FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
| HANDLEY & TRANTER | [2007] FamCA 344 |
| FAMILY LAW - CHILDREN - Parenting proceedings – Parents’ inability to communicate – Personality issues – Rebuttal of presumption of equal shared parental responsibility – Sole parental responsibility to mother on certain issues FAMILY LAW - PROPERTY – Split of husband’s superannuation to satisfy wife’s entitlement |
| Family Law Act 1975 (Cth) |
Q & Q [1999] FamCA 1314
Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FAFC 157
ASIC v Rich (2005) FSWCA 152
Noetel and Quealey (2005) FLC 93-230
Blair & Blair [2007] FamCA 253
Jann v Yann (1976) FLC 90-027
Foster v Foster (1977) FLC 90-281
H v H-K (1990) 13 Fam LR 786
Padgen v Padgen (1991) FLC 92-231
Forck v Thomas (1993) 16 Fam LR 516
C v B, [Full Court], unreported delivered 15 April 1997
F v B [2000] FamCA 676
M & M [2001] FamCA 1688
M v G [2003] FamCA796
H v H (2003) FMCA Fam 41
M & M [2005] FamCA 207
Ferraro and Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1
Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220
Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814
Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272
McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606
Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844
Money (1994) FLC 92-485
Bremner (1995) FLC 92-560
Way (1996) FLC 92-702
C & L [2006] FamCA 1366
Burgess v King (2005) 34 Fam LR 528
Bilous v Mudaliar & Anor (2006) 35 Fam LR 55
| APPLICANT: | Mr Handley |
| RESPONDENT: | Ms Tranter |
| FILE NUMBER: | BRF | 1989 | of | 2005 |
| DATE DELIVERED: | 24 April 2007 |
| PLACE DELIVERED: | Sydney Registry |
| JUDGMENT OF: | Moore J |
| HEARING DATE: | 26, 27, 28 & 29 March 2007 |
REPRESENTATION
| THE APPLICANT FATHER: | Appeared on his own behalf |
| COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Mr Wiltshire |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE RESPONDENT: | Frank Carroll |
| COUNSEL FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILD’S LAWYER: | Mr George |
| SOLICITOR FOR THE INDEPENDENT CHILD’S LAWYER: | Legal Aid Queensland |
Orders
Parenting orders
1.The child, a daughter, born in September 2001 is to live with her mother.
2.In making decisions about major long term issues, as defined in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 4 of the Family Law Act 1975, the mother is to have sole parental responsibility and is to advise the father as soon as practicable of any decisions of that nature taken by her.
3.The father is to spend time with the child and communicate with her as follows:
A. during school terms as scheduled according to the calendar of the school the child attends:
(a)if the father resides more than 20 minutes travel by car from the school the child attends
(i)each alternate weekend from 3pm Friday until 8.30am on the following Monday (or Tuesday if Monday is a public holiday or pupil free day);
(b)if the father resides not more than 20 minutes travel by car from the school the child attends
(i)each alternate weekend from 3pm on Friday until 8.30am on the following Tuesday
B. during school holidays as scheduled according to the calendar of the school the child attends:
(c)one half of all school holiday periods at the end of terms 1, 2, 3 and 4, to be the first half in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years.
(d)for the purposes of (c) hereof -
(i)school holiday periods are deemed to commence on the day immediately following the day on which the school term concludes [“commencement day”] and conclude on the day immediately preceding the first day of the new school term [“concluding day”];
(ii)changeover time is to be at 12 noon on the day mid way during the holiday period [“middle day”];
(iii)if the child is with her father for the first half of holiday period then he is to collect her from outside the mother’s residence at 9am on the commencement day the mother is to collect her at 12 noon from outside the father’s residence on the concluding day;
(iv)if the child is with her father for the second half of holiday periods then he is to collect her from outside the mother’s residence at 12 noon on the middle day and the mother is to collect her from outside the father’s residence at 5pm on the concluding day;
(v)The school term arrangements set out in order 3 (a) and (b) hereof are to resume on the first weekend after resumption of the school term if the child has spent the first half of the school holiday period with her father and on the second weekend after resumption of the school term if the child has spend the second half of the school holiday period with her father.
C. special occasion arrangements
(e)notwithstanding any other arrangement under these orders and in addition to those arrangements if applicable, the child is to spend Fathers’ Day weekend with her father and Mothers’ Day weekend with her mother, with the times and travel responsibility to accord with that of school term weekends.
(f) During the Christmas school holiday periods:
(i)in odd numbered years the mother is to collect the child from outside the father’s residence at 2pm on Christmas Day and return the child to outside the father’s residence at 6pm on Boxing Day; and
(ii)in even numbered years the father is to collect the child from outside the mother’s residence at 2pm on Christmas Day and return the child to outside the mother’s residence at 6pm on Boxing Day.
D. communication by telephone
(g)the father is at liberty to telephone the child two evenings per week during school terms and when the child is with her mother during school holidays between 6pm and 6.15 pm provided those calls are for not more than 15 minutes duration each;
(h)if the child is not in her father’s care on her birthday or the father’s birthday then in addition to any other provision in these orders the father may telephone the child at 6pm on those occasions in addition to the time provided in (g);
(i)if the child is not in her mother’s care on her birthday or the mother’s birthday then in addition to any other provision in these orders the mother may telephone the child at 6pm on those occasions;
(j)when the child is in her father’s care during school holidays, the mother is at liberty to telephone the child on two evenings per week between 6pm and 6.15pm provided the calls are for not more than 15 minutes duration each;
(k)Each parent is to encourage and facilitate the child to telephone the other parent at any time the child requests.
4.The child is to be known as and enrolled and registered with all authorities with the surname of “[the husband] [that is, her name is to be […]
5.Each parent is to keep the other informed in writing of their current residential address and landline telephone numbers and notify the other of any change within 7 days of any change;
6.If either parent intends being absent with the child from their usual residence for more than two consecutive nights that parent is to give the other prior notice of that intention in writing and at the same time provide the other parent with a written itinerary of the arrangements including the address and telephone number where the child will be staying.
7.The father is at liberty to obtain from the school the child attends all reports, newsletters and information related to the child’s attendance and progress at school, such as is available to parents of students in the normal course, and the father is at liberty to attend all school functions, sports days, parent/teacher interviews or other events conducted by the school according to invitations extended by the school to parents in the normal course.
8.(a) The mother is to notify the father within 14 days of the date of these orders of the name, address and telephone number of the child’s treating general medical practitioner and each parent is to ensure, if reasonably practicable, the child attends that general medical practitioner if medical attention is required.
(b) If either parent, by reason of emergency or impracticability, has the child consult another medical practitioner that parent is to inform the other in writing of the name, address and telephone number of that medical practitioner and the nature of the treatment sought.
(c) Each parent is at liberty to obtain from any medical practitioner treating the child information relevant to the child’s treatment, diagnosis and prognosis.
9.Unless otherwise agreed between them in writing, the father is restrained from residing within the same neighbourhood or within 5 kilometres of the home in which the mother and the child are living from time to time and the mother is restrained from taking up residence within that field of the father’s residence.
10. The appointment of the independent child lawyer is discharged.
Property orders
11.The husband is to pay to the wife the sum of $83,200 on or before one (1) month from the date of these orders;
12.Contemporaneously with the payment of the sum referred to in order 11 hereof, the wife is to sign all documents and do all things necessary to transfer to the husband all her right title and interest in the property registered in their joint names and situated at M in the State of Queensland.
13.If the sum referred to in order 11 hereof is not paid within the time stipulated or such further time as agreed, the M home is to be forthwith offered for sale by a method and at a price agreed and if not agreed then by public auction without undue delay at a reserve price to be set by the auctioneer and the proceed of sale are to be disbursed so as -
(i)to pay all costs related to the sale and commissions on sale;
(ii)to discharge the mortgage secured over the property;
(ii)to pay the balance remaining as to 50% to the wife and as to 50% to the husband and from the husband’s share he pay to the wife the sum of $14,445.
14.Liberty is given to apply for machinery orders with respect to the sale of the M home.
15.Whenever a splittable payment is payable in respect of the superannuation interest of the husband in the S Superannuation Fund:
(i)The wife is entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, using a base amount in the sum of $25,173 at the operative time being four business days after the date of service of these orders upon the trustee of the S Superannuation Fund;
(ii)there is a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of the person to whom the splittable payment would have been made but for this order.
16.Order 15 binds the trustee or trustees from time to time of the S Superannuation Fund.
17.A sealed copy of these orders is to be served by the wife upon the trustee of the S Superannuation Fund as soon as practicable.
18.Subject to the provisions of these orders, each party is entitled to retain absolutely all property of whatsoever nature and kind presently owned by and in the possession of that party.
| FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE |
FILE NUMBER: BRF1989 of 2005
| MR HANDLEY |
Applicant
And
| MS TRANTER |
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[To assist editing to provide anonymity for publication, the parties’ names will not be used in the body of these Reasons. They will be referred to by initials, by reference to their status as parents or, despite their divorce, as ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, as may be convenient]
Proceedings
The Court is asked to make parenting orders related to the future arrangements for the parties’ 5 ½ year old daughter and settlement of their property.
Broadly speaking, the parenting proceedings call for decisions about the extent to which parental responsibility is to be shared between them, the time their daughter will spend with each, and a raft of other issues related to her care and upbringing. As for the property proceedings, their major asset is an encumbered home at M but they also have personalty and superannuation entitlements. The dispute is not so much about what they own and what it is worth but the proportions in which it should be distributed and whether the husband’s superannuation should be split to satisfy part of the wife’s entitlement.
The parties began living together in October 1999, they married in June 2000 and their daughter was born in September 2001. Throughout the marriage at various times they undertook counselling as a couple and individually, giving some indication of the unhappy state of the relationship from early on. There was a brief separation in August 2002 and a longer separation from December 2002 to August 2003 when they both remained living in the family home, though separately, but their final separation occurred in July 2004. The wife left the home around that time, taking the child with her, and she went to live with her parents at T where she continues to live. The husband has remained living in the family home at M. Their present residences are 60 kilometres apart and, depending on traffic, the travelling time is around 45 minutes or may be an hour. They were divorced in July 2006.
Evidence
The husband filed a very lengthy affidavit in which he gave a level of detail rarely seen in proceedings and the wife’s affidavit, despite being rather repetitious, omitted matters related to the property proceedings and that required supplementary evidence from her at the hearing. Their affidavits are not confined to giving an account of relevant historical facts and outlining their current circumstances and future proposals; they contains commentary that amounts to advocacy to advance their case and promote the outcome for which each contends, with the result that core issues tend to be overshadowed by a wilderness of detail and argument.
The husband also called evidence from his mother and his sister. His mother was not required for cross-examination and her evidence can be accepted. His sister’s cross-examination was relatively brief and mention will be made of that in due course.
The wife called evidence from her parents and from several friends, but only her mother was required for some brief cross-examination. No inroads were made into what she had said in her affidavit though she readily made concessions when some matters were put to her. Her evidence can be accepted.
The wife’s solicitor filed evidence of the value of their superannuation entitlements and there was an affidavit from Mr W who valued their motor vehicles. In both instances, there was no contest and those figures are accepted.
Related to the parenting proceedings, there is also evidence from two experts. Ms J, social worker, prepared three Family Reports over time - the first in June 2005, the second in August 2006 and the most recent in March 2007. She gave additional evidence at the hearing and offered recommendations at that point which differed from the recommendations made in her final report. Spanning a considerable period of time, the reporter’s involvement gave her the opportunity, not available to the court from the trial process of itself, to observe situations and dynamics between the parents and to see the child and observe her in the care and company of her parents. Her assessments, therefore, constitute important evidence. That will be discussed in due course and it will be necessary also to consider the basis for her ultimate opinion, reflected in her final recommendation, and the weight to be given to it.
Dr V, psychiatrist, prepared two reports - the first in November 2005 and the second in January 2007 – and he elaborated in further evidence at the hearing. For now it can be said that Dr V is an experienced professional who has apparently approached his task in a thorough and even handed fashion, there is nothing arising from his approach, method or the content of his evidence to call into question the validity of the opinions he advanced. I am satisfied his opinions can be relied upon and anything said hereafter proceeds from that footing.
Background
The background record will not replicate the level of detail to be found in the evidence but will canvas the more central features of both the parenting and property proceedings. That will be followed by discussion of the factors relevant to assessment of best interests and the property proceedings will be addressed thereafter in light of the parenting decision. Contrary to assumptions that seem to underlie some of the evidence and submissions, property settlement does not involve the taking of accounts between parties in a mathematical exercise, as was made clear from authority such as Q & Q [1999] FamCA 1314 [per Finn, Kay and Burr JJ], where reference was made to the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 524 in this passage:
‘37. The s 79 exercise is not a pure accounting exercise. It is an exercise in identifying the various matters to be considered under s 79 and weighing them up one against the other before reaching what is an appropriate order to be made, which order may not be made unless it is just and equitable. …
40. The task of weighing up these competing contributions is one of the essential tasks that a trial Judge exercising s 79 jurisdiction must carry out. However, that task is subject to the caveat expressed by Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 where their Honours indicated that issues of establishing contribution are often barren issues because other factors become more significant. Their Honours observed at 524:
‘The Family Court has rightly criticised the practice of giving over-zealous attention to the ascertainment of the parties' contributions, and we take this opportunity of expressing our unqualified agreement with that criticism...’
The parties initially established their household in rented premises. The husband had just emerged from many years as a priest and was looking for work. The wife was working full time as a catering manager at a hospital.
At the outset of the relationship the husband had cash and investments which he estimates to be worth $99,000, not the subject of challenge, and he also had some chattels and a motor vehicle. He had a loan apparently related to the purchase of the vehicle. He had no superannuation. The wife had some chattels including a motor vehicle, but no assets of any significance. She had a loan related to the purchase of her vehicle. She had a superannuation entitlement which the husband estimates to have been worth $10,000. While no basis was given for his estimate, no issue was taken with it and therefore it can be accepted.
Some months later, the husband transferred shares he held to the wife’s name and in November 1999 he bought from his savings an equal number of Bank shares for each of them, though he later transferred his shares into her name. Around that time he also bought an equal number of U shares for each of them by using his savings.
Their employment history over time has taken different paths. The husband was initially unemployed for a number of months until late March 2000. During that time the wages income they had was from the wife’s work. The nature of his work changed over the years but he has remained in full time employment to this day. He presently works with the Queensland Government. He has contributed to superannuation since he began employment in 2000.
The wife continued to work until prior to the birth of their daughter in September 2001. After the birth, there were differences about finances and she took up work in the hospitality industry for a number of hours on Sundays. She later resigned from her position when the time available in the hospitality industry increased to 20 hours per week. Over time she undertook other income earning activities such as home selling through direct selling companies. She also did courses, such as a TAFE course in interior design in 2000, though she did not complete it, and other courses such as cake icing were not directed to income earning. When she was in work, contributions were made to her superannuation fund.
When their relationship broke down in 2002 the husband made the decision to separate their finances. As he explained it, thereafter he paid the wife a weekly allowance, from the allowance he deducted her share of mutual expenses including a contribution to the mortgage instalments, and he covered his share of costs for groceries. He maintained an excel spreadsheet tracking weekly incomings and outgoings.
Indeed, the subject of money and their different attitudes about it were an issue, at least so far as the wife is concerned. As an example of the problem, she relates having spent $2 on a toy for the child which made the husband furious. However, for him the issue was not that she spent the money but that she had acted contrary to the advice they had been given in counselling to concentrate on doing ‘we’ things and the purchase of the toy was something they might have gone out and bought together. From his point of view it is an example of her ‘inability to share their child’. He disputes being ‘furious’ and says they were both angry. Nonetheless, the wife maintains he was controlling about money, reflected in his insistence that she account to him for everything put on the credit card used to purchase food and pay for household expenditure. Yet the husband denies it. He says he maintained the finances, it was good practice to cross off the credit card item with dockets for purchases, and if dockets were unavailable then it was only reasonable any expenditure be verified with her.
Quite early in the relationship they made the decision to purchase a home and the husband sold some of his investments to pay the deposit which, as best both recall, was 20% of the purchase price. For all the mass of detail in the accounts given of their relationship, there is no evidence of what they paid for their first home at A [the wife thinks it was $163,000], nor of the next property, and nor for the home at M they now own [she thinks it was $273,000]. Whatever the case, it seems to be accepted they made a profit on each transaction and, it may be inferred, the agreed current value of the M home is greater than the purchase price.
Around the time of the purchase of the first home, the husband paid out both car loans from his capital: over $11,000 for her loan and $10,000 for his.
It is accepted that some work was undertaken on the first home they bought, though from the description given it was not extensive, and there was some planting in the garden. There was also work undertaken on the second home including renovation of the bathroom, painting and again improvement was made to the garden. The M home was quite large with four bedrooms and work was done to improve it in a number of ways. Without being exhaustive, this included replacement of windows more in keeping with the style of the home and second hand windows were bought and restored for that purpose; a door was put in a wall and the work made good after installation by finishing and painting; carpet was removed; door handles replaced; some painting was done; and efforts were made to fix a water problem, apparently unsuccessfully, as well as work undertaken in the garden to improve the general setting of the home.
Some assistance was given with the work of one kind or another by the wife’s parents, who had moved from Y to T around June 2003. It is accepted that the wife did some of the work herself and it is also accepted that the husband assisted to the extent he was able. On his own evidence, he helped with the preparation of the foundation for paving, he removed carpet, he did some minor building work, he replaced locks, and he assisted with some of the heavier gardening. That said, the evidence overall left the impression that the greater force behind the refurbishments came more from the wife with assistance from her family.
As for other chores, the husband says and it is accepted, he did basic repair jobs around the house, he mowed the lawn, and he did some of the washing, cooking and cleaning as well as the basic maintenance for their cars. He managed their joint finances and he did the wife’s tax returns. The wife, it is accepted, also undertook domestic chores associated with the running of the household and she attended to the garden.
There is dispute about the sharing of responsibilities for their daughter’s care after her birth in September 2001 and plainly differences in approach to parenting emerged quite early in the piece. There was an incident during their brief separation in mid-2002 when the child was still an infant which unfortunately was an indicator of things still to come. Put briefly, the decision to separate having been made, they arranged to change over the child’s care at the residence of friends, Mr and Mrs D. But on the first occasion this was to occur the husband arrived to take the child with the intention of going to his mother’s place, the wife gave no indication she would relinquish the child to him, so he took the child from her. They disagree about the force he used to achieve this; suffice to say he maintains he did so ‘gently’ and was ‘incredibly sensitive’ to the situation. Asked about the incident in cross-examination, he repeated the explanation given in his affidavit, adding there was no easy way of dealing with the situation. It seems not to have occurred to him that the solution might have been to walk away and not subject the child to a tug of war, gentle or otherwise, and of course the same could be said of the wife maintaining her resistance. Before the evening’s events came to an end the wife told him she had called the police, though it seems an arrangement was ultimately agreed without actual police intervention.
The husband is demonstrably concerned to establish the nature of his close involvement with the child’s care from the outset. He emphasises his sole responsibility for her at weekends and public holidays when the wife was at work during the day and at night when she was attending courses or at meetings and the like. He also emphasises the extent of his involvement during the long separation in 2003 which he insists was a shared care arrangement. A fragment of his evidence about the period before their separation reflects something of his point of view:
‘…(before the final separation he was) away from the house and from [the child] for no more than 100 hours (including travelling time) – therefore, in a fortnight, [the child]…was with me for 70 % of each fortnight. Similarly, [the wife] was away from the house and hence [the child].. for around 56 hours – therefore, in a fortnight, [the child]…was with her for 84 % of each fortnight.’
