – where stay is sought to preserve the subject matter of the appeal – where the subject matter is payment from the applicant to the respondent – where submitted that refusal of the stay would render the applicant subject to enforcement proceedings – whether a stay can be granted when leave to appeal has not yet been granted

REPRESENTATION:

Applicant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

Self-represented

APPEARANCES:

This matter was heard and determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).

REASONS FOR DECISION

  1. These are the reasons for my decision, made on 12 September 2018, that the applicants’ application for a stay pending appeal be refused.

  2. The primary dispute between the parties arises out of the applicants’ tenancy from the landlord respondent of certain residential premises at Forest Glen.  The tenancy agreement commenced on 31 March 2017 and was due to end on 30 March 2018.

  3. Prior to the expiration of the tenancy agreement, relations between the parties soured as a result of the applicants’ dissatisfaction with various aspects of the amenities in the property.  The applicants vacated the property before the nominated expiration date of the tenancy.

  4. It appears on the material before me that the applicants and the respondent attempted unsuccessfully to agree to terms for the applicants’ early vacation of the premises. The applicants then made a “dispute resolution request” to the Residential Tenancies Authority (“RTA”) pursuant to s 402 of the Residential Tenancies and Rooming Accommodation Act 2008 (“RTRA”). The RTA then gave the parties notice under s 403(2) of the RTRA that the dispute was not suitable for conciliation. 

  5. The applicants then commenced proceedings in the Tribunal in the form of a minor civil dispute against the respondent claiming, in effect, for the repayment of bond clean, certain costs and a claim for a 50 per cent reduction in rent already paid.  The total claimed by the applicants was $11,115.30. 

  6. The respondent lodged a counter-application seeking loss of rent and various other costs, totalling $9,065. 

  7. The matters came on for hearing on 7 March 2018 before a Magistrate sitting at Maroochydore.  On 4 April 2018, the Magistrate delivered the Tribunal’s decision together with written reasons.  The learned Magistrate:

    -rejected a preliminary point which had been argued to the effect that the Tribunal lacked jurisdiction because the conciliation process under the RTRA had not been completed;

    -rejected a preliminary argument that the respondent’s counter-application had been made…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCATA 131
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hessey-Tenny & Anor v Jones involved an appeal against a decision made by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT). The applicants sought a stay of proceedings to prevent enforcement of the QCAT decision pending the outcome of their appeal. The applicants argued that refusal of the stay would render them subject to enforcement proceedings. The Supreme Court was required to decide whether a stay could be granted when leave to appeal had not yet been granted. The Court considered section 145 of the QCAT Act, which allows for the stay of a decision pending the final outcome of an appeal. The Court noted that this section is premised on the existence of an appeal and is analogous to rule 761 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. The Court referred to previous cases, including Perovich v ASIC and Bell v Bay-Jespersen, which held that the power to stay a decision pending an appeal does not extend to cases where leave to appeal has not yet been granted. The Court also considered the Supreme Court's inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay in such circumstances, but noted that QCAT does not possess this jurisdiction. The Court concluded that the power to grant a stay under section 145 is not available in cases where leave to appeal has not yet been granted. The Court further noted that QCAT's power to make interim orders is limited to cases where an appeal has already been lodged. In light of these considerations, the Court refused the application for a stay of proceedings.

ORDERS:
The application for a stay of the learned Magistrate’s decision of 4 April 2018 be refused.

Orders

Orders of the court

The application for a stay of the learned Magistrate’s decision of 4 April 2018 be refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 145 of the QCAT Act provides:“145 Effect of appeal on decision(1)The start of an appeal under this division against a decision does not affect the operation of the decision or prevent the taking of action to implement the decision.(2)However, the tribunal may make an order staying the operation of the decision being appealed against until the appeal is finally decided.(3)The tribunal may act under subsection (2) on the application of the appellant or on its own initiative.(4)The tribunal’s power to act under subsection (2) is exercisable only by – (a) the tribunal constituted for the appeal; or(b)if the tribunal has not been constituted for the appeal – a judicial member.” As a preliminary procedural issue, it should be noted that s 145 is premised on the notion that an appeal has been started. In that regard, s 145(1) and (2) are the cognate equivalent of r 761 in the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999. Rule 761 has been construed as not being a source of power for the Court of Appeal to grant a stay in circumstances where leave to appeal is required but has not yet been granted. In Perovich v ASIC[1], McPherson JA said at [4]:“The power of the Court of Appeal to stay a decision under appeal is conferred by r 761(2) of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules, and is exercisable by a single judge of appeal. But it relates to a stay of enforcement only of a decision ‘subject to an appeal’. In Stone v Copperform Pty Ltd [2002] 1 Qd R 106; [2001] QCA 7, I held that the Court or a judge of appeal had no power under r 761(2) to order the stay of enforcement of a decision that was not subject to an appeal, but was subject only to an application for leave to appeal which had not yet been granted. The decision was later, although in a slightly different context, approved and applied in Bell v Bay-Jespersen [2004] 2 Qd R 235; (2004) QCA 68, by which I am bound.”[1](2005) 56 ACSR 303. By parity of reasoning, the power of the Tribunal to order a stay under s 145(2) is not available in a case such as the present in which an application for leave to appeal is required and has been applied for, but has not yet been granted. The Supreme Court does, however, have inherent jurisdiction to grant a stay in cases in which leave to appeal is required but has not yet been granted. The availability of such a discretion in the Court’s inherent jurisdiction was referred to, and relied on, by McMurdo JA in Simonova v Department of Housing and Public Works.[2] After referring to the Court’s inherent power to grant a stay in circumstances where there was not yet an appeal, but only an application for leave to appeal, his Honour said[3]:“I accept, as is submitted for the respondent that, in this context, the circumstances must be exceptional before an order in the nature of a stay will be granted, pending an application for leave to appeal.”[2][2018] QCA 60.[3]At p 5. This Tribunal, of course, does not have resort to an inherent jurisdiction such as that possessed by the Supreme Court. However, s 58(1) of the QCAT Act provides:“(1) Before making a final decision in a proceeding, the Tribunal may make an interim order it considers appropriate in the interests of justice, including, for example – (a)to protect a party’s position for the duration of the proceeding; or(b)to require or permit something to be done to secure the effectiveness of the exercise of the tribunal’s jurisdiction for the proceeding.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.