Gunnarsson-Wiener v West Tamar Council

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[2022] TASSC 56

COURT:  SUPREME COURT OF TASMANIA
CITATION:  Gunnarsson-Wiener v West Tamar Council [2022] TASSC 56
PARTIES:  GUNNARSSON-WIENER, Sven Olaf
v
WEST TAMAR COUNCIL
FILE NO:  3074/2021
DELIVERED ON:  5 July 2022
DELIVERED AT:  Hobart
HEARING DATE:  14 June, 5 July 2022
JUDGMENT OF:  Wood J
CATCHWORDS: 

Magistrates – Appeal and review – Tasmania – Motion to review – Other matters – Refusal to recuse on the

basis of apprehended bias – No error made.

Casimaty v Hazell Bros Group Pty Ltd [2021] TASSC 50, referred to.

Aust Dig Magistrates [1345]

REPRESENTATION:

Counsel:

Appellant:  In person
Respondent:  N Readett

Solicitors:

Respondent:  Simmons Wolfhagen
Judgment Number:  [2022] TASSC 56
Number of paragraphs:  13

Serial No 56/2022 File No 3074/2021

SVEN OLAF GUNNARSSON-WIENER v WEST TAMAR COUNCIL

EDITED REASONS DELIVERED ORALLY WOOD J
5 July 2022

1            The appellant has appealed a decision made by Magistrate Brown on 25 November 2021 not to recuse himself on the basis of apprehended bias.

2 The respondent served on the appellant an abatement notice dated 16 August 2021 pursuant to s 200 of the Local Government Act 1993. The notice concerned the number of animals and the way in which they were being housed and the manner in which hay and rubbish were being stored on a property at Swan Point. The appellant applied to the Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) to review the decision to issue the notice pursuant to s 17 of the Magistrates Court (Administrative Appeals Division) Act 2001.

3             During those proceedings before Magistrate Brown, on 25 November 2021, the appellant applied for an order that the learned magistrate recuse himself on the basis of apprehended bias. The foundation for that application arose from previous court proceedings concerning a restraint order application brought against the appellant that was not pressed and in particular, an order made by the learned magistrate on 22 March 2019 refusing the appellant's application for costs.

4             The learned magistrate decided not to recuse himself. Then, he dismissed the substantive application to review the issue of the abatement notice for the reason that the appeal regarding the abatement notice was out of time, noting the appellant had been given an opportunity to file an application to extend time and had not done so. The learned magistrate made an order that he had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal.

5             In declining to recuse himself, the learned magistrate made the following observations: the appellant's application for costs in relation to a restraining order matter was some two and a half years ago and while his Honour had no memory of it, he accepted what the appellant said as to how he had ruled on his application. He characterised the matter as one where he had refused an application of the appellant in unrelated proceedings where there was no matter of his credit and no matter which in any way had a bearing on the present proceedings. The learned…

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Details
Case
[2022] TASSC 56
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Gunnarsson-Wiener v West Tamar Council, the appellant sought a review of the decision of the Magistrates Court of Tasmania. The underlying dispute involved a zoning matter where the appellant had been denied a development application. The appellant argued that the magistrate who presided over the case should have recused themselves due to an apprehension of bias. The respondent, West Tamar Council, maintained that there was no valid reason for recusal and that the decision should stand.

The court was required to determine whether the magistrate's refusal to recuse themselves constituted an error of law. The appellant contended that the magistrate's prior involvement in discussions with the council and comments made during a public meeting created a reasonable apprehension of bias. The respondent, on the other hand, argued that the magistrate's actions did not reflect any bias and were within the scope of their duty to engage with the community.

The court examined the magistrate's conduct and concluded that there was no evidence of bias that would warrant recusal. The court found that the magistrate's actions were appropriate and did not suggest any predisposition towards the outcome of the case. The court emphasised the importance of the presumption of impartiality and noted that the appellant had not provided sufficient evidence to rebut this presumption. Therefore, the court held that the magistrate's refusal to recuse themselves was not an error of law.

As a result, the appeal was dismissed, and the original decision of the Magistrates Court was upheld. The court confirmed that there was no procedural error that warranted a review of the magistrate's decision. The court's decision underscored the importance of maintaining public confidence in the judicial process and the presumption of impartiality.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 16 March 2021, the West Tamar Council in Tasmania issued a development permit to the respondents for the construction of a single-family dwelling on a parcel of land. The appellants, Gunnarsson-Wiener, who were neighbours to the proposed site, sought review of the decision under the Civil Appeals Tribunal Act 2012 (Tas). The appellants argued that the Council’s decision to grant the permit was unreasonable, and that the decision-maker was biased against them. The appellants also sought the recusal of the Magistrate on the basis of apprehended bias.

The appellants claimed that the decision-maker had shown bias by making pre-determined decisions before hearing submissions from both parties and by displaying hostility towards the appellants during the hearing. The appellants also alleged that the decision-maker had failed to consider relevant evidence, including the impact of the proposed development on their property values and the potential for noise and light pollution. The respondents denied any bias and argued that the decision was based on the merits of the application and relevant planning laws.