Such precision about the division of labour and attention given to their daughter as a baby and infant before they separated is unnecessary. Reviewed overall, the evidence suggests, and I find, both parents were keen to be involved with their daughter, they were involved to the extent their other commitments permitted, they both took a share of responsibility for her care in the many ways necessary when they were available to do so, and certainly neither falls into the category of absent or disinterested parent by any means. For a young child of the daughter’s age the pre-separation arrangements are important, but they are less significant than the more recent history of her parental care because that has more implications for identification of the nature and quality of her current relationships and attachments. It should also be noted that the child’s paternal grandmother was involved in her care regularly when both parents were working, though that ceased on separation.
Since separation there have been various developments relevant to both property and parenting. Those relevant to property can be recorded fairly briefly:
a)While the husband has occupied the M home he has paid the mortgage instalments and rates, he has maintained the house, and he has paid all the other expenses related to his occupation.
b)He had two superannuation funds, both established during the relationship, and he rolled one into the other. He has obviously continued to contribute in the intervening period. Just before their final separation he contributed $1,000 to the wife’s superannuation fund.
c)They have a life policy covering the lives of each and their daughter is the beneficiary under the policy. The husband has continued to pay the premiums and wishes to maintain the policy but the wife wants it cancelled. As she sees it, she will take out insurance on her own life for her daughter’s benefit if she sees fit.
d)According to his financial statement, which is unchallenged, the husband earns around $63,300 per annum gross. He has other income from dividends and interest and receives a small amount by way of government benefits. Apart from his obligations related to the ownership of the M home he has no property related financial commitments. He pays child support as assessed, currently $143 per week.
e)As for the wife, she is not presently in paid work. She has done some domestic cleaning but a good deal of her time is spent doing voluntary work in her mother’s business which markets clothing for older women. On her account of it, the business is not yet sufficiently viable to provide her with a salary but she hopes that will change in the future and she will be able to derive an income from her efforts. Her current income consists of government benefits and child support paid by the husband. She has the benefit of accommodation with her parents who also pay her household expenses and petrol amounting to $50 per week [see Part F, financial statement].
Turning to parenting matters, on 6 December 2004 the husband instituted the current proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. During the preceding months there had been continual differences about what was best for the child in their changed circumstances which they attempted to address, unsuccessfully as it happens, through mediation which concluded around September. This unsettled state of affairs took place against a background of the husband endeavouring to establish what he saw as a continuation of the pre-separation shared care. In other words, he would care for the child on weekends and public holidays [relevant to a later development in May 2005] and his mother would look after her one day a week. His view about it, at least as to part, is reflected in this passage of his affidavit:
‘Under the arrangement achieved through mediation (since September 2004 to the interim orders of 30 June 2005), [the child] was with the wife] for 70 % of the fortnight (coincidentally the amount of time that [the child] was used to having me around) and [the child] was with me for 30 % of the time.
Proposals The mother’s time The father’s time
Before final separation 84% 70%
My proposal on day of separation 57% 43%
[the mother’s] proposal received 19/7/04 79% 21%Plan since Sept 2004 to June 2005 70% 30%’
His concerns about achieving a continuation of the pre-separation arrangements are set out fully in his affidavit where, amongst other things, he relates urging the to focus on what is best for their daughter, to work together, to not be so restrictive, he reminded her they can do things together, and he told her that as time goes on there will be events they will both want to be involved in, and surely an effort could be made to enjoy those occasions rather than put their daughter ‘into an unenviable position where she has to decide who she wants to sit with’.
However he saw the child’s interests being served following separation, his proposals did not meet with the approval of the wife who saw them as inconsistent with the child’s need for stability and routine as well as impracticable given the distance between their residences. Added to that, she maintains she had to contend with the husband’s manner towards her which she describes as ‘bullying’ and ‘condescending’. She would adhere to these descriptors about his manner of relating to her right up to the hearing, but perhaps an illustration of the latter might be this passage from the husband’s evidence about his efforts post separation to convince her to his point of view:
‘I have also regularly provided [the wife] with reading material and research summaries to back up my reading in the hope that she may be better informed when making decisions about [the child’s] best interests. [The wife] stated that she was not interested in research. I can recall giving [my wife] a few articles and showing her articles to support what I was saying (BN# 39). In August 2004, I prepared a three-page summary (BC) for [the wife] to address her concerns about the volume of articles that I had researched. I do not recall offering [the wife]anything further.’
In these early months before Court proceedings began to regulate the child’s arrangements, there were other developments which only need to be recorded now in a summary way:
a)The child’s 3rd birthday in September 2004 turned into an unpleasant experience. There was elaborate detail given by the husband of proposals and suggestions about how and where it would be celebrated, different versions emerged about where it was anticipated the gift giving would occur, there was dispute about whether the husband was angry gifts were opened earlier than he anticipated, and ultimately there was unpleasantness about the simple issue of what gifts the child should take to her mother’s and if some should go with her father to his place.
b)In a deteriorating climate, the husband decided to keep the child overnight on a Sunday evening in October. As he explained it, he was not prepared to see his time further eroded and thus the child would have the ‘absolute minimum’ of four nights a fortnight with him. He received a letter a couple of days later from the wife’s solicitor in which it was alleged he had committed domestic violence when he had advised the wife he would be keeping the child overnight. He takes exception to this allegation. He denies being violent then or at any other time in his relationship with the wife. He also denies her allegations of intimidating behaviour during the relationship, such as thumping the bench in front of her during disagreement, though he says he does recall times of frustration with her and difficulties getting her attention. He points out he has never sought or required the services of a psychologist in the course of his employment and, contrary to her evidence, his moods did not and do not swing violently and unpredictably. Such allegations, he maintains, are inconsistent with his character - a topic that falls within Dr V’s evidence and so can be left for later discussion.
c)In any event, the husband also sought early in the separation to establish block periods to be spent with the child during school holidays when he would adjust his work commitments. To that end, in late September he advised the wife by letter of a holiday he had booked for later in the year and there was a deal of correspondence exchanged about the topic. But just prior to his departure for the holiday he received a message from the wife that the holiday would not be happening and if he wanted to know more to ring the police. He was also contacted by the police. What had occurred was a suggestion that the child may have been sexually abused and the authorities were notified. The suggestion came from Mr D, a friend of the parents, who the husband says had written books about the issue of sexual abuse of children which he was trying to get published. In any event, Mr D had relayed to the wife concerns about the child’s supposed behaviour towards him, summarised by Ms J in her first report like this -
‘..[Mr [D] had] described how [the child] had stroked the inside of his thigh towards his genitals, at the same time looking up at him and seemingly waiting for a response. This had taken place on three different occasions.’
There had also been remarks about friends having observed the husband ‘tongue-kissing’ the child at a wedding attended after separation. Mr D had advised the wife to take the child to a doctor, which she did, and the doctor referred the matter to the appropriate authorities. From there the wife was interviewed and the child examined. The police interviewed the husband on 5 December, with his full co-operation. There was no substantiation of any wrongdoing, by him or anyone else, towards the child. It was at that point the husband instituted the current proceedings.
d)Like the allegation of domestic violence, the husband sees the allegation as directed towards limiting his time with the child. He sees the difficulties he had negotiating with the wife as related to her efforts to thwart his time with the child and his involvement in her life and he also points to the timing of the intervention on the eve of the occasion he was to take the child on the planned holiday. Rather than support and encourage time and involvement, he sees the wife as trying to reduce their time together and to cut him out of the child’s life as much as possible.
(e)The wife denies the allegation of suspected abuse was motivated by mala fides on her part and she also denies trying to cut him out of the child’s life. It is her case she was genuinely motivated by concern in taking the steps she did after Mr D’s intervention and only did what she had been advised to do, as was appropriate to the circumstances confronting her. As for trying to limit the husband’s involvement with the child, from her perspective the problem lies with the husband’s personality and his manner of communication which she finds obsessive, over detailed, intrusive and relentless. She finds it impossible to maintain with him any boundaries or sense of proportion in matters concerning their daughter and she experiences the frequency and style of his communications as a form of harassment which she has to cope with constantly. She also finds his actions and demeanour in getting his point across to be intimidating at times, making impossible effective communication where she can make her voice heard.
On 14 February 2005 interim orders provided for residence in favour of the mother. Contact between the child and her father was expressed to be at times agreed but not less than alternate weekends from 8am Friday until 7pm Sunday and Wednesday overnight every alternate week, from 8am Sunday until 10am Monday commencing 5 March 2005 and each alternate week thereafter. Telephone communication was set for three times a week at times specified. Those orders also provided for the appointment of a child representative and at some point a Family Report was ordered.
The orders did not bring an end to dispute about parental matters. They could not agree on the child’s kindergarten enrolment for 2005. There were differences about whether she would be involved in a program about separated families, called ‘[S]’, amongst others, though the husband would not frame the differences on that topic as ‘disagreement’. Disagreement did occur, however, between the husband and the kindergarten staff about his presence there. That led to action he took in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal about their views on the extent of his involvement in the kindergarten. As he explained the surrounding circumstances, after being interviewed by Dr V he had some time and rang the kindergarten to ask if he could help out, they rejected his offer telling him there was a new policy, and he felt discriminated against.
The interim orders did not make any provision for special occasions such as Mother’s Day and, when that occasion arose in May, the child did not spend the day with her mother but with her father. In the lead up to that date there was a raft of correspondence between the parties’ solicitors in which the husband agitated adherence to an agreement reached the previous September about holidays and public holidays being spent with him and he sought to have the mother commit to that agreement. She would not do so, apparently taking the view that the interim orders superseded any earlier agreement. Unable to achieve his goal, the husband did not permit the child to spend the day with her mother unless the mother agreed he would henceforth have the child all of the public holidays. Rather than paraphrase them, his reasons are probably best explained in his own words:
‘282. I, in good faith and based on the September 2004 agreement, had been of the understanding that [the wife] was continuing to permit [the child] time with me over the public holidays and school holidays. I was already concerned that if [the child] were to remain with [the wife] on Mothers' Day, in accordance with the September 2004 agreement, that [the child] would go for eight whole days without having any time with me other than by telephone. However, I reasoned that this time would be compensated for eventually through the upcoming public holiday time in June and August. When [the wife] indicated that she had no intention to honour the agreement made in September 2004 and that she was simply going to comply with the minimum time provided for in the court order of 14 February 2005, I felt that I needed to rethink the merit of permitting [the wife] to have time with [the child] for the whole of Mothers' Day. I believe the agreement of September 2004 to be still valid, until both parties agree on a negotiated alternative agreement or the court determines otherwise. I felt that I had no mechanism to insist on compliance with the September agreement, and so I no longer viewed that it was in [the child’s] best interests for me to consent to a further reduction of the time that [the child] was to have with me, by [the wife] having [the child] for the whole of Mothers Day (without an agreement for appropriate compensatory time).’
Taken to the topic in cross-examination, the husband emphasised the long history of public holidays being spent in his care and that he wanted some form of security from the wife who was insisting on adhering to the terms of the orders [on the one hand] yet asking for a departure from them [on the other] to have Mother’s Day with the child when the orders made no mention of the occasion. As he put it, she could not have it both ways.
Interviews for the first Family Report were conducted later in May. At the time, the husband was maintaining a proposal for equal shared time. If that was thought undesirable by reason of the degree of conflict, he proposed being the parent with the majority of the time and the mother would have close to half time. He identified this outcome as warranted by his ability to be more cooperative than the wife. The wife was maintaining what was described as the ‘more conventional arrangement’ of every second weekend from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon and a couple of hours in between those visits. Major issues identified by the reporter were the conflict between the parents and the child’s primary attachment and relationships with each parent. After giving an account of the interviews conducted, she recorded her assessment of the child as a ‘delightful, spontaneous little girl, confident for her age … curious and enjoys exploring her environment …fairly easy-going personality … meeting all of her milestones’. Summarising her opinion, she noted the mother’s view of the father as controlling and his anger if she did not consult him on every issue, however big or small. Ms J said there was some support for this dynamic from her own observations. She noted the husband’s view of the wife as unco-operative bout the division of the child’s time and yet she noted he had not consulted the wife over things such as riding horses or flying interstate. Ms J assessed the child’s primary attachment being to her mother from whom, she said, the child derives her ‘inner sense of security’. She said the child is flourishing in her development and needs to continue living with her mother. At the same time she assessed a warm and loving relationship between the child and her father, and this also needed the opportunity to flourish and develop. But she did not support the husband’s proposal for equal shared care. She regarded the conflict between the parents as seriously problematic, commenting that something as straightforward but nonetheless critical to a young child - bedtime routine - was a source of dispute. On what she had available to her, she recommended the child spend every second weekend with her father from Saturday morning until Sunday afternoon and in the other week she spend one overnight if this fitted in with his work hours and her kindergarten and later her pre-school. She considered the weekends could increase by starting on Friday afternoons around Christmas 2005 and when the child reaches school age it could extend to Monday morning, though the overnight in the other week would cease at this time because of the distance involved and the disruption to her school week. Finally, holiday contact should not be for longer than one week at a time until the end of her first year at school.
After the release of the Report the matter came back to Court and further interim orders were made by consent on 30 June 2005. The residence order continued and the recommendations of the reporter were implemented. Contact with the husband was agreed to be ‘at all reasonable times as may be agreed’ but to include these times:
‘(a)Each alternate weekend from Saturday 9.30am to Sunday 5pm commencing from Saturday 16 July 2005, such contact to continue until 31 December 2005.
(b)Subject to the father being available to supervise the child during this time and subject to the child’s pre school schedule, each other week, from Wednesday 5.30pm to Thursday 5.30pm commencing from Wednesday 6 July 2005.
(c)With respect to subparagraph (a) herein, from the father’s first contact weekend in January 2006, he shall have the child from Friday at 5pm until Sunday at 5pm, each alternate weekend PROVIDED THAT once the child commences Year 1 at primary school, the weekend contact shall be from Friday after school at 3pm until Monday at school at 8.45am, each alternate weekend.
(d)Once [the child] commences Year 1 at primary school, the mid week overnight contact referred to in subparagraph (b) herein shall cease.’
Provision was also made for telephone contact once a week on Mondays from 6pm to 6.15pm, for Father’s Day, Mother’s Day, birthdays, and half of the school holidays [provided until year 2 the holidays were to be for period of no more than one week duration], and there were agreed arrangements for the Christmas period. The husband was to do the travelling, each were to keep the other informed about residential address and phone numbers and they were directed to undergo psychiatric assessments arranged by the child representative.
In October 2005 they started to keep a communication book which was obviously an attempt to assist in bridging the poor state of their communications and presumably to aid the child’s interests by having information relevant to her care relayed from one to the other. The first entry on 13 October relates to the return of a necklace followed by the husband seeking the wife’s opinion on the child’s remark that she has no friends at kindy. There are now two books [exhibit 3] containing many entries directed to one topic or another, the last dated 27 January 2007. Disputes were agitated here about the book’s purpose and the interpretation of entries. Certainly the book is now regarded by the wife as an ineffective communication tool and she has recently declined to use it. She would have it accepted that her description of the husband’s style of communication as ‘bullying’ and ‘harassing’ is apparent from his entries which also demonstrate his insistence on communicating on all manner of things, however small. For his part, the husband supports the continued use of the book which, he agrees, was implemented because they could not communicate otherwise. He says he also finds it useful if things are written down because he can rely on it later and refer to it to show what happened. Indeed, large parts of his affidavit include passages quoted from the book about one topic or another. He also commented during discussion of the book that it would be a record of the child’s life by showing developments along the way. The irony of that seems not to have been recognised.
Dr V conducted interviews in mid-October 2005 and he produced his first report in November. After giving an account of the interview with each parent, he said the results of mental state examination demonstrated both to be ‘a study in contrasts’, an observation borne out by their presentation at the hearing. As for the husband, he found him pleasant and co-operative but difficult to engage or get to know as a person. He said he is ‘markedly obsessional and tended to get buried in intricate detail including of conversations’ which was at times difficult to contain, he was described as well organised but not good at expressing his feeling and could be said to have the characteristic of alexithymia, but he has some capacity for thoughtfulness about issues. Dr V found no evidence of depression or anxiety, though certainly a very controlled individual with respect to his feelings and fairly humourless. He was focussed on the child’s need to have a meaningful relationship with him and he believed the mother to be obstructing this. His cognitive functions were intact and he has a superior IQ.
As for the wife, Dr V described her as very pleasant and co-operative, a fairly engaging person with well developed social skills, rich in affect but not histrionic. He assessed her as thoughtful and mature, with a capacity for self-reflection. Nor was there any evidence of depression or anxiety in her presentation, she was reactive and warm and had a sense of humour. She too was centred on the welfare of the child and her role. She was ‘not entirely critical of her ex-partner as a father’ though convinced shared care would not work. Her cognitive functions were intact and he assessed her as having normal intelligence.
From this footing, his provisional diagnosis was that neither suffers from any major mental disorder such as psychosis, mood disorder, anxiety disorder or organic mental state. As he saw it, the issue was personality. On that topic, he said:
‘With respect to the mother, […] on the data available personality issues would seem to fall in the normal range. The only issue of note is some problems in maintaining relationships and from her own description the relationship history indicates engaging with males who have significant problems. This may indicate a need to nurture and "change" men who have difficulties. Apart from this there is nothing else that emerges on the history. The suspicion that her child had been sexually abused does not appear to have emerged from any psychopathological issues or illness on her part but, as is often the case in false accusations of child sexual abuse in the Family Court situation, the idea appears to have been implanted by an individual she looked up to and was presumed to have some knowledge and expertise.
With respect to the father, […], there are significant personality vulnerabilities that have presumably arisen out of the more unfortunate aspects of the developmental history. He presents as a fairly emotionally restricted individual. He is also highly obsessional and controlled with difficulty in accessing his emotions and expressing them. As to whether the personality vulnerabilities are of an extent as to constitute disorder is a matter of judgement and would require further information.’
After consulting documents provided, including the Family Report, he did not alter his diagnosis and added:
‘…..I note that the relationship between the parents is highly conflictual with claims and counter claims, some on issues that do not appear to be of great importance. Such a degree of conflict may indicate that the personality issues in both the parties are more significant than emerges from the clinical interview.
I trust the following points are useful.
• The father does not suffer from any mental disorder that would preclude him from being a contact parent and in any case this is not in dispute. I note further that the personality issues in him are not such as to of themselves make him an unsuitable parent for a shared care arrangement. There is nothing to suggest that he will not take good care of the child or be a nurturing parent.
• Likewise there is nothing of psychiatric significance in the mother that would preclude her being an effective mother in the care of the child.
• It would seem to me the most significant issue with respect to a shared care situation is the level of conflict and distrust between the parents. It would seem to me that there has to be at least a modicum of co-operation between the parents for a shared care arrangement to work.
• The question of whether it is in the best interests of the child to be in a shared care arrangement as against standard contact with one of the parents as the residential parent is of course a matter that only a Court can determine taking all issues into account. Psychiatric status can only be a small part of such a decision.’
In 2006 the child moved to pre-school and again there were disputes about this. He says that without consulting him, the wife elected to have her attend on certain days of the week which would mean she would be at preschool on one of the days she was to be with him under the orders. The wife denies he was left out of the loop and did have the opportunity to have input into the days of attendance. In any event, the husband saw the days selected as restricting the child’s weekday time with him while there were no corresponding restrictions on the weekday time she would spend with her mother. He made the decision to not take her to preschool on those days. Asked under cross-examination about the decision, he gave an elaborate reply, the core of it being that her attendance would cut across his time every second Wednesday/Thursday, it came down to deciding whether it was more important for her to attend preschool or spend the day with him and he opted for the latter. He said he was concerned about the impact on the child of not attending on those days, but he kept in touch with the teachers who said she was performing well and there were things he did with her on those days anyway.
The decision, of course, is one about which parents might reasonably disagree and there is no criticism of the husband for the election he made. Nonetheless it sits a little at odds with his strongly expressed desire to be involved in all aspects of the child’s activities and life and to demonstrate to her his interest in her education. Taking her to preschool on those days and picking her up may have given him the opportunity to be involved and to share with her the many things that can arise out of those comings and goings.
