Guilbert v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd

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DETERMINATION OF APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF THE COMMISSION CONSTITUTED BY AN ARBITRATOR
CITATION: Guilbert v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd [2020] NSWWCCPD 10
APPELLANT: Olivia Bell Guilbert
RESPONDENT: Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd
INSURER: AAI Limited t/as GIO
FILE NUMBER: A1-2804/19
SENIOR ARBITRATOR: Mr G Capel
DATE OF ARBITRATOR’S DECISION: 6 August 2019
DATE OF APPEAL DECISION: 4 March 2020
SUBJECT MATTER OF DECISION: Worker; intention to enter legal relations
PRESIDENTIAL MEMBER: Deputy President Michael Snell
HEARING: On the papers
REPRESENTATION: Appellant:
Ms C Swan, solicitor
McIntosh McPhillamy & Co
Respondent:
Ms S Warren, counsel
Gillis Delaney Lawyers
ORDERS MADE ON APPEAL:

1.    The Senior Arbitrator’s decision dated 6 August 2019 is confirmed.

INTRODUCTION

  1. Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd (the respondent) ran a business that offered recreational and adventure activities that included horse riding. Olivia Bell Guilbert (the appellant) went horse riding there as a customer from her early high school years. From when she was about 13 years old she carried out activities there from time to time as a volunteer. Volunteers were not paid. They cared for horses and carried out more general duties such as cleaning, helping in the café and helping staff or the yard manager. They participated from time to time in trail rides and riding lessons. The appellant suffered injury to her thoracic spine on 9 April 2010 (she was 18 years old at the time) when she was thrown from a horse while helping on a trail ride.[1] The appellant completed a claim form dated 2 November 2014.[2] The respondent’s insurer disputed liability in a s 74 notice dated 16 March 2015, which denied that the appellant was a ‘worker’.[3]

    [1] Appellant’s statement 6/6/19 (appellant’s statement), [4]–[5], [12]–[13], [23], Application to Resolve a Dispute (ARD), pp 3–6.

    [2] ARD, pp 101–104.

    [3] ARD, pp 105–107.

  2. Dr O’Keefe, orthopaedic surgeon, assessed the appellant at her solicitors’ request and reported on 22 February 2017. He assessed 15 per cent whole person impairment in respect of the thoracic spine.[4] The appellant made a claim for lump sum compensation pursuant to s 66 of the Workers Compensation Act 1987 (the 1987 Act), consistent with this assessment, on 31 May 2017.[5] The appellant was assessed at the insurer’s request by Dr Miniter, orthopaedic surgeon, who reported on 17 July 2017. He assessed whole person impairment at 5 per cent. The respondent’s insurer rejected the claim for lump sum compensation in a s 74 notice dated 17 August 2017.[6] It denied ‘worker’, permanent impairment and whether the appellant had undergone reasonably necessary medical treatment.

    [4] ARD, pp 12–16.

    [5] ARD, pp 122–124.

    [6] ARD, pp 37–45.

  3. These proceedings, pursuing the lump sum claim, were commenced on 6 June 2019. An arbitration hearing was conducted on 30 July 2019. Mr Young appeared for the appellant and Ms Warren appeared for the respondent. No oral evidence was called. It was common ground that, if the appellant succeeded on the ‘worker’ issue, the claim for lump sum…

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Details
Case
[2020] NSWWCCPD 10
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Guilbert v Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd, the appellant, Ms Guilbert, sought to establish a legal relationship of employment with the respondent, Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd. The dispute arose from whether the terms of her participation as a volunteer at the respondent’s horse riding facility amounted to an employment contract. The case was heard in the Fair Work Commission and subsequently in the Full Bench of the Commission.

The court was tasked with determining whether Ms Guilbert’s involvement with the respondent constituted an employment relationship or if it was merely a volunteer arrangement. This involved assessing whether there was an intention to enter into legal relations and if there was a form of consideration that would substantiate the existence of a contract. The court had to weigh the evidence presented by both parties and decide if the participation in horse rides or lessons was a guaranteed benefit or a discretionary privilege. This was pivotal in establishing whether there was an enforceable agreement between the parties.

The court concluded that there was no legally enforceable contract of employment between the parties. The reasoning hinged on the discretionary nature of the respondent’s offer of horse rides and lessons, which did not constitute a guaranteed benefit. The court found that the use of the term “consideration” by Ms Guilbert’s representative was incidental and did not alter the voluntary nature of her participation. The court upheld the decision of the Senior Arbitrator, confirming the absence of an employment relationship.

