Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd v Yuanda Australia Pty Ltd

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SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA

(Civil: Application for Judicial Review)

HANSEN YUNCKEN PTY LTD & ANOR v YUANDA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ANOR

[2018] SASC 158

Judgment of The Honourable Justice Lovell

4 October 2018

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW - JUDICIAL REVIEW - GROUNDS OF REVIEW - JURISDICTIONAL MATTERS

CONTRACTS - BUILDING, ENGINEERING AND RELATED CONTRACTS - THE CONTRACT - GENERALLY

The Second Defendant (the Adjudicator) was appointed under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 (SA) (the Act) to adjudicate a payment claim made by the First Defendant against the Plaintiffs. The Adjudicator determined that the Plaintiffs pay the First Defendant $1,905,069.

An issue before the Adjudicator was the question of liquidated damages. The Plaintiffs alleged that they put in issue the sum of $6,483,947.25. The Adjudicator in his Determination found that only the sum of $4,420,873.13 had been put in issue. The Plaintiffs alleged that the Adjudicator was in error, and requested that the Adjudicator correct the error pursuant to s 22(5) of the Act. The Adjudicator declined to exercise discretion under that section.

The Plaintiffs seek judicial review of that decision on three grounds:

1. The criteria in s 22(5) are jurisdictional facts, and the Court could determine whether the jurisdiction under s 22(5) was enlivened;

2. The Adjudicator committed a jurisdictional error in declining to exercise the jurisdiction conferred by s 22(5) of the Act;

3.       The Decision was so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker in the position of the Adjudicator could have made it.

Held, dismissing Grounds 1, 2 and 3 of the Grounds of Review:

1. The criteria set out in s 22(5) are not, when considered in the context of the Act, jurisdictional facts;

2.       The Adjudicator was correct in determining that the Plaintiffs had put in issue only the sum of $4,420,873.13 for liquidated damages;

3.       The Adjudicator did not act unreasonably.

Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act (2009) s 22(5), referred to.
Hossain v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 92 ALJR 780; Trustee for the Allway Unit Trust (trading as Westside Mechanical Contracting Pty Ltd) v R&D Airconditioning Pty Ltd [2018] SASC 46; Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 92 ALJR 248; Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Malaysian Declaration Case) (2011) 244 CLR 144; Musico v Davenport [2003] NSWSC 977; Uniting Church in Australia Property Trust (Qld) v Davenport [2009] QSC 134, considered.

HANSEN YUNCKEN PTY LTD & ANOR v YUANDA AUSTRALIA PTY LTD & ANOR
[2018] SASC 158

LOVELL J:

Overview

  1. The Second Defendant Mr O’Sullivan (the Adjudicator) was appointed under the Building and Construction Industry Security of Payment Act 2009 (SA) (the Act) to adjudicate a payment claim made by the First Defendant (Yuanda) against the Plaintiffs (HYLC). The Adjudicator determined that HYLC pay Yuanda $1,905,069. Upon receipt of the Adjudicator’s determination, HYLC wrote to him alleging that he had made an…

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Details
Case
[2018] SASC 158
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hansen Yuncken Pty Ltd (the "Applicant") sought judicial review of a decision made by Yuanda Australia Pty Ltd (the "Respondent") in relation to a construction contract. The Applicant argued that the Respondent's decision to not pay a progress payment was flawed and sought a declaration that the decision was invalid and an order for payment. The primary issue before the court was whether the criteria set out in s 22(5) of the relevant Act were jurisdictional facts. The court held that the criteria were not jurisdictional facts, and therefore, the decision of the Respondent was not invalid. The court found that the criteria set out in s 22(5) were not jurisdictional facts as they were not essential preliminary facts to the exercise of the statutory power. The court held that the criteria were facts to be adjudicated upon in the course of the inquiry, and therefore, the failure to comply with one or more of the statutory preconditions did not result in a decision which lacked the characteristics necessary for it to be given force and effect by the statute. The Applicant's application for judicial review was dismissed with costs. The court did not make any orders for payment.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

