Grubisa and Australian Securities and Investments Commission

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Grubisa and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2023] AATA 3328 (10 October 2023)

Division:TAXATION AND COMMERCIAL DIVISION

File Number(s):      2022/2728-2729

Re:Dominique Eva Grubisa

APPLICANT

AndAustralian Securities and Investments Commission

RESPONDENT

DECISION

Tribunal:Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

Date:10 October 2023

Place:Sydney

The reviewable decisions are set aside and in substitution it is decided the applicant should not be banned under either s 920A of the Corporations Act or s 80 of the NCCP Act.

............................[SGD]............................................

Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

CATCHWORDS

CORPORATIONS - banning order - whether applicant should be banned from providing financial services - whether applicant should be banned  from engaging in credit activities - whether discretion to ban enlivened - where applicant holding out to have financial services license - where applicant holding out to have credit license - where applicant not providing financial services - where applicant not engaged in credit activities - decision under review set aside - in substitution applicant not banned

LEGISLATION

Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth)
Family Law Act 1975 (Cth)

National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth)

CASES

Australian Communications and Media Authority v Today FM (Sydney) Pty Ltd [2015] HCA 7; (2015) 255 CLR 352

Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal [2010] FCA 807
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v PE Capital Funds Management Ltd (administrators appointed) [2022] FCA 76
Australian Securities and Investments Commission v TAL Life Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 193
Bowker and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2020] AATA 573
Hughes and Vale Pty Ltd v New South Wales (No 2) [1955] HCA 28; (1955) 93 CLR 127
In the matter of Vault Market Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1641
MRWL and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2022] AATA 3366
Schroeder and Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2021] AATA 3519

SECONDARY MATERIALS

Legal Profession Uniform General Rules 2015

REASONS FOR DECISION

Deputy President Bernard J McCabe

10 October 2023

  1. Dominique Grubisa has earned a rare if dubious distinction: she has been the subject of banning orders that prevent her from providing financial services or engaging in credit activities despite the fact she was not (and does not plan to be) in the business of doing either of those things. Ms Grubisa actually leads a business that provides seminars to members of the public through the ‘DG Institute’. The seminars purport to educate paying subscribers about wealth creation.

  2. The decision to ban Ms Grubisa from providing financial services was made under s 920A of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). The decision to ban her from engaging in credit activities was made under s 80(1) of the National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth) (the NCCP Act). The reviewable banning decisions were both made by delegates of the regulator, the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC).

  3. While ASIC acknowledges Ms Grubisa and her associated entities (a) were not involved in the provision of financial services and (b) did not engage in credit…

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Details
Case
[2023] AATA 3328
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an application by Ms Grubisa to review decisions made by the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) to ban her from providing financial services and engaging in credit activities. ASIC sought to ban Ms Grubisa on the basis that she had held herself out as holding an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) and an Australian Credit Licence (ACL) when she did not possess them, and that there was a likelihood she would contravene financial services and credit laws in the future.

The court was required to determine whether Ms Grubisa had contravened the prohibition on "holding out" under section 911C of the *Corporations Act 2001* (Cth) and the equivalent provision under the *National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009* (Cth). Furthermore, the court had to consider whether ASIC had reason to believe Ms Grubisa was likely to contravene financial services or credit laws in the future, as required by section 920A(1)(f) of the *Corporations Act* and section 80(1)(e) of the *National Consumer Credit Protection Act*.

The court found that Ms Grubisa had made incorrect representations about holding the relevant licences, and that the intention behind these representations was irrelevant; the focus was on what was said and how it was understood. However, the court determined that while Ms Grubisa had engaged in problematic behaviour, a banning order would not further a legitimate regulatory interest under the *Corporations Act* or the *National Consumer Credit Protection Act*. The court reasoned that the issues presented by Ms Grubisa were matters for other decision-makers and did not warrant a ban under the specific legislative provisions before it.

Consequently, the court set aside ASIC's decisions and ordered in substitution that Ms Grubisa should not be banned from providing financial services or engaging in credit activities under either section 920A of the *Corporations Act* or section 80 of the *National Consumer Credit Protection Act*.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In written submissions, counsel for Ms Grubisa argued the representations were not incorrect, or – if they were – they were unintentional. I am satisfied the representations were incorrect for reasons I have explained, and the applicant’s intention is ultimately irrelevant: the holding out focuses on what was said in context, and how it was understood. The submissions also referred to evidence given by Ms Grubisa to the effect that she was under the impression from one her staff that Mr Wise had been consulted about the wording that made its way into the email. Mr Wise denied he had been consulted about the wording and insisted he would have advised using different words if he had been approached: transcript at p 96. Ms Grubisa’s counsel suggested I should treat those denials with caution, but they are ultimately beside the point. DGI Wealth management and Ms Grubisa were the ones making the problematic representations, and the contravention occurred when they engaged in the holding out. The evidence which ASIC says gives it reason to believe the applicant is likely to contravene a financial services law and likely to contravene credit legislation I turn now to the other grounds which ASIC has identified as bases for the banning decisions. The first of these is the prospect of the applicant contravening a financial services law in the future, which is mentioned in s 920A(1)(f) of the Corporations Act. The companion provision in the NCCP Act which deals with the prospect of contravening credit legislation is found in s 80(1)(e) of that statute. ASIC points out I need only be satisfied there is reason to believe the applicant is likely to contravene the relevant legislation in the future. This (slightly tortured) concept was explained by Dowsett J in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Administrative Appeals Tribunal . In that case, his Honour explained (at [51]):In order that there be a banning order, it is not necessary that either ASIC or the Tribunal be satisfied that [the subject of the order] will, in the future, breach a financial services law. It is only necessary that the relevant decision-maker have reason to believe that he will do so. ASIC says the fact Ms Grubisa has repeatedly made erroneous statements in her marketing presentations and on the website about the licences is reason enough to believe the applicant is likely to contravene the legislation in the future. ASIC points out I do not need to be specific about which provision of the legislation might be contravened: it is enough that the applicant’s conduct suggests she is either careless with respect to her legal obligations, or is prepared to disregard them. Counsel for Ms Grubisa disputed that characterisation. He suggested in submissions that Ms Grubisa was unlikely to make the same mistake (assuming it was one) about her licences in the future. Counsel added the applicant had acted quickly in response to ASIC’s notice of concerns in December 2020 when she instructed her team to review the website and remove the offending statements. ASIC points out the response to the notice of concerns was not wholly effective as some of the problematic videos remained available for some time.