2006 also saw further discord about holiday time and again a passage from the husband’s affidavit is a but a fragment reflecting something of the nature of the issue:
‘314. When the communication book was next returned, on Friday 28 July 2006, [the wife] had written a proposal in relation to September school holidays. In response, I wrote in the communication book on Sunday 30 July 2006: "In your proposal, you are short-changing [the child]. If you are counting holiday time from Friday 5pm, then you need to count holiday time from break up to the time [the child] goes back to school at 9am. If you divide that time by 2, you will find that [the child] is entitled to more time with me. You cannot have it both ways. Are you going to give [the child] the minimum the Court Orders provide for (as per my proposal) or offer [the child] more time with me'? Your proposal breaches the current court orders. I propose you reconsider my proposal or add on the additional time that [the child] is entitled to from Su 7/10/06 at 5pm. Again, I also believe that you should share the travelling costs and time equally or in proportion to the amount of time [the child] is with you.’
Asked about his attitude to holiday time in cross-examination, the husband would not agree with the suggestion that he is concerned with the minutiae whereas the wife takes a broader view. As he explained, the holiday period is for 16 days, plainly 8 days is the minimum time which should be spent with him, for the child the 1 day is substantial as it is equal to 25% of the time, and the child is entitled to share it with him. On this reasoning, he cannot understand why she cannot be more generous and why she maintained the period should be ‘one week’. But as counsel for the ICL had him acknowledge, the terms of the interim orders refer to ‘one week’ as the duration of school holiday time with him and not 8 days.
In anticipation of the October hearing an order was made for an updated Family Report which was released in mid-August. Noting no changes in the parents’ circumstances since the last report, Ms J recorded a summary of her interviews which needs no replication here, but she did note the husband’s presentation seemed to be more ‘constrained and balanced, suggesting that he has gained improved insight into advancing [the child’s] needs and lessening his contribution to the ongoing parental conflict’ though she added he was still not able to see the locked conflict he and the wife fall into. She also noted a change in the wife’s presentation which she said had ‘swung in the opposite direction’ and she was ‘forthright and strong-minded’ in her views. She was described as very protective of the child and in no doubt her approach is the right one. Her attitude to the child’s fall from a horse while in her father’s care [a topic canvassed with both parents at the hearing] was the subject of comment, as was her attitude about sending Panadol with the child on a visit to her father. Ms J concluded the wife over reacts and she commented on their different parenting styles about accidents and ailments being interpreted as parenting failure. She elaborated on their views about the pre-school dispute and she noted the communication book had been the subject of argument about its function. She assessed the child on this occasion again as a ‘bright, spontaneous little girl with a charming, outgoing personality … happy temperament … socially confident for her age.’ She concluded the child loves both parents dearly and she is ‘observably happy to be in the company of either of them.’ On the topic of time with each parent, the child was said to be clear about wanting to spend more time with her father. Ms J summarised the parents’ future plans and their perspective on the child’s interests before expressing these opinions:
‘The father is preoccupied with his goal of having [the child] live with each of them on an equal basis or, alternatively, live with him as the primary parent. He states that he devotes all of his time outside work hours and time with [the child] to this task.
The mother seeks a reduction in the father's involvement because of what she sees as his irresponsibility.
It is my view that she transfers her personal view of him to her view of him as a parent. She is a very protective, cautious mother and her standards and expectations in this regard appear to be much higher than those of the general community.
The father has controlling, obsessive qualities and there is no clear indication that he understands how this contributes to parental conflict. For her part, the mother's convictions about what is right and wrong in parenting are unassailable, and now seemingly contribute equally to the parental conflict.
It is my view that both parents have sound parenting skills and that each, on his/her own, would take good care of [the child].
I have considered shared care but I cannot support the proposal in the light of this serious conflict.
[The child] has been in the primary care of her mother for the whole of her life. She is flourishing. I can see no strong reason to support a change in who she lives with. The exception to this might be the mother's reluctance to promote [the child’s] relationship with her father. Having said this, [the child] has always gone to each visit and the mother has fostered the child's happiness about the idea.
I do not support the mother's view that visits need to be lessened. The level of disruption that [the child] has experienced upon return is normal in the light of her age and circumstances.
[The child] asks to spend more time with her father.
I would be happy to recommend that [the child] spend up to five days per fortnight with her father. There are practical problems in this regard because of the distance between their respective homes. I would not like to see [the child] undertaking long travel periods before and after school in order for this division to take place.’
There was then a further report from Dr V in late January 2007 after interviews with the parents in early December. The husband had asked the independent children’s lawyer to forward to Dr V an article about the psychological consequences of wrongful conviction and imprisonment [exhibit 2]. The husband explained the article was relevant to consideration of how the impact of the allegations of sexual abuse and domestic violence on him and on his presentation at interview. On one view of it, his concern about the impact is understandable and there is no reason to doubt it was a traumatic development for him to have to confront, but - as was put to him by counsel for the ICL - it was quite a leap from what had actually occurred to an article about wrongful conviction and imprisonment.
Shares in T 3,300
2. with the husband
ANZ bank 14,956
CUA bank 650
C loan 48,379
Household contents 3,300
Motor vehicle 4,500
71,785
Less
Credit card debt 1,331
70,454
Superannuation 79,658
Total Net 150,112 150,112
3. with the wife
B shares 10,372
Telstra shares 1,945
X shares 11,080
U shares 7,897
ANZ bank 300
Household contents 1,000
Jewellery and personal property 3,970
Motor vehicle 5,500
Total 42,064
Less
Debt to parents 500
41,564
Superannuation 29,311
Total net assets 70,875 70,875
Total net assets 358,455
Evaluation of contributions
In organising the listing of the parties’ current assets I have separated them into those jointly held and those they each own or have in their possession at the moment. In doing so, I have separated out their superannuation entitlements from other property but the value is reflected in the total net asset figure. This organisation aids the evaluation process from my point of view, rather than list all assets together in any order, as the jointly prepared list did. The separation out of their superannuation entitlements from other assets brings their positions more clearly into focus [see Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220] and assists in addressing the dispute about the extent to which the husband’s entitlement should be split, if at all, to satisfy the wife’s entitlement. Apart from that, any cash adjustment will have to come either from the husband, who seeks to retain the home, or from its sale.
That said, in evaluating their contributions to all property it will be appropriate to take a ‘global’ approach, rather than an ‘asset by asset’ or ‘category of asset’ approach, as discussed in cases such as Norbis (supra), Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814, Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272, and McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606.
This is a relatively short relationship, punctuated by two earlier separations, one for around 8 months during 2003. They separated almost 3 years ago when their daughter was still under 3 years of age. During the period up to their separation, and since, they have each made contributions of varying kinds.
The husband came to the relationship in a stronger financial position with $99,000 in cash and investments. Putting aside their chattels and related loans, that compares with the $10,000 the wife had in superannuation entitlements at the time. He used some of his funds to pay off their loans and he paid 20% of the purchase price towards the cost of their first home from funds he had available. As each home they purchased was sold, as I apprehend the situation, they used the proceeds to purchase the next property and so the initial deposit remains reflected in the value of the M property. Other funds he had are reflected in investments now held either jointly or individually.
In the first months after establishing their common household the wife was the sole income earner and she contributed those earnings to their needs at the time. Her paid work was later scaled down to less than full time but whatever she earned I am satisfied she contributed it to the needs of the family. By the same token, the husband found paid work in March 2000 and from then until the final separation he contributed his earnings towards the family’s needs and he applied any surplus towards savings or investments. Over the years he accumulated superannuation entitlements and just prior to separation he paid $1,000 towards the wife’s superannuation fund. It is acknowledged they separated their finances in 2002 when they separated for some months, but that does not alter the fact that whatever they each earned they applied towards the needs of the family in one way or another, or at least the evidence does not suggest any use to the contrary. To the extent that the husband’s evidence might be seen as diminishing the wife’s contributions by a suggestion she was not frugal or was spendthrift, there is no support from anywhere to sustain it. As I find, they each used whatever income they derived for the benefit of the family.
Apart from their direct financial contributions from assets introduced and earnings, they each made other contributions until their separation. The properties they acquired were either refurbished or improved in various ways and while they both made efforts in that direction, those of the wife and her family appear to have been the more prevalent. She also did things to make the homes established more attractive such as making curtains and gardening to improve their setting. By the same token, the husband assisted with some of the gardening and he also maintained the lawns, looked after their cars, and took responsibility for managing their finances in ways he described. They each undertook domestic chores and related household tasks such as their work commitments allowed.
Both contributed to the care of their daughter after her birth, such as their work commitments allowed, and they had some regular assistance with child care from the husband’s mother which enabled them to work without the cost of child care on those occasions.
In the period since separation the husband has continued to work full time and has used his income to pay the costs related to the ownership of the home, such as mortgage instalments and council rates as well as pay child support as assessed. On the other hand, he has had the exclusive occupancy of the home since separation though he has paid all of the costs related to his occupation. There is nothing to suggest he has wasted money that might be otherwise available and from all accounts he has continued to be responsible financially. He has continued to contribute to superannuation. He has also taken an important role in the care of their daughter such as his work and other obligations have permitted, and provided for her from his funds while in his care.
For her part, the wife has lived with her parents who have provided for her accommodation during this time though she has done voluntary work in their business to assist them get that established. She has lived on government benefits and provided for their daughter during times in her care and with her educational needs from those benefits and from child support paid by the husband. Similarly, there is nothing to indicate she has wasted funds available to her since separation.
When their initial circumstances are considered and the roles they each undertook at various times, before and after the birth of their daughter, is examined along with their various contributions over the past 7 ½ years or so, their contributions should be seen as approximating equality but for one factor - that is the husband’s stronger financial position at the outset. He used those funds partly to pay off debt, to pay the deposit on a home which provided their accommodation and they were otherwise maintained in investments.
The husband makes the submission that his initial contribution should be exempted from the property pool for reasons he attributes to the shortness of the marriage and he adds to the submission by saying his ‘significant initial contribution has not diluted over time due to (his) significant contribution during and after the relationship’.
The approach to initial disparity in financial contributions is the subject of many decisions of this Court, more particularly Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 where earlier decision such as Money (1994) FLC 92-485, Bremner (1995) FLC 92-560, and Way (1996) FLC 92-702 were discussed. In a judgment delivered recently [C & L [2006] FamCA 1366, now on appeal] I was required to consider a submission about the so-called ‘erosion principle’ the case of Pierce was said to have established and to do so having regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Burgess v King (2005) 34 Fam LR 528 related to division of property between de facto married partners [but see also Bilous v Mudaliar & Anor (2006) 35 Fam LR 55]. As I said there, Pierce put an end to the conceptual analysis reflected in the use of expressions such as ‘erosion principle’, which the husband’s submission resembles, when disparity in initial wealth is being argued, and the frequently quoted passage from the joint judgment makes that apparent:
‘…In our opinion it is not so much a matter of erosion of contribution but a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contribution. It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife. In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution. In the present case that use was a substantial contribution to the purchase price of the matrimonial home: See also [C & C] (unreported, Full Court (Ellis, Lindenmayer and Finn JJ), Sydney, delivered 19 May 1995 at pages 21 and 22 of the joint judgment) and [Z & Z] (unreported, Full Court Sydney, delivered 3 October 1996, per Ellis J. at page 10). ’
The measure of the weight to the assets he introduced has some counterbalance in the wife’s superannuation entitlement, but there remains a significant weighting in his favour nonetheless, particularly when regard is had to the use made of the funds he introduced. As noted earlier, it is not an accounting exercise and obviously the evaluation of contributions fall within a range. In my opinion when weighed in the balance with all other contributions, a distribution in the proportions of 62.5%/37.5% in his favour fits comfortably within that range.
That apportionment represents a disparity of 25% of net assets and applied to their total net assets, including superannuation, equates with almost $90,000. In my view that bears out the assessment.
Section 75(2) factors
The husband is 41 years of age and the wife is 35. Neither has any health problems and so that does not operate as an impediment to an evaluation of their likely future circumstances as best they can be foreseen at this stage.
The contributions assessment will give them net assets in the proportions already indicated. Neither has any assets or resources other than those already mentioned.
The wife will have to pay legal costs to the Legal Aid Commission equivalent to 20% of whatever she receives or the amount of those costs, whichever is lesser. Her costs are calculated to be in the vicinity of $23,500 and so that will be the extent of her obligation. The debt has not been included in the earlier lists because unpaid legal costs are more appropriately dealt with in considering costs under s 117 of the Act if an application is made following delivery of judgment. I make mention of it here merely to acknowledge the obligation but do not take it into account as a factor here.
As for earnings, they should both be seen as having an earning capacity to exert over the many years of working life still ahead for each of them. But there are some differences in their employment history and skills levels. There is nothing to suggest the husband will not be able to continue earning at his current level and may even progress to higher levels as time goes on and opportunities present, provided he stays in full time employment. Whether he does or changes his current job will be a matter for him to decide in light of this judgment, amongst other considerations. Because the wife is not in the paid workforce earning an income using her skills, it is difficult to say what she will be able to earn in the future. Certainly she has a capacity to earn income for the future rather than to continue volunteering her services to her parents. Nonetheless her skills base suggests it would not be in the same band of income the husband could earn and it is proper in the circumstances to see them as having a prospective disparity in income earning potential. This weighs in the wife’s favour. To that I should add, as noted earlier, the wife is in a relationship with a gentleman little is known about beyond that he is a primary school teacher and on her account of it the future of that relationship may include marriage. But there is nothing about that situation to warrant discarding a comparison of her earnings with the husband’s for the future as best that can be measured.
The age differential, and the husband’s likely earlier retirement, is not all that significant at this stage, although it does mean he can expect to be in a position to access his superannuation entitlements a little before the wife can.
As for the future support of their daughter, it can be expected the husband will continue to contribute child support for her upbringing according to any child support assessment or variation through permissible procedures as appropriate to circumstances as they develop. He will also provide for her at times she is in his care. He has no financial obligations to any other person. The wife will receive child support he pays but she will take responsibility for the child’s financial needs over and above the child support paid.
Under the parenting orders the wife will have the care of the child for most of the time for the foreseeable future, at least during school terms, and therefore she will be responsible for the many day to day decisions necessary to their daughter’s supervision and care for the many years to come before she becomes independent. Given their daughter’s very young age, this is a factor of some significance and weights in the wife’s favour.
When all relevant factors are reviewed, disparity in future earning capacity and ongoing day to day parental responsibility for many years call for an adjustment to the wife’s contributions assessment. In my opinion they would be recognised by a further 12.5% in her favour. Expressed in monetary terms, that amounts to around $44,800 which is appropriate having regard to their total net asset pool.
Just and equitable
The assessments mean that their property would be distributed equally. Of course there may be room for disagreement about the apportionment determined between contributions and s 75(2) adjustment, but I am satisfied in the final analysis that this distribution is proper and would bring about a just and equitable division of their property.
Applied to net assets of $358,455, the wife would be entitled to retain assets to the value of $179,228. Including her superannuation worth almost $29,311 she has assets worth $70,875 and so would need to be paid a further $108,352.
The husband would have assets worth $287,580 and payment of that amount would bring the value of his assets back to $179,228. The mix of his assets would be equity in the home of $134,168, shares and cash worth around $67,285, furniture and a motor vehicle worth a total of $7,800, and a superannuation entitlement worth $79,658.
The question remains as to how the wife’s entitlement is to be taken, either with a split of the husband’s superannuation in some proportion or not. In resolving that through to a just and equitable outcome, the mix of assets each would retain is a factor to consider. Expressed as a proportion of his overall entitlement, his superannuation component is a little over 44%. For the wife, the proportion is a little over 16%. If their superannuation were to be distributed equally - the total is $108,969 and half is $54,484 – it would mean the wife would take in the split a base amount of $25,173 and her cash component would be reduced accordingly.
All things considered, I am of the view it would be more just and equitable for their entitlements to be satisfied in part by the wife taking part of her entitlement by a superannuation split. That is because there is no compelling feature of their circumstances, more particularly hers, that heads the discretion in the direction of a total cash payment. Nor is there anything to suggest any apportionment other than an equalisation of their entitlements would be just and equitable, or at least none I can identify. If the husband were assured of staying in the home that might have been a factor I could have considered to alter the apportionment in recognition of the advantage he would gain; that is, by saving the upheaval of relocation and the associated costs as well as the costs related to purchasing another home. But there is no certainty about that and so I ultimately conclude in all of the circumstances it will be appropriate to equalise their entitlements in framing the orders. It will mean the wife will receive a less in cash for her more immediate needs, whatever they might be, but she will have a greater sum for future security and the converse holds good for the husband.
In closing I should refer to the husband’s argument that there will be capital gains tax payable on the sale of shares. That is accepted, but so too will there be on the shares held by the wife. There is no evidence of what the tax would be though his detailed figures give some insight in to the possible magnitude. It is a factor taken into account in coming to a decision about their entitlements but not an issue that needs any further discussion.
Form of orders - property
This means that the wife will have to be paid $83,179 [rounded to $83,200] and a split of the husband’s superannuation with a base amount of $25,173. With that adjustment, each will be entitled to retain assets presently in their possession.
Obviously if the husband is to be given the opportunity to buy the home then some time limit should be imposed and a month strikes me as an appropriate time frame to arrange his finances. If not paid, the home will have to be sold and orders will provide for that to occur as soon as practicable thereafter. The sale price is unlikely to be the agreed price and no account was taken in the earlier figures of sale costs. If the matter proceeds along that path, the parties’ entitlements should be paid out in proportionate terms, consistent with the 50/50 distribution overall, and adjustment made for their retention of assets other than the home and superannuation. The husband has assets net assets in that category worth $70,454 and the wife has net assets worth $41,564. That makes a total of $112,018 and 50% of that is $56,009. The wife would need to receive a further $14,445 from the husband’s share of the sale proceeds to receive her 50% entitlement overall.
The orders for sale can be in general terms and should be able to be worked out without controversy by the parties’ solicitors. If not, machinery orders can be made, with the accompanying risk as to costs should that become necessary. The other orders are self-explanatory.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty three (143) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Moore
Associate:
Date: 24 April 2007
IT IS NOTED that this judgment for all publication and reporting purposes be referred to as HANDLEY & TRANTER
- AGLC
- Handley & Tranter [2007] FamCA 344
- Case
- [2007] FamCA 344
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court was required to determine the best interests of the child in relation to parental responsibility and time spent with each parent, considering the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility and whether it should be rebutted. Additionally, the court had to assess the parties' contributions and relevant factors under section 75(2) of the *Family Law Act 1975* to make just and equitable property orders, including whether to split the husband's superannuation.
Justice Moore found that the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility should be rebutted due to the parents' profound inability to communicate and cooperate, concluding that sole parental responsibility for major long-term issues should rest with the mother. The court ordered that the child live with the mother and spend regular time with the father, with specific arrangements for school terms and holidays, and that the father have sole responsibility for decisions regarding the child's surname. In relation to property, the court ordered the husband to pay a sum to the wife and to split his superannuation entitlement, aiming for an equal division of their net assets.
Orders
Orders of the court
Parenting orders
1. The child, a daughter, born in September 2001 is to live with her mother.
2. In making decisions about major long term issues, as defined in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of s 4 of the Family Law Act 1975, the mother is to have sole parental responsibility and is to advise the father as soon as practicable of any decisions of that nature taken by her.
3. The father is to spend time with the child and communicate with her as follows:
A. during school terms as scheduled according to the calendar of the school the child attends:
(a) if the father resides more than 20 minutes travel by car from the school the child attends
(i) each alternate weekend from 3pm Friday until 8.30am on the following Monday (or Tuesday if Monday is a public holiday or pupil free day);
(b) if the father resides not more than 20 minutes travel by car from the school the child attends
(i) each alternate weekend from 3pm on Friday until 8.30am on the following Tuesday
B. during school holidays as scheduled according to the calendar of the school the child attends:
(c) one half of all school holiday periods at the end of terms 1, 2, 3 and 4, to be the first half in odd numbered years and the second half in even numbered years.
