Chalmers v Liang

SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA

COURT OF APPEAL

S APCI 2010 0084

NEIL CAMERON CHALMERS
	Applicant
v
GANG LIANG and TING-TAI ZHU
	Respondents

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JUDGES	MAXWELL P, REDLICH JA and KYROU AJA
WHERE HELD	MELBOURNE
DATE OF HEARING	17 March 2011
DATE OF JUDGMENT	16 December 2011
MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION	[2011] VSCA 439
JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM	Liang v Chalmers [2010] VSC 241

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CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Compensation – Murder – Compensation awarded to father ($120,000) and step-mother ($60,000) of murder victim – Concealment of victim’s body by offender – Whether parents’ pain and suffering aggravated by concealment – Whether awards manifestly excessive – Whether applicant’s rehabilitation would be adversely affected – Application refused – Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 85B.

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APPEARANCES:	Counsel	Solicitors
For the Appellant	Ms C M Kenny SC with Mr C O Parkinson
For the Respondent	Mr T Moisidis	Michael Smith & Associates

MAXWELL P

REDLICH JA
KYROU AJA:

The applicant was convicted of the murder of Xiao Ling Liang (‘Ms Liang’). He was sentenced to 22 years’ imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 18 years. In a separate decision published today, the Court has refused his application for leave to appeal against conviction.

Following the conviction, an application was made to the trial judge by Ms Liang’s father, Gang Liang, and her stepmother, Ting-Tai Zhu, for a compensation order under s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic). Mr Liang and Ms Zhu were eligible to apply for compensation because each had ‘suffered … injury as a direct result of the offence’,[1] injury being defined to include ‘grief, distress or trauma or other significant adverse effect’.[2] After hearing evidence from Mr Liang and Ms Zhu, the judge assessed the compensation payable to Mr Liang in the sum of $120,000 and to Ms Zhu in the sum of $60,000.[3]
[1]Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) s 85B(1).
[2]Ibid s 85A(1).
[3]Liang v Chalmers [2010] VSC 241 (‘Reasons’). The amounts ordered to be paid by the applicant were reduced in each case by $30,000, to take into account amounts already received by Mr Liang and Ms Zhu under the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic).

The applicant now seeks leave to appeal against those awards,[4] on the ground that each award was manifestly excessive.
[4]An order under s 85B of the Sentencing Act 1991 (Vic) is included in the definition of sentence in s 3 of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic). An appeal against such an order is, consequently, an appeal against sentence, for which leave of the Court is required: Criminal Procedure Act 2009 (Vic) s 278.

The applicable principles

It was common ground on the appeal that his Honour was correct to apply what was said by Neave JA in Director of Public Prosecutions (Vic) v Energy Brix Australia Corporation Pty Ltd.[5] Her Honour said that the factors which should be taken into account in assessing compensation for a person’s grief or trauma under s 85B include the following:

·the circumstances in which the death occurred;
·the effect on the person of hearing of the event causing loss;
·the closeness of the relationship between the person and the victim;
·the age of the person; and
·the extent of grief and psychological suffering experienced as a result of the loss.

[5](2006) 14 VR 345, 356–7 [50].

In the same case, Vincent JA (with whom Buchanan JA agreed) said:

It is one thing … for a person to lose through natural causes someone to whom the individual is deeply attached, another where death has resulted from civil wrongdoing, and another again where it has been brought about by criminal conduct. The grief and distress occasioned in the third situation, which often is experienced against a background of a sense of understandable outrage, may be in some situations even more acute and its impact upon the life of the individual more long lasting.[6]

[6]DPP (Vic) v Energy Brix Australia Corporation Pty Ltd (2006) 14 VR 345, 352–3 [30].

Later, his Honour said:

There is no and there obviously cannot be a yardstick by which the extent of personal grief or distress can be measured, and no method of conversion of a human emotion or psychological reaction to an amount of money exists. Clearly, widely differing views as to the appropriate award to be made in a given case can be held and an appellate court must be extremely reluctant to intervene in such cases.[7]
[7]Ibid 355 [36].

