FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Haqani v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 387
MIGRATION – decision of Refugee Review Tribunal refusing protection visa – applicant national of Afghanistan – harassment by Taliban for beard and hair style and manner of dress – whether Tribunal erred in failing to find applicant had well-founded fear of persecution for reasons of religious belief – applicant’s claim to have hid weapons for mujahadin in his home – whether Tribunal erred in finding inconsistencies in applicant’s evidence in support of this claim
Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b)
Guden v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 236 referred to
GUL ROSE HAQANI v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 1166 OF 1999
MOORE J
31 MARCH 2000
SYDNEY
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1166 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
GUL ROSE HAQANI
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 MARCH 2000
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 1166 OF 1999
BETWEEN:
GUL ROSE HAQANI
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT
JUDGE:
MOORE J
DATE:
31 MARCH 2000
PLACE:
SYDNEY
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
Introduction
This is an application by Gul Rose Haqani (“the applicant”) for judicial review of a decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal (“the Tribunal”) of 6 October 1999. The Tribunal affirmed a decision of a delegate of the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Minister”) refusing to grant the applicant a protection visa. The criterion for the grant of such a visa is that the applicant is a person to whom Australia has protection obligations under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees done at Geneva on 28 July 1951 as amended by the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees done at New York on 31 January 1967 (“the Convention”).
Background
The applicant is, the Tribunal accepted, a national of Afghanistan and arrived in Australia from Pakistan on 18 April 1999. On 30 April 1999 he lodged an application for a protection visa with the Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (“the Department”). On 21 May 1999 the application was refused by a delegate of the Minister, and on 27 May 1999 the applicant sought review of that decision. Both the delegate and the Tribunal considered the circumstances of the applicant and whether the applicant was a refugee.
Proceedings before the Tribunal
The reasons for decision of the Tribunal commenced with a discussion of the relevant legislation and what is comprehended by the definition of “refugee” and by the notion of “persecution”. Reference was made to the judgments of the High Court in Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169…
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- Case
- [2000] FCA 387
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court found that the Tribunal had not erred in law. It was not necessary for the Tribunal to determine whether the Taliban represented the State of Afghanistan, nor was it necessary to consider the applicant's claims from the perspective of religious persecution. The Tribunal had considered the relevant independent evidence and correctly focused on the political motivations behind the applicant's persecution. The court held that the Tribunal's approach was consistent with established legal principles and did not constitute an error of law. The court also found that the decision was adequately supported by evidence, as the Tribunal had considered the applicant's claims and the relevant circumstances in making its decision.
The application for judicial review was dismissed, and the applicant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The application is dismissed.
2. The applicant pay the respondent’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: MOORE J
Last, the Tribunal was not satisfied that the applicant’s flight from Afghanistan would be perceived by the Taliban as an admission of guilt in connection with opposition activity. The Tribunal based this conclusion on its findings that the Taliban had no interest in the applicant and that the applicant had not fled to escape persecution for any Convention reason, as well as on independent evidence about the cross-border traffic to and from Afghanistan.Consideration of the Issues raised in the Application As the application was finally argued two grounds were pressed:“1.The decision involved an error of law, being an error involving an incorrect interpretation of the law or an incorrect application of the law to the facts as found by the respondent, within the terms of section 476(1)(e) of the Migration Act (‘the Act’).Particulars…[the Tribunal Member] found that the applicant was assaulted and hospitalised because he was seen as not complying with the strict social regime imposed by the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban militia in Afghanistan. This, together with other findings of fact made by the Tribunal member sufficed to bring the Applicant within the ambit of the Refugees Convention and the Applicant therefore ought to have been granted a protection visa. In refusing to grant a protection visa, the Tribunal Member’s decision involved an error of law.…5.The decision was made in circumstances where there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision in that the decision was based upon the existence of particular facts, and those facts did not exist, in terms of sections 476(1)(g) and 476(4)(b) of the Act.Particulars(a)The [Tribunal] based its decision upon a particular fact, that the Applicant’s claims in relation to the storage of weaponry were inconsistent, which did not exist.” The submissions in support of the first ground were to the following effect. The Taliban was a theocratic organisation and did not presently represent the State of Afghanistan. Reference was made to legal criteria for statehood set out in Brownlie Principles of Public International Law 5th ed. 1998 at p. 70-71. Both in 1996 and in 1999 the applicant suffered harm at the hands of members of the Taliban. Thus, it should have been inferred by the Tribunal, the motives of those inflicting harm stemmed from their religious beliefs and their perception about the religious beliefs of the applicant. It is to be recalled that the hospitalisation of the applicant in 1996 resulted from an assault arising out of the applicant having given directions to a woman in the street. The assault in 1999 concerned the length of the applicant’s beard and his sister’s manner of dressing. The Tribunal addressed these matters in the passage of its decision set out in paragraph 22 above. This passage, in my opinion, manifests an unexceptionable approach to the facts. While the passage was followed by a reference to the Taliban as “a heavy handed and often violent regime” those observations have to be viewed with the reasons of the Tribunal as a whole. In an earlier section entitled “relevant independent information about Afghanistan” the Tribunal referred to several independent sources which made plain the Taliban’s fundamentalist adherence to Islamic religious beliefs. The approach of the Tribunal does not suggest it was not conscious of this information when considering the question of whether the applicant was persecuted for his actual or imputed religious beliefs. Moreover the comparatively limited attention the Tribunal paid to this question of persecution for reasons of religious belief is explicable. The application for a protection visa was originally made and later pursued only on the footing that the applicant had a well founded fear of persecution because of his political opinions. It is understandable, therefore, that the question of persecution of the applicant because of his religious beliefs was not dealt with at length by the Tribunal. Nonetheless, the way the Tribunal approached the matter does not manifest an error of law.