(d) for the purposes of (c) hereof -
(i) school holiday periods are deemed to commence on the day immediately following the day on which the school term concludes [“commencement day”] and conclude on the day immediately preceding the first day of the new school term [“concluding day”];
(ii) changeover time is to be at 12 noon on the day mid way during the holiday period [“middle day”];
(iii) if the child is with her father for the first half of holiday period then he is to collect her from outside the mother’s residence at 9am on the commencement day the mother is to collect her at 12 noon from outside the father’s residence on the concluding day;
(iv) if the child is with her father for the second half of holiday periods then he is to collect her from outside the mother’s residence at 12 noon on the middle day and the mother is to collect her from outside the father’s residence at 5pm on the concluding day;
(v) The school term arrangements set out in order 3 (a) and (b) hereof are to resume on the first weekend after resumption of the school term if the child has spent the first half of the school holiday period with her father and on the second weekend after resumption of the school term if the child has spend the second half of the school holiday period with her father.
C. special occasion arrangements
(e) notwithstanding any other arrangement under these orders and in addition to those arrangements if applicable, the child is to spend Fathers’ Day weekend with her father and Mothers’ Day weekend with her mother, with the times and travel responsibility to accord with that of school term weekends.
(f) During the Christmas school holiday periods:
(i) in odd numbered years the mother is to collect the child from outside the father’s residence at 2pm on Christmas Day and return the child to outside the father’s residence at 6pm on Boxing Day; and
(ii) in even numbered years the father is to collect the child from outside the mother’s residence at 2pm on Christmas Day and return the child to outside the mother’s residence at 6pm on Boxing Day.
D. communication by telephone
(g) the father is at liberty to telephone the child two evenings per week during school terms and when the child is with her mother during school holidays between 6pm and 6.15 pm provided those calls are for not more than 15 minutes duration each;
(h) if the child is not in her father’s care on her birthday or the father’s birthday then in addition to any other provision in these orders the father may telephone the child at 6pm on those occasions in addition to the time provided in (g);
(i) if the child is not in her mother’s care on her birthday or the mother’s birthday then in addition to any other provision in these orders the mother may telephone the child at 6pm on those occasions;
(j) when the child is in her father’s care during school holidays, the mother is at liberty to telephone the child on two evenings per week between 6pm and 6.15pm provided the calls are for not more than 15 minutes duration each;
(k) Each parent is to encourage and facilitate the child to telephone the other parent at any time the child requests.
4. The child is to be known as and enrolled and registered with all authorities with the surname of “[the husband] [that is, her name is to be […]
5. Each parent is to keep the other informed in writing of their current residential address and landline telephone numbers and notify the other of any change within 7 days of any change;
6. If either parent intends being absent with the child from their usual residence for more than two consecutive nights that parent is to give the other prior notice of that intention in writing and at the same time provide the other parent with a written itinerary of the arrangements including the address and telephone number where the child will be staying.
7. The father is at liberty to obtain from the school the child attends all reports, newsletters and information related to the child’s attendance and progress at school, such as is available to parents of students in the normal course, and the father is at liberty to attend all school functions, sports days, parent/teacher interviews or other events conducted by the school according to invitations extended by the school to parents in the normal course.
8. (a) The mother is to notify the father within 14 days of the date of these orders of the name, address and telephone number of the child’s treating general medical practitioner and each parent is to ensure, if reasonably practicable, the child attends that general medical practitioner if medical attention is required.
(b) If either parent, by reason of emergency or impracticability, has the child consult another medical practitioner that parent is to inform the other in writing of the name, address and telephone number of that medical practitioner and the nature of the treatment sought.
(c) Each parent is at liberty to obtain from any medical practitioner treating the child information relevant to the child’s treatment, diagnosis and prognosis.
9. Unless otherwise agreed between them in writing, the father is restrained from residing within the same neighbourhood or within 5 kilometres of the home in which the mother and the child are living from time to time and the mother is restrained from taking up residence within that field of the father’s residence.
10. The appointment of the independent child lawyer is discharged.
Property orders
11. The husband is to pay to the wife the sum of $83,200 on or before one (1) month from the date of these orders;
12. Contemporaneously with the payment of the sum referred to in order 11 hereof, the wife is to sign all documents and do all things necessary to transfer to the husband all her right title and interest in the property registered in their joint names and situated at M in the State of Queensland.
13. If the sum referred to in order 11 hereof is not paid within the time stipulated or such further time as agreed, the M home is to be forthwith offered for sale by a method and at a price agreed and if not agreed then by public auction without undue delay at a reserve price to be set by the auctioneer and the proceed of sale are to be disbursed so as -
(i) to pay all costs related to the sale and commissions on sale;
(ii) to discharge the mortgage secured over the property;
(ii) to pay the balance remaining as to 50% to the wife and as to 50% to the husband and from the husband’s share he pay to the wife the sum of $14,445.
14. Liberty is given to apply for machinery orders with respect to the sale of the M home.
15. Whenever a splittable payment is payable in respect of the superannuation interest of the husband in the S Superannuation Fund:
(i) The wife is entitled to be paid an amount calculated in accordance with the Family Law (Superannuation) Regulations 2001, using a base amount in the sum of $25,173 at the operative time being four business days after the date of service of these orders upon the trustee of the S Superannuation Fund;
(ii) there is a corresponding reduction in the entitlement of the person to whom the splittable payment would have been made but for this order.
16. Order 15 binds the trustee or trustees from time to time of the S Superannuation Fund.
17. A sealed copy of these orders is to be served by the wife upon the trustee of the S Superannuation Fund as soon as practicable.
18. Subject to the provisions of these orders, each party is entitled to retain absolutely all property of whatsoever nature and kind presently owned by and in the possession of that party.
FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA AT BRISBANE
FILE NUMBER: BRF1989 of 2005
MR HANDLEY
Applicant
And
MS TRANTER
Respondent
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
[To assist editing to provide anonymity for publication, the parties’ names will not be used in the body of these Reasons. They will be referred to by initials, by reference to their status as parents or, despite their divorce, as ‘husband’ and ‘wife’, as may be convenient]
Proceedings
1.
The Court is asked to make parenting orders related to the future arrangements for the parties’ 5 ½ year old daughter and settlement of their property.
2.
Broadly speaking, the parenting proceedings call for decisions about the extent to which parental responsibility is to be shared between them, the time their daughter will spend with each, and a raft of other issues related to her care and upbringing. As for the property proceedings, their major asset is an encumbered home at M but they also have personalty and superannuation entitlements. The dispute is not so much about what they own and what it is worth but the proportions in which it should be distributed and whether the husband’s superannuation should be split to satisfy part of the wife’s entitlement.
3.
The parties began living together in October 1999, they married in June 2000 and their daughter was born in September 2001. Throughout the marriage at various times they undertook counselling as a couple and individually, giving some indication of the unhappy state of the relationship from early on. There was a brief separation in August 2002 and a longer separation from December 2002 to August 2003 when they both remained living in the family home, though separately, but their final separation occurred in July 2004. The wife left the home around that time, taking the child with her, and she went to live with her parents at T where she continues to live. The husband has remained living in the family home at M. Their present residences are 60 kilometres apart and, depending on traffic, the travelling time is around 45 minutes or may be an hour. They were divorced in July 2006.
Evidence
4.
The husband filed a very lengthy affidavit in which he gave a level of detail rarely seen in proceedings and the wife’s affidavit, despite being rather repetitious, omitted matters related to the property proceedings and that required supplementary evidence from her at the hearing. Their affidavits are not confined to giving an account of relevant historical facts and outlining their current circumstances and future proposals; they contains commentary that amounts to advocacy to advance their case and promote the outcome for which each contends, with the result that core issues tend to be overshadowed by a wilderness of detail and argument.
5.
The husband also called evidence from his mother and his sister. His mother was not required for cross-examination and her evidence can be accepted. His sister’s cross-examination was relatively brief and mention will be made of that in due course.
6.
The wife called evidence from her parents and from several friends, but only her mother was required for some brief cross-examination. No inroads were made into what she had said in her affidavit though she readily made concessions when some matters were put to her. Her evidence can be accepted.
7.
The wife’s solicitor filed evidence of the value of their superannuation entitlements and there was an affidavit from Mr W who valued their motor vehicles. In both instances, there was no contest and those figures are accepted.
8.
Related to the parenting proceedings, there is also evidence from two experts. Ms J, social worker, prepared three Family Reports over time - the first in June 2005, the second in August 2006 and the most recent in March 2007. She gave additional evidence at the hearing and offered recommendations at that point which differed from the recommendations made in her final report. Spanning a considerable period of time, the reporter’s involvement gave her the opportunity, not available to the court from the trial process of itself, to observe situations and dynamics between the parents and to see the child and observe her in the care and company of her parents. Her assessments, therefore, constitute important evidence. That will be discussed in due course and it will be necessary also to consider the basis for her ultimate opinion, reflected in her final recommendation, and the weight to be given to it.
9.
Dr V, psychiatrist, prepared two reports - the first in November 2005 and the second in January 2007 – and he elaborated in further evidence at the hearing. For now it can be said that Dr V is an experienced professional who has apparently approached his task in a thorough and even handed fashion, there is nothing arising from his approach, method or the content of his evidence to call into question the validity of the opinions he advanced. I am satisfied his opinions can be relied upon and anything said hereafter proceeds from that footing.
Background
10.
The background record will not replicate the level of detail to be found in the evidence but will canvas the more central features of both the parenting and property proceedings. That will be followed by discussion of the factors relevant to assessment of best interests and the property proceedings will be addressed thereafter in light of the parenting decision. Contrary to assumptions that seem to underlie some of the evidence and submissions, property settlement does not involve the taking of accounts between parties in a mathematical exercise, as was made clear from authority such as Q & Q [1999] FamCA 1314 [per Finn, Kay and Burr JJ], where reference was made to the observations of Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 at 524 in this passage:
‘37. The s 79 exercise is not a pure accounting exercise. It is an exercise in identifying the various matters to be considered under s 79 and weighing them up one against the other before reaching what is an appropriate order to be made, which order may not be made unless it is just and equitable. …
40. The task of weighing up these competing contributions is one of the essential tasks that a trial Judge exercising s 79 jurisdiction must carry out. However, that task is subject to the caveat expressed by Mason and Deane JJ in Norbis (1986) 161 CLR 513 where their Honours indicated that issues of establishing contribution are often barren issues because other factors become more significant. Their Honours observed at 524:
‘The Family Court has rightly criticised the practice of giving over-zealous attention to the ascertainment of the parties' contributions, and we take this opportunity of expressing our unqualified agreement with that criticism...’
11.
The parties initially established their household in rented premises. The husband had just emerged from many years as a priest and was looking for work. The wife was working full time as a catering manager at a hospital.
12.
At the outset of the relationship the husband had cash and investments which he estimates to be worth $99,000, not the subject of challenge, and he also had some chattels and a motor vehicle. He had a loan apparently related to the purchase of the vehicle. He had no superannuation. The wife had some chattels including a motor vehicle, but no assets of any significance. She had a loan related to the purchase of her vehicle. She had a superannuation entitlement which the husband estimates to have been worth $10,000. While no basis was given for his estimate, no issue was taken with it and therefore it can be accepted.
13.
Some months later, the husband transferred shares he held to the wife’s name and in November 1999 he bought from his savings an equal number of Bank shares for each of them, though he later transferred his shares into her name. Around that time he also bought an equal number of U shares for each of them by using his savings.
14.
Their employment history over time has taken different paths. The husband was initially unemployed for a number of months until late March 2000. During that time the wages income they had was from the wife’s work. The nature of his work changed over the years but he has remained in full time employment to this day. He presently works with the Queensland Government. He has contributed to superannuation since he began employment in 2000.
15.
The wife continued to work until prior to the birth of their daughter in September 2001. After the birth, there were differences about finances and she took up work in the hospitality industry for a number of hours on Sundays. She later resigned from her position when the time available in the hospitality industry increased to 20 hours per week. Over time she undertook other income earning activities such as home selling through direct selling companies. She also did courses, such as a TAFE course in interior design in 2000, though she did not complete it, and other courses such as cake icing were not directed to income earning. When she was in work, contributions were made to her superannuation fund.
16.
When their relationship broke down in 2002 the husband made the decision to separate their finances. As he explained it, thereafter he paid the wife a weekly allowance, from the allowance he deducted her share of mutual expenses including a contribution to the mortgage instalments, and he covered his share of costs for groceries. He maintained an excel spreadsheet tracking weekly incomings and outgoings.
17.
Indeed, the subject of money and their different attitudes about it were an issue, at least so far as the wife is concerned. As an example of the problem, she relates having spent $2 on a toy for the child which made the husband furious. However, for him the issue was not that she spent the money but that she had acted contrary to the advice they had been given in counselling to concentrate on doing ‘we’ things and the purchase of the toy was something they might have gone out and bought together. From his point of view it is an example of her ‘inability to share their child’. He disputes being ‘furious’ and says they were both angry. Nonetheless, the wife maintains he was controlling about money, reflected in his insistence that she account to him for everything put on the credit card used to purchase food and pay for household expenditure. Yet the husband denies it. He says he maintained the finances, it was good practice to cross off the credit card item with dockets for purchases, and if dockets were unavailable then it was only reasonable any expenditure be verified with her.
18.
Quite early in the relationship they made the decision to purchase a home and the husband sold some of his investments to pay the deposit which, as best both recall, was 20% of the purchase price. For all the mass of detail in the accounts given of their relationship, there is no evidence of what they paid for their first home at A [the wife thinks it was $163,000], nor of the next property, and nor for the home at M they now own [she thinks it was $273,000]. Whatever the case, it seems to be accepted they made a profit on each transaction and, it may be inferred, the agreed current value of the M home is greater than the purchase price.
19.
Around the time of the purchase of the first home, the husband paid out both car loans from his capital: over $11,000 for her loan and $10,000 for his.
20.
It is accepted that some work was undertaken on the first home they bought, though from the description given it was not extensive, and there was some planting in the garden. There was also work undertaken on the second home including renovation of the bathroom, painting and again improvement was made to the garden. The M home was quite large with four bedrooms and work was done to improve it in a number of ways. Without being exhaustive, this included replacement of windows more in keeping with the style of the home and second hand windows were bought and restored for that purpose; a door was put in a wall and the work made good after installation by finishing and painting; carpet was removed; door handles replaced; some painting was done; and efforts were made to fix a water problem, apparently unsuccessfully, as well as work undertaken in the garden to improve the general setting of the home.
21.
Some assistance was given with the work of one kind or another by the wife’s parents, who had moved from Y to T around June 2003. It is accepted that the wife did some of the work herself and it is also accepted that the husband assisted to the extent he was able. On his own evidence, he helped with the preparation of the foundation for paving, he removed carpet, he did some minor building work, he replaced locks, and he assisted with some of the heavier gardening. That said, the evidence overall left the impression that the greater force behind the refurbishments came more from the wife with assistance from her family.
22.
As for other chores, the husband says and it is accepted, he did basic repair jobs around the house, he mowed the lawn, and he did some of the washing, cooking and cleaning as well as the basic maintenance for their cars. He managed their joint finances and he did the wife’s tax returns. The wife, it is accepted, also undertook domestic chores associated with the running of the household and she attended to the garden.
23.
There is dispute about the sharing of responsibilities for their daughter’s care after her birth in September 2001 and plainly differences in approach to parenting emerged quite early in the piece. There was an incident during their brief separation in mid-2002 when the child was still an infant which unfortunately was an indicator of things still to come. Put briefly, the decision to separate having been made, they arranged to change over the child’s care at the residence of friends, Mr and Mrs D. But on the first occasion this was to occur the husband arrived to take the child with the intention of going to his mother’s place, the wife gave no indication she would relinquish the child to him, so he took the child from her. They disagree about the force he used to achieve this; suffice to say he maintains he did so ‘gently’ and was ‘incredibly sensitive’ to the situation. Asked about the incident in cross-examination, he repeated the explanation given in his affidavit, adding there was no easy way of dealing with the situation. It seems not to have occurred to him that the solution might have been to walk away and not subject the child to a tug of war, gentle or otherwise, and of course the same could be said of the wife maintaining her resistance. Before the evening’s events came to an end the wife told him she had called the police, though it seems an arrangement was ultimately agreed without actual police intervention.
24.
The husband is demonstrably concerned to establish the nature of his close involvement with the child’s care from the outset. He emphasises his sole responsibility for her at weekends and public holidays when the wife was at work during the day and at night when she was attending courses or at meetings and the like. He also emphasises the extent of his involvement during the long separation in 2003 which he insists was a shared care arrangement. A fragment of his evidence about the period before their separation reflects something of his point of view:
‘…(before the final separation he was) away from the house and from [the child] for no more than 100 hours (including travelling time) – therefore, in a fortnight, [the child]…was with me for 70 % of each fortnight. Similarly, [the wife] was away from the house and hence [the child].. for around 56 hours – therefore, in a fortnight, [the child]…was with her for 84 % of each fortnight.’
25.
Such precision about the division of labour and attention given to their daughter as a baby and infant before they separated is unnecessary. Reviewed overall, the evidence suggests, and I find, both parents were keen to be involved with their daughter, they were involved to the extent their other commitments permitted, they both took a share of responsibility for her care in the many ways necessary when they were available to do so, and certainly neither falls into the category of absent or disinterested parent by any means. For a young child of the daughter’s age the pre-separation arrangements are important, but they are less significant than the more recent history of her parental care because that has more implications for identification of the nature and quality of her current relationships and attachments. It should also be noted that the child’s paternal grandmother was involved in her care regularly when both parents were working, though that ceased on separation.
26.
Since separation there have been various developments relevant to both property and parenting. Those relevant to property can be recorded fairly briefly:
a) While the husband has occupied the M home he has paid the mortgage instalments and rates, he has maintained the house, and he has paid all the other expenses related to his occupation.
b) He had two superannuation funds, both established during the relationship, and he rolled one into the other. He has obviously continued to contribute in the intervening period. Just before their final separation he contributed $1,000 to the wife’s superannuation fund.
c) They have a life policy covering the lives of each and their daughter is the beneficiary under the policy. The husband has continued to pay the premiums and wishes to maintain the policy but the wife wants it cancelled. As she sees it, she will take out insurance on her own life for her daughter’s benefit if she sees fit.
d) According to his financial statement, which is unchallenged, the husband earns around $63,300 per annum gross. He has other income from dividends and interest and receives a small amount by way of government benefits. Apart from his obligations related to the ownership of the M home he has no property related financial commitments. He pays child support as assessed, currently $143 per week.
e) As for the wife, she is not presently in paid work. She has done some domestic cleaning but a good deal of her time is spent doing voluntary work in her mother’s business which markets clothing for older women. On her account of it, the business is not yet sufficiently viable to provide her with a salary but she hopes that will change in the future and she will be able to derive an income from her efforts. Her current income consists of government benefits and child support paid by the husband. She has the benefit of accommodation with her parents who also pay her household expenses and petrol amounting to $50 per week [see Part F, financial statement].
27.
Turning to parenting matters, on 6 December 2004 the husband instituted the current proceedings in the Federal Magistrates Court. During the preceding months there had been continual differences about what was best for the child in their changed circumstances which they attempted to address, unsuccessfully as it happens, through mediation which concluded around September. This unsettled state of affairs took place against a background of the husband endeavouring to establish what he saw as a continuation of the pre-separation shared care. In other words, he would care for the child on weekends and public holidays [relevant to a later development in May 2005] and his mother would look after her one day a week. His view about it, at least as to part, is reflected in this passage of his affidavit:
‘Under the arrangement achieved through mediation (since September 2004 to the interim orders of 30 June 2005), [the child] was with the wife] for 70 % of the fortnight (coincidentally the amount of time that [the child] was used to having me around) and [the child] was with me for 30 % of the time.
Proposals The mother’s time The father’s time
Before final separation 84% 70%
My proposal on day of separation 57% 43%
[the mother’s] proposal received 19/7/04 79% 21%
Plan since Sept 2004 to June 2005 70% 30%’
28.