The question for consideration, therefore, is whether the amounts awarded were within the range reasonably open to the judge in the circumstances of the case. For reasons which follow, we have concluded that they were. We would therefore grant leave to appeal but dismiss the appeal.
The circumstances of the offending

The circumstances of the offending, and its aftermath, are described in detail in the reasons for judgment in the conviction appeal.[8] It will suffice to set out here the summary given by the judge in determining the compensation applications.
[8]Chalmers v The Queen [2011] VSCA 436.

Ms Liang was killed in her own home in February 2006, by the application of manual force, at a time when the applicant was living in a sexual relationship with her. After killing Ms Liang, the applicant removed her body and buried it in a grave in bushland at Tallarook. He initially pretended that she had disappeared. He was subsequently identified (by surveillance video) as the person who had removed Ms Liang’s body from the scene of her death, but refused to disclose the location of the grave until the initial murder trial had been under way for some days in the Supreme Court in October 2007.

As the applicant had intended, the consequence of the concealment of the body, and of his having covered it with lime, was that it had substantially decomposed before it was recovered.

The application by Mr Liang

The judge made the following findings in relation to Mr Liang:[9]
[9]Ms Liang is here referred to as ‘Shirley’.

Mr Liang gave evidence that he is an old‑aged pensioner aged 82. Shirley was his only child. Her mother died some years ago and he re-married the second applicant, Ms Zhu.
In 1997 Shirley sponsored the immigration of both the applicants to Australia. They lived with her for approximately two years after arriving here. During this period they were entirely dependent on her financially. Subsequently she gave them ongoing personal and financial support. On two occasions she paid for them to return to China for visits.
Whenever there was a festival they would have a meal together. She also relied on them to help care for Alicia, who they picked up from kindergarten. They had the care of Alicia on a regular basis on a number of days per week.
Since Shirley died the applicants are financially dependent on the old-aged pension. They do not speak English (save to a very small degree) and do not have a car. After Shirley’s death the applicants cared for Alicia for six months. Alicia’s father then took custody of her. Alicia now lives with her father and contact with her has broken down.
Mr Liang said in evidence that the holding of a proper funeral was an important Chinese custom. The disappearance of Shirley’s body and the delay of 17 months which occurred after Shirley’s death until her cremation caused him great distress. He feels he now has no child to depend upon and that his family has suffered disgrace. He no longer has the possibility of a male heir to carry on the family name.
He did not attend the criminal trials of the offender because he was told his attendance was unnecessary. He has suffered from depression since Shirley’s death. The fact of his depression is corroborated by the medical report of Dr S O Chan dated 10 October 2006 which states that at that time both of the applicants were depressed as their daughter was missing and a police investigation was underway to determine where she was.[10] Dr Chan commented that the outlook was bleak and they were very distraught. He noted that Mr Liang was very depressed. Mr Liang was not coping with the situation and had become very negative and aggressive at home. He could not control his emotional state and in Dr Chan’s view was in need of psychological help.
[10]Emphasis added – see [16] below.
Dr Chan also records that Mr Liang has osteoporosis and back pain from prolapsed lumbar vertebral discs which cause pain and difficulty with walking and standing and he also has fainting episodes.
It was put in cross‑examination to Mr Liang that he did not have a close relationship with his daughter because he disapproved of her role in the prostitution industry. He agreed that he had expressed disapproval as to her involvement in prostitution, but he did not accept the proposition that he did not have a close relationship with her.
I accept his evidence. It seems to me that disapproval of Shirley’s occupation was entirely consistent with paternal concern and affection. Disagreement in a relationship is not evidence of underlying estrangement.
Further, the objective facts of continuing support and contact between Shirley and the applicants, coupled with the lack of other siblings, strongly support the conclusion that Shirley was a significant family member from the applicants’ point of view.
It was also suggested that Mr Liang’s failure to attend either of the trials of the offender reflected a lack of concern for his daughter’s death. I do not accept this. I accept that he followed what he understood to be the police direction and there are a number of obvious reasons why he may not have wished to attend the trial.
Additional evidence was called from a psychologist, Khai Wong, who had seen each of the applicants on two occasions and was able to speak to them in Cantonese, their first language. Ms Wong gave coherent and impressive evidence of the effects of Shirley’s death upon her father. Regarding a counselling session in April this year, she stated in part:
Mr Liang attends the session with his wife Ms Ting Tai Zhu. I observe that he was cooperative and friendly and told the psychologist he took the tram to my counselling room and it is convenient to travel to the service. At the end of the initial session he recalled specific details about the grief, sorrow and traumatic experience during the initial period when he lost his daughter Ms Liang, now deceased. I observe his behaviour to have experienced severe pain quietly and had coped with the grief and self healing constructively. At the end of the session Mr Liang after saying that he has written many letters to the court he sighed with relief that the case is coming to a closure for him. At this point I observe his face was frozen, there was a drop of tear and he paused for a moment and did not talk any further. I observe there is a deep sadness (not distress) on his face.

