Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Wright

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Wright [2014] FCA 1163

Citation: Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd v Wright [2014] FCA 1163
Appeal from: Superannuation Complaints Tribunal:  Determination Number D13–14\057
Parties: HANNOVER LIFE RE OF AUSTRALASIA LTD (ABN 37 062 395 484) v PAULA IRENE WRIGHT and UNISUPER LIMITED (ABN 54 006 027 121)
File number: NSD 2199 of 2013
Judge: FOSTER J
Date of judgment: 31 October 2014
Catchwords: SUPERANNUATION – whether, in the particular circumstances of the present case, the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal had the power to redraft an exclusion clause imposed as a term and condition of additional optional death and disablement cover offered by the trustee of a superannuation fund under insurance arrangements put in place by that trustee with a reinsurer in circumstances where the reinsurer insisted upon the inclusion of that particular exclusion clause relying upon the terms and conditions of the policy entered into between it and the trustee
Legislation: Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), s 44(1)
Superannuation (Resolution of Complaints) Act 1993 (Cth), ss 12, 14, 15J, 37, 45, 46
Cases cited: Attorney-General v Breckler (1999) 197 CLR 83
Birdseye v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (2003) 38 AAR 55
Colonial Mutual Life Assurance Society Limited v Brayley [2002] FCA 1333
Employers First v Tolhurst Capital Ltd (2005) 143 FCR 356
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Crown Insurance Services Ltd (2012) 207 FCR 247
Repatriation Commission v Bawden (2012) 206 FCR 296
Retail Employees Superannuation Pty Ltd v Crocker (2001) 48 ATR 359
Soames v Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs (2013) 59 AAR 500
Date of hearing: 11 March 2014
Date of last submissions: 21 March 2014
Place: Sydney
Division: GENERAL DIVISION
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 127
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr MBJ Lee SC, Mr J Hatzistergos
Solicitor for the Applicant: William Roberts Lawyers
Solicitor for the First Respondent: There was no appearance either by or on behalf of the First Respondent
Solicitor for the Second Respondent: The Second Respondent submitted save as to costs

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

GENERAL DIVISION

NSD 2199 of 2013

ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPERANNUATION COMPLAINTS TRIBUNAL
BETWEEN:

HANNOVER LIFE RE OF AUSTRALASIA LTD (ABN 37 062 395 484)
Applicant

AND:

PAULA IRENE WRIGHT
First Respondent

UNISUPER LIMITED (ABN 54 006 027 121)
Second Respondent

JUDGE:

FOSTER J

DATE OF ORDER:

31 OCTOBER 2014

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal recorded in paragraphs 7 and 57 of its Review Determination and Reasons dated 26 September 2013 (Determination No D13–14\057 in File No 11–1851) be set aside.

3.In lieu of the determination set aside by Order 2 above, the decisions made by the applicant and the second respondent to include and thereafter to refuse to remove a total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the Total and Permanent Disablement cover provided to the…

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Details
Case
[2014] FCA 1163
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Hannover Life Re of Australasia Ltd sought to set aside a decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal (SCT) which had found that the SCT had the power to alter the terms and conditions of a policy which it had not itself entered into. The dispute arose from the fact that the insurer, Hannover Life, had imposed a total spine exclusion clause as a condition of Ms Wright taking out additional optional death and disablement cover. The SCT had found that the exclusion was unfair and unreasonable and had ordered that it be removed. The central issue before the court was whether the SCT had the power to redraft a policy to which it was not a party. The court held that the SCT did not have that power, and that it was bound to make a decision in accordance with the law and the terms of the contract. The court found that the SCT had erred in finding that it had the power to remove the total spine exclusion clause. The appeal was allowed, and the SCT’s decision was set aside. In its place, the court affirmed the decision of Hannover Life and UniSuper to include the total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the cover provided to Ms Wright. No order was made as to the costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Superannuation Complaints Tribunal recorded in paragraphs 7 and 57 of its Review Determination and Reasons dated 26 September 2013 (Determination No D13–14\057 in File No 11–1851) be set aside.

3. In lieu of the determination set aside by Order 2 above, the decisions made by the applicant and the second respondent to include and thereafter to refuse to remove a total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the Total and Permanent Disablement cover provided to the first respondent under the second respondent’s insurance arrangements with the applicant be affirmed.

