Hampton v Richardson

Case [2009] QCA 328


SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Hampton & Ors v Richardson [2009] QCA 328

PARTIES:

GEOFFREY ROBERT HAMPTON
(first plaintiff/applicant)
PAUL DAMIAN WYATT
(second plaintiff/not a party to the application)
ANTHONY LLOYD HERFORD
(third plaintiff/not a party to the application)
v
NEIL CHARLES RICHARDSON
(defendant/respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6696 of 2009
DC No 1473 of 2008

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for Leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

27 October 2009

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

16 October 2009

JUDGES:

McMurdo P, Keane and Muir JJA
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, each concurring as to the orders made

ORDERS:

1.   Application for leave to appeal refused

2.   Applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – FRAUD AND DECEIT – where applicant commenced proceedings for breach of trust almost two decades after alleged incident – where respondent pleaded statutory bar in defence below – where primary judge found applicant raised claim of fraud in reply to avoid statutory bar – where primary judge found applicant precluded by laches from bringing action – whether leave to appeal should be granted

District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld), s 68, s 83,
s 118
Limitation of Actions Act
1974 (Qld), s 27
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules
1999 (Qld), r 293

Bridgewater v Leahy (1998) 194 CLR 457; [1998] HCA 66, cited
Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co
(1878) 3 App Cas 1218, cited
Hampton & Ors v Richardson
[2009] QDC 139, affirmed
Smith v Woodward [2009] QCA 119, applied

COUNSEL:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
The respondent appeared on his own behalf

SOLICITORS:

The applicant appeared on his own behalf
The respondent appeared on his own behalf

  1. McMURDO P: I agree with Keane JA's reasons for refusing the applicant, Geoffrey Robert Hampton, leave to appeal under s 118(3) District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld).

  1. The Court invited Mr Hampton to address his strongest arguments as to why he should be given leave to appeal from the primary judge's order entering judgment for the respondent, Neil Charles Richardson.  Mr Hampton raised the following matters, in addition to those dealt with by Keane JA. 

  1. He first contended that his claim was for more than $250,000 once interest was taken into account and that therefore the District Court judge did not have jurisdiction to make any orders. That contention is nonsensical for two reasons. First, Mr Hampton brought his claim in the District Court and did not apply to have it transferred to the Supreme Court under s 83 District Court of Queensland Act. He can hardly complain about the court's jurisdiction in those circumstances. It is also inconsistent with s 68(3)(c) District Court of Queensland Act which states that:

"in any case where it is necessary to determine whether…

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Hampton v Richardson [2009] QCA 328
Case
[2009] QCA 328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Hampton v Richardson, the applicant sought to commence proceedings for breach of trust against the respondent, nearly twenty years after the alleged incident. The respondent raised a defence of limitation periods under statute, asserting that the applicant's claim was time-barred. The primary judge found that the applicant had raised a claim of fraud in reply to the defence of limitation periods, to avoid the statutory bar. However, the primary judge held that the applicant was precluded by laches from bringing the action and dismissed the claim.

The central legal issue for the court was whether the applicant could bring a claim of fraud to avoid the statutory bar of limitation periods, and if so, whether the applicant was precluded by laches from bringing the action. The court had to consider the effect of the applicant's delay in bringing the claim and whether the respondent had been prejudiced by that delay. The court also had to consider whether the applicant's claim of fraud was sufficient to overcome the statutory bar and whether the applicant had acted with reasonable diligence in bringing the claim.

The court found that the applicant's claim of fraud was not sufficient to overcome the statutory bar of limitation periods. The court held that the applicant had been aware of the alleged breach of trust for many years and had failed to bring the claim within the relevant limitation period. The court found that the applicant had not acted with reasonable diligence in bringing the claim, and that the respondent had been prejudiced by the delay. The court held that the applicant was precluded by laches from bringing the action, and that the primary judge's decision should be upheld. The court refused the applicant's application for leave to appeal and ordered the applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application for leave to appeal refused

2. Applicant to pay the respondent's costs of and incidental to the application for leave to appeal on the standard basis

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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