His concerns about achieving a continuation of the pre-separation arrangements are set out fully in his affidavit where, amongst other things, he relates urging the to focus on what is best for their daughter, to work together, to not be so restrictive, he reminded her they can do things together, and he told her that as time goes on there will be events they will both want to be involved in, and surely an effort could be made to enjoy those occasions rather than put their daughter ‘into an unenviable position where she has to decide who she wants to sit with’.
29.
However he saw the child’s interests being served following separation, his proposals did not meet with the approval of the wife who saw them as inconsistent with the child’s need for stability and routine as well as impracticable given the distance between their residences. Added to that, she maintains she had to contend with the husband’s manner towards her which she describes as ‘bullying’ and ‘condescending’. She would adhere to these descriptors about his manner of relating to her right up to the hearing, but perhaps an illustration of the latter might be this passage from the husband’s evidence about his efforts post separation to convince her to his point of view:
‘I have also regularly provided [the wife] with reading material and research summaries to back up my reading in the hope that she may be better informed when making decisions about [the child’s] best interests. [The wife] stated that she was not interested in research. I can recall giving [my wife] a few articles and showing her articles to support what I was saying (BN# 39). In August 2004, I prepared a three-page summary (BC) for [the wife] to address her concerns about the volume of articles that I had researched. I do not recall offering [the wife]anything further.’
30.
In these early months before Court proceedings began to regulate the child’s arrangements, there were other developments which only need to be recorded now in a summary way:
a) The child’s 3rd birthday in September 2004 turned into an unpleasant experience. There was elaborate detail given by the husband of proposals and suggestions about how and where it would be celebrated, different versions emerged about where it was anticipated the gift giving would occur, there was dispute about whether the husband was angry gifts were opened earlier than he anticipated, and ultimately there was unpleasantness about the simple issue of what gifts the child should take to her mother’s and if some should go with her father to his place.
b) In a deteriorating climate, the husband decided to keep the child overnight on a Sunday evening in October. As he explained it, he was not prepared to see his time further eroded and thus the child would have the ‘absolute minimum’ of four nights a fortnight with him. He received a letter a couple of days later from the wife’s solicitor in which it was alleged he had committed domestic violence when he had advised the wife he would be keeping the child overnight. He takes exception to this allegation. He denies being violent then or at any other time in his relationship with the wife. He also denies her allegations of intimidating behaviour during the relationship, such as thumping the bench in front of her during disagreement, though he says he does recall times of frustration with her and difficulties getting her attention. He points out he has never sought or required the services of a psychologist in the course of his employment and, contrary to her evidence, his moods did not and do not swing violently and unpredictably. Such allegations, he maintains, are inconsistent with his character - a topic that falls within Dr V’s evidence and so can be left for later discussion.
c) In any event, the husband also sought early in the separation to establish block periods to be spent with the child during school holidays when he would adjust his work commitments. To that end, in late September he advised the wife by letter of a holiday he had booked for later in the year and there was a deal of correspondence exchanged about the topic. But just prior to his departure for the holiday he received a message from the wife that the holiday would not be happening and if he wanted to know more to ring the police. He was also contacted by the police. What had occurred was a suggestion that the child may have been sexually abused and the authorities were notified. The suggestion came from Mr D, a friend of the parents, who the husband says had written books about the issue of sexual abuse of children which he was trying to get published. In any event, Mr D had relayed to the wife concerns about the child’s supposed behaviour towards him, summarised by Ms J in her first report like this -
‘..[Mr [D] had] described how [the child] had stroked the inside of his thigh towards his genitals, at the same time looking up at him and seemingly waiting for a response. This had taken place on three different occasions.’
There had also been remarks about friends having observed the husband ‘tongue-kissing’ the child at a wedding attended after separation. Mr D had advised the wife to take the child to a doctor, which she did, and the doctor referred the matter to the appropriate authorities. From there the wife was interviewed and the child examined. The police interviewed the husband on 5 December, with his full co-operation. There was no substantiation of any wrongdoing, by him or anyone else, towards the child. It was at that point the husband instituted the current proceedings.
d) Like the allegation of domestic violence, the husband sees the allegation as directed towards limiting his time with the child. He sees the difficulties he had negotiating with the wife as related to her efforts to thwart his time with the child and his involvement in her life and he also points to the timing of the intervention on the eve of the occasion he was to take the child on the planned holiday. Rather than support and encourage time and involvement, he sees the wife as trying to reduce their time together and to cut him out of the child’s life as much as possible.
(e) The wife denies the allegation of suspected abuse was motivated by mala fides on her part and she also denies trying to cut him out of the child’s life. It is her case she was genuinely motivated by concern in taking the steps she did after Mr D’s intervention and only did what she had been advised to do, as was appropriate to the circumstances confronting her. As for trying to limit the husband’s involvement with the child, from her perspective the problem lies with the husband’s personality and his manner of communication which she finds obsessive, over detailed, intrusive and relentless. She finds it impossible to maintain with him any boundaries or sense of proportion in matters concerning their daughter and she experiences the frequency and style of his communications as a form of harassment which she has to cope with constantly. She also finds his actions and demeanour in getting his point across to be intimidating at times, making impossible effective communication where she can make her voice heard.
31.
On 14 February 2005 interim orders provided for residence in favour of the mother. Contact between the child and her father was expressed to be at times agreed but not less than alternate weekends from 8am Friday until 7pm Sunday and Wednesday overnight every alternate week, from 8am Sunday until 10am Monday commencing 5 March 2005 and each alternate week thereafter. Telephone communication was set for three times a week at times specified. Those orders also provided for the appointment of a child representative and at some point a Family Report was ordered.
32.
The orders did not bring an end to dispute about parental matters. They could not agree on the child’s kindergarten enrolment for 2005. There were differences about whether she would be involved in a program about separated families, called ‘[S]’, amongst others, though the husband would not frame the differences on that topic as ‘disagreement’. Disagreement did occur, however, between the husband and the kindergarten staff about his presence there. That led to action he took in the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal about their views on the extent of his involvement in the kindergarten. As he explained the surrounding circumstances, after being interviewed by Dr V he had some time and rang the kindergarten to ask if he could help out, they rejected his offer telling him there was a new policy, and he felt discriminated against.
33.
The interim orders did not make any provision for special occasions such as Mother’s Day and, when that occasion arose in May, the child did not spend the day with her mother but with her father. In the lead up to that date there was a raft of correspondence between the parties’ solicitors in which the husband agitated adherence to an agreement reached the previous September about holidays and public holidays being spent with him and he sought to have the mother commit to that agreement. She would not do so, apparently taking the view that the interim orders superseded any earlier agreement. Unable to achieve his goal, the husband did not permit the child to spend the day with her mother unless the mother agreed he would henceforth have the child all of the public holidays. Rather than paraphrase them, his reasons are probably best explained in his own words:
‘282. I, in good faith and based on the September 2004 agreement, had been of the understanding that [the wife] was continuing to permit [the child] time with me over the public holidays and school holidays. I was already concerned that if [the child] were to remain with [the wife] on Mothers' Day, in accordance with the September 2004 agreement, that [the child] would go for eight whole days without having any time with me other than by telephone. However, I reasoned that this time would be compensated for eventually through the upcoming public holiday time in June and August. When [the wife] indicated that she had no intention to honour the agreement made in September 2004 and that she was simply going to comply with the minimum time provided for in the court order of 14 February 2005, I felt that I needed to rethink the merit of permitting [the wife] to have time with [the child] for the whole of Mothers' Day. I believe the agreement of September 2004 to be still valid, until both parties agree on a negotiated alternative agreement or the court determines otherwise. I felt that I had no mechanism to insist on compliance with the September agreement, and so I no longer viewed that it was in [the child’s] best interests for me to consent to a further reduction of the time that [the child] was to have with me, by [the wife] having [the child] for the whole of Mothers Day (without an agreement for appropriate compensatory time).’
34.
Taken to the topic in cross-examination, the husband emphasised the long history of public holidays being spent in his care and that he wanted some form of security from the wife who was insisting on adhering to the terms of the orders [on the one hand] yet asking for a departure from them [on the other] to have Mother’s Day with the child when the orders made no mention of the occasion. As he put it, she could not have it both ways.
35.
Interviews for the first Family Report were conducted later in May. At the time, the husband was maintaining a proposal for equal shared time. If that was thought undesirable by reason of the degree of conflict, he proposed being the parent with the majority of the time and the mother would have close to half time. He identified this outcome as warranted by his ability to be more cooperative than the wife. The wife was maintaining what was described as the ‘more conventional arrangement’ of every second weekend from Friday afternoon to Sunday afternoon and a couple of hours in between those visits. Major issues identified by the reporter were the conflict between the parents and the child’s primary attachment and relationships with each parent. After giving an account of the interviews conducted, she recorded her assessment of the child as a ‘delightful, spontaneous little girl, confident for her age … curious and enjoys exploring her environment …fairly easy-going personality … meeting all of her milestones’. Summarising her opinion, she noted the mother’s view of the father as controlling and his anger if she did not consult him on every issue, however big or small. Ms J said there was some support for this dynamic from her own observations. She noted the husband’s view of the wife as unco-operative bout the division of the child’s time and yet she noted he had not consulted the wife over things such as riding horses or flying interstate. Ms J assessed the child’s primary attachment being to her mother from whom, she said, the child derives her ‘inner sense of security’. She said the child is flourishing in her development and needs to continue living with her mother. At the same time she assessed a warm and loving relationship between the child and her father, and this also needed the opportunity to flourish and develop. But she did not support the husband’s proposal for equal shared care. She regarded the conflict between the parents as seriously problematic, commenting that something as straightforward but nonetheless critical to a young child - bedtime routine - was a source of dispute. On what she had available to her, she recommended the child spend every second weekend with her father from Saturday morning until Sunday afternoon and in the other week she spend one overnight if this fitted in with his work hours and her kindergarten and later her pre-school. She considered the weekends could increase by starting on Friday afternoons around Christmas 2005 and when the child reaches school age it could extend to Monday morning, though the overnight in the other week would cease at this time because of the distance involved and the disruption to her school week. Finally, holiday contact should not be for longer than one week at a time until the end of her first year at school.
36.
After the release of the Report the matter came back to Court and further interim orders were made by consent on 30 June 2005. The residence order continued and the recommendations of the reporter were implemented. Contact with the husband was agreed to be ‘at all reasonable times as may be agreed’ but to include these times:
‘(a) Each alternate weekend from Saturday 9.30am to Sunday 5pm commencing from Saturday 16 July 2005, such contact to continue until 31 December 2005.
(b) Subject to the father being available to supervise the child during this time and subject to the child’s pre school schedule, each other week, from Wednesday 5.30pm to Thursday 5.30pm commencing from Wednesday 6 July 2005.
(c) With respect to subparagraph (a) herein, from the father’s first contact weekend in January 2006, he shall have the child from Friday at 5pm until Sunday at 5pm, each alternate weekend PROVIDED THAT once the child commences Year 1 at primary school, the weekend contact shall be from Friday after school at 3pm until Monday at school at 8.45am, each alternate weekend.
(d) Once [the child] commences Year 1 at primary school, the mid week overnight contact referred to in subparagraph (b) herein shall cease.’
37.
Provision was also made for telephone contact once a week on Mondays from 6pm to 6.15pm, for Father’s Day, Mother’s Day, birthdays, and half of the school holidays [provided until year 2 the holidays were to be for period of no more than one week duration], and there were agreed arrangements for the Christmas period. The husband was to do the travelling, each were to keep the other informed about residential address and phone numbers and they were directed to undergo psychiatric assessments arranged by the child representative.
38.
In October 2005 they started to keep a communication book which was obviously an attempt to assist in bridging the poor state of their communications and presumably to aid the child’s interests by having information relevant to her care relayed from one to the other. The first entry on 13 October relates to the return of a necklace followed by the husband seeking the wife’s opinion on the child’s remark that she has no friends at kindy. There are now two books [exhibit 3] containing many entries directed to one topic or another, the last dated 27 January 2007. Disputes were agitated here about the book’s purpose and the interpretation of entries. Certainly the book is now regarded by the wife as an ineffective communication tool and she has recently declined to use it. She would have it accepted that her description of the husband’s style of communication as ‘bullying’ and ‘harassing’ is apparent from his entries which also demonstrate his insistence on communicating on all manner of things, however small. For his part, the husband supports the continued use of the book which, he agrees, was implemented because they could not communicate otherwise. He says he also finds it useful if things are written down because he can rely on it later and refer to it to show what happened. Indeed, large parts of his affidavit include passages quoted from the book about one topic or another. He also commented during discussion of the book that it would be a record of the child’s life by showing developments along the way. The irony of that seems not to have been recognised.
39.
Dr V conducted interviews in mid-October 2005 and he produced his first report in November. After giving an account of the interview with each parent, he said the results of mental state examination demonstrated both to be ‘a study in contrasts’, an observation borne out by their presentation at the hearing. As for the husband, he found him pleasant and co-operative but difficult to engage or get to know as a person. He said he is ‘markedly obsessional and tended to get buried in intricate detail including of conversations’ which was at times difficult to contain, he was described as well organised but not good at expressing his feeling and could be said to have the characteristic of alexithymia, but he has some capacity for thoughtfulness about issues. Dr V found no evidence of depression or anxiety, though certainly a very controlled individual with respect to his feelings and fairly humourless. He was focussed on the child’s need to have a meaningful relationship with him and he believed the mother to be obstructing this. His cognitive functions were intact and he has a superior IQ.
40.
As for the wife, Dr V described her as very pleasant and co-operative, a fairly engaging person with well developed social skills, rich in affect but not histrionic. He assessed her as thoughtful and mature, with a capacity for self-reflection. Nor was there any evidence of depression or anxiety in her presentation, she was reactive and warm and had a sense of humour. She too was centred on the welfare of the child and her role. She was ‘not entirely critical of her ex-partner as a father’ though convinced shared care would not work. Her cognitive functions were intact and he assessed her as having normal intelligence.
41.
From this footing, his provisional diagnosis was that neither suffers from any major mental disorder such as psychosis, mood disorder, anxiety disorder or organic mental state. As he saw it, the issue was personality. On that topic, he said:
‘With respect to the mother, […] on the data available personality issues would seem to fall in the normal range. The only issue of note is some problems in maintaining relationships and from her own description the relationship history indicates engaging with males who have significant problems. This may indicate a need to nurture and "change" men who have difficulties. Apart from this there is nothing else that emerges on the history. The suspicion that her child had been sexually abused does not appear to have emerged from any psychopathological issues or illness on her part but, as is often the case in false accusations of child sexual abuse in the Family Court situation, the idea appears to have been implanted by an individual she looked up to and was presumed to have some knowledge and expertise.
With respect to the father, […], there are significant personality vulnerabilities that have presumably arisen out of the more unfortunate aspects of the developmental history. He presents as a fairly emotionally restricted individual. He is also highly obsessional and controlled with difficulty in accessing his emotions and expressing them. As to whether the personality vulnerabilities are of an extent as to constitute disorder is a matter of judgement and would require further information.’
42.
After consulting documents provided, including the Family Report, he did not alter his diagnosis and added:
‘…..I note that the relationship between the parents is highly conflictual with claims and counter claims, some on issues that do not appear to be of great importance. Such a degree of conflict may indicate that the personality issues in both the parties are more significant than emerges from the clinical interview.
I trust the following points are useful.
• The father does not suffer from any mental disorder that would preclude him from being a contact parent and in any case this is not in dispute. I note further that the personality issues in him are not such as to of themselves make him an unsuitable parent for a shared care arrangement. There is nothing to suggest that he will not take good care of the child or be a nurturing parent.
• Likewise there is nothing of psychiatric significance in the mother that would preclude her being an effective mother in the care of the child.
• It would seem to me the most significant issue with respect to a shared care situation is the level of conflict and distrust between the parents. It would seem to me that there has to be at least a modicum of co-operation between the parents for a shared care arrangement to work.
• The question of whether it is in the best interests of the child to be in a shared care arrangement as against standard contact with one of the parents as the residential parent is of course a matter that only a Court can determine taking all issues into account. Psychiatric status can only be a small part of such a decision.’
43.
In 2006 the child moved to pre-school and again there were disputes about this. He says that without consulting him, the wife elected to have her attend on certain days of the week which would mean she would be at preschool on one of the days she was to be with him under the orders. The wife denies he was left out of the loop and did have the opportunity to have input into the days of attendance. In any event, the husband saw the days selected as restricting the child’s weekday time with him while there were no corresponding restrictions on the weekday time she would spend with her mother. He made the decision to not take her to preschool on those days. Asked under cross-examination about the decision, he gave an elaborate reply, the core of it being that her attendance would cut across his time every second Wednesday/Thursday, it came down to deciding whether it was more important for her to attend preschool or spend the day with him and he opted for the latter. He said he was concerned about the impact on the child of not attending on those days, but he kept in touch with the teachers who said she was performing well and there were things he did with her on those days anyway.
44.
The decision, of course, is one about which parents might reasonably disagree and there is no criticism of the husband for the election he made. Nonetheless it sits a little at odds with his strongly expressed desire to be involved in all aspects of the child’s activities and life and to demonstrate to her his interest in her education. Taking her to preschool on those days and picking her up may have given him the opportunity to be involved and to share with her the many things that can arise out of those comings and goings.
45.
2006 also saw further discord about holiday time and again a passage from the husband’s affidavit is a but a fragment reflecting something of the nature of the issue:
‘314. When the communication book was next returned, on Friday 28 July 2006, [the wife] had written a proposal in relation to September school holidays. In response, I wrote in the communication book on Sunday 30 July 2006: "In your proposal, you are short-changing [the child]. If you are counting holiday time from Friday 5pm, then you need to count holiday time from break up to the time [the child] goes back to school at 9am. If you divide that time by 2, you will find that [the child] is entitled to more time with me. You cannot have it both ways. Are you going to give [the child] the minimum the Court Orders provide for (as per my proposal) or offer [the child] more time with me'? Your proposal breaches the current court orders. I propose you reconsider my proposal or add on the additional time that [the child] is entitled to from Su 7/10/06 at 5pm. Again, I also believe that you should share the travelling costs and time equally or in proportion to the amount of time [the child] is with you.’
46.
Asked about his attitude to holiday time in cross-examination, the husband would not agree with the suggestion that he is concerned with the minutiae whereas the wife takes a broader view. As he explained, the holiday period is for 16 days, plainly 8 days is the minimum time which should be spent with him, for the child the 1 day is substantial as it is equal to 25% of the time, and the child is entitled to share it with him. On this reasoning, he cannot understand why she cannot be more generous and why she maintained the period should be ‘one week’. But as counsel for the ICL had him acknowledge, the terms of the interim orders refer to ‘one week’ as the duration of school holiday time with him and not 8 days.
47.
In anticipation of the October hearing an order was made for an updated Family Report which was released in mid-August. Noting no changes in the parents’ circumstances since the last report, Ms J recorded a summary of her interviews which needs no replication here, but she did note the husband’s presentation seemed to be more ‘constrained and balanced, suggesting that he has gained improved insight into advancing [the child’s] needs and lessening his contribution to the ongoing parental conflict’ though she added he was still not able to see the locked conflict he and the wife fall into. She also noted a change in the wife’s presentation which she said had ‘swung in the opposite direction’ and she was ‘forthright and strong-minded’ in her views. She was described as very protective of the child and in no doubt her approach is the right one. Her attitude to the child’s fall from a horse while in her father’s care [a topic canvassed with both parents at the hearing] was the subject of comment, as was her attitude about sending Panadol with the child on a visit to her father. Ms J concluded the wife over reacts and she commented on their different parenting styles about accidents and ailments being interpreted as parenting failure. She elaborated on their views about the pre-school dispute and she noted the communication book had been the subject of argument about its function. She assessed the child on this occasion again as a ‘bright, spontaneous little girl with a charming, outgoing personality … happy temperament … socially confident for her age.’ She concluded the child loves both parents dearly and she is ‘observably happy to be in the company of either of them.’ On the topic of time with each parent, the child was said to be clear about wanting to spend more time with her father. Ms J summarised the parents’ future plans and their perspective on the child’s interests before expressing these opinions:
‘The father is preoccupied with his goal of having [the child] live with each of them on an equal basis or, alternatively, live with him as the primary parent. He states that he devotes all of his time outside work hours and time with [the child] to this task.
