Hayes (Liquidator) v 5G Developments Pty Ltd, in the matter of 5G Developments Pty Ltd

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hayes (Liquidator) v 5G Developments Pty Ltd, in the matter of 5G Developments Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1541

File number: NSD 1287 of 2019
Judge: STEWART J
Date of judgment: 20 September 2019
Date of publication of reasons: 3 October 2019
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application for reinstatement of deregistered company under s 601AH(2) of the CorporationsAct 2001 (Cth) – whether the plaintiff is a ‘person aggrieved’ by the deregistration of the company – whether it is just to reinstate the company – where no prejudice likely to result from reinstatement – whether the company can be wound up immediately upon reregistration – application granted
CORPORATIONS – application to wind up company under s 459A or on the just and equitable ground under s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act  – whether the plaintiff is a creditor – whether bona fide dispute as to the debt – where likely that company is insolvent – where evidence demonstrates concerns regarding management of the company – application granted
CORPORATIONS – application for the appointment of a special purpose liquidator – conflict of interest – application granted
EVIDENCE – objection to evidence – where the respondent objected to tender of transcripts of examinations conducted under s 596A of the Corporations Act – whether transcripts were inadmissible hearsay under the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) – whether transcripts constitute an admission under s 81 of the Evidence Act – where company said to have made admissions through director was deregistered at the time of examination – evidence ruled inadmissible
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 95A(2), 95(1), 459A, 459P, 461(1)(k), 462(2)(b), 596A, 597(14), 601AH, 1305,

Sch 2 Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations), ss 5-15(c), 5-20(c), 5-30(a),  90-15(1), 90-20

Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) ss 59, 81, 87, 136

Cases cited: AMP General Insurance Limited v Victorian WorkCover
Authority [2006] VSCA 236; 15 VR 176
ASIC v ABC Fund Managers [2001] VSC 383; 39 ACSR 443
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Rich [2009] NSWSC 1229; 75 ACSR 1
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Westpoint Corporation Pty Ltd [2006] FCA 135; 227 ALR 623
Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd [1995] FCA 1663; 62 FCR 502
Boys, in the matter of 38 Akuna Pty Ltd (Deregistered) v ASIC [2019] FCA 320
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Securities & Investment Commission; re Civic Finance Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2010] FCA 1411; 81 ATR 456
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; in the matter of James Hardie Australia Finance Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2008] FCA 1181; 170 FCR 545
GDK Products Pty Ltd, in the matter of Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) v Umberto Pty Ltd (in liq) [2018] FCA 541
Harmon v Hartford [2019] NSWSC 413; 136 ACSR 94
In the matter of ERB International Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2014] NSWSC 200; 98 ACSR 124
In the matter of Likehart Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2017] NSWSC 884
In the matter of 77738930144 Pty Ltd (in liq) (formerly Commercial Indemnity…
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Details
Case
[2019] FCA 1541
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Hayes (Liquidator) v 5G Developments Pty Ltd, in the matter of 5G Developments Pty Ltd, involved the liquidator of Denham Constructions Pty Ltd, Mr. Hayes, seeking the reinstatement of 5G Developments Pty Ltd, which had been deregistered, as well as its winding up. The Court was tasked with determining whether Mr. Hayes was a 'person aggrieved' by the deregistration and if it was just to reinstate the company. The Court also had to consider whether the company could be wound up immediately upon reregistration, as well as the appointment of a special purpose liquidator to address potential conflicts of interest. The court ruled that Mr. Hayes was a 'person aggrieved' and that it was just to reinstate the company, as there was no prejudice likely to result from the reinstatement and the company was likely insolvent. The Court granted the application to wind up the company on the basis of insolvency and the just and equitable ground. Additionally, the Court granted the application for the appointment of a special purpose liquidator to deal with the narrow question of assessing the intended proof of debt in the liquidation of 5G Developments. The Court ruled that transcripts of examinations conducted under s 596A of the Corporations Act were inadmissible hearsay under s 59 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth), as the director who made the statements was not a party to the proceeding at the time of examination.

The Court's reasoning was based on the fact that the applicant had a sufficient interest in the deregistration and the potential benefit of reinstating the company outweighed any prejudice caused by the delay. The Court found that the applicant had not acted delinquently in bringing the proceedings, and the circumstances of the delay did not warrant the exercise of discretion against the applicant. The Court concluded that the company was insolvent, as it was unable to pay its debts as they fell due. The Court granted the application for the reinstatement of the company's registration, as well as the winding up of the company and the appointment of a special purpose liquidator. The Court ordered that Glenn Livingstone of KPMG be appointed as the special purpose liquidator, to receive service of a proof of debt claimed by Denham Constructions Pty Ltd and to assess whether 5G Developments Pty Ltd should admit or reject the proof of debt. The Court also dispensed with notification and advertising requirements relating to the application for the winding up of 5G Developments and granted liberty to ASIC to apply for variation or discharge of these orders on at least 48 hours' notice. The plaintiffs' costs were ordered to be costs in the liquidation of 5G Developments.

