Hammond v Pascoe

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL [1992] QCA 380
QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 1599 of 1986

BETWEEN:

PETER GERRARD HAMMOND

(Plaintiff) Appellant

- and -

MARK EDWARD PASCOE

(First Defendant)

- and -

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

(Second Defendant) Respondent

JUDGMENT OF FITZGERALD P.

Delivered the Ninth day of October, 1992

The circumstances are set out in the joint Judgment of

McPherson JA and White J. and I need not repeat them.
However, I disagree with their Honours' conclusion. My
reasons may be briefly stated.

There was no evidence that either vehicle was travelling at an excessive speed, but it is clear the appellant's motor cycle was travelling more quickly than the respondent's motor vehicle, which was travelling slowly. The first respondent was aware both of the slow speed at which he was travelling and that the appellant's motor cycle was following and would inevitably catch up with his motor vehicle. It was also obvious that the road was straight and suitable for overtaking, with appropriate lines marked on the road.

In such circumstances, it seems to me that it was grossly negligent for the respondent to turn right without checking whether another vehicle was overtaking or about to do so, and that this negligence was not significantly reduced by the respondent activating his right traffic indicator a relatively short time before the commencement of the turn. In the absence of more precise findings as to when that occurred or where the appellant was at the time, it is difficult to understand the basis for finding the appellant had an opportunity to observe the traffic indicator and that, as he did not do so, he must have failed to keep a proper lookout. However, I respect the finding made by the trial judge against the appellant on this point.

As their Honours have correctly pointed out, this Court should be slow to interfere with the trial judge's apportionment of blame for the collision. Nonetheless, His Honour's own findings seem to me clearly to indicate that the respondent bears a far greater responsibility for the accident than the appellant. In my opinion, 80% of the fault should be attributed to the respondent and 20% to the appellant.

The appeal should be allowed and the cross-appeal dismissed. The judgment below should be set aside and, in lieu thereof, there should be judgment for the appellant for 80% of the damages assessed ($417,745.30), that is, $334,196.24. The respondent must pay the costs, including any reserved costs, of the trial and this appeal, to be taxed.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL

QUEENSLAND

Appeal No. 1599 of 1986

Before the Court of Appeal
The President
Mr. Justice McPherson

Justice White

BETWEEN:

PETER GERRARD HAMMOND

(Plaintiff) Appellant

- and -

MARK EDWARD PASCOE

(First Defendant)

- and -

BRISBANE CITY COUNCIL

(Second Defendant) Respondent

JUDGMENT OF FITZGERALD P.

Delivered the ninth day of November, 1992

MINUTE OF ORDER: APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL DISMISSED WITH

COSTS.

CATCHWORDS: Negligence. Apportionment of responsibility. Applicant/motor cyclist held two-thirds to blame for…

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Details
Case
[1992] QCA 380
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Court of Appeal heard an appeal and cross-appeal in the case of Hammond v Pascoe, concerning a motor vehicle accident that resulted in serious injuries to the plaintiff and the death of his wife. The plaintiff, riding his Ducati motor cycle, collided with a Sigma station wagon driven by Mark Pascoe, an employee of the Brisbane City Council. The primary issue was the apportionment of responsibility for the accident between the plaintiff and Pascoe. The trial judge had apportioned two-thirds of the fault to the plaintiff and one-third to Pascoe. The plaintiff argued that the trial judge should have accepted his version of events and rejected Pascoe's, while Pascoe sought a higher apportionment of blame against the plaintiff.

The court examined the evidence presented by both parties, which was largely irreconcilable. The plaintiff claimed he was overtaking Pascoe's car, which was slowing down and preparing to turn, while Pascoe stated he had activated his right indicator before decelerating and turning. The court found that the trial judge was entitled to reject the plaintiff's account due to inconsistencies and the presence of reconstruction in his recollection. The court also determined that the trial judge was correct in not finding Pascoe negligent for not checking his rear-view mirror before turning, as the plaintiff was already in the process of overtaking and could have avoided the collision by taking appropriate action.

The appeal and cross-appeal were dismissed, with the apportionment of blame remaining as decided by the trial judge. The court emphasised the wide discretion given to the trial judge in apportioning responsibility and found no error in the trial judge's assessment of the evidence. The final orders were that the appeal and cross-appeal be dismissed with costs.

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