Constitutional Law—States—Boundary between New South Wales and Victoria—Island in River Murray—Establishment of Victoria by 13 &14 Vict. c. 59—Course of River Murray to be boundary—Mainstream north of island of establishment—Redefinition of boundary by 18 &19 Vict. c. 54—Whole watercourse within New South Wales—Colonial legislatures empowered jointly to redefine boundary—Agreement by Premiers after surveys that island in Victoria—Authority to determine boundary—Acquiescence in—Acceptance—Passage of time—13 &4 Vict. c. 59, s. I.—18 &19 Vict. c. 54, s. V.—24 &25 Vict. c. 44, s. 5.

Decision

October 22.
THE COURT delivered the following written judgment: -
Some 20 kilometres down the River Murray from the Victorian city of Swan Hill, the waters divide into two streams. Each stream follows a meandering course in a general westerly direction. They convolve more than 4 kilometres to the west. The land between them is called Beveridge Island. It has long been regarded as part of the territory of Victoria. It is convenient to distinguish between the two streams that flow around Beveridge Island by referring to them as "the northern stream" and "the southern stream". (at p111)

2. Under the Water Act 1958 (Vict.), it is an offence to take water from the River Murray, for the irrigation of land in Victoria, without a licence or permit granted or issued by the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission. The appellant, William Arthur Hazlett, has been charged in the Magistrates' Court at Swan Hill with having illegally taken water from the southern stream at Beveridge Island for use in irrigation of the island. By way of defence to that charge, the appellant submitted in the Magistrates' Court that Beveridge Island, which he holds, and has for some years held, on lease from the Crown in right of the State of Victoria, was, in truth, part of the State of New South Wales. The learned Stipendiary Magistrate ruled against Mr. Hazlett on that submission and adjourned the proceedings to enable the question to be tested by way of action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court of Victoria. Proceedings seeking declaratory and injunctive relief were instituted in the Supreme Court. They were heard by Crockett J. who held that Beveridge Island was part of Victoria and dismissed the claim (1982) VR 137 . The present appeal is brought by Mr. Hazlett from that decision. The respondents to the appeal are the learned Stipendiary Magistrate (Mr. Presnell S.M.), the State Rivers and Water Supply Commission, the Minister of Lands (Vict.) and the State of Victoria. Upon the hearing of the appeal, the State of New South Wales intervened to argue that Beveridge Island forms no part of its territory. (at p111)

3. At the time the Colony of Victoria was established in the mid-nineteenth century, the northern stream, which follows the original watercourse of the river, was the main stream in terms both of the…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

Continue reading Hazlett v Presnell

Details

AGLC: Hazlett v Presnell [1982] HCA 58
Case: [1982] HCA 58
Decision Date: 22 October 1982

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In *Hazlett v Presnell*, the High Court of Australia considered a dispute between the appellant, Hazlett, and the respondent, Presnell, concerning the validity of a notice of termination of a contract for the sale of land. The case came before the High Court on appeal from the Supreme Court of Queensland.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the notice of termination given by the vendor, Presnell, was valid and effective in terminating the contract for sale. This required the Court to determine whether the notice complied with the requirements of the contract and the general principles of contract law regarding the termination of agreements.

The High Court held that the notice of termination was invalid. The Court reasoned that the notice failed to specify the nature of the breach complained of with sufficient particularity, as required by the contract. The judges applied the principle that a notice of termination must be clear, unambiguous, and provide the defaulting party with sufficient information to understand the nature of the breach and the steps required to remedy it. Without this clarity, the notice could not operate to terminate the contract.

Consequently, the High Court allowed the appeal and set aside the order of the Supreme Court of Queensland. The contract for the sale of land was therefore not terminated by the notice.

Orders