Decision

Reasons for decision

If Ms Grubisa were to apply for an AFSL or an ACL, or were she to become involved in an organisation that provided financial services or carried on credit activities, she would face an uphill battle obtaining the relevant approvals if the findings of fact I have made were to be considered (and any organisation involved in those industries would think twice before engaging her). But that is not the application before me, and it is not clear that such an application would ever be made. CONCLUSION I have made serious adverse findings against the applicant. There may yet be consequences for her under other legislation administered by other regulators. But I do not step into the shoes of those other bodies. I only wear ASIC’s shoes. ASIC’s actions are informed by the objectives of the legislative regimes it administers, and by the objects of the ASIC Act itself. I am informed by the same matters. I do not see how a banning order made pursuant to the Corporations Act or the NCCP Act will further a legitimate regulatory interest. In reaching that conclusion, I do not mean to excuse the applicant’s problematic behaviour that has been uncovered through ASIC’s diligent investigations. But the issues she presents are issues for a different decision-maker. The reviewable decisions are set aside. I decide in substitution that the applicant should not be banned under either s 920A of the Corporations Act or s 80 of the NCCP Act.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

I will deal firstly with the relevant provisions of the Corporations Act before I turn to the provisions of the NCCP Act. It makes sense to proceed in that order given the hearing tended to focus on the Corporations Act provisions. As it happens, the provisions in both statutes invite similar considerations because the regime ordained in each statute is broadly similar.The Corporations Act provisions Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act deals with the regulation of financial services and markets. The object of the chapter is set out in s 760A. That section provides:The main object of this Chapter is to promote:(a) confident and informed decision making by consumers of financial products and services while facilitating efficiency, flexibility and innovation in the provision of those products and services; and(aa) the provision of suitable financial products to consumers of financial products; and(b) fairness, honesty and professionalism by those who provide financial services; and(c) fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products; and(d) the reduction of systemic risk and the provision of fair and effective services by clearing and settlement facilities. At the risk of generalisation, an analysis of the various components of the object tends to confirm the regulatory framework is concerned with consumer protection and the efficient operation of markets for financial products. Consistent with that object, the Corporations Act establishes licensing regimes that apply to those who carry out different functions within the purview of the legislation. Chapter 7.6 deals with the licensing of financial services providers. Section 911A requires a person who carries on a financial services business to hold an AFSL that covers the provision of those financial services. Section 911B permits a person to provide a financial service on behalf of another entity which holds an AFSL that covers those services provided certain conditions are met. Section 911C contains the prohibition which enforces the licensing requirement in the other two sections. Section 911C provides:Prohibition on holding outA person must not hold out:(a) that the person has an Australian financial services licence; or(b) that a financial service provided by the person or by someone else is exempt from the requirement to hold an Australian financial services licence; or(c) that, in providing a financial service, the person acts on behalf of another person; or(d) that conduct, or proposed conduct, of the person is within authority (within the meaning of Division 6) in relation to a particular financial services licensee;if that is not the case. The prohibition in s 911C is a financial services law. A holding out in contravention of s 911C is a criminal offence under s 1311. The expression ‘holding out’ is not defined in the legislation. It involves making a representation: see In the matter of Vault Market Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 1641 at [28] per Brereton J. A ‘holding out’ typically consists of an overt statement. Of course, a representation might also occur in the event of strategic silence (eg, a failure to speak up to negate either (a) a statement made to, or (b) a known assumption made by, the listener) where the effect of the silence is to effectively adopt or convey an impression as if it were an overt statement. Importantly:·whether a representation was made “is a question of fact to be addressed by considering what was said and done against the background of all the surrounding circumstances”: see Australian Securities and Investments Commission v TAL Life Limited (No 2) [2021] FCA 193 at [110] per Allsop CJ. His Honour was referring in that case to contraventions of the prohibition against misleading or deceptive conduct in s 1041H but Cheeseman J concluded in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v PE Capital Funds Management Ltd (administrators appointed) [2022] FCA 76 at [107] that the same analysis applied to the ‘holding out’ requirement contained in s 911C. ·one must have regard to how the representation will be understood by the audience to whom it is addressed: see Vault Market at [30].