Habermann v Cook Shire Council

Link copied
Case Copied 19 min read

SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Habermann v Cook Shire Council [2021] QSC 101

PARTIES:

ELLANNA STORM HABERMANN

(applicant)

v

COOK SHIRE COUNCIL

(respondent)

FILE NO/S:

290 of 2020

DIVISION:

Trial

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court of Queensland at Cairns

DELIVERED ON:

14 May 2021

DELIVERED AT:

Cairns

HEARING DATE:

7 May 2021, supplementary submissions received 11, 12 May 2021

JUDGE:

Henry J

ORDER:

1.   Application dismissed.

2.   I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 10.00 am on 21 May 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

CATCHWORDS:

CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – MOTIONS, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – DISCLOSURE – where the applicant plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of her employer, the respondent defendant – where in correspondence with the applicant the respondent’s solicitors disclosed the effect of legal advice given by the respondent’s counsel – where the correspondence was endorsed with the heading “Without Prejudice, Save as to Costs’” –  whether legal professional privilege was waived –whether disclosure of the advice by the respondent’s counsel is supported by “special circumstances and the interests of justice require it” – whether the court should order disclosure

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 211, r 223

Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, cited
Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101, not followed
Field v Commissioner for Railways for NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285, cited
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, cited
Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, followed
Pihiga v Roche [2011] 278 ALR 209, cited
Secretary, Department of Justice v Osland (2007) 95 ALD 380, followed

Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783, cited

COUNSEL:

J Greggery QC for the applicant plaintiff

R Morton for the respondent defendant

SOLICITORS:

Organic Legal for the applicant plaintiff

Jensen McConaghy for the respondent defendant

  1. The applicant plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of her employer, the respondent defendant. A disclosure dispute has arisen between the parties, prompting the present application that the Court order disclosure of certain documents pursuant to r 223 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).

  2. By the time of the application’s hearing the sole issue was whether this Court should order the disclosure by the respondent to the applicant of an advice by the respondent’s counsel in respect of which legal professional privilege has allegedly been waived.

    Background

  3. The alleged waiver of the privilege occurred against a background where, by letter of 3 November 2020 to the respondent’s solicitors, the applicant’s solicitors nominated pursuant to r 553 UCPR a day, time and place for the holding of a conference by mediation.

  4. The response of the respondent’s solicitors, dated 11 November 2020, explained:

    “As set out in our correspondence of…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Habermann v Cook Shire Council and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] QSC 101
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Habermann v Cook Shire Council, the plaintiff, Habermann, sought to compel the defendant, Cook Shire Council, to disclose an advice given by its counsel. The plaintiff argued that the defendant had waived its legal professional privilege regarding the advice, and that disclosure was warranted by special circumstances and the interests of justice. The matter was heard by the court, which ultimately decided against the plaintiff's application.

The court considered the legal issues involved in determining whether legal professional privilege was waived and whether disclosure was warranted by special circumstances and the interests of justice. The court examined the background of the case, including the "without prejudice, save as to costs" correspondence sent by the defendant's solicitors to the plaintiff's solicitors, which disclosed the effect of legal advice given by the defendant's counsel. The court also considered the relevance of the advice to the proceeding and whether it met the criteria for disclosure under the relevant rule.

The court concluded that the circumstances did not warrant disclosure of the advice. The court held that the "without prejudice" endorsement did not preclude disclosure, as the plaintiff intended to use the advice to fairly comprehend the force of the defendant's offer to settle. However, the court found that there was no waiver of privilege and that the interests of justice did not require disclosure. The court emphasised that the relevance of the advice to the proceeding was at best indirect, and that the applicant's complaint of unfairness did not meet the dual criterion required for disclosure.

Based on the court's reasoning and decision, the application to compel disclosure was dismissed. The court ordered that the parties would be heard as to costs if they had not agreed on costs in the meantime, on a specified date and time.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Application dismissed.

2. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 10.00 am on 21 May 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

Background

Background to the litigation

By the time of the application’s hearing the sole issue was whether this Court should order the disclosure by the respondent to the applicant of an advice by the respondent’s counsel in respect of which legal professional privilege has allegedly been waived.Background The alleged waiver of the privilege occurred against a background where, by letter of 3 November 2020 to the respondent’s solicitors, the applicant’s solicitors nominated pursuant to r 553 UCPR a day, time and place for the holding of a conference by mediation. The response of the respondent’s solicitors, dated 11 November 2020, explained:“As set out in our correspondence of 2 October 2020, we have recently briefed Counsel and we also await receipt of further material from the Defendant.We otherwise confirm that we are seeking instructions from our client with respect to whether it is agreeable to proceeding to mediation as proposed.We shall revert to you in due course.” Then on 20 November 2020 the respondent’s solicitors sent the applicant’s solicitors a further letter endorsed in bold print in its heading: “‘Without Prejudice, Save as to Costs’”The body of the letter was as follows:“We refer to your correspondence of 3 November 2020 and our correspondence of 11 November 2020 regarding the proposed mediation.We have now received advices from Richard Morton of Counsel. Based on that advice, (which is consistent with our views of this claim) the Plaintiff is unlikely to establish that the Defendant is liable for her alleged psychiatric injury and even in the unlikely event that liability was established, quantum would not be awarded in the magnitude sought by your client.LGW has made its “best offer” and will not make any further offers at a mediation.[Redacted section, which it is common ground contained the terms of a settlement offer]Finally, in any event, we are not available for a mediation on Friday, 18 December 2020 in Townsville before Mr Philp QC.” The effect of the second paragraph in the above passage was to disclose the respondent’s counsel had given legal advice that the plaintiff would be unlikely to establish the defendant is liable for the alleged psychiatric injury and in the unlikely event liability was established, the quantum which would be awarded would not be of the magnitude sought by the plaintiff. At the highest it was a disclosure, in sparse terms, of the conclusions, not the reasons, in counsel’s advice. By so disclosing the effect of counsel’s advice, it is alleged the respondent has waived its legal professional privilege in respect of that advice and that this Court should order the disclosure of counsel’s advice. The respondent argues the applicant ought be precluded from relying upon the letter of 20 November 2020 because it was endorsed “without prejudice”, that the advice is not in any event disclosable because it is not relevant to the proceeding and that the letter did not constitute a waiver of legal professional privilege.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

The applicant’s supplementary submissions on this question referred to the following observation of the plurality in Mann v Carnell:[1]“The privilege may be invoked, and its application may be of importance, in pre-trial proceedings such as the discovery and inspection of documents. Documents may be discoverable even though they may not be admissible in evidence. Their importance may be, for example, that they indicate a useful line of investigation, or that they contain information which could affect the manner in which a party may decide to conduct proceedings.”[2] (emphasis added)[1](1999) 201 CLR 1.[2](1999) 201 CLR 1, 10-11. The applicant also highlights reference to Mann v Carnell in Fraser v Fraser [2019] WASC 135, but that case involved a disclosure which it was accepted could inform a line of cross-examination at trial, regarding a change of position. That passage is of limited assistance in informing consideration of the UCPR, which speaks not of discovery or of a test of whether a document is admissible in evidence. Rather, it speaks of disclosure and a test of whether a document is directly relevant to an issue in the proceeding. Greater assistance on the relevance issue may be derived from the words of the provision under which the court is here asked to compel disclosure. The context that r 223 falls within Chapter 7 “Disclosure” might at first blush be thought to suggest it only applies to documents to which the r 211 duty of disclosure applies. However, while the operation of r 223(4)(b)(i) turns upon whether the r 211 duty of disclosure has been complied with, r 223(4)(a) does not. Its sole criterion is that “there are special circumstances and the interests of justice require it”. This clearly allows of the possibility that special circumstances and the interests of justice may found the exercise of a court’s discretion to require disclosure of a document, notwithstanding that the document is not caught by r 211’s duty of disclosure. Nonetheless, the fact that the document in issue is not caught by the r 211 duty may remain a consideration in assessing whether the circumstances truly have the threshold character required by r 223(4)(a) and in turn whether the discretion ought be exercised. Putting it differently, that assessment may be informed by the foundational context in which the judge is being asked to intervene and exercise the exercise the discretion, viz, in the proceeding in which the application for a r 223 order is made. Here the relevance of the document in issue to the proceeding is at best indirect, in that its disclosure may inform a decision whether or not to settle the proceeding. I am prepared to accept such a feature might, consistently with r 5(2)’s emphasis on the application of the rules with the objective of avoiding undue delay, inform consideration of the dual criterion that there are special circumstances and the interests of justice require disclosure. However, I do not accept, and nor does the applicant assert, that feature could of itself be sufficient to meet the criterion. The complaint of unfairness

