SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Habermann v Cook Shire Council [2021] QSC 101
PARTIES:
ELLANNA STORM HABERMANN
(applicant)
v
COOK SHIRE COUNCIL
(respondent)
FILE NO/S:
290 of 2020
DIVISION:
Trial
PROCEEDING:
Application
ORIGINATING COURT: Supreme Court of Queensland at Cairns
DELIVERED ON:
14 May 2021
DELIVERED AT:
Cairns
HEARING DATE:
7 May 2021, supplementary submissions received 11, 12 May 2021
JUDGE:
Henry J
ORDER:
1. Application dismissed.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 10.00 am on 21 May 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).
CATCHWORDS:
CIVIL PROCEEDINGS IN STATE AND TERRITORY COURTS – MOTIONS, INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATIONS AND OTHER PRE-TRIAL MATTERS – OTHER MATTERS – DISCLOSURE – where the applicant plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of her employer, the respondent defendant – where in correspondence with the applicant the respondent’s solicitors disclosed the effect of legal advice given by the respondent’s counsel – where the correspondence was endorsed with the heading “Without Prejudice, Save as to Costs’” – whether legal professional privilege was waived –whether disclosure of the advice by the respondent’s counsel is supported by “special circumstances and the interests of justice require it” – whether the court should order disclosure
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld), r 211, r 223
Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, cited
Bennett v Chief Executive Officer, Australian Customs Service (2004) 140 FCR 101, not followed
Field v Commissioner for Railways for NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285, cited
Mann v Carnell (1999) 201 CLR 1, cited
Osland v Secretary, Department of Justice (2008) 234 CLR 275, followed
Pihiga v Roche [2011] 278 ALR 209, cited
Secretary, Department of Justice v Osland (2007) 95 ALD 380, followedUnilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783, cited
COUNSEL: J Greggery QC for the applicant plaintiff
R Morton for the respondent defendant
SOLICITORS: Organic Legal for the applicant plaintiff
Jensen McConaghy for the respondent defendant
The applicant plaintiff claims damages for personal injuries allegedly caused by the negligence of her employer, the respondent defendant. A disclosure dispute has arisen between the parties, prompting the present application that the Court order disclosure of certain documents pursuant to r 223 Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 1999 (Qld) (UCPR).
By the time of the application’s hearing the sole issue was whether this Court should order the disclosure by the respondent to the applicant of an advice by the respondent’s counsel in respect of which legal professional privilege has allegedly been waived.
Background
The alleged waiver of the privilege occurred against a background where, by letter of 3 November 2020 to the respondent’s solicitors, the applicant’s solicitors nominated pursuant to r 553 UCPR a day, time and place for the holding of a conference by mediation.
The response of the respondent’s solicitors, dated 11 November 2020, explained:
“As set out in our correspondence of…
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- Case
- [2021] QSC 101
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered the legal issues involved in determining whether legal professional privilege was waived and whether disclosure was warranted by special circumstances and the interests of justice. The court examined the background of the case, including the "without prejudice, save as to costs" correspondence sent by the defendant's solicitors to the plaintiff's solicitors, which disclosed the effect of legal advice given by the defendant's counsel. The court also considered the relevance of the advice to the proceeding and whether it met the criteria for disclosure under the relevant rule.
The court concluded that the circumstances did not warrant disclosure of the advice. The court held that the "without prejudice" endorsement did not preclude disclosure, as the plaintiff intended to use the advice to fairly comprehend the force of the defendant's offer to settle. However, the court found that there was no waiver of privilege and that the interests of justice did not require disclosure. The court emphasised that the relevance of the advice to the proceeding was at best indirect, and that the applicant's complaint of unfairness did not meet the dual criterion required for disclosure.
Based on the court's reasoning and decision, the application to compel disclosure was dismissed. The court ordered that the parties would be heard as to costs if they had not agreed on costs in the meantime, on a specified date and time.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. Application dismissed.
2. I will hear the parties as to costs, if costs have not been agreed in the meantime, at 10.00 am on 21 May 2021 (out of town parties having leave to appear by telephone or video-link).
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The applicant’s argument that the dual criterion has been met centred upon the interests of justice, the implication being those interests were such as in this case to also constitute special circumstances. That argument was that it is unfair for the respondent to use counsel’s advice as a persuasive device in support of its settlement offer while depriving the applicant of access to that advice. As the applicant’s counsel put it, it is not in the interests of justice that the respondent should be permitted to use counsel’s advice as a sword in support of its position and invoke privilege as a shield against full understanding of that position by the applicant. Consideration The starting point for weighing the force of that argument is that the alleged waiver occurred in correspondence which was endorsed “without prejudice”. It has long been established that parties engaging in communications attempting to compromise litigation may avoid the embarrassment which the liability of their communications being put into evidence may impose by defining such communications through the use of the words “without prejudice”.[3] However, the rule against disclosure of without prejudice communications is not absolute.[4] The rule will not protect against disclosure where disclosure is not sought for a purpose inconsistent with the rationale underpinning the rule, namely “the public interest in promoting the settlement of disputes without calling in aide the courts”.[5] [3]Field v Commissioner for Railways for NSW (1957) 99 CLR 285, 291.[4]See for example the exceptions listed in Unilever plc v Procter & Gamble Co [2001] 1 All ER 783, 791-3.[5]To adopt the words of Lander J in Pihiga v Roche [2011] 278 ALR 209, [86]. In the present case the applicant emphasises it is neither seeking to use the communication as evidence in its claim, nor seeking to use it inconsistently with the expressed or implied agreement between the parties that the communications will be kept confidential. The applicant’s argument is that it intends to use the full content of the advice to fairly comprehend the force of the respondent’s offer to settle. Such a use is consistent with the public interest in promoting the settlement of disputes and will be internal to the deliberations of a party to the proceedings and thus not breach any confidence as between the parties. I accept such use would not offend the principles underpinning the rule. It follows the “without prejudice” endorsement would not preclude disclosure here. The more fundamental challenges for the applicant are whether there has been a waiver of privilege and, if there has, whether there are special circumstances and the interests of justice require disclosure. Those considerations do not fall for analysis in isolation. Each turns upon the context in which the communication occurred, particularly whether there is substance to the applicant’s complaint of unfairness. For a time there existed some tension in the authorities as to whether disclosure of a conclusion expressed in legal advice, without disclosure of the reasons, will result in a waiver of privilege. In Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice,[6] Gibbs J[7] and Mason and Brennan JJ[8] cited with approval the analysis in Wigmore Evidence in Trials at Common Law[9] which explained that one of the elements of waiver is that of fairness and consistency. Wigmore wrote:“A privileged person would seldom be found to waive, if his intention not to abandon could alone control the situation. There is always also the objective consideration that when his conduct touches a certain point of disclosure, fairness requires that his privilege shall cease whether he intended that result or not. He cannot be allowed, after disclosing as much as he pleases, to withhold the remainder. He may elect to withhold or to disclose, but after a certain point his election must remain final.”[10] (emphasis added)[6](1986) 161 CLR 475.[7](1986) 161 CLR 475, 481.[8](1986) 161 CLR 475, 488.[9](1961), Vol 8, par 2327, p 637.[10]Cited by Gibbs J in Attorney-General (NT) v Maurice (1986) 161 CLR 475, 481.