Orders

Orders of the court

4. Pursuant to s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule to the Act, Glenn Livingstone of KPMG is appointed as special purpose liquidator of 5G Developments for the following limited purposes:

a) to receive service on behalf of 5G Developments of a proof of debt by Denham Constructions Pty Ltd (in liquidation) (ACN 086 503 568) claimed by that company as being owed to it; and

b) to assess, take any and all steps necessary to determine, and to determine whether 5G Developments ought to admit the proof of debt or to reject it.

5. The plaintiff is to provide a sealed copy of these orders to ASIC within seven (7) days.

6. Pursuant to s 467(3) of the Act all notification and advertising requirements relating to the application for the winding up of 5G Developments are dispensed with.

7. Liberty be granted to ASIC to apply for variation or discharge of these orders on at least 48 hours’ notice.

8. The plaintiffs’ costs be costs in the liquidation of 5G Developments.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In a manner not uncommon to liquidators, Mr Hayes’s affidavits set out the conclusions and opinions that he reached as a consequence of his investigations. Objection was justifiably taken to that approach, and I accordingly restricted all such conclusions and opinions under s 136 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) to be treated as his submissions and not to be evidence of the truth of the facts or opinions asserted. The consequence was that the plaintiffs’ case was for the most part a documentary case. In critical respects it relies on inferences. Mr Hayes also sought to rely on the transcripts of examinations that he had conducted under s 596A of the Corporations Act. 5GCI objected to the tender of the transcripts on the basis that they are inadmissible hearsay under s 59 of the Evidence Act. Ultimately, Mr Hayes sought to rely on only one transcript, being the transcript of the evidence given on examination by Stephen McGrath on 16 November 2018. As will be seen, Mr McGrath was the sole director of DC and DW in the period in which Mr Hayes says that DW’s debt to DC arose. On the basis that a ruling on the admission of the transcript was not necessary during the hearing, I provisionally admitted the transcript on the basis that I would make a ruling in due course. It is that ruling to which I now turn. Within the transcript of the examination of Mr McGrath, Mr Hayes sought to rely on three particular extracts which were said to be admissions by Mr McGrath either for himself or on behalf of DW and are therefore admissible under s 81 of the Evidence Act as exceptions to the rule against hearsay. It was accepted that in the event that one or more of the particular extracts was admitted, then the whole transcript should be admitted in order to provide context to the particular extract or extracts which was admitted. This approach is provided for in s 81(2) of the Evidence Act. Section 59(1) of the Evidence Act is the provision against the admission of hearsay evidence. It provides that evidence of a previous representation made by a person is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed that the person intended to assert by the representation. The passages in the transcript on which Mr Hayes seeks to rely are evidence of previous representations made by Mr McGrath and they are sought to be relied on to prove the existence of facts that Mr McGrath asserted. Those extracts therefore constitute hearsay evidence and are prima facie not admissible. Section 81(1) of the Evidence Act provides that the hearsay rule does not apply to evidence of an admission. “Admission” is defined in Part 1 of the dictionary in the Act as being a previous representation that is: (a) made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding; and (b) adverse to the person’s interest in the outcome of the proceeding. As Mr McGrath is not a party to the proceeding, anything that he stated adverse to his interests will not constitute an admission within this definition. However, s 87(1) provides that for the purpose of determining whether a previous representation made by a person is also taken to be an admission by a party, the court is to admit the representation if it is reasonably open to find that, relevantly, when the representation was made, the person had authority to make statements on behalf of the party in relation to the matter with respect to which the representation was made. On this basis, Mr Hayes submitted that the statements by Mr McGrath recorded in the transcript that are adverse to the interests of DW were made by Mr McGrath with the authority of DW and, since DW is the first defendant in this proceeding, they are therefore representations of a party to the proceeding. On that basis it was submitted that the statements by Mr McGrath qualify as admissions within the definition and are therefore to be admitted under s 81.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Mr Massie may be correct in all of that, but the difficulty is that he may not be. This is not an appropriate place to seek to resolve the considerable complexity in the transactions and the different relationships. There is some evidential basis to Mr Hayes’s submissions, and there are many unanswered questions and unexplained curiosities, such that I cannot at this stage be confident that his prospective claims will fail. This is not “the clearest of cases”.Conclusion on reinstatement I have already concluded that DC is a person “aggrieved” by the deregistration of DW. If I am satisfied that DW should also be wound up and that there may be some benefit to DC by doing that, then I would be satisfied that it is “just” that DW be reinstated to the register. That is simply on the basis that there would be sufficient reason