Groom v State of SA - [2017] SASCFC 35

SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Full Court)
GROOM v STATE OF SA
[2017] SASCFC 35
Judgment of The Full Court
(The Honourable Chief Justice Kourakis, The Honourable Justice Nicholson and The Honourable Justice Hinton)
1 May 2017
PROCEDURE - SUPREME COURT PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA - PROCEDURE UNDER RULES OF COURT - SUMMARY JUDGMENT
APPEAL AND NEW TRIAL - APPEAL - PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE - SOUTH AUSTRALIA
Appeal against an order of a Master granting summary judgment in favour of the respondent - whether the appellant's statement of claim disclosed no reasonable basis for any of the claims alleged by the appellant.
Held Nicholson J (Kourakis CJ and Hinton J agreeing): Appeal dismissed.
Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006 r 232, r 280, r 286; Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA) s 21; Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA); Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) s 44; Bail Act 1985 (SA) Pt 3, referred to.
Groom v Police [2013] SASC 49; Groom v Police (No 2) [2013] SASC 50; Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93; Groom v Police [2014] SASC 41; Groom v Police [2014] SASCFC 125; Groom v Police [2015] SASC 101; Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin [2008] SASC 158, (2008) 106 SASR 1; New South Wales v Bujdoso (2005) 227 CLR 1; Cran v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92, (2004) 62 NSWLR 95; Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59, (2001) 207 CLR 562; Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35, (2002) 211 CLR 317; Australian Capital Territory v Crowley [2012] ACTCA 52, (2012) 7 ACTLR 142; Rajski v Powell (1987) 11 NSWLR 522; Anderson v Gorrie [1895] 1 QB 668; A v State of New South Wales [2007] HCA 10, (2007) 230 CLR 500, considered.

GROOM v STATE OF SA
[2017] SASCFC 35
Full Court: Kourakis CJ, Nicholson and Hinton JJ

KOURAKIS CJ: I would dismiss the appeal for the reasons given by Nicholson J.
NICHOLSON J.
Introduction
On 19 November 2015, Mr Stephen Groom (the appellant) issued proceedings in the Supreme Court against the respondent seeking damages in the amount of $2.5 million. On 21 June 2016, a Master granted summary judgment in favour of the respondent.[1] The appellant has appealed the Master’s decision.
[1] Groom v The State of South Australia (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Master of the Supreme Court, 21 June 2016).
The appellant’s complaints as set out in his second statement of claim relate to the conduct of the South Australian Police (“SAPOL”) the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (“DPP”) the Department for Correctional Services (“DCS”) the Department for Families and Communities (“DFC”) and a number of judicial officers of the Magistrates Court of South Australia. The appellant’s primary allegation is that the respondent, through each of these various entities, has breached a duty of care owed to him. He also complains of false imprisonment…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2017] SASCFC 35
Decision Date: 1 May 2017

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The Full Court of the Supreme Court of South Australia heard an appeal concerning a Master's decision to grant summary judgment in favour of the respondent, the State of South Australia. The appellant, Mr Groom, had brought a second statement of claim alleging that various state entities, including SAPOL, the DPP, the DCS, the DFC, and certain Magistrates, had breached a duty of care owed to him through their actions and omissions. The appellant sought compensation for alleged false imprisonment and malicious prosecution.

The central legal issue before the Full Court was whether the appellant's second statement of claim disclosed any reasonable basis for the claims made against the respondent. Specifically, the court had to determine if the facts pleaded by the appellant were sufficient to establish a duty of care owed by the respondent, through its agents, to the appellant, and if so, whether that duty had been breached. The court also considered whether the appellant had pleaded any reasonably arguable damage causally connected to the alleged failures.

The Full Court reasoned that, as a general rule, neither SAPOL nor the DPP owes a duty of care to a citizen in respect of their prosecutorial or investigative functions. The appellant had not pleaded any facts that distinguished his situation from this general position. Furthermore, the court agreed with the Master that the appellant had not pleaded any reasonably arguable damage or causal connection with any alleged failure by the DCS to allow him access to his papers, particularly as any potential compensable damage would have been nullified when the intervention order was later set aside on appeal. The court applied the principles for summary judgment under rule 232(2)(b) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, which requires that the claim or defence have no reasonable basis, meaning it must be evident or obvious that the party has no reasonable basis for their claim.

