Griffiths v Ansett Pilots Association

Case [2001] FCA 1215

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Griffiths v Ansett Pilots Association [2001] FCA 1215

INDUSTRIAL LAW - Organisations - Rules challenged as not providing for control of committee by members as required by s 195(1)(b)(iv) of Workplace Relations Act 1996 - small association with members based at five locations around Australia - association having no branches - sufficiency of control over committee of management provided by rules considered without reference to plebiscite rule - adequacy of plebiscite rule which empowers committee of management to formulate question - 15% of members required to petition for plebiscite to be conducted - effect of delay of up to six months which might occur between receipt of petition and completion of plebiscite.

Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) ss 3, 187A, 195(1), 196

Hodder v Australian Workers Union (1985) 9 FCR 498
Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129
Pillar v Building Workers’ Industrial Union of Australia (1994) 48 FCR 512
Boland v Munro (1980) 48 FLR 66
Maynes v Clarke (1989) 28 IR 94
Allen v Townsend (1977) 31 FLR 431
Ford v Federated Miscellaneous Workers Union of Australia (1954) 79 CAR 147
Municipal Officers Association v Lancaster (1981) 54 FLR 129
Doyle v Australian Workers Union (1986) 12 FCR 197

DAVID EDWIN GRIFFITHS v ANSETT PILOTS ASSOCIATION

V240 of 2000

RYAN J
MELBOURNE
30 AUGUST 2001

IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V240 of 2000

BETWEEN:

DAVID EDWIN GRIFFITHS
Applicant

AND:

ANSETT PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE OF ORDER:

30 AUGUST 2001

WHERE MADE:

MELBOURNE

THE COURT ORDERS:

1.THAT it be declared that the rules of the Ansett Pilots Association (“the Association”) contravene s 196 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (“the Act”) in a particular respect, namely that they fail to provide for control of the Committee of Management by the members of the Association as required by s 195(1)(b)(iv) of the Act.

2.THAT the Association be released from the undertaking given to the Court before North J on 26 June 2000.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

VICTORIA DISTRICT REGISTRY

V240 of 2000

BETWEEN:

DAVID EDWIN GRIFFITHS
Applicant

AND:

ANSETT PILOTS ASSOCIATION
Respondent

JUDGE:

RYAN J

DATE:

30 AUGUST 2001

PLACE:

MELBOURNE

REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

  1. On 27 April 2000 I granted a rule nisi calling on the Ansett Pilots Association (“the Association”) to show cause why orders should not be made declaring that the registered rules of the Association contravene s 196 of the Workplace Relations Act 1996 (Cth) (“the Act”), in that they;

    “(1) ..... contravene section 196 of the [CTH] Workplace Relations Act 1996 in a particular respect namely the rules are contrary to, or fail to make a provision required by, section 195(1)(b)(iv) of the Act which relevantly requires that the rules of an organisation shall provide for the control of committees of the organisation by the members of the organisation;”

    “(2)..... impose on applicants…

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AGLC
Griffiths v Ansett Pilots Association [2001] FCA 1215
Case
[2001] FCA 1215
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Griffiths v Ansett Pilots Association involved the plaintiff, Griffiths, challenging the validity of certain rules of the Association, which was an organisation of pilots registered under the relevant legislation. The crux of the dispute was the extent to which the rules provided for the control of committees by the members, as required by the statute. The court had to determine whether the rules, in their entirety, met the statutory requirements for control over committees by the members. This included assessing whether the rules provided adequate mechanisms for the members to influence the decisions made by the committees, and whether there were sufficient checks and balances to prevent arbitrary or oppressive actions by the committees.

The key legal issues addressed by the court were whether the rules of the Association provided for adequate control over the committees by the members, and whether certain provisions within the rules, particularly those relating to the formulation of questions for plebiscites and the timing of ballot commencement, were excessive and thus rendered the rules invalid. The court had to consider the provisions of the rules in their entirety and assess whether they collectively provided for the required control mechanisms, as well as whether any specific provisions were oppressive or unreasonable.

