Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 4)

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 4) [2021] FCA 1655

File number(s): QUD 280 of 2017
Judgment of: RARES J
Date of judgment: 22 November 2021
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – native title – Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 240 – application for leave to settle proceeding brought against respondent under s 237 – where company allegedly paid money to recipient which knew it was in breach of trust – whether recipient liable under rule in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244 – whether terms of settlement were in best interests of company in whose name proceeding brought pursuant to s 237 – leave to enter into settlement granted
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 237, 240, Pt 2F.1A

Native Title Act 1993 (Cth)

Cases cited:

Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244

Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 2) [2019] FCA 2061

Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 3) [2021] FCA 728

Henry v Western Downs Group Limited [2018] FCA 1168

Huang v Wang (2016) 114 ACSR 586

Nation Energy (Australia) Pty Limited v Paltar Petroleum Limited (Administrators Appointed) [2019] FCA 1473

The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal;  Ex parte 2HD Pty Limited (1979) 144 CLR 45

Robash Pty Limited v Gladstone Pacific Nickel Pty Limited (2011) 86 ACSR 432

Water Conservation and Irrigation New South Wales v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Native Title
Number of paragraphs: 21
Date of hearing: 22 November 2021
Counsel for the Applicants: Mr P. Somers
Solicitor for the Applicants: Mr T. Hauff
Counsel for the First Respondent: Mr D. Atkinson QC
Solicitor for the First Respondent: DLA Piper
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Third Respondent: The third respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Fourth Respondent: The fourth respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Fifth Respondent: The fifth respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Sixth Respondent: The sixth respondent did not appear
Counsel for the Intervenor: Ms H. Blattman
Solicitor for the Intervenor: Crown Law

ORDERS

QUD 280 of 2017
BETWEEN:

BEATRICE MAUD HENRY

First Applicant

ELIZABETH JOHNSTON

Second Applicant

GREGORY EMMERSON (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Applicant

AND:

SANDLEWOOD ABORIGINAL PROJECTS LIMITED ACN 095 897 555

First Respondent

RUSSELL DOCTOR

Second Respondent

JASON JARRO (and others named in the Schedule)

Third Respondent

ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR QUEENSLAND

Intervenor

ORDER MADE BY:

RARES J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 NOVEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicants and first respondent have leave to enter into the proposed deed of settlement.

2.The applicants have leave to settle their claim against the first respondent on the terms set out in the settlement deed, being confidential exhibit 1 in the oral application heard on 22 November 2021 (the settlement deed).

3.The settlement sum (as defined in the settlement deed) be paid into Court.

Note:…

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Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1655
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Henry v Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited (No 4), the dispute centred around an application for leave to settle a proceeding brought against Sandlewood Aboriginal Projects Limited under section 237 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The applicant, Western Downs, sought to settle the proceeding on terms that were in the best interests of the company, particularly concerning complex and difficult issues of fact and law raised in the litigation. The Federal Court was tasked with determining whether the proposed settlement terms were in the best interests of the company and if leave to enter into the settlement should be granted.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation and application of sections 237 and 240 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Specifically, the court had to consider whether the recipient of funds allegedly paid in breach of trust was liable under the rule in Barnes v Addy and whether the terms of the settlement were in the best interests of the company. The court also needed to assess the discretion exercised under section 240 in granting leave to settle a proceeding brought under section 237.

The court found that the proposed settlement was reasonable and in the best interests of the company. The evidence and submissions presented indicated that there were complex issues of fact and law that could justify a bona fide compromise. The court emphasised the importance of considering the prospects of success of the action, the likely costs, and the consequences of both success and failure in litigation. The Attorney-General, who was responsible for the charitable trust, also supported the settlement, noting the reasonableness of the terms and the need for the settlement sum to be paid into Court before any distribution. The court granted leave to enter into the proposed settlement, considering the complexities and uncertainties of the litigation.