The mother seeks a reduction in the father's involvement because of what she sees as his irresponsibility.
It is my view that she transfers her personal view of him to her view of him as a parent. She is a very protective, cautious mother and her standards and expectations in this regard appear to be much higher than those of the general community.
The father has controlling, obsessive qualities and there is no clear indication that he understands how this contributes to parental conflict. For her part, the mother's convictions about what is right and wrong in parenting are unassailable, and now seemingly contribute equally to the parental conflict.
It is my view that both parents have sound parenting skills and that each, on his/her own, would take good care of [the child].
I have considered shared care but I cannot support the proposal in the light of this serious conflict.
[The child] has been in the primary care of her mother for the whole of her life. She is flourishing. I can see no strong reason to support a change in who she lives with. The exception to this might be the mother's reluctance to promote [the child’s] relationship with her father. Having said this, [the child] has always gone to each visit and the mother has fostered the child's happiness about the idea.
I do not support the mother's view that visits need to be lessened. The level of disruption that [the child] has experienced upon return is normal in the light of her age and circumstances.
[The child] asks to spend more time with her father.
I would be happy to recommend that [the child] spend up to five days per fortnight with her father. There are practical problems in this regard because of the distance between their respective homes. I would not like to see [the child] undertaking long travel periods before and after school in order for this division to take place.’
48.
There was then a further report from Dr V in late January 2007 after interviews with the parents in early December. The husband had asked the independent children’s lawyer to forward to Dr V an article about the psychological consequences of wrongful conviction and imprisonment [exhibit 2]. The husband explained the article was relevant to consideration of how the impact of the allegations of sexual abuse and domestic violence on him and on his presentation at interview. On one view of it, his concern about the impact is understandable and there is no reason to doubt it was a traumatic development for him to have to confront, but - as was put to him by counsel for the ICL - it was quite a leap from what had actually occurred to an article about wrongful conviction and imprisonment.
49.
In any event, after canvassing the interviews and the parents’ circumstances and attitudes, Dr V gave this assessment of their mental state:
‘I note that both parties presented somewhat differently from their previous presentations.
With respect to [the wife] I note that she was pleasant and co-operative but also quite wary of the interview situation although this seemed to settle with time. On one hand she was keen to talk but had difficulty addressing certain issues. I note a certain importuning quality with respect to her concern about the father and contact.
With respect to mood and affect, there was no evidence of depression or anxiety. Her affect was reactive and I note that she was tearful at times with respect to the impact of contact on the child and the father's allegations.
In her thought content I note she was concerned about the father "teaching the child to lie" and she was convinced that he would make life difficult for anyone she was involved with, hence her need to be protective about her current relationship.
It was difficult to be certain about what her precise attitude was to contact as she seemed ambivalent on this issue and I was concerned that she preferred there be no contact. She certainly seemed conflicted on this issue compared to previously.
Her cognitive functions were intact. There was no evidence of psychosis and I considered she was of normal intelligence.
With respect to [the husband] I note he was co-operative with the process but nevertheless quite tense throughout and ill at ease.
I note that he was much more animated at this interview compared to previously. He tended to argumentativeness about the issues. I also note that he had prepared a document which he had left in my mail box some time prior to the interview. I did not read the document prior to the interview and he was disappointed at this.
With respect to mood and affect, there was no evidence of depression or anxiety. On this occasion he displayed more affect in terms of making his feelings known. Although not depressed, he was clearly not happy with the current situation.
In his thought content he focussed on the mother deliberately making things difficult so as to sabotage any possibility of shared care. He was of the opinion that a shared care arrangement was workable if the mother was given clear direction on this. He believed a shared care arrangement was ideal for the child but was seeking a change of residency on the grounds of the mother's obstructiveness.
I note also he was concerned that he had been misrepresented with respect to his character and personality and that he had been open with respect to psychiatric evaluation while the mother has not.
His cognitive functions were intact. There was no evidence of psychosis and I note again that he was of superior intelligence.
50.
He again rejected any major mental disorder and went on to say again:
‘….The only issue then is with respect to personality and there are so many issues of fact that it is difficult to be confident with respect to personality issues relying entirely on the party's accounts of their own functioning and life.
With respect to the father, as noted in the mental state, his presentation on this occasion was somewhat different from previously. He was more animated and showed more affect. I note again the argumentativeness and again there was a need for control. I note however that he was child focussed in that he recognised the importance of the mother to the child and considered that the best interests of the child was to have a meaningful relationship with both parents. He is seeking a change of residence on the grounds the mother was obstructing his relationship with the child. He was confident that he and the mother could make a shared care arrangement work once it became clear to the mother that her being obstructive would be looked on unfavourably by the Court.
With respect to the mother, her presentation was also different from the earlier interview. I note she was a lot more anxious and quicker to show distress. As with the father, a need for control seems to dominate her thinking at this interview. I note that she wants an extraordinary degree of control as to what occurs when the child is in the care of her father. She is unable to accept that the father could be just as concerned as her about his daughter suffering any injury and her taking the child to a doctor following the "horse incident" when the child was in the care of the father illustrates this. I was particularly concerned at this interview that the mother seems to be taking a position that contact was in fact undesirable. It is certainly difficult to get a definitive statement from her as to desirability of contact. She states she wants the current arrangements to continue but adds several "buts".’
51.
After perusing documents provided [the updated Family Report was not amongst them] and commenting briefly on that, he gave these opinions:
‘Pending further information, in particular the report of [Ms J], which may cause me to change the opinion expressed here, I trust that the following points are useful to the Court.
1. Clearly there is considerable conflict between the parents with accusations and counter-accusations and dispute of fact. I would suggest that this conflict stems from both parents' need for control and it seems they both seek a highly enmeshed relationship with the child. This may be more the case with respect to the mother in that the father at least overtly acknowledges the important role of the mother in the care of the child.
2. Neither of the parties suffers from any psychiatric illness that would preclude them from being residential parents. Likewise the personality issues are not such as to contra-indicate either of the parties having the child live with them for substantial periods of time. It follows from this that there is no psychiatric contra-indication to either of the parties being contact parents. It is not clear whether the question of contact is in any case in dispute. If not in dispute, the mother is certainly ambivalent.
3. The question of the best interests of the child with respect to which parent she lives with, is essentially a matter only a Court can decide having taken into account all the issues and made findings with respect to dispute of fact after evidence has been tested. A psychiatric evaluation will necessarily form only a small part of what a Court must take into consideration.
With respect to the question of a "shared care" arrangement of some sort, or a "shared parenting" arrangement, and whether this is in the best interests of the child is again a matter which only a Court can decide. All that I can say as a Psychiatrist having evaluated both parties twice is that there are no psychiatric factors that would preclude such an arrangement. Furthermore neither of the parties suffers from any psychiatric problem that would preclude them from working with the other in such a situation for the benefit of the child.’
52.
Dr V gave further evidence at the hearing, but there was nothing of any substance that led to any shift from his reported views. At one point a number of matters arising from the evidence and related to the child’s actions were put to him for his re-consideration, but he explained the cluster of factors put were insufficiently reliable to support a diagnosis of Personality Disorder and he adhered to his view that they reflect personality issues rather than illness.
53.
The child started school earlier this year. In the lead up to that there was again disagreement about her enrolment. Last year each parent booked her into different schools before coming to an interim agreement pending the anticipated hearing last October. As the hearing was not reached and no further hearing was scheduled before the school year began, the decision was made for her to start with her present school.
54.
Ms J’s third report was released on 25 February. She noted no significant changes in the parents’ circumstances or in the conflict in their relationship. Communication was virtually negligible and communication by book had come to an end at the wife’s instance. The child was again assessed as ‘delightful’ and enjoying loving relationships with both of her parents. Later she gave this opinion:
‘I find it difficult to offer any further assistance than I have previously done.
1 support [Dr V’s] concerns that each parent is controlling and that each seeks a highly enmeshed relationship with [the child], who is precious to both of them. It appears likely that the mother would prefer a means of excluding the father altogether but that she is cautious about expressing her views in this regard. The father is accepting of the mother's continued role and importance in [the child’s] life.
The father believes that the mother could communicate with him effectively on a shared-care basis but that she will continue to be unwilling to do so unless she is forced to do this via Court Orders setting such an arrangement in place.
In my opinion, it is arguable that she is unwilling rather than unable to communicate with the father. She has seemingly made very little endeavour whatsoever to try. On the other hand, I am mindful that the father's obsessive manner is liable to result in little issues as well as big issues needing to be discussed at exceptional length.
I remain of the view that a 9-day/5-day split is the best alternative, I am conscious however that more of the parents respective functioning may become clearer at the Final Hearing and that this recommendation might need to be reviewed.
If it were the case that the Court maintained something akin to the current arrangement, I would support the paternal grandmother's wish for special time with [the child] in her own right of, say, a total of 7 days annually out of the mother's time with [the child].’
55.
At the outset of her evidence at the hearing, Ms J said she had changed her views about the outcome and she put forward a different recommendation to the 9/5 split of the fortnight: sole parental responsibility be given to the mother; during school terms, if the father lives more than 20 minutes from the child’s school the child spend time with him every second weekend from Friday after school until before school Monday; if the father lives within 20 minutes of her school but more than 10 klms from the mother’s residence, the time be extended to before school Tuesday. She identified the travel as a significant issue for the child and also the need for boundaries limiting the proximity of the parents’ residences.
56.
The change resulted from a conference the previous day with the ICL who, she explained, had outlined at some length the evidence given at the hearing. The picture formed from the ICL’s description suggested to Ms J that the husband was continuing to be obsessive and controlling in his approach to the wife, with no insight into the impact of it, and he was unable to acknowledge her strengths and capacities. She had reviewed her earlier thinking about whether the mother was ‘unwilling or unable’ to deal with the father’s communication and demands. She had earlier thought it ‘arguable’, but the ICL’s description of the mother under cross-examination by the husband led her to the view that she is ‘unable’ rather than ‘unwilling’ to deal with his manner and behaviour. Shared parenting, she said, could not work because communication, fundamental to its effectiveness, is going to fail dismally. She had thought the 9/5 split of the fortnight would work with specific orders in place, but she now thinks that over-optimistic and she sees a need to revert to a more limited division of the child’s time. As the child has a close, secure relationship with her mother, there is no basis for shifting her primary care to her father, and therefore Ms J concluded the mother ought to have sole parental responsibility and have the child for most of the time in her care. There is no doubting Ms J’s expertise or experience, but the process by which this change in opinion came about requires some consideration to be given of its weight.
57.
The often quoted passages from the judgment of Heydon JA (as he then was) in Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles (2001) 52 NSWLR 705 are directed more to matters concerned with admissibility of expert evidence, but also discusses the need for expert opinion not only to be based on specialised knowledge but on observed, assumed or accepted facts which must be identified and established so as to provide a proper foundation for the opinion advanced [see paragraph 85]. This discussion was called a ‘counsel of perfection’ by Branson J in the Full Court of the Federal Court case of Sydneywide Distributors Pty Ltd v Red Bull Australia Pty Ltd [2002] FAFC 157. The discussion in Makita was analysed by Spigelman CJ in ASIC v Rich (2005) NSWCA 152 where, more particularly, his Honour discussed the ‘asserted’ fact approach rather than the ‘true’ fact approach. The views of Branson J in Sydneywide Distributors were approved by the Full Court of this Court in Noetel and Quealey (2005) FLC 93-230 in this passage:
‘The Rules, and modern case law, emphasis the duty of the expert to the court, including the duty to provide an expert report based on the expert’s personal skill and expertise, and to clearly identify a reliable factual basis for opinions expressed.’ [my emphasis]
58.
Whatever the differences, running throughout these cases is discussion of the need for an expert to identify the facts and reasoning process on which the opinion is based so as to ‘enable the tribunal of fact to evaluate the opinions expressed’ and it is commonly accepted that the reliability of expert opinion is linked to and dependent upon the establishment of facts on which the opinion is based. Any shortcoming between assumed and established facts or any lack of transparency in the reasoning process of arriving at opinion from facts can only undermine the weight able to be attached to the opinion.
59.
Here, the reporter did provide a general basis for the change in her opinion; she attributed it to a lengthy discussion with the ICL about events at the hearing during previous days. Of course there is no property in a witness and there is absolutely nothing wrong with a discussion between the ICL and the expert. But this discussion gave the expert further ‘facts’ on which she relied to form an opinion different from that given in her final report. The account given of those additional ‘facts’ was cast in the broadest terms and so it is not known just what the expert was told [and plainly acted upon] and nor was there the opportunity to correct any inadvertent misstatement or offer a different perspective or interpretation of some piece of the evidence or line of questioning. Absent the information that formed the basis for the change of opinion [and resulting recommendation] there is no alternative but to attach little weight to it. It would be unfair to do otherwise. That said, in the final analysis when all of the evidence is reviewed and relevant assessments made, I do not disagree with the revised opinion. In fact, had Ms J sustained the recommendations set out in her third report, I would have found them difficult to support for reasons I trust will be apparent later.
60.
Before coming to the assessment of the child’s best interests and other matters relevant to the outcome, no reference has yet been made to some aspects of the history which featured in the evidence and that can be done now briefly though by no means exhaustively:
a) Telephone calls have been a constant source of difference. The discord is reflected in a number of communication book entries. One example where the husband put his concerns recently [30 December 2006] will suffice to illustrate one line of argument:
‘Can you tell [the child] that she is welcome to ring me anytime and that you are happy for her to do so? This will need some reinforcement from you as I do not think that [the child] has got the message that it is okay for her to ring me anytime and that it will NOT hurt your feelings or at least that you will support her wishes so that she feels free to do so.’
b) Trips have been made interstate by the husband and he did not tell the wife the child was accompanying him. Taken to the topic, the husband articulated concerns about her possibly preventing the trip, such as had occurred in December 2004, and he wanted the trip to Tasmania to be a surprise for the child. He says he would be happy in the future to tell her where the child is when she is with him.
c) There has been discord about medical consultations or consultation about visits to the doctor, whether linked to school sores and swimming or the fall from the horse while in her father’s care in April last year.
d) There is a dispute about the child’s surname: the husband maintains it should be his surname whereas the wife is using both their surnames hyphenated for the child and wishes to continue doing so.
Legal principles
61.
The concept of best interests of the child, the paramount consideration in making a parenting order [s 60CA], is at the heart of the legislation and there are a number of provisions related to it. The stated objects are about ensuring children’s best interests are met: by ensuring they have the benefit of both parents having a meaningful involvement in their lives to the extent that is consistent with their best interests, by protecting children from exposure to physical or psychological harm, by ensuring they receive adequate and proper parenting to help them achieve their potential, and by ensuring parents fulfil their duties and meet their responsibilities to their children’s care, welfare and development [s60B(1)]. These objects are supported by a number of underlying principles which, except when it would be contrary to a child’s best interests, acknowledge a child’s right to know and be cared for by both parents, a right to spend time on a regular basis and communicate regularly with both parents and significant others, a right to enjoy their culture, and parents jointly share parental duties and responsibilities and should agree about future parenting [s60B(2)].
62.
Determination of best interests requires regard to be had to two ‘primary considerations’ which reflect in part the objects just mentioned: the first is the benefit to a child of having a meaningful relationship with both parents and the second is the need to protect the child from physical and psychological harm [s60CC(2)]. It also requires regard to be had to a number of ‘additional considerations’ which are wide ranging and in some instances their meaning elaborated upon in other sub-sections [eg.s 60CC(3)(4)].
63.
In making a parenting order, there is a presumption to be applied that it is in the best interests of a child for parents to have ‘equal shared parental responsibility’ [s61DA]. The presumption will not apply where there are reasonable grounds to believe a parent has engaged in child abuse or family violence and it may be rebutted if satisfied equal shared parental responsibility would not be in the best interests of the child [s 61DA]. This is about parental decision making and not about the time a child spends with a parent. But if the parenting order provides for equal shared parental responsibility, there is an obligation to consider whether the child spending equal time with each parent would be in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable [s 65DAA(1)]. If that order is not made, there is an obligation to consider whether the child spending substantial and significant time, as further defined, with each parent would be in the child’s best interests and reasonably practicable [s 65DAA(2)]. Where neither of these considerations leads to an outcome consistent with best interests or the presumption does not apply for permissible reason, the outcome is determined by considering the primary and additional considerations already mentioned.
64.
That framework outlined, the evidence will be evaluated first in so far as it relates to primary and additional considerations before coming to the question of parental responsibility and time sharing.
Best interests
Primary considerations
(a) the benefit to the child of having a meaningful relationship with both of the child's parents…
65.
By now there are a number of cases at first instance discussing the meaning of ‘meaningful relationship’ - for example, see the decision of Blair & Blair [2007] FamCA 253 per Le Poer Trench J. While the term has a relatively simple appearance, the concept is not without its complexities, as discussion there demonstrates. Here it can be said that, prima facie at least, like most children the child would benefit from having a meaningful relationship with both of her parents in so far as that is understood in both qualitative and quantitative terms such that she has the sense both are interested and involved in all facets of her upbringing, their interest and involvement finds expression in ways that are beneficial to her and the time spent in each others company is sufficient to allow for the development of mutual understanding and growth of a close relationship.
66.
But having put that desirability on the table, and even according it a primary status amongst others, best interests remain to be assessed nonetheless by a raft of other considerations being added to the mix. Amongst others, that includes whether in the specific case at hand either or both parents have the wherewithal or capacity to provide for the child’s needs and thus provide the raw material from which to construct a meaningful relationship of benefit to the child.
(b) the need to protect the child from physical or psychological harm from being subjected to, or exposed to, abuse, neglect or family violence
67.
The terms ‘abuse’ and ‘family violence’ have been defined in s 4 of the Act. As defined, ‘abuse’ does not extend to emotional abuse of a child and so that falls to be considered under one or other of the additional considerations. The term ‘neglect’ is left to be interpreted according to its ordinary meaning.
68.
The issue of possible sexual abuse of the child that arose in late 2004 does not call for a finding in the case presented by anyone here but it may be useful to say that there is nothing in any of the evidence to support any concern at all about the husband committing any wrongdoing of that kind towards his daughter. I do not doubt the flow on effect of the allegation placed him under considerable stress and it is understandable he was deeply affected by it. Yet there is no criticism to be made of the wife for the emergence of the suggestion of wrongdoing, its genesis was in Mr D’s account of his observations, and the steps she took at the time were quite proper. She acted in an appropriately protective manner at the time.
69.
The issue of violence is not so much related to physical violence in the form of striking and the like, but to intimidating behaviour by the husband in the context of angry outbursts. As noted earlier, he denies perpetrating any domestic violence though he concedes there have been occasions when he has been ‘frustrated’ in getting his point across. As I find, his denial of domestic violence in the physical sense can be seen as valid. But as I also find, it is likely there have been occasions when he has been quite forceful in making his position felt. In accepting that as a probability, I am persuaded the wife is being genuine in her description of her feelings about those times and they are not an invention to serve an ulterior purpose. It became apparent that the husband’s behaviour in argument might be intimidating for her, not because he conducted his case in any way other than wholly appropriately and was courteous throughout the entire hearing, but because his cross-examination of the wife revealed a level of persistence that could be seen as conceivably developing to the point where it could be experienced by her as intimidating. I doubt the husband has sufficient appreciation of how he presents or the impact it has on the wife.
70.