In its reasoning, the court found that while the rules as a whole provided for some level of control over the committees, certain provisions were overly restrictive and thus invalidated the rules. The court emphasised that the rules must be evaluated in their entirety, and that while some individual provisions may not be problematic, the cumulative effect of restrictive provisions could render the rules invalid. The court also noted that the rules must provide for reasonable and practical mechanisms for members to exercise control over the committees, and that overly restrictive provisions could lead to an ineffective system of control. The court concluded that the rules failed to meet the statutory requirements due to the excessive restrictions placed on the timing and conduct of plebiscites.

The outcome of the case was that the rules of the Association were found to be invalid due to the excessive restrictions on the timing and conduct of plebiscites, which undermined the required level of control by the members over the committees. The court's decision highlighted the importance of ensuring that the rules provide for adequate, practical, and reasonable control mechanisms, and that overly restrictive provisions can lead to an ineffective system of control. The final orders of the court would likely involve declaring the rules invalid and potentially directing the Association to revise its rules to meet the statutory requirements for member control over committees.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Another illustration of the application of a provision like s 196(c), in the context of the extrinsic facts pertaining to a particular organisation, is afforded in Gordon v Carroll (1975) 27 FLR 129, where a Full Court of the Australian Industrial Court (Smithers, Woodward and St. John JJ) observed, at 173;“Each case must be determined on its own special facts. These should include: (1) the total number of members in each of the various branches of the organization; (2) the number of members who live or work within convenient travelling distance of the place of meeting; (3) the ease or difficulty in contacting or canvassing members - this will often depend on their concentration in places of work; (4) the attendance history of an organization over the years - thus a provision which appears reasonable at the time it is introduced may be shown by experience to be unrealistic and therefore unreasonable; the reverse may also occur; and (5) the existence of other methods of exercising control over an executive, such as the ability to demand a referendum, will often be important.Taking all these matters into consideration, we are of the opinion that a requirement of five per cent attendance at meetings of the type being considered is not of itself unreasonable or oppressive or a breach of the regulations. But we think it becomes so, in the case of this organization, when it produces the result that 825 members are required as a quorum for meetings of the Victorian No. 1 branch if any directions are to be given to the executive committee on matters within its purview.”Factual background The Association is an organisation of employees registered under the Act and, it appears, is comprised exclusively of persons employed as pilots in the Ansett Australia Division of Ansett Australia Limited (“Ansett”) on airline services within, or extending beyond, the Commonwealth of Australia. Ansett employs approximately 815 airline pilots of whom about 763 are members of the Association. Members of Ansett’s pilot workforce are based in four Australian capital cities and Cairns in the sense that they reside in and work from one of those cities. The distribution of Ansett pilots between the various bases is as follows: General meetings of the Association are governed by rules 34 to 37, which provide:“34 GENERAL MEETINGS ‑ NOTIFICATION(a)Annual General Meetings of the Association shall be held during August of each year at such place as shall be prescribed by the Committee of Management;(b)All other meetings held pursuant to this clause shall be called General Meetings;(c)The President or the Committee of Management may whenever he/she or it thinks fit convene a General Meeting of the Association and the President shall, on the requisition in writing of at least 25 Members of the Association, forthwith proceed to convene a General Meeting, to deal with any business set out in such requisition;(d)The requisition shall state the objects of the meeting, and shall be signed by the requisitionists, and deposited with the Secretary;(e)If the President does not within 14 days from the deposit of the requisition proceed to convene a meeting, the requisitionists may themselves convene a meeting, but any meeting so convened shall not be held after the expiration of 3 months from the said date of deposit of the requisition;(f)Seven days’ notice at least specifying the place, the day and the hour of the meeting, and in the case of special business the general nature of that business, shall be given to all Members of the Association;(g)The accidental omission to give notice of a meeting to, or the non‑receipt of a notice, by, any Member, shall not invalidate the proceedings of any meeting.35 GENERAL MEETINGS ‑ ATTENDANCE(a)Twenty Members shall constitute a quorum at a General Meeting;(b)If, within 30 minutes from the time appointed for a meeting, a quorum is not present, the meeting shall be abandoned;(c)If the President is not present within 30 minutes after the time appointed for holding the meeting or being present is unwilling to act as Chairperson, the Members present shall choose someone of the Committee of Management present to be Chairperson.36 GENERAL MEETINGS ‑ VOTING(a)Questions arising at any General Meeting shall be decided by a majority of the votes of Members present in person or by proxy;(b)Voting shall ordinarily be by show of hands but shall be by secret ballot on the request of any ten members.37 GENERAL MEETINGS ‑ PROXIES(a)Proxies for General Meetings must be in writing and shall refer to a specific meeting but shall be deemed to relate to any adjournment or continuation of that meeting;(b)It must state the name of the Member who is to carry the proxy voting right and shall be limited to 1 name only;(c)Members attending such meetings shall not have the right to carry more than 3 proxies;(d)The Chairperson of the meeting, shall on presentation of such proxies check each one and ensure that it complies with the intent of this rule;(e) The Chairperson shall rule as to the validity of a proxy.”

