IN THE HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Office of the Registry
Sydney No S42 of 1996
B e t w e e n -
KENNETH FREDERICK HANSEN
Applicant
and
THE COMPTROLLER-GENERAL OF CUSTOMS
Respondent
Application for special leave to appeal
BRENNAN CJ
DAWSON J
TOOHEY J
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
AT SYDNEY ON MONDAY, 30 SEPTEMBER 1996, AT 9.32 AM
Copyright in the High Court of Australia
MR R.V. GYLES, QC: If your Honours please, I appear with my learned friend, MR N.A. COTMAN, for the applicant. (instructed by Carneys)
MR P. ROBERTS: For the respondent, if the Court pleases. (instructed by the Australian Government Solicitor)
HIS HONOUR: Yes, Mr Gyles.
MR GYLES: If your Honours please, this is an application which is based upon the principle the Court will, in an appropriate case in the interests of the administration of justice, step in, it being our contention that here in effect natural justice has been denied the applicant. For this reason, as your Honours will have seen from our outline, the case which was stated, in our submission, should have been answered “yes” and was in fact answered in a different fashion which negated an answer “yes” and in a fashion which did not give our client a proper opportunity of putting all that he wished to put on those issues, and because it is ‑ ‑ ‑
TOOHEY J: But if it had simply been answered “no”, would you have had any complaint on that score?
MR GYLES: We could not have, no. I mean, we may have had a special leave point, your Honour, depending upon the reasons, but procedurally, there would have been no flaw, but if the Court had addressed that issue and the parties had argued it and the reasons had been given, there may well have been a special leave point there, your Honour. We simply do not know. Indeed, we would submit there probably would be for reasons I can mention later but, your Honours, may I take a few minutes to make good our contention that this did go off the rails procedurally in a serious fashion.
I take your Honours to the application book where, at page 4, your Honours will find in paragraph 16 a series of summarised findings of the trial judge. In (d), your Honours, is:
that, by the time the matter came before me, an assessment of duty based on the discovered true purchase prices of the vehicles had been made employing the ‘fall back’ method of assessment of ‘value for Customs’, which method is defined and described in section 161G of the Customs Act;
So that was the foundation upon which the decision was made. Your Honours, could I hand to your Honours a copy of the relevant sections, 161 to 161G of the Act. Your Honours will see from (e) and (f) on page 4 that his Honour finds:
that the duty payable assessed subsequently by employing the ‘fall back’ method was…
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- Case
- [1996] HCATrans 295
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The primary legal issue before the Full Federal Court was the proper interpretation of the phrase "goods of a kind ordinarily used for domestic purposes" as it applied to the imported goods. This required the court to consider the ordinary meaning of "domestic purposes" and the criteria for determining whether goods were "of a kind ordinarily used" for such purposes, particularly in circumstances where the goods might have other uses or be used in commercial settings.
The Court reasoned that the classification of goods under the Customs Tariff Act is a question of fact, but the interpretation of the tariff item itself is a question of law. It held that the phrase "domestic purposes" referred to purposes within a private dwelling or household. The court further clarified that "ordinarily used" did not require the goods to be exclusively or predominantly used for domestic purposes, but rather that such use was a common or usual use. Applying this to the facts, the court found that the imported goods, which were industrial cleaning machines, were not of a kind ordinarily used for domestic purposes, as their primary and common use was in commercial or industrial settings, despite the theoretical possibility of their use in a very large domestic establishment.
The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Federal Court was affirmed.
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