SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Hampton & Ors v Richardson [2009] QCA 328
PARTIES:
GEOFFREY ROBERT HAMPTON
(first plaintiff/applicant)
PAUL DAMIAN WYATT
(second plaintiff/not a party to the application)
ANTHONY LLOYD HERFORD
(third plaintiff/not a party to the application)
v
NEIL CHARLES RICHARDSON
(defendant/respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6696 of 2009
DC No 1473 of 2008DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
27 October 2009
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
16 October 2009
JUDGES:
McMurdo P, Keane and Muir JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders madeORDERS:
1. Application for leave to appeal refused
2. Applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis
CATCHWORDS:
LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – FRAUD AND DECEIT – where applicant commenced proceedings for breach of trust almost two decades after alleged incident – where respondent pleaded statutory bar in defence below – where primary judge found applicant raised claim of fraud in reply to avoid statutory bar – where primary judge found applicant precluded by laches from bringing action – whether leave to appeal should be granted
District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 68, s 83,
s 118
Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), s 27
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 293Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457; [1998] HCA 66, cited
Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218, cited
Hampton & Ors v Richardson [2009] QDC 139, affirmed
Smith v Woodward [2009] QCA 119, appliedCOUNSEL:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
The respondent appeared on his own behalfSOLICITORS:
The applicant appeared on his own behalf
The respondent appeared on his own behalf
McMURDO P: I agree with Keane JA's reasons for refusing the applicant, Geoffrey Robert Hampton, leave to appeal under s 118(3) District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).
The Court invited Mr Hampton to address his strongest arguments as to why he should be given leave to appeal from the primary judge's order entering judgment for the respondent, Neil Charles Richardson. Mr Hampton raised the following matters, in addition to those dealt with by Keane JA.
He first contended that his claim was for more than $250,000 once interest was taken into account and that therefore the District Court judge did not have jurisdiction to make any orders. That contention is nonsensical for two reasons. First, Mr Hampton brought his claim in the District Court and did not apply to have it transferred to the Supreme Court under s 83 District Court of Queensland Act. He can hardly complain about the court's jurisdiction in those circumstances. It is also inconsistent with s 68(3)(c) District Court of Queensland Act which states that:
"in any case where it is necessary to determine whether…
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- AGLC
- Hampton v Richardson [2009] QCA 328
- Case
- [2009] QCA 328
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The central legal issue for the court was whether the applicant could bring a claim of fraud to avoid the statutory bar of limitation periods, and if so, whether the applicant was precluded by laches from bringing the action. The court had to consider the effect of the applicant's delay in bringing the claim and whether the respondent had been prejudiced by that delay. The court also had to consider whether the applicant's claim of fraud was sufficient to overcome the statutory bar and whether the applicant had acted with reasonable diligence in bringing the claim.
The court found that the applicant's claim of fraud was not sufficient to overcome the statutory bar of limitation periods. The court held that the applicant had been aware of the alleged breach of trust for many years and had failed to bring the claim within the relevant limitation period. The court found that the applicant had not acted with reasonable diligence in bringing the claim, and that the respondent had been prejudiced by the delay. The court held that the applicant was precluded by laches from bringing the action, and that the primary judge's decision should be upheld. The court refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application for leave to appeal refused
2. Applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis
Background
Background to the litigation
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Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
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Decision
Reasons for decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
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