Decision

Reasons for decision

The same reasons demonstrate that the present circumstances are not special and fall well short of the interests of justice requiring disclosure.Conclusion and Orders The application as litigated before me must fail. I am conscious the pre-hearing resolution of other aspects of the application may be relevant to costs and so will give the parties an opportunity to consider their position regarding costs. My orders are: Application dismissed. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 10.00 am on 21 May 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The applicant’s argument that the dual criterion has been met centred upon the interests of justice, the implication being those interests were such as in this case to also constitute special circumstances. That argument was that it is unfair for the respondent to use counsel’s advice as a persuasive device in support of its settlement offer while depriving the applicant of access to that advice. As the applicant’s counsel put it, it is not in the interests of justice that the respondent should be permitted to use counsel’s advice as a sword in support of its position and invoke privilege as a shield against full understanding of that position by the applicant. Consideration The starting point for weighing the force of that argument is that the alleged waiver occurred in correspondence which was endorsed “without prejudice”. It has long been established that parties engaging in communications attempting to compromise litigation may avoid the embarrassment which the liability of their communications being put into evidence may impose by defining such communications through the use of the words “without prejudice”.[3] However, the rule against disclosure of without prejudice communications is not absolute.[4] The rule will not protect against disclosure where disclosure is not sought for a purpose inconsistent with the rationale underpinning the rule, namely “the public interest in promoting the settlement of disputes without calling in aide the courts”.[5] [3]Field v Commissioner for Railways for NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285, 291.[4]See for example the exceptions listed in Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783, 791-3.[5]To adopt the words of Lander J in Pihiga v Roche [2011] 278 ALR 209, [86]. In the present case the applicant emphasises it is neither seeking to use the communication as evidence in its claim, nor seeking to use it inconsistently with the expressed or implied agreement between the parties that the communications will be kept confidential. The applicant’s argument is that it intends to use the full content of the advice to fairly comprehend the force of the respondent’s offer to settle. Such a use is consistent with the public interest in promoting the settlement of disputes and will be internal to the deliberations of a party to the proceedings and thus not breach any confidence as between the parties. I accept such use would not offend the principles underpinning the rule. It follows the “without prejudice” endorsement would not preclude disclosure here. The more fundamental challenges for the applicant are whether there has been a waiver of privilege and, if there has, whether there are special circumstances and the interests of justice require disclosure. Those considerations do not fall for analysis in isolation. Each turns upon the context in which the communication occurred, particularly whether there is substance to the applicant’s complaint of unfairness. For a time there existed some tension in the authorities as to whether disclosure of a conclusion expressed in legal advice, without disclosure of the reasons, will result in a waiver of privilege. In Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice,[6] Gibbs J[7] and Mason and Brennan JJ[8] cited with approval the analysis in Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common Law[9] which explained that one of the elements of waiver is that of fairness and consistency. Wigmore wrote:“A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There is always also the objective consideration that when his conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not. He cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder. He may elect to withhold or to disclose, but after a certain point his election must remain final.”[10] (emphasis added)[6](1986) 161 CLR 475.[7](1986) 161 CLR 475, 481.[8](1986) 161 CLR 475, 488.[9](1961), Vol 8, par 2327, p 637.[10]Cited by Gibbs J in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 481.