SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Civil: Application)
HANSSEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ORS
[2019] SASC 60
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Stanley
12 April 2019
PROCEDURE - CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS - MOTIONS, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS
The plaintiff’s claim was commenced in 2018. The claim is for damages for personal injury as a result of the conditions under which he was detained by the Commonwealth government while claiming asylum. The claim was statute barred. The plaintiff has applied for an extension of time within which to bring the proceedings. The defendant has brought application pursuant to rule 211 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 seeking a preliminary hearing of the application for an extension of time. The rule 211 application is yet to be heard by the Court.
The plaintiff applies to amend his statement of claim. The proposed amendment seeks to clarify the facts allegedly ascertained by the plaintiff upon reading the report of Dr Craig Raeside.
Held, per Stanley J:
1. The foundation for the amended plea was that the source of the facts allegedly ascertained by the plaintiff was the Raeside report. This had always been the plaintiff’s position.
2. The necessity to amend only came into sharp relief once new counsel gave advice in relation to this issue. This advice was given on 18 February 2019. Mr Krupka submitted that new counsel were focussed on the Saadat v Commonwealth of Australia & Ors matter which was listed for trial on 11 February 2019. In the circumstances, this was a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
3. Granting the application was unlikely to disrupt or delay the preparation for the trial of the matter.
4. The interests of justice favoured allowing the amendment in these circumstances in order to ensure that the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time was determined on its substantive merits rather than any technical arguments based on the disconformity of the present pleading with the evidence.
5. The application to amend was granted.
6. The parties were to be heard as to costs.
Limitation of Actions Act 1936 (SA) s 48; Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 (SA) r 211, referred to.
Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34; James v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No. 2) (1985) 9 FCR 442; Pearson v Naydler (1977) 1 WLR 899, considered.
HANSSEN v COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA & ORS
[2019] SASC 60Civil
STANLEY J:
Introduction
This is an application to amend the statement of claim.
The plaintiff claims damages for personal injury as a result of the conditions under which he was detained by the Commonwealth government while claiming asylum. He alleges he suffered psychiatric injury due to the Commonwealth’s negligence. He also alleges various intentional torts but he has expressly indicated that those causes of action are abandoned. The Commonwealth has joined various third parties who had responsibility for the management and conduct of the relevant detention centres pursuant to contractual arrangements with the…
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- Case
- [2019] SASC 60
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the nature of the amendment and the delay in bringing the application. The amendment sought to clarify the facts allegedly ascertained by the plaintiff upon reading the Raeside report, which had been on notice since the proceedings were instituted. The court accepted that the delay in bringing the application was due to new counsel focusing on the Saadat matter, and considered this to be a satisfactory explanation for the delay. However, the delay was a factor that weighed against granting the amendment. The court also considered the Commonwealth's submissions that granting the application would undermine confidence in the administration of civil justice. The court found that granting the application was unlikely to disrupt or delay the preparation for the trial of the matter and that the impact on judicial and court resources would be minimal. The court concluded that the interests of justice favoured allowing the amendment to ensure that the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time was determined on its substantive merits rather than any technical arguments based on the disconformity of the present pleading with the evidence.
The court granted the application to amend the pleadings, and directed the parties to discuss the costs of the application. The court found that the amendment did not significantly prejudice the Commonwealth beyond the costs incurred on the application and in reconsidering whether to proceed with the r 211 application. The court also found that the interests of justice favoured allowing the amendment to ensure that the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time was determined on its substantive merits. The court considered that the delay in bringing the application was a factor that weighed against granting the amendment, but found that the explanation for the delay was satisfactory. The court concluded that granting the amendment was unlikely to disrupt or delay the preparation for the trial of the matter, and that the impact on judicial and court resources would be minimal.
Orders
Orders of the court
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Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Ms Walker, counsel for the Commonwealth, submits that the application should be refused. She contends that there is undue delay in the application being brought, no satisfactory explanation for the delay has been provided, the Commonwealth will suffer in costs which are unlikely to be paid, and that if the amendment was granted in all these circumstances it would undermine confidence in the administration of civil justice. Consideration It is clear that the amendment sought seeks to clarify the facts allegedly ascertained by the plaintiff on 6 May 2011 upon reading the Raeside report of 30 April 2011. The Commonwealth has been on notice since the proceedings were instituted out of time that the plaintiff was seeking an extension of time on the sole basis that he ascertained certain material facts upon reading the Raeside report. The amendment sought does not change that position. However, the nature of the amendment sought to paragraph 48 of the existing statement of claim is to plead a wider set of facts said to have been ascertained by the plaintiff on reading the Raeside report than is pleaded presently. Nonetheless, the foundation for the amended plea is that the source of the facts allegedly ascertained by the plaintiff is the Raeside report. This has always been the plaintiff’s position. The Commonwealth does not allege that it will suffer any specific prejudice if the application is granted beyond the costs it will incur on the application and in reconsidering whether to continue to pursue its r 211 application in light of the amendment. The Commonwealth submits that this prejudice is made more acute because the plaintiff is impecunious. There is no evidence of the plaintiff’s impecuniosity but for the purpose of this application I am prepared to proceed on the assumption that he is impecunious. However, the common law and equity have traditionally proceeded under the general rule that poverty is no bar to a litigant.[3] [3] Cowell v Taylor (1885) 31 Ch D 34 at 38; Pearson v Naydler (1977) 1 WLR 899 at 902; James v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (No. 2) (1985) 9 FCR 442 at 445. On the other hand, there has been significant delay in bringing the application. Even on the plaintiff’s case, it was put on notice of the deficiency in the existing pleading by Mr Prince’s affidavit of 30 August 2018. Yet the application to amend was not brought until 5 March 2019. I accept the evidence that the necessity to amend only came into sharp relief once new counsel gave advice in relation to this issue. This advice was given on 18 February 2019. Mr Krupka submits that new counsel were focussed on the Saadat matter which was listed for trial on 11 February 2019. In the circumstances I consider this is a satisfactory explanation for the delay. Nonetheless, the delay is a factor which weighs against the exercise of the discretion in favour of granting the amendment. I do not accept the submission that granting the application would undermine confidence in the administration of civil justice. While I am prepared to accept that if the application is granted, that will cause the Commonwealth to give consideration as to whether it should proceed with the r 211 application, it is far from clear that it will not proceed with that application. There is no trial date. Accordingly, granting the application is unlikely to disrupt or delay the preparation for the trial of the matter. It follows that issues of uncertainty and strain to the parties do not arise. The impact upon judicial and court resources of granting the application will be minimal, as will be the impact on other litigants accessing justice. In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how confidence in the administration of justice would be undermined by allowing the amendment. On the contrary, I consider that the interests of justice favour allowing the amendment in these circumstances in order to ensure that the plaintiff’s application for an extension of time is determined on its substantive merits rather than any technical arguments based on the disconformity of the present pleading with the evidence. Conclusion