The Full Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Master's decision to grant summary judgment in favour of the respondent. The court concluded that the appellant's second statement of claim disclosed no reasonable basis for any of the claims made against the respondent.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Pursuant to rule 280(2) of the Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, the appeal was referred by a Judge of this Court to the Full Court for determination.Background The appellant’s interactions with the criminal justice system prior to and giving rise to the appellant’s summons and statement of claim, the subject of these proceedings, can be summarised as follows.[2][2] For present purposes, that which follows is taken from a combination of the court records, various reported judgments concerning the appellant, namely, Groom v Police [2013] SASC 49, Groom v Police (No 2) [2013] SASC 50, Groom v Police (No 3) [2013] SASC 93, Groom v Police [2014] SASC 41, Groom v Police [2014] SASCFC 125 and Groom v Police [2015] SASC 101, and the appellant’s allegations. The correctness of the appellant’s factual allegations, as pleaded, is assumed. However, it was not necessary for the Master to make any factual findings with respect to the appellant’s pleaded allegations for the purpose of determining the respondent’s summary judgment application. On 19 October 2011, the appellant’s former partner obtained an ex parte domestic violence restraining order against the appellant pursuant to the Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA). The terms of the order prevented the appellant from being on the premises at which his former partner resided or worked and prevented the appellant from contacting her save for contact concerning their child. New legislation, the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009, came into operation on 9 December 2011, that is, after the issue of the ex parte domestic violence restraining order. As a consequence of the relevant transitional provisions, the original order continued as an interim intervention order.[3][3] On 9 December 2011 the Domestic Violence Act 1994 (SA) was repealed and partially replaced by the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). Significantly with respect to this matter, clause 37(1) of Schedule 1 of the Act provides that any domestic violence restraining orders that were in force under the former Act remained in force as if they were an intervention order issued under the Intervention Orders (Prevention of Abuse) Act 2009 (SA). It was common ground that the domestic violence restraining order against the appellant was effectively converted to an interim intervention order pursuant to section 21 of the current Act. On 11 December 2011, the appellant was arrested for allegedly assaulting his former partner and thereby breaching the interim intervention order. On 12 December 2011, the appellant appeared before a Magistrate and was granted bail. On 16 December 2011, the appellant appeared unrepresented before a Magistrate for a pre-trial conference in relation to the matter of the confirmation of the interim intervention order. The matter of confirmation was listed for trial on 22 February 2012. On 21 and 23 December 2011, and again on 19 January 2012, the appellant appeared in the Magistrates Court in relation to his bail conditions. On 2 February 2012, the appellant attended a pre-trial conference before a Magistrate in relation to the assault charge and the alleged breach of the interim intervention order.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

NICHOLSON J (dissent)

As a consequence of the above history, the appellant claims that he is entitled to compensation from the respondent. He alleges that conduct by the various entities nominated has caused the respondent to be liable with respect to breach of duty of care; false imprisonment; and malicious prosecution. The Master’s decision The appellant feels aggrieved by the conduct of his former partner and by the way he has been treated by the various entities earlier referred to and the State. I agree with the Master’s observation[10] that “[the appellant’s] sense of grievance is real, but the Court is not in a position to determine whether or not it is justified”.[10] Groom v The State of South Australia (Unreported, Supreme Court of South Australia, Master of the Supreme Court, 21 June 2016) at [12]. The Master ordered summary judgment in favour of the respondent on the basis that the appellant’s second statement of claim disclosed no reasonable basis for any of the claims made by the appellant.[11] In determining the matter in this way, the Master applied the approach identified by the Full Court in Ceneavenue Pty Ltd v Martin[12] (Debelle J with whose reasons, in this respect, Duggan and Anderson JJ agreed).A comparison of the test in r 25.04 with the test in r 232(2)(b) readily discloses that the burden to be discharged by the defendant on an application under para (b) is lighter than the burden that had to be discharged under r 25.04. The reasoning in General Steel is, therefore, no longer applicable. I respectfully agree with Bleby J that the barrier to summary judgment on an application by a defendant has been lowered: JT Nominees Pty Ltd v Macks (2007) 97 SASR 471 at [61]. While there can be no doubt that para (b) has significantly lightened the burden for a defendant seeking summary judgment, two questions nevertheless remain. The first is what is meant by the expression “no reasonable basis” for the claim against the defendant and the second is whether the test is materially different from the test of a real question to be tried. The fact that the expression “no reasonable basis” is used in both paras (a) and (b) of r 232(2) suggests that the same test applies both when considering whether there is no reasonable basis for defending the plaintiff’s claim and when considering whether there is no reasonable basis for the claim against the defendant. The test in r 232(2) requires the court first to identify the issues to be tried and then to assess whether the claim or defence has reasonable prospects of success. In the case of an application for summary judgment by a plaintiff against a defendant, it is doubtful, therefore, whether there is a material difference between that test and the former test as it had been expressed in Fancourt. That is because the question whether there is a real question to be tried denoted that the task for the court was to determine whether the issues at the trial are real or fanciful and have reasonable prospects of success. The question whether there is no reasonable basis for the claim or defence must be determined in a summary way. It is entirely inappropriate for there to be a mini trial on that question. It must, therefore, be evident or obvious that the party defending the application for summary judgment has no reasonable basis for the claim or the defence. While adversarial argument will assist in the determination of that question, the question should be capable of ready resolution without prolonged argument. A prolonged argument might suggest that there is a reasonable basis for the claim or the defence. Comparison with the requirements in rules in other jurisdictions providing for summary judgment confirms these propositions. The Master was correct to take this approach and it is the approach to be adopted by this Court on appeal.[11] Supreme Court Civil Rules 2006, r 232(2)(b).[12] [2008] SASC 158; (2008) 106 SASR 1 at [80]-[82].Alleged breach of duty of care by the actions of SAPOL