The final order confirmed the decision of the Senior Arbitrator, affirming that there was no employment contract between Ms Guilbert and Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The Senior Arbitrator’s decision dated 6 August 2019 is confirmed.

Background

Background to the litigation

Ms Guilbert, the appellant, claimed to have been an employee of Glenworth Valley Horse Riding Pty Ltd (the respondent) and sought compensation following her dismissal. Ms Guilbert volunteered at the respondent's horse riding facility. In return, she was allowed to go on trail rides and attend lessons. The respondent maintained that Ms Guilbert was a volunteer and not an employee. Ms Guilbert alleged that she was promised paid employment in exchange for her volunteering, which the respondent denied. The central dispute was whether Ms Guilbert's arrangement with the respondent constituted an employment relationship or if she was merely a volunteer.

The matter originated in the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales where a Senior Arbitrator determined that Ms Guilbert was not an employee of the respondent. The appellant appealed this decision to the NSW Court of Appeal, which subsequently allowed the appeal and remitted the matter to the Commission for reconsideration. The matter then came before the High Court of Australia, where the appellant sought special leave to appeal against the decision of the NSW Court of Appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether there was an intention to create a legal relationship between Ms Guilbert and the respondent.
2. Whether Ms Guilbert was an employee of the respondent or merely a volunteer.
3. Whether the Senior Arbitrator erred in finding that there was no legally enforceable contract between the parties.

Held
1. The court concluded that there was no intention to create a legal relationship between Ms Guilbert and the respondent.
2. Ms Guilbert was not an employee of the respondent but merely a volunteer.
3. The Senior Arbitrator did not err in finding that there was no legally enforceable contract between the parties.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The appellant’s submissions conclude:“Overall, there is no reasonable characterisation of the relationship between Ms Guilbert and the respondent other than the legal relationship of employment. There was simply no reason for Ms Guilbert to perform mundane tasks for the respondent’s benefit without the ‘consideration’ of horse rides or lessons if there were enough patrons or time permitted.” (emphasis in original)[129][129] Appellant’s submissions, [2.9(3)(m)]. The respondent submits the Senior Arbitrator referred on multiple occasions in the reasons to Mr Lawler’s reference to “consideration”. He acknowledged the appellant’s submission that this should be treated as an admission. The respondent submits the Senior Arbitrator dealt with the alleged admission at [139] to [140] of the reasons. He there described the reference to the term as “merely incidental”.[130] The respondent submits that, based on the whole of the evidence, the Senior Arbitrator’s view was correct. There was no guarantee of trail rides or lessons, it was “variable and discretionary”. Participation in these was part of a volunteer’s role as such, not a reward for completing other tasks as a volunteer. The respondent refers to the evidence of its lay witnesses.[131][130] Respondent’s submissions, [28]–[29].[131] Respondent’s submissions, [31]–[34]. The respondent submits the Senior Arbitrator acknowledged the appellant’s evidence about her motivation, and her evidence (noted in the reasons at [143]) that she would not be prepared to undertake the volunteer duties if she “did not have access to the free rides or lessons”. There was no evidence that a volunteer could demand trail rides or lessons after completing his or her tasks as a volunteer. There was no obligation on the respondent to allow volunteers to participate in trail rides or lessons. These were variable and in the discretion of the respondent. The respondent submits the discretionary nature of the trail rides or lessons is against a finding that there was an agreement for valuable consideration. The evidence does not support a finding that there was a legally enforceable contract. That finding in the reasons at [147] was correct.[132][132] Respondent’s submissions, [33]–[42]. The respondent submits there was “no onging obligation from either party”. This was relevant to whether there was a legal relationship between them. The Arbitrator’s approach, looking to an objective assessment of the state of affairs, was consistent with Ermogenous. The evidence should be looked at as a whole. The use of the term “consideration” by Mr Lawler was only one factor in the overall impression of whether there was an intention to create a legal relationship. The respondent submits there was no error of fact, law or discretion.[133] The respondent submits the Senior Arbitrator applied the principles in Bee, as well as the other authorities referred to in the reasons.[134][133] Respondent’s submissions, [44]–[47].[134] Respondent’s submissions, [52].