Burgess v King

Case [2005] NSWCA 396


Reported Decision:

(2006) DFC 95-328

Court of Appeal


CITATION:

Burgess v. King [2005] NSWCA 396

HEARING DATE(S):

2 November 2005

 
JUDGMENT DATE: 


18 November 2005

JUDGMENT OF:

Mason P at 1; Hodgson JA at 2; Campbell AJA at 37

DECISION:

1. Appeal allowed. 2. Orders below varied by substituting for the figure of $65,000.00 the figure of $115,000.00. 3. Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings at first instance on a party and party basis. 4. Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, and to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act if otherwise eligible.

CATCHWORDS:

FAMILY LAW - De facto relationships - Statutory power to make orders adjusting property interests of parties - Matters to be considered - Large capital gain in matrimonial home owned by respondent - Respondent able to keep home because of contributions by appellant of about one-quarter its value - Whether primary judge should have considered whether the appellant should have some benefit from this capital gain - Extent of appellate intervention.

LEGISLATION CITED:

Property (Relationships) Act 1984 s.20

PARTIES:

Raymond Peter Burgess - appellant
Sandra Elizabeth King - respondent

FILE NUMBER(S):

CA 40260/05

COUNSEL:

Mr. R. Maurice for appellant
Mr. J. Levy for respondent

SOLICITORS:

Heazlewoods Bushby International, Epping for appellant
Thurlow Fisher, Bankstown for respondent

LOWER COURT JURISDICTION:

Supreme Court - Equity Division

LOWER COURT FILE NUMBER(S):

SC1635/04

LOWER COURT JUDICIAL OFFICER:

Young CJ in Eq.




                          CA 40260/05
                          SC 1635/04

                          MASON P
                          HODGSON JA
                          M.W. CAMPBELL AJA

                          Friday 18 November 2005
BURGESS V. KING
Judgment

1 MASON P: I agree with Hodgson JA.

2 HODGSON JA: On 24 March 2005, Young CJ in Eq. gave judgment in proceedings in which the appellant and respondent had each sought orders under the Property (Relationships) Act 1984. For reasons given in that judgment, the primary judge ordered that the respondent pay the appellant $65,000.00, and that there be an equitable charge on the respondent’s house property for that amount. On 17 May 2005, the primary judge ordered that the appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings on an indemnity basis.

3 The appellant appeals to this Court from those orders.


      CIRCUMSTANCES

4 The appellant was born in 1951 and the respondent was born in 1953. A de facto relationship between them commenced in 1989, and concluded in 2002.

5 Both had previously been married, and each of them had children from those marriages. The appellant has two children, one born in 1976 and the other born in 1988. The respondent has three children, born respectively in 1978, 1981 and 1985. There are no children of the relationship between the appellant and the respondent.

6 At the commencement of the relationship, the appellant had a 50% interest in his former matrimonial home, although this was never applied for the benefit of the relationship. Ultimately, the appellant received in satisfaction of this interest $60,000.00 in 1994 and $40,000.00 in 1999. He used about $70,000.00 in 1998 to purchase a unit at…

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AGLC
Burgess v King [2005] NSWCA 396
Case
[2005] NSWCA 396
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Burgess v King* concerned an appeal from an order made by a primary judge regarding the adjustment of property interests between parties to a de facto relationship. The dispute centred on the division of assets, particularly the matrimonial home owned by the respondent, which had experienced a significant capital gain. The appellant argued that the primary judge had failed to adequately consider their entitlement to a share of this capital gain, despite their substantial contributions to the property's value.

The central legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the primary judge had erred in their assessment of the parties' contributions and the subsequent property division. Specifically, the court was required to determine if the primary judge had properly considered the appellant's contributions in light of the substantial capital gain in the matrimonial home, and whether the appellant should have received a benefit from this increase in value. The extent to which an appellate court should intervene in the exercise of a primary judge's discretion in property adjustment matters was also a key consideration.

The Court of Appeal found that the primary judge had not given sufficient weight to the appellant's contributions when assessing the division of the capital gain. The court reasoned that while the respondent was able to retain the home due to the appellant's contributions, which amounted to approximately one-quarter of its value, the appellant should have received a greater benefit from the subsequent capital appreciation. The court applied principles of property adjustment in de facto relationships, emphasising the need to consider all relevant contributions and the overall financial circumstances of the parties. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the orders below were varied to increase the appellant's awarded sum.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal allowed. 2. Orders below varied by substituting for the figure of $65,000.00 the figure of $115,000.00. 3. Appellant to pay the respondent’s costs of the proceedings at first instance on a party and party basis. 4. Respondent to pay the appellant’s costs of the appeal, and to have a certificate under the Suitors’ Fund Act if otherwise eligible.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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