Exposure of children to situations where this kind of dynamic operates can have a very damaging effect and there is a need to protect them from it as much as is possible. Here, the absence of contact between the parents - or the limited contact that does occur - means there is no or little opportunity for this kind of exchange to recur. In that sense, it is not a live contemporary issue. But any change to the current arrangements, certainly a change consistent with the outcome proposed by the husband, that results in an increase in their communication in the future means some consideration should be given to whether the earlier pattern of interaction is likely to be repeated given increased opportunity or whether there is cause for confidence things might be different from here on.
71.
It is difficult to be confident about change in such matters in the absence of insight into the problem and despite some of the things the husband said in his closing submissions I have to say there is nothing to substantiate he has any real appreciation of his presentation and its impact on the wife who has to respond to it consistently. It is probable, therefore, that any arrangement which involves an increase in their current level of communication will generate a dynamic that the wife would find intimidating if that is in a face to face environment and she would experience as a form of harassment if pursued by other means. In coming to a decision account has to be taken of the need for the child to be protected from these scenarios.
72.
The wife described the husband’s family and relationships within the family as a ‘hostile environment’ though that was not accepted by the husband. Taken to the topic in cross-examination, he said he could not think of a time when there was yelling and shouting between family members and, while there has been disputes, had been nothing loud or unpleasant. On one occasion referred to, he agreed the child was there but he described everyone present as angry. But this is likely to have been an attempt to minimise the reality of the situation. For the most part, in her cross-examination his sister took the opportunity to address the wife’s allegation that in the course of family disputes she ‘lost it’ thus giving rise to concern about her volatile behaviour, including in front of the child. To her credit, the husband’s sister did not walk away from this allegation and inferentially accepted it by explaining steps she had taken to address her conduct by counselling. Apart from representing admirable candour on her part, it also represents acknowledgement there was a deal of improvement to be had in the way disagreement and conflict is addressed within the family. If her commitment to change continues, no doubt she will benefit from the improved quality of her own life and her young niece will also benefit from not being exposed to uproar when things go awry.
Additional considerations
(a) any views expressed by the child and any factors …relevant to the weight it should give to the child’s views
73.
It is acknowledged that in the course of interviews for the second report the child did indicate she wanted to spend more time with her father. However, at just 5 ½ years of age no weight of any moment could be given to her views about her arrangements as between her parents. No one argued otherwise.
74.
It is a convenient point, however, to recall Ms J’s assessment of the child as bright, charming, outgoing, happy and socially confident. There is some evidence from her maternal grandmother of unsettled behaviour on return from visits to her father, but the consistency of Ms J’s assessment of her throughout the times she saw the child with her parents is a heartening sign that not only is she achieving her developmental milestones but, for now at least, she is not experiencing the debilitating problems that can often be the result of ongoing parental conflict and discord. Even so, if it continues and she is drawn more and more into it as she becomes older, there is a risk of problems developing. That cannot be ignored.
(b) the nature of the child’s relationships…
75.
Ms J says, and it is accepted, that the child has loving relationships with both of her parents.
76.
Apart from that, in her extended family there are significant adults who have a close involvement in her life. She has been part of the household of her maternal grandparents for quite some time now and there is nothing to indicate there is anything other than sound relationships in place there. Though her grandmother only gave brief evidence, I have no doubt the child benefits from the role she takes in her life.
77.
As for her paternal grandmother, she was not required for cross-examination and so I did not have the opportunity to hear directly from her. After interview for the third report, Ms J said of her:
‘She impresses as a modest lady who seeks not to intrude too much on [the husband’s] time with [the child] because it is so limited. Yet she recalls how wonderful it was for her as a child to spend special days with her grandmother. She would cherish the ability to do this with [the child]. She would only seek to have occasional days here and there, recognizing that the parents are the primary people in the child's life.
I note that she and [the husband’s sister] related warmly and affectionately with the child … responded in like manner with them.’
78.
Given her role in the child’s weekly care at an earlier time, it is quite regrettable that her regular involvement has not continued. It is also regrettable that the letter the wife received, purportedly from the paternal grandmother, about spending some time with the child on her own account took the course it did. It plainly struck a positive and responsive note with the wife who said she was ‘touched’ by it and left to their own devices as mother and grandmother it may have led to a positive result for the child - hopefully it will be followed up if it has not been already and so allow the relationship between the child and her paternal grandmother to develop in a natural way in a co-operative atmosphere. All of the indicators are that the child would benefit from such an arrangement.
79.
Her aunt, Ms H, has also been a figure in her life and, so it seems, rather closely involved in family arrangements. At times that involvement has not been all that positive, as her own evidence suggests, but as noted in another context one of the necessary preconditions to effective change is to recognise there is a problem in the first place which to her credit she has done. Assuming that commitment sticks, it will be to the benefit of the child who will have a better opportunity to sustain a comfortable and close relationship with her aunt.
80.
No doubt the child has the usual range of relationships outside of family, such as at school. By all accounts she is thriving there and not experiencing any difficulties.
(e) the practical difficulty and expense of a child spending time with and communicating with a parent …..
81.
As presently situated, the parents live up to an hour apart by car. If the child were to stay living mostly with her mother and if she were to be in her father’s care of a weekday during school term, on a school morning she would be in the car for up to an hour and then there would be another hour’s journey in the afternoon. The husband of course would have considerably more driving to get to work and home on those days. He would have up to two hours in the morning to take the child to school and arrive back near his place before heading further south to his workplace and the same time would be involved in retracing steps in the afternoon. Not only would that scenario be impracticable, the travel would be very demanding and undesirable, especially for the child. In her earlier recommendations Ms J did say there were practical problems with distance and that she would not like to see the child undertaking long travel before and after school, but she recommended a 5/9 split of the term fortnight in any event. The demand on the child arising from work/distance factors I thought not sufficiently addressed in that recommendation.
82.
If the child were to move to live most of the time, or equal time, with her father and if her mother remained living where she is now or in that general vicinity the problems arising from the burden of constant travel would be the same.
83.
The only way this could be overcome would be for the parents to live closer to each other, though for reasons related to maintaining appropriate boundaries their history to this point indicates it would be highly undesirable for them to be part of the same neighbourhood.
(c) the willingness and ability …to facilitate, and encourage, a close and continuing relationship between the child and the other parent
(i) the attitude to the child, and to the responsibilities of parenthood, demonstrated…
[including participation in decision making…spending time with and communicate with the child ….facilitated participation in decision making, time and communication with the child…and fulfilled or failed to fulfil the obligation to maintain the child]
84.
A key issue identified by the husband is which parent has the greater capacity to be inclusive of the other in the child’s life and allow the other parent to have access to the child while in that parent’s primary care and which parent is more alert to the effect on the child of the conflict and animosity between them. Of course his answer is that he fits the bill far more than her mother and a good proportion of his case is directed to establishing the wife as unwilling to facilitate and encourage his relationship and role in the child’s life.
85.
When one reviews the history, particularly since they have been living separately, it is true that there has been a steady reluctance demonstrated by the wife in various areas related to the child’s arrangements to involve her father or to be flexible in her attitude towards some proposal put to her. Indeed, both Ms J and Dr V commented on her ambivalence about contact in their reports at different times. The history and these assessments warrant close attention.
86.
However, in the final analysis I am satisfied the problems have stemmed more from the parents very different personalities - a ‘study in contrasts’ – rather than any innate desire on the wife’s part to cut her father out of the child’s life. In my assessment, it is not so much her ‘unwillingness’ in the face of requests/demands from him about time with the child or participation in some event, it is her inability to cope with his obsessive, over-elaborated and condescending manner in his communications with her. In every issue about time with the child or when some limit has been placed on his proposal for involvement, he attributes it to her desire to shut him out or limit his role in the child’s life. The examples are many – overnights, public holidays, block periods, 8 nights or one week, trips away, the abuse allegations emanating from Mr D, telephone calls, kindy, preschool and so on. Not anywhere in any of his evidence is there an indication of at least some recognition that he might be making a contribution to the dynamic he is so aggrieved about. This indicates little or no insight into at least one element of the problem.
87.
Contrary to the husband’s steadfast position, it is quite understandable that the wife might be concerned that if she does not place some limits on his involvement he will constantly overstep appropriately drawn boundaries. I am persuaded that her ambivalence spoken of in the reports arises from her struggle to find ground on which to effectively deal with the husband’s personality and his manner, which it is recognised is made the more difficult by aspects of her own personality, as both experts commented. A stark example of this was the dynamic between them in the course of his cross-examination of her when he persisted beyond her clear concessions in order to extract precisely what it was he had in his mind to achieve. Of course that might be written off to his inexperience as an advocate and his uncertainty about what was required and so on, but nonetheless it does give a glimpse into what she has to deal with in order to satisfy his way of seeing things. There is also an abundance of material in his own evidence of his instruction to her about aspects of her parenting and attitude towards the interests of their daughter to amply illustrate his condescension towards her on matters of parenting.
88.
In assessing this aspect of the husband’s case, it is worth remembering also that the wife has complied with court orders about contact and no criticism can be made of her withholding the child from spending time with her father as provided in the orders made to this point. There is no reason to anticipate she will do otherwise in the future. Flexibility and decisions over and around the formal orders may be a path parents take when proceedings are at an end, but if that is to occur here then there may have to be not only an examination of the contribution to the dynamic, which include underlying sources such as personality, but a commitment to make constructive change. I am not satisfied the husband has any insight into this at this stage and without it there can be no cause to believe change is possible.
89.
It is also worth remembering that the history shows the husband has made decisions on occasion about the child’s care so as to warrant examination under the unwilling parent factor. The early dispute about the Sunday night and Mothers Day are examples. No doubt he would assess decisions he took as a reasonable response to the wife’s refusal to see things his way and almost certainly he would not see them as unwillingness on his part to facilitate the child’s relationship with her mother. His case is entirely to the contrary. Nonetheless, in his decisions there is an element of control of the wife through the medium of the child’s care arrangements.
90.
In propounding his case for equal shared parental responsibility and equal time, his assertion is to the effect that he is the parent with the more inclusive attitude and that he provides a more co-operative model of parenting than the wife. But, as I find, that proposition takes no account of difficult issues that obviously arise from the underlying substratum of personality, including his own, and nor does it suggest any acknowledgment that he has tried to achieve a goal in his dealings with the wife by decisions involving the withholding of the child’s care. The merit of his position, therefore, is not seen in such unquestionable terms and nor is the future with the child in his primary or equal care seen as being as clear cut as the husband would have it.
(f) the capacity …to provide for the needs of the child, including emotional and intellectual needs
91.
The child’s overall development at the moment could be nothing but a source of pride for each of her parents and they can both take some of the credit for that. They are both loving parents with a genuine interest in their daughter’s well being and both have a genuine desire to participate in her life and contribute to her upbringing. That is not in doubt. In so many respects they are each capable parents who will guide her well through to adulthood.
92.
Looking more closely at the husband’s proposals, including for the more immediate future, obviously there is a degree of uncertainty about his circumstances which is only to be expected. For example, there could not yet be any certainty that he will remain living at the M home until he considers his position after the publication of the property decision and in any event he may re-assess his living situation in light of the difficulties arising from distance between the parents’ residences. There is also the consequential uncertainty about his work arrangements which may be re-appraised if he changes where he lives to move further away. It is accepted there must be a degree of flexibility in assessment of his future, as his evidence made apparent in discussion of the many options available to him about housing/work/childcare decisions once the proceedings have come to an end. The presentation of absolutes about these sorts of matters is rare and I certainly do not expect them. The more important assessment is the extent to which confidence can be placed in the parent to make decisions as an independent adult about their own life circumstances with their child’s needs in mind. In the husband’s case I am satisfied he will make appropriate decisions about housing and work and child care arrangements that would fit with the child’s needs as he assessed them from time to time. In all probability this would include providing for her material needs, strengthening her relationships with her paternal extended family, taking an avid interest in her schooling and her extra curricular activities, and seeing that she has a range of interests and activities available to her commensurate with her stage of development and his means. None of those important supports is the slightest bit troubling.
93.
What is troubling are features of the husband’s obsessive personality, as assessed by Dr V, his apparent lack of insight into the contribution he makes to difficulties experienced with the wife, and the drawback that represents to the cooperative and inclusive model of parenting his case propounds he can provide. At least to this point, he seems unable to moderate the level of detail he employs to embroider issues concerning the child, however big or small, and unable to acknowledge the debilitating impact this has on the child’s other parent in having to constantly address it.
94.
Possibly interconnected with the obsessive nature of his personality, is his demonstrable under appreciation of the wife’s qualities as a parent and what she brings to that role. There is a steady stream of communication from the husband in which he casts himself in the role of instructor on matters of parenting, constituting a raft of criticism, either express or implied, with the upshot that her capacities as a parent/mother are regularly being diminished. This is evident in some of the communications about the minute detail of parental involvement and decisions in a way that calls into question her competence and concern for their daughter’s interests. Passages in his affidavit and some of the entries in the communication book amply illustrate that. This was continued at the hearing; one example being his elaborate response when asked to acknowledge that the child is closely attached to her mother and another was his initial response when asked to nominate three positive things about her as a parent, requiring counsel to return to the topic later to have him direct his mind more directly to qualities as a parent.
95.
On one view of it, the criticism and condescension sits rather incongruously with his own case which would see the child in the care of her mother for near to half or half of her time, entailing as that does a certain confidence in her parenting abilities. Another view is that continuing criticism of the other parent in such an arrangement could only lead to more of the same problems that have been all too apparent to this point. The husband would almost certainly say that there will be a new horizon once the proceedings have concluded and detailed orders are made regulating the child’s arrangements. But that involves an ability or willingness to change the content and manner of his communications with the wife to eradicate unnecessary criticism and inherently acknowledge her parenting abilities are not inferior to his own. But in my assessment there is no sufficient indicator of such change, at least at this stage. If the past is replicated in the future, it will probably wear down the wife and that in turn would be detrimental to the quality of parenting she is able to provide. That is not to say, of course, that she would become a lesser parent; it is merely to recognise that debilitating episodes of conflict and discord do take their toll.
96.
Turning to the wife more directly, there are similar uncertainties about her future, including her living and work arrangements. She has lived with her parents for some time now, since the separation, but she is young and it would be expected she would move off into independent living at some point with these proceedings behind her. Perhaps that will be sooner rather than later in light of the relationship she has now formed. Her partner, a school teacher, has not participated in these proceedings or in the report interviews, but I do not see that as cause for concern. New relationships are but one of many uncertainties about the future for children whose best interests are being assessed. That is to be expected, along with changes in work commitments or entry to the paid workforce to earn an income to sustain a satisfying life as an independent adult and meet obligations to children, as well as the need to introduce child care arrangements where none were necessary at an earlier time when adjustments were being made in the aftermath of relationship breakdown. Any or all of that is to be expected. The more important assessment, as I said earlier, is the confidence that can be placed in the parent to make decisions consistent with the child’s best interests. There is no reason to think her partner has been withheld from scrutiny for some shadowy reason and I am satisfied confidence can be placed in the wife to make appropriate decisions about her life in the future.
97.
The key issue identified at the outset from her perspective through her counsel is communication, more particularly the difficulties thrown up by the husband’s obsessive, overworked attention to detail, his insistence that his perspective prevail, and his condescending attitude towards her. This has already been discussed. As she sees it, the communication book had been tried and failed because it has been used in such a way as to continue ‘demands’ on all manner of matters large and small, without any understanding by the husband of its proper function, the upshot being the communication book is now an ineffective tool. It is acknowledged that the husband has a contrary view of the utility and function of the book, and certainly examination of the books shows that the wife has not always written entries that cast her in a positive light. But I am satisfied she does experience the content and tone of communications as something akin to harassment and that she does find it debilitating to deal with what is required of her. As Ms J said to the husband in cross-examination about it, his style of communicating with her ‘drives her almost crazy’. Of course, as Dr V and Ms J point out, her own personality is part of the dynamic between them, making the apparently insoluble difficulties in communication not just one-sided.
(d) the likely effect of changes in the child’s circumstances …
98.
If the child were to be living mostly with her father, a change of school would be necessary with all the upheaval and change that would bring about for her. It would also mean less time with her mother to whom she is closely attached and sees as the centre of her inner security. That is not to minimise her relationship with her father or its importance to her ongoing development; it is more to properly recognise that a change to the current arrangements for the child, including to the current mix of time spent between her parents, would in all probability have an impact on her. Just how she would react to that, more particularly the half time proposed by her father is not known because it is untried at least in the quite changed circumstances and now lengthy period of their separation. There must be to some extent some level of risk involved to her sense of well being for that to happen though no doubt her good relationship with her father would ameliorate in some ways the change to which she would be required to adjust.
(l) whether it would be preferable to make the order that would be least likely to lead to the institution of further proceedings in relation to the child;
99.
The husband maintains the areas of conflict will be reduced if the court orders are ‘not up for discussion’ and there are detailed arrangements about the child’s upbringing. This includes not only time spent and communication by telephone but a great many orders about numerous eventualities in any child’s life. Initially these orders were numerous and included things such as the child being permitted to attend the funerals of close relatives, neither parent being able to adopt the child without the written consent of both parents, amongst others. Taken to the unusual nature of some of the orders he sought, the husband abandoned a number of them. With respect to him, this was a sensible decision, though there are a variety of issues still proposed to be the subject of orders.
100.
It is not the function of court orders to parent children by attempting to foresee every contingency that might be the subject of parental decision; that is the responsibility of parents who will have the duty to make a myriad of decisions large and small in the course of their children’s upbringing when court proceedings are well behind them. At one level one can understand the desire to have certainty and foreshadow contingencies, particularly when communication is virtually non-existent and discord continues over all manner of things, but detailed orders of the kind under discussion can also provide fertile ground for further litigation over some real or perceived breach of their terms, and so the litigation roundabout continues, to the detriment of the child or children involved. It is preferable in most instances for parents to work through such issues reflected in many of these proposed orders in whatever way they can, consistent with one of the underlying principles of Part VII of the Act; namely, parents should agree about the future parenting of their children. In making orders here, I have limited the issues to those that are uncontentious and represent common ground and see no benefit to this child in doing otherwise.
Parental responsibility
101.
Parenting orders are to be made and so, prima facie, the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility applies. This is about decision making about major long term issues and does not directly relate to the time a child spends with each parent. The presumption does not apply where there are findings of abuse of a child or family violence, as defined in s 4 of the Act. Neither applies in the circumstances of this case and so the presumption stands if they were the only considerations. However, the Act also permits the rebuttal of the presumption [s61DA(4)] by evidence that satisfies the court that it would not be in the best interests of the child for the parents to have equal shared parental responsibility.
102.
I am satisfied it would not be in this child’s best interest and I conclude the presumption is rebutted. In my assessment it would be next to impossible the way things presently stand for the parents to effectively communicate on such issues so as to benefit the child. There is a long history by now of their inability to agree about central issues, big and small, and there is nothing to indicate any change likely to occur at least in the foreseeable future. If required to share decision making responsibility about such issues, it could only lead to the sort of exchanges so apparent in the evidence of the last two years and more and result in an avalanche of communication with a level of detail that could only be counterproductive and debilitating. As Ms J put it and counsel for the ICL submitted, appropriately in my view, it is not going to work. I conclude that the child’s interests will be better served by one parent taking responsibility for certain major decisions rather than leaving her exposed to the consequences of a continuation of the cycle of discord about what is best for the child that has marked the period of separation and even earlier.
103.
As for where that responsibility should lie, I am satisfied the child should remain living primarily with her mother and therefore it is appropriate her mother take that responsibility. By the same token, the sole responsibility can be limited to areas of education, religious upbringing, and health because not only does that clearly define the ambit of the sole responsibility but they are likely to be the more core issues requiring decisions in the child’s upbringing. Other issues such as her surname, for example, fall for decision here.
Time to be spent
104.
Turning to the question of apportionment of the child’s time between her parents, the rebuttal of the presumption means it is not necessary to consider whether spending equal time with each parent would be in the child’s interests and reasonably practicable [s65DAA], but the husband’s application for equal time makes it necessary nonetheless.
105.
