Harrison v Commissioner of State Revenue

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QUEENSLAND CIVIL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL


CITATION:

Harrison v Commissioner of State Revenue [2018] QCATA 75

PARTIES:

FRANCIS LISTER HARRISON
(appellant)

v

COMMISSIONER OF STATE REVENUE

(respondent)

APPLICATION NO/S:

APL172-16

ORIGINATING APPLICATION NO/S:

GAR225-15

MATTER TYPE:

Appeals

DELIVERED ON:

1 June 2018

HEARING DATE:

16 November 2016 and subsequently on the papers

HEARD AT:

Brisbane

DECISION OF:

Judge S Sheridan, Deputy President

Member Roney QC

ORDERS:

1.   The appeal is upheld.

2.   The respondent’s assessments are set aside.

3.   The matter is remitted to the Commissioner for any assessment of land tax which might be made having regard to the findings made in this appeal.

CATCHWORDS:

APPEAL – TAXES AND DUTIES – LAND TAX – LIABILITY FOR LAND TAX – Aggregation of land – Where land tax was assessed as payable on aggregate value of properties on the basis that the appellant owned all three properties – Where assessment of land tax appealed – Whether the appellant is the owner of each three properties in own right – Whether the appellant is the trustee of each property for adult children – Whether constructive trust by means of an estoppel – Whether constructive trust arose from common intention of parties – Whether trust arose from promise to leave property by will – Whether trust sub modo arose out of a promise to convey an interest in land – Whether the words “trustee of a trust” in s 20 of the Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld) extend to fiduciaries

Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld), s 8, s 10, s 19, s 20, Schedule 4
Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld), s 142, s 142(1), s 146, s 147

Allen v Snyder [1977] 2 NSWLR 685, distinguished
Barns v Barns (2003) 214 CLR 169, distinguished
Chang v Registrar of Titles (1976) 137 CLR 177, considered
Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101, considered
Golden Mile Property Investments Pty Ltd (in Liq) v Cudgegong Australia Pty Ltd (2015) 89 NSWLR 237, considered
Harrison v Commissioner of State Revenue [2016] QCAT 150
Haque v Haque (No 2) (1965) 114 CLR 98, considered
In the Marriage of Dawes [1989] 98 FLR 375, considered
Kern Corporation Ltd v Walter Reid Trading Pty Ltd (1987) 163 CLR 164, considered
KLDE Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Stamp Duties (1984) 155 CLR 288, considered
Lysaght v Edwards (1876) 2 Ch D 499, considered
Muschinski v Dodds (1985) 160 CLR 583, considered
Parsons v McBain (2001) 109 FCR 120, considered
Riches v Hogben [1985] 2 Qd R 292, considered
Sidhu v Van Dyke (2014) 251 CLR 505, considered
Stern v McArthur (1988) 165 CLR 489, considered
Tanwar Enterprises Pty Ltd v Cauchi (2003) 217 CLR 315, considered

APPEARANCES & REPRESENTATION:

Appellant:

Self-represented

Respondent:

M Brennan QC with M K Conrick

This matter was heard and in part determined on the papers pursuant to s 32 of the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal Act 2009 (Qld).

REASONS…

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Details
Case
[2018] QCATA 75
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the appeal of Harrison v Commissioner of State Revenue, the appellant, Harrison, contested the Queensland Land Tax assessments that were imposed on the aggregate value of three properties he owned. The primary issue before the court was whether Harrison was the sole owner of the properties in his own right, or if he held them as a trustee for his adult children, potentially reducing his tax liability. The court examined various potential trusts, including constructive trusts arising from estoppel or common intention, as well as trusts stemming from promises to leave the properties by will or to convey an interest in the land. Additionally, the court deliberated on whether the term "trustee of a trust" in section 20 of the Land Tax Act 2010 (Qld) could encompass fiduciaries.

The court found that the learned Member had not been satisfied on the evidence that Harrison held the properties on trust for his children. The court cited the decision in Giumelli v Giumelli, emphasizing that a constructive trust is a remedial response to equitable intervention and obliges the holder of the legal title to surrender the property, determining the rights and titles of the parties. The court concluded that for Harrison to succeed, it must be demonstrated that the nature of the children's interest in the properties was such that a court would construe the circumstances as having given rise to a trust in their favour. The court held that while each child had a contractual obligation to pay "rent" to Harrison, there was insufficient evidence to establish a constructive trust had arisen in their favour.

Ultimately, the appeal was upheld, the respondent’s assessments were set aside, and the matter was remitted to the Commissioner for any reassessment of land tax in light of the court’s findings.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal is upheld.

2. The respondent’s assessments are set aside.

3. The matter is remitted to the Commissioner for any assessment of land tax which might be made having regard to the findings made in this appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

We therefore propose to permit the grounds of appeal to be expanded beyond those which were raised below and will deal with the appellant’s contentions in support of these alternative bases, and his other arguments as well.The decision below In essence, the learned Member concluded that he could not be satisfied on the evidence that the appellant held the properties on trust for his respective children. The learned Member referred in his reasons at [37] to the decision in Giumelli v Giumelli, in which it was said as follows:[2] In submissions to this Court, the term “constructive trust” was used to identify the nature of the equitable remedy granted by the Full Court. Care is required in the use of the term “constructive” in this context. Professor Scott has pointed out:“It is sometimes said that when there are sufficient grounds for imposing a constructive trust, the court ‘constructs a trust’. The expression is, of course, absurd. The word ‘constructive’ is derived from the verb ‘construe’, not from the verb ‘construct’ … The court construes the circumstances in the sense that it explains or interprets them; it does not construct them.”…[3] A constructive trust of this nature is a remedial response to the claim to equitable intervention made out by the plaintiff. It obliges the holder of the legal title to surrender the property in question, thereby bringing about a determination of the rights and titles of the parties.[6][6]Giumelli v Giumelli (1999) 196 CLR 101. The learned Member considered that this passage succinctly set out the principles that applied to the circumstances of this case. He held that if there is a trust, it arose from the circumstances under which it would be inequitable for the appellant to rely on his legal ownership of the properties to deny that the children have an interest, proprietary in nature, in their respective properties. It was held that for the appellant to succeed in this application, the nature of that interest must be such that a court would, if necessary, construe the circumstances as having given rise to a trust in each child’s favour. The interest created by that trust would be a current beneficial interest in the fee simple of the relevant property, although that interest cannot (absent express agreement between all relevant parties) be converted into a legal interest until the death of the survivor of the appellant and Mrs Harrison or pursuant to the options to purchase the properties. In the meantime, each child had, the learned Member held, a contractual obligation to pay “rent” to the appellant (and, if he predeceases her, later to Mrs Harrison). The learned Member considered that it had not been clearly demonstrated on the evidence before him that a constructive trust had arisen in favour of each child. He had regard to what he saw as clear evidence of promises to the children that they may occupy the properties as their family homes during the lives of the appellant and Mrs Harrison, without having to buy the properties or to pay interest on the loans obtained by the appellant to purchase the properties, or to pay the usual costs of ownership such as rates; and that, ultimately, they will become the legal owners of the properties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established