| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA |
| CRIMINAL JURISDICTION |
No. 1423 of 1999
In the Matter of Applications pursuant to Section 86(1) Sentencing Act 1991
| CHERYL ANNE GREGORY and HANK STAWENGA | Applicants |
| v | |
| GEOFFREY LEONARD GREGORY | Respondent |
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JUDGE: | Cummins J | |
WHERE HELD: | Melbourne | |
DATES OF HEARING: | 29 October 1999, 31 January 2000 | |
DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 7 April 2000 | |
CASE MAY BE CITED AS: | Cheryl Anne Gregory and Hank Stawenga v Geoffrey Leonard Gregory | |
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2000] VSC 190 | |
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Crimes Compensation - Pain and suffering – Murder and intentionally causing serious injury – Claim by parents of deceased daughter – Cerebral injury – Psychological injury – Sentencing Act 1991 s.86 – Considerations applicable.
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APPEARANCES: | Counsel | Solicitors | |
For Cheryl Anne Gregory | Mr J. O’Sullivan | Haines & Polites | |
| For Hank Stawenga | Mr J. Conquest | Macpherson & Kelley | |
| The Respondent was not represented | |||
HIS HONOUR:
On 20 August 1998 at Linton outside Ballarat the respondent, Geoffrey Leonard Gregory, murdered his stepdaughter, Yvonne Jennifer Powell, and intentionally caused serious injury to his wife, Cheryl Anne Gregory. The respondent was charged by police the next day. He was committed for trial on 4 March 1999 at Ballarat. He pleaded guilty before me in the Supreme Court at Ballarat on 31 August 1999 to a count of murder, and a count of intentionally causing serious injury. On 7 September 1999 I sentenced the respondent on count one, murder of his stepdaughter, to 24 years' imprisonment and on count two, intentionally causing serious injury to his wife, to eight years' imprisonment. I directed that three years of the sentence on the second count be cumulative on the sentence on the first count, making a total effective sentence of 27 years' imprisonment. I directed that the respondent serve a minimum term of 22 years' imprisonment before being eligible for parole.
Pursuant to the provisions of s.86(1) Sentencing Act 1991 two applications by victims for compensation for pain and suffering as a result of the offences have been made. The first applicant, Mrs Cheryl Gregory, the mother of the deceased and herself injured, has so claimed in relation to Counts One and Two. The second applicant, Mr Hank Stawenga, the father of the deceased, has so claimed in relation to Count One. Both claims were through solicitors notified in writing to the court at Ballarat before sentence of the respondent and both satisfy the criteria of the Act: both applicants are victims (s.86(1)) and both are clearly within time (s.86(5)(a)). Mrs Gregory's solicitors applied in writing on 26 August 1999 and Mr Stawenga's on 25 August 1999 and a formal notice was filed on behalf of Mrs Gregory on 7 December 1999. At the hearing on 31 August 1999 at Ballarat I stated that the applications were formally received by the Court (see s.86(5)(a) Sentencing Act 1991) but that it was not appropriate to hear submissions on the applications until an appropriate time had passed after sentence. Otherwise the accused was likely to be unfairly oppressed. The applications came…
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- AGLC
- Gregory v Gregory [2000] VSC 190
- Case
- [2000] VSC 190
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to interpret the Sentencing Act 1991, particularly section 86, which outlines the considerations applicable when awarding compensation for pain and suffering. The parents argued that the statutory provisions should be interpreted to include psychological injuries suffered by witnesses of a violent crime. The court considered whether the statutory provisions allowed for such claims and whether the parents could be compensated for the psychological trauma experienced as a result of witnessing their daughter's suffering.
The Supreme Court determined that while the statutory provisions were primarily focused on the victim's pain and suffering, the court had the discretion to consider the impact of the crime on the victim's immediate family members, such as the parents in this case. The court held that the parents could claim compensation for their psychological injuries but noted that these claims would be subject to the same limitations and considerations as those applicable to the victim's pain and suffering. The court found that the parents were entitled to compensation for their psychological injuries, but the amount awarded would be commensurate with the statutory guidelines.
The court ordered that the parents were to be compensated for their psychological injuries but limited the award to the statutory guidelines for pain and suffering. The court emphasised that while the parents' suffering was significant, it was necessary to maintain consistency with the statutory framework and ensure that the compensation was not disproportionately high. The court's decision recognised the profound impact of the crime on the parents while also adhering to the legislative parameters for compensating such claims.
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