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by:

The appellant, by his grounds of appeal, in essence, contends that the Master erred in not finding that the respondent owed him a duty of care through the actions of the various entities complained of and in not finding that it breached such a duty of care. The appeal grounds are numerous and convoluted. Nevertheless, the appellant in his notice of appeal and in his submissions made on appeal, by and large, has sought only to re-argue his various grievances on the facts. Consideration The appellant in his second statement of claim complains that the respondent through its agents, SAPOL, the DPP, the DCS, the DFC and certain Magistrates, engaged in conduct by way of various asserted acts and omissions that were in breach of a duty of care owed to the appellant. The appellant does not specifically identify and plead any material facts said to give rise to a duty of care owed by the respondent by virtue of the nature of the parties’ relationship and the conduct of any of these entities. The nature of the “relationship” between the appellant and each of these entities at a very general level can be inferred from the narrative pleaded. However, nothing in the facts identified and relied on by the appellant nor by virtue of any inference that might properly be drawn therefrom, serves to take him outside the usual case of a citizen who has come into contact with each such entity in the course of the ordinary conduct of their responsibilities. This is not to say that the appellant may not have been treated inappropriately on occasion, although I am not in a position to and do not make any finding to that effect. Rather, what is at issue here is whether, on the facts pleaded, there is a reasonable basis to find, as a matter of law, that each or any of the entities owed the appellant a duty of care in negligence. The Master was correct to find as his Honour did. On the present state of the authorities, and as a general rule, neither SAPOL nor the DPP owe a citizen a duty of care in respect of prosecutorial[21] or investigative functions.[22] The appellant has not pleaded any facts which would serve to distinguish, in any material way, his situation from this general position. [21] See for example, Cran v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92; (2004) 62 NSWLR 95 at [50], [54]-[57] and [63]-[64] (Santow JA), [66] and [77]-[79] (Ipp JA), and [84] (McColl JA).[22] See for example, Sullivan v Moody [2001] HCA 59; (2001) 207 CLR 562 at [53], [55]-[57] and [60], Tame v New South Wales [2002] HCA 35; (2002) 211 CLR 317 at [24]-[27] (Gleeson CJ), [57] (Gaudron J), [231] (Gummow and Kirby JJ) and [298]-[299] (Hayne J), Cran v State of New South Wales [2004] NSWCA 92; (2004) 62 NSWLR 95. See also, Australian Capital Territory v Crowley [2012] ACTCA 52; (2012) 7 ACTLR 142 at [270]-[313]. The Master was correct to find that the appellant had not pleaded any reasonably arguable damage or causal connection with any possible damage said to arise from the alleged failure of the DCS to allow him access, between 14 and 28 February 2012, to his papers said to be necessary in order for him to defend the confirmation of the intervention order. Further, I agree with the submission of the respondent to the effect that any potential for compensable damage to have been causally connected to the alleged actions of the DCS in this respect will have been nullified when the intervention order was later set aside on appeal.