The name of the respondent is amended to High Performance Personnel Pty. Ltd. (in liquidation).
Application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against orders of Dawson J made on 23 December 1992 refused with costs.
Decision
MASON CJ This is an application for an extension of time within which to file a notice of appeal against orders made by Dawson J on 23 December 1992. On that day his Honour dismissed the applicant's application for a review of a taxation of costs by the taxing officer. The taxation arose from an order for costs made by this Court when it dismissed the applicant's application for special leave to appeal from a judgment in favour of the respondent given by the Supreme Court of Victoria. The order for costs made by this Court was that the applicant pay the costs of the respondent of and incidental to the application for special leave, such costs to be taxed by the proper officer of this Court. On taxation the taxing officer signed a certificate certifying that the respondent's bill of costs was taxed and allowed at $5,307.40. Oral argument in this application commenced before me on 12 March 1993, but was not finished on that day. Subsequently, the parties filed written submissions, which I have considered.
2. The Rules of this Court require that an appeal to the Full Court be filed within 21 days of the decision from which the appeal is brought. Order 60 r.4 provides:
"... the Long Vacation shall be excluded in reckoning any period prescribed by these rules or by any order or direction for serving, filing or amending any pleading."
It seems to me that this rule is directed to excluding the Long Vacation from the computation of time for pleading and that it has no application to the computation of time within which an appeal is to be brought. The consequence is that the applicant is out of time and requires an extension.
3. The applicant's explanation for his delay is that he has been fully occupied in dealing with other litigation to which he is a party in the Magistrates' Court, the County Court, the Supreme Court and the Full Court of the Supreme Court and with personal, sporting, charity, community and business obligations. The applicant's explanation is by no means as comprehensive or as clear as it should be in order to make out a case for an extension of time. But I am prepared to assume in the applicant's favour that, meagre though his explanation is, it is enough.
4. The purpose of the Court's power to grant an extension of time is to enable the Court to "do justice between the parties" ((1) See Gallo v. Dawson (1990) 64 ALJR. 458, at p 459; 93 ALR 479, at p 480). However,…
Grounds of appeal
[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.
[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.
[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.
Consideration
[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.
[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.
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AGLC
Halliday v SACS Group Pty Ltd [1993] HCA 13
Case
[1993] HCA 13
Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The case of *Halliday v SACS Group Pty Ltd* concerned a dispute between the applicant, Halliday, and the respondent, SACS Group Pty Ltd. The matter came before the High Court of Australia.
The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the respondent had breached its duty of care to the applicant by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the applicant from suffering harm. Specifically, the court had to consider the scope of the respondent's duty of care in the context of the applicant's employment and the alleged negligent conduct of a third party.
Mason CJ, in his judgment, considered the principles of negligence and the duty of care owed by an employer to an employee. His Honour examined the foreseeability of the harm suffered by the applicant and whether the respondent's actions or omissions were causative of that harm. The court applied established legal principles regarding the standard of care expected of a reasonable employer in similar circumstances, taking into account the nature of the employment and the risks involved. The court's reasoning focused on whether the respondent ought to have foreseen the risk of harm and, if so, whether it took reasonable precautions to avert that risk.