JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)
CITATION: FRIGGER -v- THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA [No 2] [2025] WASCA 7
CORAM: MAZZA JA
MITCHELL JA
HALL JA
HEARD: 7 NOVEMBER 2024
DELIVERED : 14 JANUARY 2025
FILE NO/S: CACR 76 of 2024
BETWEEN: ANGELA CECILIA THERESA FRIGGER
Appellant
AND
THE STATE OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Respondent
ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction : DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram: GETHING DCJ
File Number : IND 1112 of 2019
Catchwords:
Criminal law - Appeal against conviction - Knowingly making a false statement under oath that is false in a material particular - Where prosecution alleged that one of two statements made in two different affidavits which irreconcilably conflicted with each other must have been false in a material particular - Whether the term 'material' relates to the degree of difference between the statement and the truth or to whether the statement is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome relevant to the purpose for which it is made - Whether materiality of a false statement is a question of fact for the jury or a question of law for the trial judge - Where trial judge directed the jury that it was for them to determine whether a false statement was false in a material particular and that the requirement of materiality protected an accused person from criminal liability for a minor inaccuracy or omission - Where trial judge ought to have directed the jury that, if either of the statements the subject of the charge was false, it would have been false in a material particular - Whether wrong decision on a question of law concerning the direction as to materiality, which was favourable to the accused, gave rise to a substantial miscarriage of justice - Whether guilty verdict was unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence - Whether absence of a direction as to the use which other inconsistencies in statements made in the affidavits could be put gave rise to a miscarriage of justice
Appeal - Practice and procedure - Where appellant seeks to reopen case, amend grounds of appeal and advance further written and oral submissions after the hearing of the appeal - Whether it is in the interests of justice to grant leave after judgment has been reserved on completion of the hearing of the appeal
Legislation:
Bail Act 1982 (WA), sch 1 pt C cl 1, sch 1 pt C cl 2
Criminal Appeals Act 2004 (WA), s 30
Criminal Code (WA), s 124, s 169, s 170
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), sch 1 cl 6(12)(b)
Interpretation Act 1984 (WA), s 10(c)
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 52A
Result:
Leave to appeal granted
Appeal dismissed
Category: A
Representation:
Counsel:
| Appellant | : | F M Hugo |
| Respondent | : | L M Fox SC |
Solicitors:
| Appellant | : | Tehan Legal |
| Respondent | : | Director of Public Prosecutions (WA) |
Case(s) referred to in decision(s):
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- Case
- [2025] WASCA 7
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to decide whether the term 'material' relates to the degree of difference between the statement and the truth or to whether the statement is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome relevant to the purpose for which it is made. The court also had to determine whether materiality of a false statement is a question of fact for the jury or a question of law for the trial judge. The court held that the materiality of a false statement for the purposes of s 169 of the Criminal Code is to be assessed by reference to the purpose for which the statement is made. For the purposes of s 169, a statement will be false in a material particular if it is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome relevant to the purpose for which the statement is made. The court also held that questions of materiality must be answered at the time the false statement is verified by oath or affirmation, as this is the point in time at which the commission of the offence is complete.
The appeal was dismissed. The court held that the trial judge's direction to the jury was not wrong and that the appellant's conviction was not unreasonable or unsupported by the evidence. The court also held that the absence of a direction as to the use which other inconsistencies in statements made in the affidavits could be put did not give rise to a miscarriage of justice. The court held that it was not in the interests of justice to grant leave to reopen the case, amend the grounds of appeal and advance further written and oral submissions after the hearing of the appeal had been completed.
