FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Wright [2014] FCA 1163
Citation: Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Wright [2014] FCA 1163 Appeal from: Superannuation Complaints Tribunal: Determination Number D13–14\057 Parties: HANNOVER LIFE RE OF AUSTRALASIA LTD (ABN 37 062 395 484) v PAULA IRENE WRIGHT and UNISUPER LIMITED (ABN 54 006 027 121) File number: NSD 2199 of 2013 Judge: FOSTER J Date of judgment: 31 October 2014 Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – whether, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal had the power to redraft an exclusion clause imposed as a term and condition of additional optional death and disablement cover offered by the trustee of a superannuation fund under insurance arrangements put in place by that trustee with a reinsurer in circumstances where the reinsurer insisted upon the inclusion of that particular exclusion clause relying upon the terms and conditions of the policy entered into between it and the trustee Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(1)
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 12, 14, 15J, 37, 45, 46Cases cited: Attorney-General v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83
Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited v Brayley [2002] FCA 1333
Employers First v Tolhurst Capital Ltd (2005) 143 FCR 356
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 247
Repatriation Commission v Bawden (2012) 206 FCR 296
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Crocker (2001) 48 ATR 359
Soames v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2013) 59 AAR 500Date of hearing: 11 March 2014 Date of last submissions: 21 March 2014 Place: Sydney Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 127 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MBJ Lee SC, Mr J Hatzistergos Solicitor for the Applicant: William Roberts Lawyers Solicitor for the First Respondent: There was no appearance either by or on behalf of the First Respondent Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
NSD 2199 of 2013
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN: HANNOVER LIFE RE OF AUSTRALASIA LTD (ABN 37 062 395 484)
ApplicantAND: PAULA IRENE WRIGHT
First RespondentUNISUPER LIMITED (ABN 54 006 027 121)
Second Respondent
JUDGE:
FOSTER J
DATE OF ORDER:
31 OCTOBER 2014
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The appeal be allowed.
2.The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal recorded in paragraphs 7 and 57 of its Review Determination and Reasons dated 26 September 2013 (Determination No D13–14\057 in File No 11–1851) be set aside.
3.In lieu of the determination set aside by Order 2 above, the decisions made by the applicant and the second respondent to include and thereafter to refuse to remove a total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the Total and Permanent Disablement cover provided to the…
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- Case
- [2014] FCA 1163
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The appeal be allowed.
2. The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal recorded in paragraphs 7 and 57 of its Review Determination and Reasons dated 26 September 2013 (Determination No D13–14\057 in File No 11–1851) be set aside.
3. In lieu of the determination set aside by Order 2 above, the decisions made by the applicant and the second respondent to include and thereafter to refuse to remove a total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the Total and Permanent Disablement cover provided to the first respondent under the second respondent’s insurance arrangements with the applicant be affirmed.
4. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The Tribunal then made the determination which I have summarised at [13] above. CONSIDERATION As I have already mentioned, Ms Wright did not participate at all in this proceeding. She took no action whatsoever to oppose the making of the orders claimed by Hannover Life. USL adopted a position of neutrality, although it did provide a Written Submission to the Court by which it sought to defend the decisions which it took in relation to Ms Wright’s application for additional cover. Hannover Life filed two sets of Written Submissions and made available Senior Counsel’s speaking notes (MFI-1). Effectively, the orders sought by Hannover Life were not opposed by any interested party. In those circumstances, I do not intend to recount in detail the submissions made on behalf of Hannover Life. I propose to grant the relief sought by it. I will shortly state my reasons for doing so. To a large extent those reasons are based upon or influenced by submissions made on behalf of Hannover Life. The Tribunal held that USL had acted in accordance with the Trust Deed with the consequence that its decision to impose the total spine exclusion as a condition of Ms Wright’s cover was not unfair or unreasonable (par 42 of the Tribunal’s Decision). In addition, the Tribunal considered the fairness and reasonableness of the terms of the total spine exclusion when looking at the position of Hannover Life. Essentially, the Tribunal took the view that the scope of the exclusion went much further than was reasonably necessary. The Tribunal did not consider whether s 37(5) of the Complaints Act prevented it from approaching the matter in the way that it did. Section 37 of the Complaints Act provides:37Tribunal powers—complaints under section 14(1)For the purpose of reviewing a decision of the trustee of a fund that is the subject of a complaint under section 14:(a)the Tribunal has all the powers, obligations and discretions that are conferred on the trustee; and(b)subject to subsection (6), must make a determination in accordance with subsection (3).(2)If an insurer or other decision maker has been joined as a party to a complaint under section 14:(a)the Tribunal must, when reviewing the trustee’s decision, also review any decision of the insurer or other decision maker that is relevant to the complaint; and(b)for that purpose, has all the powers, obligations and discretions that are conferred on the insurer or other decision maker; and(c)subject to subsection (6), must make a determination in accordance with subsection (3).(3)On reviewing the decision of a trustee, insurer or other decision maker that is the subject of, or relevant to, a complaint under section 14, the Tribunal must make a determination in writing:(a)affirming the decision; or(b)remitting the matter to which the decision relates to the trustee, insurer or other decision maker for reconsideration in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal; or(c)varying the decision; or(d)setting aside the decision and substituting a decision for the decision so set aside.(4)The Tribunal may only exercise its determination making power under subsection (3) for the purpose of placing the complainant as nearly as practicable in such a position that the unfairness, unreasonableness, or both, that the Tribunal has determined to exist in relation to the trustee’s decision that is the subject of the complaint no longer exists.(5)The Tribunal must not do anything under subsection (3) that would be contrary to law, to the governing rules of the fund concerned and, if a contract of insurance between an insurer and trustee is involved, to the terms of the contract.(6)The Tribunal must affirm a decision referred to under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the decision, in its operation in relation to:(a)the complainant; and(b)so far as concerns a complaint regarding the payment of a death benefit—any person (other than the complainant, a trustee, insurer or decision maker) who:(i)has become a party to the complaint; and(ii)has an interest in the death benefit or claims to be, or to be entitled to benefits through, a person having an interest in the death benefit;was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.