Section 32 provides that (subject to a qualification in s 33) nothing in the Act affects any right that a party to a construction contract may have under that contract. Nor does anything in the Act have any effect on civil proceedings arising under a construction contract, save that a court or tribunal is required to allow for any amount paid to a party under or for the purposes of the Act in any order or award it makes, and may make an order for the restitution of any amount so paid having regard to its decision in those proceedings.Are the criteria set out in s 22(5) jurisdictional facts? The characterisation of facts as jurisdictional is ultimately an issue of construction. That inquiry involves the interpretation of the relevant statutory provision(s) in light of the statutory purpose so as to identify the relevant Parliamentary intent. Determination of the relevant Parliamentary intent is often difficult, particularly where the issue is left largely to inference.[6] Parliament is not limited in its capacity to identify what factual findings are preconditions to jurisdiction and what are not. Nor is it limited so that a particular factual finding must always be one or the other.[7][6] Australian Heritage Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1995) 60 FCR 456 at 465-466.[7] O’Halloran v Wood [2004] FCA 544 at [23]. In my view, the criteria set out in s 22(5) are not, when considered in the context of the Act, jurisdictional facts. My reasons follow. A factual reference is unlikely to be a jurisdictional fact where the relevant factual reference “occurs in the statutory formulation of a power to be exercised by the primary decision-maker or, in some other way, necessarily arises in the course of the consideration by that decision-maker of the exercise of such a power. The conclusion is likely to be different if the factual reference is preliminary or ancillary to the exercise of a statutory power.”[8] The relevant distinction is whether the fact referred to is a fact to be adjudicated upon in the course of the inquiry or whether it is an essential preliminary to the decision-making process. As French CJ observed in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Malaysian Declaration Case):The term “jurisdictional fact” applied to the exercise of a statutory power is often used to designate a factual criterion, satisfaction of which is necessary to enliven the power of a decision-maker to exercise a discretion. The criterion may be “a complex of elements”. When a criterion conditioning the exercise of statutory power involves assessment and value judgements on the part of the decision-maker, it is difficult to characterise the criterion as a jurisdictional fact, the existence or non-existence of which may be reviewed by a court. The decision-maker’s assessment or evaluation may be an element of the criterion or it may be the criterion itself.[9][8] Timbarra Protection Coalition Inc v Ross Mining NL (1999) 46 NSWLR 55 at 65 [44] per Spiegelman CJ.[9] Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (Malaysian Declaration Case) (2011) 244 CLR 144 at 179 [57].

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

If the matters contained in s 22(5) are characterised as “jurisdictional facts”, the question arises whether the failure to comply with one or more statutory preconditions results in a decision which lacks the characteristics necessary for it to be given force and effect by the statute pursuant to which the decision-maker purported to make it.Evidence HYLC tendered an affidavit of Travis George Toemoe (TGT) to which a number of documents were attached. An affidavit of Rodney James Macey (RJM), with exhibits was also tendered. Neither witness was required for cross-examination. Yuanda did not call any evidence.The Scheme of the Act The Act establishes a scheme of rights and procedures relating to the receipt and recovery by contractors of progress payments for construction work. Under the scheme, disputed payment claims may be referred for determination by an adjudicator.[4] The purpose of the legislation is to provide a prompt route for payment for those who have provided goods or services under a construction contract. As Doyle J observed in Trustee for the Allway Unit Trust (trading as Westside Mechanical Contracting Pty Ltd) v R&D Airconditioning Pty Ltd it is a scheme to “provide a speedy and effective means of ensuring cash flow to builders from the parties with whom they contract”.[5] Those providing goods or services under a construction contract are entitled to progress payments, and to make payment claims (pursuant to s 13) in respect of those progress payments. [4] Probuild Constructions (Aust) Pty Ltd v Shade Systems Pty Ltd (2018) 92 ALJR 248.[5] Trustee for the Allway Unit Trust (trading as Westside Mechanical Contracting Pty Ltd) v R&D Airconditioning Pty Ltd [2018] SASC 46 at [36]; Southern Han Breakfast Point Pty Ltd (in liq) v Lewence Construction Pty Ltd (2016) 91 ALJR 233. Section 14(1) of the Act permits a person on whom a payment claim is served pursuant to s 13, defined as the “respondent”, to reply to the payment claim by providing a “payment schedule” to the claimant. Section 14(2) sets out what a payment schedule must contain for it to be a valid payment schedule. The payment schedule must indicate the amount of the payment, if any, that the respondent proposes to make (the scheduled amount) and, if the scheduled amount is less than the claimed amount, to indicate the basis for the lesser amount (s 14(3)). Section 14(4) sets out the consequences of a failure by the respondent to provide a payment schedule. If the scheduled amount is less than the amount claimed, the claimant is entitled to apply for adjudication (s 17). The respondent is entitled to put in a written response to the adjudication application, but may not include reasons for withholding payment unless those reasons had been included in the payment schedule (s 20 (4)). Sections 18 to 21 govern the Adjudication process; the appointment of an Adjudicator, the lodging of an adjudication response and the procedures that an Adjudicator must or may adopt.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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