JUDGE:	QUIGLEY J
WHERE HELD:	Melbourne
DATE OF HEARING:	16, 17, 18 and 19 April 2018
DATE OF JUDGMENT:	19 April 2018 (ex tempore) (Revised 24 April 2018)
CASE MAY BE CITED AS:	Healey v RSPCA
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION:	[2018] VSC 190

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JUDICIAL REVIEW – Validity of warrants – Delegation – Form of authorisation – ‘authorise’ – Procedural fairness – Reasonable grounds – Warrants too wide – Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 ss 1, 24C, 24G, 24K, 38.

JUDICIAL REVIEW – Execution of warrants – Reasonableness – Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 ss 24G, 24K.

STATUTES – Interpretation – Delegation – ‘in and for Victoria’ – Interpretation of Legislation Act s 48.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Plaintiff	P G Nash QC and P W Lithgow	Maitland Lawyers
For the Defendant	N De Young	MinterEllison

HER HONOUR:

This proceeding is brought by the plaintiff, Mrs Heather Healey, challenging the validity of two warrants, one issued pursuant to s 24G (search warrants for at risk animals on premises) and the other under s 24K (search warrants for premises) of the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986 (‘POCTA’),[1] and the subsequent execution of those warrants by the defendant, the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Victoria (‘RSPCA’), on 7 June 2016 at the plaintiff’s property at 2-4 Correll Street, Longwood (‘Property’).
[1]Exhibit D6, exhibit SP-9.

This proceeding was issued on 6 September 2016.

Since that time, the defendant has laid charges against the plaintiff in respect of the animals for contravention of ss 9 and 10 of the POCTA. No trial date has currently been set in relation to the criminal proceedings.

In this proceeding, by the plaintiff’s Further Amended Statement of Claim dated 25 July 2017, the plaintiff challenges the lawfulness of the decision of the RSPCA inspector to apply for the warrants on administrative grounds. There was no pleaded direct challenge to the Magistrate's decision to issue the warrants, rather the conclusion I am asked to form is that the consequence of the challenge to the lawfulness of the procedure followed ought to lead to a conclusion that the warrants are invalid.

The primary reasons for invalidity, as pleaded or argued before me, were that:

(a) the delegation from the Department Head to the RSPCA’s Chief Operating Officer was invalid;[2]

(b) the RSPCA inspector did not have the ‘written approval’ from the Department Head, or his delegate in this case, in order to make the applications as required by sub-ss 24G(1) and 24K(1) of the POCTA; and

(c) the defendant failed to accord the plaintiff procedural fairness by failing to give her an opportunity to be heard before the making of the application for the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Healey v RSPCA

Details

AGLC: Healey v RSPCA [2018] VSC 190
Case: [2018] VSC 190
Decision Date: 19 April 2018 (ex tempore) (Revised 24 April 2018)

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicants in this case sought a judicial review of the validity of warrants issued by the respondent under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act 1986. The applicants argued that the warrants were invalid due to issues with the delegation of authority and the form of authorisation. They further contended that the warrants were too wide in scope and that there were breaches of procedural fairness.

The primary legal issues before the court were whether the warrants were validly issued, and if the execution of the warrants was reasonable. The applicants argued that the respondent did not have the authority to issue the warrants because they were not authorised in the manner prescribed by the Act. They also argued that the warrants were too broad and did not provide sufficient detail, which breached the principles of natural justice. The respondent maintained that the warrants were validly issued and that the execution of the warrants was reasonable.

The court found that the warrants were invalid because the authorisation was not in the form prescribed by the Act. The court held that the word "authorise" in the Act meant that the authority must be given in writing and signed by a person with the appropriate authority. The court also found that the warrants were too wide in scope and did not provide sufficient detail, which breached the principles of natural justice. The court further found that there were breaches of procedural fairness because the applicants were not given an opportunity to be heard before the warrants were issued.

The court quashed the warrants and made orders for costs. The court held that the warrants were invalid and that the respondent had breached the applicants' rights to procedural fairness. The court also found that the respondent had not acted reasonably in executing the warrants. The court made orders for the warrants to be quashed and for costs to be paid by the respondent.

Orders