The ratio of this case is that, for the purposes of s 169 of the Criminal Code, a statement will be false in a material particular if it is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome relevant to the purpose for which the statement is made. Questions of materiality must be answered at the time the false statement is verified by oath or affirmation, as this is the point in time at which the commission of the offence is complete. The materiality of a false statement is not a question of fact for the jury, but a question of law for the trial judge.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In Minister for Immigration v Dela Cruz,[62] s 20 of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) referred to statements in an arriving passenger card, or to an officer granting a visa, that were 'false or misleading in a material particular'. The Full Federal Court held that, in the context of s 20, a statement will be false in a material particular if it was relevant to the purpose for which it was made. The court held that a statement would be relevant for that purpose if it may be taken into account in making a decision under the Act as to the grant of the visa or entry permit in respect of which the statement was made.[63][62] Minister for Immigration v Dela Cruz (1992) 34 FLR 348.[63] Dela Cruz (371). In R v Maslen,[64] s 178BB of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) created an offence of making a statement with intent to obtain financial advantage knowing that statement to be 'false or misleading in a material particular'. Hunt CJ at CL (Sully and Smart JJ agreeing) held that the false statement would be material if it was objectively capable of inducing the provision of relevant financial advantage.[65][64] R v Maslen (1995) 79 A Crim R 199.[65] Maslen (203). In Gill v Chief Executive Officer of Customs,[66] s 234 of the Customs Act 1901 (Cth) created an offence of knowingly or recklessly making a statement to a customs officer that was 'false or misleading in a material particular'. It was held that a false statement would be material for these purposes if it was material to the assessment of customs duty.[67][66] Gill v Chief Executive Officer of Customs [2001] NSWCCA 470; (2001) 166 FLR 125.[67] Gill [74] - [80], applying Hansen v Comptroller-General of Customs (1996) 130 FLR 72 at 83 - 84. In Commissioner of State Taxation v EDI Rail (Maryborough) Pty Ltd,[68] s 75JD(4) of the Stamp Act 1921 (WA) provided for penalties where information given to the Commissioner in an application for exemption from stamp duty was 'false in a material particular or any material information is not given to the Commissioner'. McLure P (Owen and Newnes JJA agreeing) held that information must be both relevant and significant, in the sense that it is capable of influencing the outcome of the exercise of the Commissioner's relevant power, to be material.[69][68] Commissioner of State Taxation v EDI Rail (Maryborough) Pty Ltd [2010] WASCA 17; (2010) 41 WAR 197.[69] EDI Rail [70] - [71]. In Burke v Corruption and Crime Commission,[70] s 168 of the Corruption and Crime Commission Act 2003 (WA) created an offence of giving evidence to the Commission which the person knew was false or misleading in a material particular. Buss JA (Martin CJ and Mazza JA agreeing) held that the question of materiality was determined by reference to whether the evidence was material to the Commission's investigation.[71][70] Burke v Corruption and Crime Commission [2012] WASCA 49; (2012) 289 ALR 150.[71] Burke [126]. The general approach reflected in the above cases is to assess the materiality of a false statement by reference to the purpose for which the statement is made and the capacity of the false statement to affect that purpose. In our view, consistently with the above authorities and bearing in mind the very broad range of circumstances in which statements may be verified by oath, affirmation or statutory declaration, materiality for the purposes of s 169 of the Criminal Code is to be assessed by reference to the purpose for which the statement is made. For the purposes of s 169, a statement will be false in a material particular if it is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome relevant to the purpose for which the statement is made. Where the false statement is made for the purposes of a judicial or administrative process, the question will be whether the false statement is reasonably capable of affecting the outcome of that process. In contrast to the position in relation to the offence of perjury, the materiality to which s 169 of the Criminal Code refers is to the falsity of the statement rather than the matter to which the false statement relates.[72] However, as with the offence of perjury, questions of materiality in s 169 are concerned with the capacity of the false statement to have the relevant effect rather than whether the statement actually had that effect. Questions of materiality, including the purpose for which the statement is made, must be answered at the time the false statement is verified by oath or affirmation, as this is the point in time at which the commission of the offence is complete.[72] Compare Mellifont v Attorney-General (Qld) (1991) 173 CLR 289, 308 - 309.