to restore DW to the register; it would not be without point or purpose; it would not be futile. With regard to the exercise of my discretion on the question of reinstatement, 5GCI submitted that Mr Hayes has waited until the last minute before bringing these proceedings which has caused the court and 5GCI considerable inconvenience, and even caused 5GCI prejudice because of the short time in which it had to meet the case. 5GCI pointed in particular to the long time between Mr Hayes’s appointment as liquidator of DC and the examinations in November last year, and the long period of time between then and commencing this proceeding. It was submitted that on the basis of those considerations the Court should exercise its discretion against granting the relief sought. I am also troubled by the delay. The first period of delay, i.e. prior to the examinations, is of less concern because at that stage Mr Hayes presumably did not know that it was likely that he would bring the present proceeding. It was however the examinations and documents that were obtained at about that time and into January 2019, that revealed to Mr Hayes the case that he has now brought. Mr Hayes explained in evidence some of the reasons for the delay between then and commencing the proceeding. That included understandable delays with regard to funding, and the requirement from the funder that an advice on the prospects of success must first be obtained. Whilst I am not satisfied that the plaintiffs have moved with all the diligence and speed that they might have done, I am also not persuaded that they have been delinquent in their approach. I do not regard the circumstances of the delay in this case to be such as to justify the exercise of my discretion against the plaintiffs.Winding up I have already concluded that DC is a creditor of DW within the meaning of the relevant provisions. It is then necessary to consider whether either of the bases for winding up, i.e. insolvency or just and equitable, is established.Insolvent? Winding up under s 459A of the Corporations Act requires a finding that the company is “insolvent”. Section 95A(2) provides that a person who is not solvent is insolvent, and s 95(1) provides that a person is solvent if, and only if, the person is able to pay all the person’s debts as and when they become due and payable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Hayes’s case, briefly stated, is that in the course of executing his duties as liquidator of DC he made various investigations including by the examination of witnesses and the production of documents from which he has concluded that DC has a clear claim against DW in the sum of approximately $12 million, and that DW has clear claims against other parties, in particular 5GCI and related companies and Mr Massie. Those claims are based on contentions that various transactions entered into by DW were uncommercial transactions, insolvent transactions or voidable transactions within the meaning of the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), and that Mr Massie was in breach of his duties as director. In a separate proceeding commenced at the same time, Mr Hayes as liquidator of DC seeks to set aside some of the transactions which are also the subject of the prospective claims by DC against DW. Mr Hayes says that he should be appointed liquidator of DW because, having conducted the investigations of DC, and, given the limited time available, he is in the best position to bring the claims on behalf of DW and no one else is presently in a position to do so. However, recognising the potential conflict of interest position that he will be in being both the liquidator of DC and DW in circumstances where DC asserts a very substantial claim against DW, he seeks the appointment of a special purpose liquidator – if deemed necessary – to deal with the narrow question of assessing DC’s intended proof of debt in the liquidation of DW.Reinstatement – principles The relief for the reinstatement of the registration of DW is sought under s 601AH(2) of the Corporations Act. That sub-section provides that the court may make an order that ASIC reinstate the registration of a company if an application for reinstatement is made to the court by, relevantly, “a person aggrieved by the deregistration”, and the court is satisfied that it is just that the company’s registration be reinstated. It is settled that, in addition to the requirements that the plaintiff is a “person aggrieved” by the deregistration of the company and that it is “just” to restore the company to the register, there is a residual discretion in the court to refuse to make an order that the company be restored to the register: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation; in the matter of James Hardie Australia Finance Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2008] FCA 1181; 170 FCR 545 at [13] per Lindgren J. Insofar as the requirement that the applicant is “a person aggrieved” is concerned, the threshold is low; the assessment needs to be dealt with in a summary way; as long as the claim is not plainly hopeless and bound to fail, it should, subject to other relevant matters, proceed: Re Brockweir Pty Ltd [2012] VSC 225 at [22] per Sifris J. In determining whether or not a party is “a person aggrieved”, it is merely necessary to distinguish them from “an officious bystander or mere busybody”: Partners v Sampson [2002] NSWSC 383 at [8] per Barrett J. The expression is of wide import and is to be construed liberally: Boys, in the matter of 38 Akuna Pty Ltd (Deregistered) v ASIC [2019] FCA 320 at [26] per Lee J. The expression includes a person who has a right of some value or potential value, including a right to bring proceedings against the company: In the matter of Likehart Pty Ltd (deregistered) [2017] NSWSC 884 at [18] per Black J.