4. There be no order as to the costs of the appeal.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Hannover Life seeks an order setting aside par 7 and par 57 of the Tribunal’s decision and, in lieu thereof, an order affirming the decisions of USL and Hannover Life to include the total spine exclusion clause in the terms and conditions of the cover provided to Ms Wright under UniSuper’s insurance arrangements in respect of death and disablement cover. THE RELEVANT FACTS As I mentioned at [5] above, on 19 July 2011, Ms Wright lodged a DDI Form with UniSuper dated that day. A blank version of that form was furnished to Ms Wright as part of the guide sent to her earlier in 2011. In the introductory text on p 1 of that form, persons who were interested in applying for optional insurance cover were counselled to read the guide for detailed information on eligibility criteria and special conditions for optional death and disablement cover. On the same page of that form, a summary of the relevant eligibility criteria for that cover was set out. In addition, the form included a clear statement that the optional death and disablement cover being offered by UniSuper was provided by Hannover Life. Prima facie, Ms Wright was eligible to take out optional death and disablement cover. On the form, Ms Wright specified that she wished to take out ten units overall of death and disablement cover at $1.40 per unit per week. As I have said, that request involved the purchase of nine additional units of cover. USL and Hannover Life required an applicant for optional death and disablement cover to answer a number of questions set out on the DDI form concerning that person’s medical history. Ms Wright answered those questions. In doing so, she disclosed that she suffered from a number of medical conditions. In particular, she said that she suffered from occasional back pain the onset of which had commenced in 1998. She said that she had never lost time off work because of the back pain which she suffered from time to time. She stated that her back pain was managed with manipulative therapies and that she had consulted an osteopath for treatment in respect of her back pain. Ms Wright signed the declaration required of her at the end of the form. One matter which she acknowledged by that declaration was that she understood that all optional insurance cover would be subject to the terms and conditions of the policy between USL and Hannover Life. By letter dated 5 August 2011, USM requested Ms Wright to complete two further questionnaires. One was a financial questionnaire and the other a Back/Neck Disorder Questionnaire. In addition, she was required to undergo a medical examination in connection with which she completed a Standard Medical Exam Form. In the Standard Medical Exam Form, Ms Wright disclosed that, from time to time, she suffered from back and shoulder pain which she treated with rest, stretching and OTC pain medicine. On that form, she said that she had fully recovered from such pain. In the Back/Neck Disorder Questionnaire, Ms Wright said that she suffered intermittently from pain in the back/neck, the onset of which had commenced in 2000 and was continuing. She said that the symptoms comprised muscle tightness which she treated with stretching, massage and manipulative therapies. She disclosed in that document that her last visit to the osteopath had occurred in July 2011. This was only a matter of weeks before she made her application for additional cover.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