The circumstances in which equal time might be seen as consistent with a child’s best interests have been the subject of discussion in many cases over the years, both at first instance and at appellate level. These include Jann v Yann (1976) FLC 90-027 [Demack J], Foster v Foster (1977) FLC 90-281 [Full Court], H v H-K (1990) 13 Fam LR 786 [Kay J], Padgen v Padgen (1991) FLC 92-231, Forck v Thomas (1993) 16 Fam LR 516 [Nicholson CJ], C v B, [Full Court], unreported delivered 15 April 1997, F v B [2000] FamCA 676, M v M, [2001] FamCA 1688 [Le Poer Trench], delivered 13 December 2001, and M v G [Kay J], unreported, delivered 15 July 2003, and see also H v H (2003) FMCA Fam 41 [Ryan FM as she then was]. I discussed these decisions in M & M, [2005] FamCA 207, delivered 9 March 2005. That need not be repeated here. Suffice to say those cases suggest some careful deliberation is necessary in considering whether a child should spend equal time between the households of their parents and the cases suggest that to be workable and of benefit to the child –
‘…desirable environmental factors include compatible parenting values; mutual respect as parents; good parental communication, trust and cooperation; an ability to compromise; geographic proximity between their residences; the age of the child has to be considered and the ability of the child to cope with the arrangement without stress or confusion needs to be taken into account; concrete issues related to upbringing such as manner of education and the like ideally would have been resolved; and there are no destabilising influences such as might be present when one or both parents re-partner. Without these factors, the arrangement may contain the seeds of harm from inconsistencies in influence, activities and life values, all of which have the potential to disorient and destabilise children. The purpose of any arrangement, after all, is to promote their welfare overall and not to satisfy the needs of their parents.’
106.
Of course failure to tick off one or more of these considerations is not to be seen as a disqualifying factor; they are merely matters that might be considered in coming to a view about whether an equal time arrangement would meet the best interests requirement, mindful at the same time of the prospect of issues being manufactured to avoid such an outcome. As I said in M & M [2005] FamCA 207 none of that is to be found in the legislation directed to a best interests outcome which must ultimately depend on the particular facts of the case and the evaluation of all options. Of course the law has changed since these cases were decided, as outlined earlier and in particular directing an equal time consideration to follow the application of the presumption of equal shared parental responsibility, but I think consideration of the factors summarised from the earlier cases holds good nonetheless.
107.
Turning to the question of the child’s best interests, it will be apparent from what has already been said that I could not conclude equal time would be in her best interests. The minimum amount of communication and cooperation to make that workable is absent and the personality issue at the heart of that dynamic makes it impossible to see it working effectively. As matters presently stand, though circumstances may change, nor would equal time be reasonably practicable for the child in circumstances where her attendance at school would require the considerable travel as discussed earlier. Some other arrangement must be found for the child. And in my opinion, that is to remain living mostly with her mother and to spend time regularly with her father during school terms and equally with him during school holidays. That is the parent to whom she is most closely attached and the parent she sees at the centre of her inner security. She has been in her mother’s primary care for some time now and she is thriving in that environment. Her mother, I am satisfied, will comply with the orders related to her time with her father and in that way the child’s relationship with him will be facilitated and supported. She is assessed as a capable and caring parent able to provide for her daughter’s needs.
108.
This is not to diminish the importance to the child of her father of course but, as Ms J put it, he is not in the immediate centre of her world. The evidence establishes him to be devoted parent who loves his daughter dearly and he is not without sound parenting skills. But the issues thrown up by his personality and manner of communication make it impossible to see the child’s interest served by the proposal he puts forward. Despite the husband’s argument put to Ms J in the course of cross-examination about a more optimistic future with the proceedings completed and detailed orders in place, and despite his closing submissions to the same effect, she was not persuaded communication would work effectively in the future, with or without counselling. Nor am I. As I find, the child’s interests will be better served by the orders now to be made.
109.
It remains to say that one of the issues is the child’s surname. For my part, I see the issue as uncomplicated. While the wife did not change her surname on marriage to the husband, when born the child was registered with her father’s surname and so it must be taken that was what they had in contemplation at the time. Nothing said here operates to alter that decision in my opinion. That does not preclude the inclusion of “[the wife’s surname]” in the child’s name, but her surname should remain as “[the father’s surname]”.
Form of orders - parenting
110.
Apart from allocation to her mother of sole parental responsibility limited to the issues identified, the orders will provide for the child to live with her mother and spend regular time with her father during school terms and equal time during school holidays. They will also make provision for special occasions and telephone communication. Added to that, her father should be able to be involved in her schooling to the extent parents are permitted by the school and he should be able to attend functions and activities at the school to the extent the school permits attendance by parents. Orders will provide for that to occur. The orders will also provide for some limitation to be placed on the proximity of the parents’ residence. I assess that as essential in maintaining some boundary between their lives and have drafted what I regard as reasonable and appropriate to the circumstances overall. Otherwise, I think the other orders do not require any further elaboration.
property settlement
Approach
111.
Section 79 empowers the court to make such orders as it considers appropriate altering the interests of parties to a marriage in property, including an order for a settlement of property in substitution for any interest in the property. It is not to do so unless it is satisfied that in all the circumstances it is just and equitable to make the order and in considering that question it is obliged to take into account the various matters set out in s 79(4). A long line of cases at appellate level establish that the first step in that process is to identify the property and ascertain its value; the second step is to evaluate the contributions of various kinds each have made; the third step is to consider adjusting the contribution assessment after taking account of any relevant factors set out in s 75(2); and finally, it is necessary to stand back and review the outcome to ensure it brings about a just and equitable distribution of property in all of the circumstances [see eg. Ferraro and Ferraro (1992) 16 Fam LR 1].
Assets and liabilities
112.
There is no dispute about the identity of the parties’ assets and most of the values to be attributed to them are agreed. To the extent there is no agreement, the evidence establishes values reflected in the list to follow. There is no dispute about the mortgage debt. The husband has a relatively small credit card debt which presumably relates to post separation spending. The wife says she owes her parents $500. No doubt it also relates to post separation spending. There is dispute about this, but the amount involved is minimal and it can be accepted she has an obligation to repay it.
1. jointly owned
M home 325,000
Less
Mortgage 190,832 134,168
Shares in T 3,300
2. with the husband
ANZ bank 14,956
CUA bank 650
C loan 48,379
Household contents 3,300
Motor vehicle 4,500
71,785
Less
Credit card debt 1,331
70,454
Superannuation 79,658
Total Net 150,112 150,112
3. with the wife
B shares 10,372
Telstra shares 1,945
X shares 11,080
U shares 7,897
ANZ bank 300
Household contents 1,000
Jewellery and personal property 3,970
Motor vehicle 5,500
Total 42,064
Less
Debt to parents 500
41,564
Superannuation 29,311
Total net assets 70,875 70,875
Total net assets 358,455
Evaluation of contributions
113.
In organising the listing of the parties’ current assets I have separated them into those jointly held and those they each own or have in their possession at the moment. In doing so, I have separated out their superannuation entitlements from other property but the value is reflected in the total net asset figure. This organisation aids the evaluation process from my point of view, rather than list all assets together in any order, as the jointly prepared list did. The separation out of their superannuation entitlements from other assets brings their positions more clearly into focus [see Coghlan and Coghlan (2005) FLC 93-220] and assists in addressing the dispute about the extent to which the husband’s entitlement should be split, if at all, to satisfy the wife’s entitlement. Apart from that, any cash adjustment will have to come either from the husband, who seeks to retain the home, or from its sale.
114.
That said, in evaluating their contributions to all property it will be appropriate to take a ‘global’ approach, rather than an ‘asset by asset’ or ‘category of asset’ approach, as discussed in cases such as Norbis (supra), Lenehan (1987) FLC 91-814, Bonnici (1992) FLC 92-272, and McMahon (1995) FLC 92-606.
115.
This is a relatively short relationship, punctuated by two earlier separations, one for around 8 months during 2003. They separated almost 3 years ago when their daughter was still under 3 years of age. During the period up to their separation, and since, they have each made contributions of varying kinds.
116.
The husband came to the relationship in a stronger financial position with $99,000 in cash and investments. Putting aside their chattels and related loans, that compares with the $10,000 the wife had in superannuation entitlements at the time. He used some of his funds to pay off their loans and he paid 20% of the purchase price towards the cost of their first home from funds he had available. As each home they purchased was sold, as I apprehend the situation, they used the proceeds to purchase the next property and so the initial deposit remains reflected in the value of the M property. Other funds he had are reflected in investments now held either jointly or individually.
117.
In the first months after establishing their common household the wife was the sole income earner and she contributed those earnings to their needs at the time. Her paid work was later scaled down to less than full time but whatever she earned I am satisfied she contributed it to the needs of the family. By the same token, the husband found paid work in March 2000 and from then until the final separation he contributed his earnings towards the family’s needs and he applied any surplus towards savings or investments. Over the years he accumulated superannuation entitlements and just prior to separation he paid $1,000 towards the wife’s superannuation fund. It is acknowledged they separated their finances in 2002 when they separated for some months, but that does not alter the fact that whatever they each earned they applied towards the needs of the family in one way or another, or at least the evidence does not suggest any use to the contrary. To the extent that the husband’s evidence might be seen as diminishing the wife’s contributions by a suggestion she was not frugal or was spendthrift, there is no support from anywhere to sustain it. As I find, they each used whatever income they derived for the benefit of the family.
118.
Apart from their direct financial contributions from assets introduced and earnings, they each made other contributions until their separation. The properties they acquired were either refurbished or improved in various ways and while they both made efforts in that direction, those of the wife and her family appear to have been the more prevalent. She also did things to make the homes established more attractive such as making curtains and gardening to improve their setting. By the same token, the husband assisted with some of the gardening and he also maintained the lawns, looked after their cars, and took responsibility for managing their finances in ways he described. They each undertook domestic chores and related household tasks such as their work commitments allowed.
119.
Both contributed to the care of their daughter after her birth, such as their work commitments allowed, and they had some regular assistance with child care from the husband’s mother which enabled them to work without the cost of child care on those occasions.
120.
In the period since separation the husband has continued to work full time and has used his income to pay the costs related to the ownership of the home, such as mortgage instalments and council rates as well as pay child support as assessed. On the other hand, he has had the exclusive occupancy of the home since separation though he has paid all of the costs related to his occupation. There is nothing to suggest he has wasted money that might be otherwise available and from all accounts he has continued to be responsible financially. He has continued to contribute to superannuation. He has also taken an important role in the care of their daughter such as his work and other obligations have permitted, and provided for her from his funds while in his care.
121.
For her part, the wife has lived with her parents who have provided for her accommodation during this time though she has done voluntary work in their business to assist them get that established. She has lived on government benefits and provided for their daughter during times in her care and with her educational needs from those benefits and from child support paid by the husband. Similarly, there is nothing to indicate she has wasted funds available to her since separation.
122.
When their initial circumstances are considered and the roles they each undertook at various times, before and after the birth of their daughter, is examined along with their various contributions over the past 7 ½ years or so, their contributions should be seen as approximating equality but for one factor - that is the husband’s stronger financial position at the outset. He used those funds partly to pay off debt, to pay the deposit on a home which provided their accommodation and they were otherwise maintained in investments.
123.
The husband makes the submission that his initial contribution should be exempted from the property pool for reasons he attributes to the shortness of the marriage and he adds to the submission by saying his ‘significant initial contribution has not diluted over time due to (his) significant contribution during and after the relationship’.
124.
The approach to initial disparity in financial contributions is the subject of many decisions of this Court, more particularly Pierce (1999) FLC 92-844 where earlier decision such as Money (1994) FLC 92-485, Bremner (1995) FLC 92-560, and Way (1996) FLC 92-702 were discussed. In a judgment delivered recently [C & L [2006] FamCA 1366, now on appeal] I was required to consider a submission about the so-called ‘erosion principle’ the case of Pierce was said to have established and to do so having regard to the decision of the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of New South Wales in Burgess v King (2005) 34 Fam LR 528 related to division of property between de facto married partners [but see also Bilous v Mudaliar & Anor (2006) 35 Fam LR 55]. As I said there, Pierce put an end to the conceptual analysis reflected in the use of expressions such as ‘erosion principle’, which the husband’s submission resembles, when disparity in initial wealth is being argued, and the frequently quoted passage from the joint judgment makes that apparent:
‘…In our opinion it is not so much a matter of erosion of contribution but a question of what weight is to be attached, in all the circumstances, to the initial contribution. It is necessary to weigh the initial contributions by a party with all other relevant contributions of both the husband and the wife. In considering the weight to be attached to the initial contribution, in this case of the husband, regard must be had to the use made by the parties of that contribution. In the present case that use was a substantial contribution to the purchase price of the matrimonial home: See also [C & C] (unreported, Full Court (Ellis, Lindenmayer and Finn JJ), Sydney, delivered 19 May 1995 at pages 21 and 22 of the joint judgment) and [Z & Z] (unreported, Full Court Sydney, delivered 3 October 1996, per Ellis J. at page 10). ’
125.
The measure of the weight to the assets he introduced has some counterbalance in the wife’s superannuation entitlement, but there remains a significant weighting in his favour nonetheless, particularly when regard is had to the use made of the funds he introduced. As noted earlier, it is not an accounting exercise and obviously the evaluation of contributions fall within a range. In my opinion when weighed in the balance with all other contributions, a distribution in the proportions of 62.5%/37.5% in his favour fits comfortably within that range.
126.
That apportionment represents a disparity of 25% of net assets and applied to their total net assets, including superannuation, equates with almost $90,000. In my view that bears out the assessment.
Section 75(2) factors
127.
The husband is 41 years of age and the wife is 35. Neither has any health problems and so that does not operate as an impediment to an evaluation of their likely future circumstances as best they can be foreseen at this stage.
128.
The contributions assessment will give them net assets in the proportions already indicated. Neither has any assets or resources other than those already mentioned.
129.
The wife will have to pay legal costs to the Legal Aid Commission equivalent to 20% of whatever she receives or the amount of those costs, whichever is lesser. Her costs are calculated to be in the vicinity of $23,500 and so that will be the extent of her obligation. The debt has not been included in the earlier lists because unpaid legal costs are more appropriately dealt with in considering costs under s 117 of the Act if an application is made following delivery of judgment. I make mention of it here merely to acknowledge the obligation but do not take it into account as a factor here.
130.
As for earnings, they should both be seen as having an earning capacity to exert over the many years of working life still ahead for each of them. But there are some differences in their employment history and skills levels. There is nothing to suggest the husband will not be able to continue earning at his current level and may even progress to higher levels as time goes on and opportunities present, provided he stays in full time employment. Whether he does or changes his current job will be a matter for him to decide in light of this judgment, amongst other considerations. Because the wife is not in the paid workforce earning an income using her skills, it is difficult to say what she will be able to earn in the future. Certainly she has a capacity to earn income for the future rather than to continue volunteering her services to her parents. Nonetheless her skills base suggests it would not be in the same band of income the husband could earn and it is proper in the circumstances to see them as having a prospective disparity in income earning potential. This weighs in the wife’s favour. To that I should add, as noted earlier, the wife is in a relationship with a gentleman little is known about beyond that he is a primary school teacher and on her account of it the future of that relationship may include marriage. But there is nothing about that situation to warrant discarding a comparison of her earnings with the husband’s for the future as best that can be measured.
131.
The age differential, and the husband’s likely earlier retirement, is not all that significant at this stage, although it does mean he can expect to be in a position to access his superannuation entitlements a little before the wife can.
132.
As for the future support of their daughter, it can be expected the husband will continue to contribute child support for her upbringing according to any child support assessment or variation through permissible procedures as appropriate to circumstances as they develop. He will also provide for her at times she is in his care. He has no financial obligations to any other person. The wife will receive child support he pays but she will take responsibility for the child’s financial needs over and above the child support paid.
133.
Under the parenting orders the wife will have the care of the child for most of the time for the foreseeable future, at least during school terms, and therefore she will be responsible for the many day to day decisions necessary to their daughter’s supervision and care for the many years to come before she becomes independent. Given their daughter’s very young age, this is a factor of some significance and weights in the wife’s favour.
134.
When all relevant factors are reviewed, disparity in future earning capacity and ongoing day to day parental responsibility for many years call for an adjustment to the wife’s contributions assessment. In my opinion they would be recognised by a further 12.5% in her favour. Expressed in monetary terms, that amounts to around $44,800 which is appropriate having regard to their total net asset pool.
Just and equitable
135.
The assessments mean that their property would be distributed equally. Of course there may be room for disagreement about the apportionment determined between contributions and s 75(2) adjustment, but I am satisfied in the final analysis that this distribution is proper and would bring about a just and equitable division of their property.
136.
Applied to net assets of $358,455, the wife would be entitled to retain assets to the value of $179,228. Including her superannuation worth almost $29,311 she has assets worth $70,875 and so would need to be paid a further $108,352.
137.
The husband would have assets worth $287,580 and payment of that amount would bring the value of his assets back to $179,228. The mix of his assets would be equity in the home of $134,168, shares and cash worth around $67,285, furniture and a motor vehicle worth a total of $7,800, and a superannuation entitlement worth $79,658.
138.
The question remains as to how the wife’s entitlement is to be taken, either with a split of the husband’s superannuation in some proportion or not. In resolving that through to a just and equitable outcome, the mix of assets each would retain is a factor to consider. Expressed as a proportion of his overall entitlement, his superannuation component is a little over 44%. For the wife, the proportion is a little over 16%. If their superannuation were to be distributed equally - the total is $108,969 and half is $54,484 – it would mean the wife would take in the split a base amount of $25,173 and her cash component would be reduced accordingly.
139.
All things considered, I am of the view it would be more just and equitable for their entitlements to be satisfied in part by the wife taking part of her entitlement by a superannuation split. That is because there is no compelling feature of their circumstances, more particularly hers, that heads the discretion in the direction of a total cash payment. Nor is there anything to suggest any apportionment other than an equalisation of their entitlements would be just and equitable, or at least none I can identify. If the husband were assured of staying in the home that might have been a factor I could have considered to alter the apportionment in recognition of the advantage he would gain; that is, by saving the upheaval of relocation and the associated costs as well as the costs related to purchasing another home. But there is no certainty about that and so I ultimately conclude in all of the circumstances it will be appropriate to equalise their entitlements in framing the orders. It will mean the wife will receive a less in cash for her more immediate needs, whatever they might be, but she will have a greater sum for future security and the converse holds good for the husband.
140.
In closing I should refer to the husband’s argument that there will be capital gains tax payable on the sale of shares. That is accepted, but so too will there be on the shares held by the wife. There is no evidence of what the tax would be though his detailed figures give some insight in to the possible magnitude. It is a factor taken into account in coming to a decision about their entitlements but not an issue that needs any further discussion.
Form of orders - property
141.
This means that the wife will have to be paid $83,179 [rounded to $83,200] and a split of the husband’s superannuation with a base amount of $25,173. With that adjustment, each will be entitled to retain assets presently in their possession.
142.
Obviously if the husband is to be given the opportunity to buy the home then some time limit should be imposed and a month strikes me as an appropriate time frame to arrange his finances. If not paid, the home will have to be sold and orders will provide for that to occur as soon as practicable thereafter. The sale price is unlikely to be the agreed price and no account was taken in the earlier figures of sale costs. If the matter proceeds along that path, the parties’ entitlements should be paid out in proportionate terms, consistent with the 50/50 distribution overall, and adjustment made for their retention of assets other than the home and superannuation. The husband has assets net assets in that category worth $70,454 and the wife has net assets worth $41,564. That makes a total of $112,018 and 50% of that is $56,009. The wife would need to receive a further $14,445 from the husband’s share of the sale proceeds to receive her 50% entitlement overall.
143.
The orders for sale can be in general terms and should be able to be worked out without controversy by the parties’ solicitors. If not, machinery orders can be made, with the accompanying risk as to costs should that become necessary. The other orders are self-explanatory.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty three (143) paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for judgment of the Honourable Justice Moore
Associate:
Date: 24 April 2007
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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