Hales v Jamilmira

Case [2003] NTCA 9


Hales v Jamilmira [2003] NTCA 9

PARTIES:HALES, Peter William

v

JAMILMIRA, Jackie Pascoe

TITLE OF COURT:  COURT OF APPEAL OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY

JURISDICTION:  APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT EXERCISING TERRITORY JURISDICTION

FILE NO:AP 17/2002 (20112873)

DELIVERED:  15 April 2003

HEARING DATES:  13 March 2003

JUDGMENT OF:  MARTIN CJ, MILDREN & RILEY JJ

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:R Wild QC

Respondent:  C McDonald QC

Solicitors:

Appellant:Director of Public Prosecutions

Respondent:  North Australian Aboriginal Legal Aid Service

Judgment category classification:      C

Judgment ID Number:  mar0311

Number of pages:  47

mar0311

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
OF THE NORTHERN TERRITORY
OF AUSTRALIA
AT DARWIN

[2003] NTCA 9
No. AP17 of 2002

BETWEEN:

PETER WILLIAM HALES

Appellant

AND:

JACKIE PASCOE JAMILMIRA

Respondent

CORAM:    MARTIN CJ, MILDREN & RILEY JJ

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

(Delivered 15 April 2003)

MARTIN CJ:

  1. On 30 April 2002 the respondent was convicted, by the Court of Summary Jurisdiction sitting at Maningrida, upon his pleas of guilty for that on 20 August 2001 he had unlawful sexual intercourse of A, who was then a female under the age of 16 years, namely 15, contrary to s 129(1)(a) of the Criminal Code, and that on 21 August 2001 he discharged a firearm in a manner that was likely to endanger, annoy or frighten any person, contrary to s 84(1) of the Firearms Act. On the first count he was sentenced to


    13 months imprisonment to be suspended after serving four months and the court fixed an operational period of 18 months. On the second count he was sentenced to two months imprisonment. The two sentences, by operation of s 50 of the Sentencing Act, were to be served concurrently.

  1. From those sentences the respondent appealed to the Supreme Court, under s 163 of the Justices Act.  The sentences imposed by the learned Magistrate were set aside.  In substitution the respondent was sentenced to 24 hours imprisonment on the first count and 14 days imprisonment on the second.  They were also to be served concurrently.

  2. The appellant, complainant in the Court of Summary Jurisdiction, now appeals from the whole of that judgment as of right pursuant to s 51 of the Supreme Court Act. He asserts that his Honour failed to give appropriate weight to the legislation requiring a sentence of actual imprisonment to be imposed in respect of the first count and in summary, that his Honour gave too much weight to certain cultural factors surrounding the respondent’s conduct and too little to the need expressed in the legislation to protect young girls.

  3. As to the firearms offence, the appellant says that his Honour erred in failing to give sufficient weight to the purpose for which the shotgun was discharged, namely to preserve a relationship against the wishes of A and her family.

  4. This appeal also raises issues going to a suggested change of attitude by the respondent before his Honour and this Court, and the principles applying generally to an appeal by the Crown.

  5. The facts upon which the learned Magistrate acted,…

Continue reading Hales v Jamilmira

Sign in free to access the full text

Details
AGLC
Hales v Jamilmira [2003] NTCA 9
Case
[2003] NTCA 9
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Hales v Jamilmira, the respondent, Jamilmira, appealed against the sentence imposed on him for a breach of section 129(1) of the Criminal Code. The sentencing matter was heard and determined by Riley J in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territory. The primary issue before the court was whether the sentence imposed by the primary judge was demonstrably and seriously inadequate.

The court considered the relevant legal principles concerning sentencing and the appropriate response to breaches of section 129(1) of the Criminal Code. The court examined the circumstances of the offence, including the fact that it was only the second known case of its kind in the history of the Territory. The court also considered the broader context of tribally arranged marriages within certain Aboriginal communities. The court acknowledged that while customary law may not regard such offences as serious, the law of the Territory must still be applied.

After careful consideration, the court concluded that the sentence imposed by Gallop AJ was not demonstrably and seriously inadequate. The court found that the degree to which the primary judge had fallen into error was substantial, but not to the extent that it warranted interference with the sentence. The court emphasized that in future cases of this kind, it may be appropriate to impose a sentence that includes some period of imprisonment. The appeal was dismissed, and the original sentence was upheld.

This decision highlights the importance of applying the law of the Territory consistently, even in cases involving cultural practices that may not align with customary law. The court's reasoning underscores the need for caution and careful consideration when dealing with such sensitive matters.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Finally, there is the fact that this is only the second occasion, as far as can be ascertained, that an Aboriginal person has been charged with an offence against s 129(1), or its earlier statutory equivalents, in the history of this Territory since its foundation in 1869. The only previous known case was R v Mungurala (unrep) NTSC, 18 April 1975; SCC 313 of 1974, a sentence imposed by Forster J. That case involved a breach of s 63 of the Criminal Law Consolidation Act and Ordinance, (carnal knowledge of a female under the age of 12) which carried a maximum of imprisonment for life. The victim in that case was ten yeas of age and the offender was aged 18. The victim was the promised wife of the offender's grandfather, who had since passed away. As a result, she became the promised wife of the offender but the offender did not know that. The victim was already post menarche and according to the customs of her people (she came from the Oenpelli area), although customary law had been transgressed, it was not regarded as a serious matter and the offender would be punished only by being sent to an outstation for a time. Forster J, after taking into account the offender's plea of guilty and the fact that he had been in custody for three weeks, sentenced him to 12 months imprisonment fully suspended to be of good behaviour for two years. In many respects, that case was far more serious than this matter. However, the point to be made is that, notwithstanding that tribally arranged marriages with girls under 16 is still wide spread in a number of Aboriginal communities, prosecution for offences committed against s 129(1) or its statutory predecessors by Aboriginal males and involving Aboriginal females is extremely rare. The fact that this Court has not previously dealt with such a case so as to give warning that this kind of behaviour will not be tolerated in Aboriginal communities even where what is done does not infringe customary law, is a strong reason for acting cautiously in this case.Conclusion The conclusion I have reached is that it has not been shown that the sentence imposed by Gallop AJ in respect of the penalty for the breach of s 129(1) of the Code was demonstrably and seriously inadequate and that the degree to which his Honour fell into error was substantial. That is not to say that I would have imposed the sentence imposed by Gallop AJ; nor is it to say that in future cases of this kind, a sentence of the kind imposed in this case will be adequate. As a general rule, it is my view that in cases involving a breach of s 129(1), the sentencer should ordinarily impose an appropriate head sentence and order that at least some portion of the sentence be served. Whilst not wishing to entirely discount the possibility of a sentence to the rising of the Court or some similar type of disposition, as that is the minimum sentence permitted by law, it should be reserved for those rare cases which fall at the very bottom of the scale of seriousness. I would dismiss the appeal.RILEY J

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Full text does not contain this section.