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Hall v Job

Hall v Job

Case [1952] HCA 57 30 October 1952

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86 CLR 639

wool was supplied for appraisement. Thus their Lordships decided 1952-1953. the case by giving effect to what they considered to be the intention

permeating the Act, that is to say the intention that the man who SQUATTING

supplied participating wool for appraisement, and (broadly) no one else, should participate in distributions. If I understand the judgment correctly, it was for the purpose of emphasising that intention that the expression "personal gift " " was used to describe an amount paid to a participant in a distribution. The moneys payable under the Act, being bestowed as the Parliament had seen fit to bestow them, were described by their Lordships as "payable to the supplier " 1. It is a true gift they said, to the supplier of the wool " (1); " a personal gift to the parties concerned 2. It seems clear that what their Lordships were insisting upon by their use of the term "personal gift was that S. 10 must be construed in the light of the essential point in the scheme of the Act, which was that the wool disposals profits were to be put into the very hands from which participating wool had been compul- sorily taken. So construed, S. 10 had the effect of attaching to those profits, when they reached the hands of a member of a partnership which had supplied participating wool for appraisement, the incidents which would have attached at the time when the wool was supplied to the proceeds of a sale of the wool made by the partner- ship at that time. That meant that it was incorrect to give the section such a retrospective operation as it would have if treated as allowing events occurring between the supply of the wool for appraisement and the distribution under the Act to alter the destination of the moneys distributed. The destination remained what it would have been if those events had not happened the recipients were selected by reference to the fact that it was they who had supplied wool for appraisement the Act operated in favour of them personally.

The point which was decided in the particular case was that the assignment made by one partner after the partnership had supplied wool for appraisement, even though it was an assignment of his partnership interest as an entirety, could not operate under S. 10 to deprive the assignor of the right to receive for his own benefit his share of moneys distributed under the Act in relation to the partnership wool; for it was to him and his co-partners, and to them alone, that the Act intended the proper proportion of the wool disposals profit to go. It was to go to them as indivi- duals personally selected as having themselves supplied for appraise- ment the wool to which the proportion related; it was bestowed

1(1952) A.C., at p. 229. 2(1952) A.C., at p. 230.

86 CLR 640

upon them-given to them if you…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

AGLC: Hall v Job [1952] HCA 57
Case: [1952] HCA 57
Decision Date: 30 October 1952

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of *Hall v Job* concerned a dispute over the beneficial entitlement to land purchased with moneys from the Loyal Orange Lodge No. 98 Parkes. The plaintiffs, who were members of the Lodge at the time it ceased to function, sought a declaration that they and other former members were beneficially entitled to the land as tenants in common. The defendants included the trustees of the Grand Lodge of the Loyal Orange Institution of New South Wales, who claimed the land belonged to the Grand Lodge. The matter was heard on appeal to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of New South Wales.

The central legal issue before the High Court was whether the subordinate Lodge, Loyal Orange Lodge No. 98 Parkes, should be treated as an independent voluntary association whose property, upon dissolution, was divisible amongst its then-current members, or whether it was an integral part of the larger Loyal Orange Institution of New South Wales, with its property subject to the Institution's rules. This involved determining the legal character of the subordinate Lodge and the effect of its cessation of activities and the subsequent actions of the Grand Lodge.

The Court reasoned that a subordinate Lodge, such as Loyal Orange Lodge No. 98 Parkes, was not an independent voluntary association formed by a contract between its members. Instead, it was constituted by a warrant from the Grand Lodge and operated under the rules of the broader Institution. The Court emphasised that membership in a subordinate Lodge was contingent upon membership in the Institution, and the rights and obligations of members stemmed from the Institution's constitution. Consequently, the principles applicable to the dissolution of independent voluntary associations were not applicable here. The Court found that the subordinate Lodge was a branch of the Institution, and its property was subject to the overarching rules of the Institution, which provided for the disposition of property upon the dissolution of a subordinate Lodge.

The High Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the decision of the Supreme Court. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to establish their claim to beneficial entitlement to the land. The land was held to be subject to the trust for the Loyal Orange Institution as a whole, and therefore, the members of the defunct subordinate Lodge were not beneficially entitled to it as if it were a separate association.

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