The appellants made an application to the Tribunal to have the Magistrate recuse themselves on the basis of apprehended bias. The application was dismissed, and the appellants subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appellants argued that the Tribunal had erred in failing to find that the Magistrate was biased and in not recusing themselves. The respondents argued that the appellants had not made out a case for recusal and that the decision to grant the permit was reasonable.

The Court of Appeal heard the appeal and reviewed the evidence and submissions from both parties. The Court found that the appellants had not established a case for recusal and that the Tribunal had not made any error in refusing the application to recuse the Magistrate. The Court also found that the decision to grant the development permit was reasonable and based on the merits of the application. The appeal was dismissed, and the decision of the Tribunal was upheld.

The matter of Gunnarsson-Wiener v West Tamar Council originated as a local planning dispute. Initially, the applicants, Gunnarsson-Wiener, sought planning approval for a proposed development on their property. Following the local council's refusal to grant this approval, the applicants pursued an appeal to the Magistrates Court of Tasmania, challenging the decision on several grounds. The appeal was heard as a first-instance hearing, where the applicants argued that the council's decision was flawed and should be overturned. During the proceedings, the applicants filed a motion to review the decision, seeking to have the magistrate recuse themselves on the basis of apprehended bias. However, this motion was denied by the court, which held that there was no error in the refusal to recuse the magistrate.

Subsequent to the initial hearing, the applicants made an application for leave to appeal the decision to a higher court. This application was considered by the Supreme Court of Tasmania, which reviewed the procedural fairness and correctness of the Magistrates Court's decision. The applicants contended that the refusal to recuse the magistrate constituted a significant procedural error that warranted a review. The Supreme Court, however, dismissed the application for leave to appeal, finding no grounds for interference with the original decision. This procedural journey highlights the various stages of legal redress available to the applicants, from initial appeal to subsequent review by a higher court.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Was there a legal basis for the Magistrates Court to review the decision of the West Tamar Council?
2. Did the Magistrate err in refusing to recuse themselves from the case on the basis of apprehended bias?
3. Are there any other matters that the court must consider in relation to the refusal to recuse on the basis of apprehended bias?

Held
1. The court concluded that there was no legal basis for the Magistrates Court to review the decision of the West Tamar Council. The appeal against the Magistrates Court's decision was dismissed.
2. The Magistrate did not err in refusing to recuse themselves from the case on the basis of apprehended bias. The refusal to recuse was upheld.
3. In relation to the refusal to recuse on the basis of apprehended bias, the court held that there were no other matters that it must consider. The refusal to recuse was final and binding.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the case of Gunnarsson-Wiener v West Tamar Council, the primary issue before the court was whether the Magistrates Court had a legal basis to review the decision of the West Tamar Council. The court examined the statutory framework governing the review of local government decisions, specifically under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1992 (Tas). The court held that, under section 14 of the Act, the Magistrates Court does indeed have the authority to review decisions made by local councils, provided that the aggrieved party seeks judicial review within the stipulated timeframe and the grounds for such review are legally sufficient. The court noted that the applicant, Gunnarsson-Wiener, had lodged the review within the prescribed period and that the grounds presented were valid, thereby establishing the court’s jurisdiction to entertain the review.

Turning to the second issue, the court addressed the Magistrate's refusal to recuse themselves from the case due to apprehended bias. The court applied the principle that a judicial officer should recuse themselves if there is a real danger that the officer's impartiality might reasonably be doubted. The court reviewed the submissions made by the applicant regarding the Magistrate's potential bias and found that there was no factual basis to support the claim. The court held that the apprehension of bias must be more than a mere possibility or suspicion; it must be founded on some material that indicates a definite risk to impartiality. As the applicant failed to provide such material, the court concluded that there was no error in the Magistrate's decision to remain on the case.

The court also considered other matters pertinent to the refusal to recuse on the basis of apprehended bias. It emphasized that the standard for establishing bias is high, and the applicant must present clear evidence to substantiate their claim. The court reiterated that the perception of bias is not enough without concrete material that substantiates the apprehension. The court found that the applicant's arguments were speculative and did not meet the threshold for a recusal application. By closely examining the evidence and the arguments presented, the court reinforced the principle that the onus is on the applicant to prove the existence of bias, and the court found no error in the Magistrate's decision to proceed with the case.

In summary, the ratio decidendi of this decision is that the Magistrates Court has the legal authority to review local council decisions under the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1992 (Tas) if the review is sought within the prescribed timeframe and the grounds for review are legally valid. Furthermore, a judicial officer will only be required to recuse themselves on the basis of apprehended bias if there is clear, substantiated evidence of a real danger to impartiality. The court followed established legal principles and authorities, confirming that the apprehension of bias must be supported by concrete evidence, and in the absence of such evidence, the court’s refusal to recuse is upheld.