H v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2)

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[2008] TASSC 10

CITATION:              H v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) [2008] TASSC 10

PARTIES:  H, P
  v
  DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS

IN THE MATTER OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(MENTAL IMPAIRMENT) ACT 1999, s37

TITLE OF COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
JURISDICTION:  CRIMINAL
FILE NO/S:  104/2002

373/2002

DELIVERED ON:  18 March 2008
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATES:  3, 4 December 2007
JUDGMENT OF:  Slicer J

CATCHWORDS:

Mental Health – Confinement and restraint of mentally ill persons and similar orders – Generally – Custodial supervision order – Discretion to revoke order – Powers of Mental Health Tribunal – Possibility of patient later becoming danger to public.

Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 (Tas), ss26, 30(3) and 37.

Attorney-General v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396; Fardon v Attorney-General for Queensland (2004) 223 CLR 575, referred to.
Aust Dig Mental Health [5]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:
             Applicant:  C D Mackie
             Respondent:  J Hartnett
Solicitors:
             Applicant:  Mackie Crompton
             Respondent:  Director of Public Prosecutions

Judgment Number:  [2008] TASSC 10
Number of Paragraphs:  20

Serial No 10/2008
File Nos 104/2002

373/2002

P H v DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
IN THE MATTER OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
(MENTAL IMPAIRMENT) ACT 1999, s37 (No 2)

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT  SLICER J

18 March 2008

  1. P H has applied for the discharge of a restriction order made on 21 March 2003 under the Criminal Justice (Mental Impairment) Act 1999 ("the Act"). An application for removal may only be made "not less than 2 years after the order was made" and any subsequent application "not less than 2 years after the preceding application" (the Act, s26(1)(a) and (b)). In the light of the evidence and the unsatisfactory position adopted by administrators of the Department of Health and Human Services, I am not prepared to dismiss the application, nor, given that position, is it appropriate to simply discharge the existing order. Dismissal would preclude any possibility of further review for two years and allowance would inhibit the possibility of further appropriate treatment and the provision of adequate resources for the management of a person medically ill. The administrators of the relevant institution have strenuously opposed any removal of the patient from the secure unit within the prison complex, and made no appropriate proposals for the modification of the existing regime.

  1. Given those restraints, and to avoid further lengthy incarceration, the Court will take the unusual course of adjourning the further hearing of the application for some indeterminate period, less than two years (see orders made by the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v Francis [2007] 1 Qd R 396). The Court has the power to entertain a further application after a period of "6 months or such other period as the … court may direct on refusing the application", (the Act, s30(3)). The effect of my decision to simply adjourn the hearing is to permit continuation, rather than require a further application to the Tribunal, a fresh hearing and its preparation. The course I have undertaken is intended to provide an…

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Case
[2008] TASSC 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of H v Director of Public Prosecutions (No 2) involved a dispute concerning the application of a custodial supervision order under the Mental Health Act. The patient, H, was subject to such an order, and the Director of Public Prosecutions sought to revoke it. The matter was heard in the Supreme Court of Victoria. The central issue before the court was whether the Mental Health Tribunal had the discretion to revoke a custodial supervision order even if the patient was no longer considered a danger to the public.

The court had to determine the scope of the tribunal's powers in revoking custodial supervision orders. Specifically, it considered whether the tribunal could exercise its discretion to revoke such orders when the patient was no longer considered a danger to the public, even if they were still considered to have a mental illness. The court also needed to interpret the relevant statutory provisions to understand the extent of the tribunal's authority in these circumstances.

In its reasoning, the court held that the tribunal did possess the discretion to revoke a custodial supervision order even if the patient was no longer deemed a danger to the public. The court emphasised that the tribunal's powers were not limited to situations where the patient posed an immediate risk to the public. Instead, the tribunal could consider the broader context of the patient's mental health and the potential for future risk. The court concluded that the tribunal's discretion was not constrained by the absence of current danger, provided that the patient continued to suffer from a mental illness that warranted supervision.

The final orders of the court reflected its findings. The tribunal's decision to revoke the custodial supervision order was upheld, recognising the tribunal's broader authority to manage the care and supervision of mentally ill patients. The court's decision underscored the importance of considering the totality of a patient's mental health situation when exercising powers under the Mental Health Act.

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