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

RYAN J
I have been compelled to that conclusion, in the present case, by the consideration that a maximum of 45 days notice to the COM of presentation of a petition is unnecessarily long and by the fact that the time for commencement of the ballot is to fixed within the extraordinarily long limit of 100 days by a Returning Officer, who is apparently to be appointed by the COM and may regard himself or herself as under its control except as the rules provide otherwise. The same Returning Officer has an unfettered discretion in fixing the closing date of the ballot provided that it remains open for at least 28 days. These matters have to be taken into account, in conjunction with the rest of the rules, including those empowering the COM to formulate the question for the plebiscite and imposing the 15% threshold for procuring its conduct in the first place. I have already indicated that the COM’s power to formulate the question, understood as subject to appropriate limitations, is not, of itself, fatal to the new rule 56. Mr Ginnane has properly conceded that the 15% threshold in the circumstances of the Association, cannot, without more, invalidate the rule. However, when these restrictions are assessed, together with the other features of the rule relevant to the time for the conduct of the plebiscite, rule 56 cannot be regarded as saving the rules as a whole from failing to make the provision required by s 195(1)(b)(iv) of the Act.Conclusion I accept that in evaluating the sufficiency of control over a committee given to the members, regard has to be had to the rules as a whole. As a Full Court of this Court (Evatt, Sheppard and Gray JJ) said, in Doyle v Australian Workers Union (1986) 12 FCR 197, at 200;“The second way in which it was alleged that s 140(1)(a) was attracted was with respect to reg 115(1)(d)(v) of the Conciliation and Arbitration Regulations 1956 (Cth). This provision, in conjunction with others, requires that the rules of an organisation provide for “the control of committees ... by the members ...”. It was contended that a rule which operates to prevent some members from standing for an office which entitles its holder to sit on a committee, and which thereby deprives the members generally of the opportunity to vote for the disqualified candidate, operates to prevent the members from having control of that committee. As was shown in Boland v Munro (1980) 48 FLR 66 at 78-81 per Evatt and Northrop JJ, the question whether the rules of an organisaton provide for the control of committees is a complex one, to be determined only upon an examination of all of the provisions of those rules which deal with the election of committees, the making of their decisions, the existence of checks and restraints upon the actions of such committees, and rights to direct those actions. Again, it was not suggested that this Court could or should overrule Boland v Munro. The aspect of control of committees will rarely, if ever, be one which arises in the examination of a particular provision within the rules of an organisation. The question which is usually raised is whether the rules as a whole contain provisions which are adequate to satisfy the requirement of reg 115(1)(d)(v). If such a question is answered in the negative, it is not because any particular provision is in contravention of the regulation, but rather because the rules fail to contain sufficient positive provisions to satisfy it.”

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: RYAN J

Full text does not contain this section.