That clause appears under a general heading: The Policy.THE DECISION OF THE TRIBUNAL After dealing with procedural matters, the substance of Ms Wright’s complaint, the factual background to the complaint, the terms of the Trust Deed and Regulations governing UniSuper and the terms of the relevant policy, the Tribunal turned its attention to the submissions made on behalf of each of the parties. The Tribunal recorded that Ms Wright had argued that the imposition of the total spine exclusion clause into the terms of death and disablement cover offered to her was an “over reaction” to her disclosure that she suffered from mild back pain. The Tribunal then noted (at [27]–[29] of its Decision) that USL had submitted that it acted in accordance with the Trust Deed and policy and that any loadings, exclusions or reductions applied by Hannover Life were not matters over which USL had any discretion. For these reasons, USL submitted that it had acted fairly and reasonably with respect to the arrangement of additional cover for Ms Wright. At [30]–[36], the Tribunal recorded the submissions made on behalf of Hannover Life. At [35], the Tribunal noted that Hannover Life relied upon the circumstance that Ms Wright had signed an acceptance of the exclusion and of her reduced cover and relied upon that fact as a matter of contract law. It was said that the Tribunal ought to uphold the contract thereby constituted. Hannover Life went on to state that the only alternative to upholding that contract was to void all cover over the automatic acceptance limit (one unit). Hannover Life also submitted that the inclusion of the total spine exclusion in Ms Wright’s cover was within its own underwriting guidelines. For this reason, it claimed that it had not acted unreasonably. At [37]–[53], the Tribunal explained its reasons for the decision to which it ultimately came. At [37], the Tribunal said:The Tribunal’s role is to determine whether the decisions of the Insurer and the Trustee to reduce the level of cover offered to the Complainant and impose an exclusion in relation to any injuries to her spine were fair and reasonable in their operation in relation to the Complainant in the circumstances. The issue is not what decision the Tribunal would have made on the evidence before it. In reaching its determination, the Tribunal took the whole of the evidence and submissions into account. At [42], the Tribunal also said:The TrusteeIt is convenient to first deal with the decisions of the Trustee. The Tribunal agrees with the Trustee that the effect of Regulation 9 of the Trust Deed is that a member must satisfy the requirements of the Insurer in relation to the purchase of death and disablement cover and the Trustee has no capacity to provide cover on different terms. The Trustee has acted in accordance with the Trust Deed and the Tribunal can find no unfairness or unreasonableness in the Trustee’s decisions in relation to this complaint. At [43], the Tribunal accepted that it had been reasonable for Hannover Life to reduce the level of cover given Ms Wright’s financial circumstances.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The Tribunal then made the determination which I have summarised at [13] above. CONSIDERATION As I have already mentioned, Ms Wright did not participate at all in this proceeding. She took no action whatsoever to oppose the making of the orders claimed by Hannover Life. USL adopted a position of neutrality, although it did provide a Written Submission to the Court by which it sought to defend the decisions which it took in relation to Ms Wright’s application for additional cover. Hannover Life filed two sets of Written Submissions and made available Senior Counsel’s speaking notes (MFI-1). Effectively, the orders sought by Hannover Life were not opposed by any interested party. In those circumstances, I do not intend to recount in detail the submissions made on behalf of Hannover Life. I propose to grant the relief sought by it. I will shortly state my reasons for doing so. To a large extent those reasons are based upon or influenced by submissions made on behalf of Hannover Life. The Tribunal held that USL had acted in accordance with the Trust Deed with the consequence that its decision to impose the total spine exclusion as a condition of Ms Wright’s cover was not unfair or unreasonable (par 42 of the Tribunal’s Decision). In addition, the Tribunal considered the fairness and reasonableness of the terms of the total spine exclusion when looking at the position of Hannover Life. Essentially, the Tribunal took the view that the scope of the exclusion went much further than was reasonably necessary. The Tribunal did not consider whether s 37(5) of the Complaints Act prevented it from approaching the matter in the way that it did. Section 37 of the Complaints Act provides:37Tribunal powers—complaints under section 14(1)For the purpose of reviewing a decision of the trustee of a fund that is the subject of a complaint under section 14:(a)the Tribunal has all the powers, obligations and discretions that are conferred on the trustee; and(b)subject to subsection (6), must make a determination in accordance with subsection (3).(2)If an insurer or other decision maker has been joined as a party to a complaint under section 14:(a)the Tribunal must, when reviewing the trustee’s decision, also review any decision of the insurer or other decision maker that is relevant to the complaint; and(b)for that purpose, has all the powers, obligations and discretions that are conferred on the insurer or other decision maker; and(c)subject to subsection (6), must make a determination in accordance with subsection (3).(3)On reviewing the decision of a trustee, insurer or other decision maker that is the subject of, or relevant to, a complaint under section 14, the Tribunal must make a determination in writing:(a)affirming the decision; or(b)remitting the matter to which the decision relates to the trustee, insurer or other decision maker for reconsideration in accordance with the directions of the Tribunal; or(c)varying the decision; or(d)setting aside the decision and substituting a decision for the decision so set aside.(4)The Tribunal may only exercise its determination making power under subsection (3) for the purpose of placing the complainant as nearly as practicable in such a position that the unfairness, unreasonableness, or both, that the Tribunal has determined to exist in relation to the trustee’s decision that is the subject of the complaint no longer exists.(5)The Tribunal must not do anything under subsection (3) that would be contrary to law, to the governing rules of the fund concerned and, if a contract of insurance between an insurer and trustee is involved, to the terms of the contract.(6)The Tribunal must affirm a decision referred to under subsection (3) if it is satisfied that the decision, in its operation in relation to:(a)the complainant; and(b)so far as concerns a complaint regarding the payment of a death benefit—any person (other than the complainant, a trustee, insurer or decision maker) who:(i)has become a party to the complaint; and(ii)has an interest in the death benefit or claims to be, or to be entitled to benefits through, a person having an interest in the death benefit;was fair and reasonable in the circumstances.