ORDERS:
1. The applicants and first respondent have leave to enter into the proposed deed of settlement.
2. The applicants have leave to settle their claim against the first respondent on the terms set out in the settlement deed, being confidential exhibit 1 in the oral application heard on 22 November 2021 (the settlement deed).
3. The settlement sum (as defined in the settlement deed) be paid into Court.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicants and first respondent have leave to enter into the proposed deed of settlement.

2. The applicants have leave to settle their claim against the first respondent on the terms set out in the settlement deed, being confidential exhibit 1 in the oral application heard on 22 November 2021 (the settlement deed).

3. The settlement sum (as defined in the settlement deed) be paid into Court.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

While one might think, as I have found in entering judgment against each of Mr Doctor and Mr Jarro, that those fees taken as a whole would be difficult to justify, proof of liability in respect of many of Sandlewood’s other payments would have required considerable evidence and attention individually. I am satisfied that there were complex and difficult issues of fact and law raised on the pleadings on which there was room for the parties to arrive at a bona fide compromise having regard to the uncertainties of litigation. Conclusion Accordingly, I am satisfied that, having regard to the submissions of the parties and on the evidence before me, the nature of the claims, and the submissions of the Attorney-General as an intervenor, with responsibility for considering the best interests of the charitable trust the subject of Western Downs’ constitution and the ILUA, that I should grant Western Downs leave to enter into the proposed settlement in the settlement deed.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Attorney-General has seen Mr Somers’ opinion and, although she has not independently reviewed the parties’ discovery or disclosures in the proceeding or conferred with potential witnesses, she was represented at the mediation and is aware of the terms of the proposed settlement. The Attorney considers that the proposed settlement between the applicants and Sandlewood is a reasonable one. The Attorney seeks that, as with the other orders for summary judgment made against Mr Doctor, Mr Jarro and Ms Lacey, the settlement sum, as opposed to the costs component of the settlement, be paid into Court and that, before payment out, the Court settle a scheme as to how all the funds paid into Court be used to advance the charitable purpose of the trust.Consideration The scheme of the Corporations Act allowing members and others to bring a proceeding on behalf of a company under Pt 2F.1A contemplates a degree of supervision of such a proceeding by the Court. First, s 237 requires a person to apply for leave to bring a proceeding in the name of a company and sets out relevant considerations that are discussed in Huang v Wang (2016) 114 ACSR 586 at 597–598 [56]–[60] per Bathurst CJ, with whom McColl and Barrett JJA agreed. Secondly, s 240 requires that leave of the Court must be obtained before a proceeding brought, or intervened in, with leave under s 237, can be discontinued, compromised or settled. Thirdly, the Court may make orders under s 241 and give any directions it considers appropriate in relation to proceedings brought under Pt 2F.1A. Nothing in Pt 2F.1A expressly sets out the considerations relevant to the grant of leave to settle a proceeding under s 240. In my opinion, the discretion to grant leave under s 240 falls to be exercised on the principle that it is unconfined, except in so far as the subject matter, scope and purpose of the Act may enable the Court to discern any reason that is definitively extraneous to any objects that the Parliament could have had in view: see Water Conservation and Irrigation New South Wales v Browning (1947) 74 CLR 492 at 505 per Dixon J; The Queen v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal; Ex parte 2HD Pty Limited (1979) 144 CLR 45 at 49–50 per Stephen, Mason, Murphy, Aickin and Wilson JJ. The considerations governing the grant of leave to bring the proceeding under s 237 must also be relevant to the discretion to grant leave to enter into any particular settlement, as Stewart J held in Nation Energy (Australia) Pty Limited v Paltar Petroleum Limited (Administrators Appointed) [2019] FCA 1473 at [15], where he said:Given that the power under s 241 is supervisory of proceedings commenced with leave under s 237, and the interests of the company are central to the granting of such leave, the interests of the company must be central to the exercise of the power under s 241. In considering what is in the best interests of the company, it is necessary to consider the prospects of success of the action, the likely costs and likely recovery if the action is successful and likely consequences if it is not: Robash Pty Ltd v Gladstone Pacific Nickel Pty Ltd [2011] NSWSC 1235; 86 ACSR 432 at [57] per Ball J.