In Ms Wong’s view Mr Liang’s grief is continuing.
In cross‑examination Ms Wong described Mr Liang’s inability to readily talk about his daughter, coupled with the written statements he has made about the loss of Shirley, as demonstrating a way of honouring his daughter. The written statements tell how difficult it is for him to break away from thinking about his daughter. Ms Wong did not accept that the emotional effects of his daughter’s death upon Mr Liang had been primarily associated with the diminution of his relationship with his grand-daughter. Ms Wong’s view is however that to be heard by the Court in response to his current application will itself be healing for Mr Liang.
I should add Ms Wong stated the incidental view that Mr Liang expressed sadness and regret rather than anger at Ms Liang’s job.
Ms Wong saw the applicants in April 2010 and I am satisfied Mr Liang has suffered very great and continuing grief which was aggravated by the protracted stress associated with the concealment of his daughter’s body by the offender. He has suffered consequential ongoing depression as a result of his daughter’s death and the circumstances associated with it.
Mr Liang was vulnerable to such effects because of his age, state of health, relative social isolation, reliance on Shirley and lack of other immediate family in Melbourne save for Ms Tzu.
I accept the fundamental truth of the following statement made in his victim impact statement (as translated):
I Gang Liang have depression and protrusion of the intervertebral disc. After my daughter was murdered my illness has further intensified and worsened. Needless to say I’m ill with deep anxiety and melancholy. I feel a double loss not only for my daughter but also my granddaughter Alicia as well. There are no successors to carry on the Liang name which is important in Chinese tradition.
I feel like throwing myself out of the window to put an end to this suffering.
The murder of my daughter has also affected my relationship with my wife. I am angry and lose control of myself and have fights with my wife.[11]
[11]Reasons, [20]–[45] (emphasis added, references omitted).

Ms Zhu’s application

The judge made the following findings in relation to Ms Zhu.

Ms Zhu has two daughters from her previous marriage, one of whom has been in Australia for the last two years. Nevertheless I accept that the murder of Shirley was emotionally traumatic for her. She had been supported both financially and personally by Shirley in coming to this country and had a close relationship with her. That relationship had developed particularly after Ms Tzu became involved in helping to care for Alicia.
Dr Chan records her as presenting as depressed in October 2006 when Shirley’s body was still missing. Ms Zhu has osteoporosis of her spine with vertebral fractures which cause back pain and difficulty with movement. She is aged 73.
At the date of Shirley’s death she was vulnerable because of her age, her state of health, her minimal command of the English language, and her social isolation.
Since Shirley’s death Ms Zhu has had the sense that no-one is there to help her husband and herself on a continuing basis. Shirley is not there to visit them regularly and their life has lost interest. Ms Zhu suffers from feelings of panic and depression.
The psychologist, Ms Wong, also gave evidence about Ms Zhu. She described a history of fatigue and stress following Shirley’s death which I find generally credible. She also describes psychological symptoms of pain and suffering including:
·feeling sad when thinking of Shirley’s life and violent death;
·empathetic suffering when Mr Liang becomes angry;
·reliving memories and experiences of conversations she had with Shirley;
·preoccupation with thoughts of the tragic death of Shirley and grief and apprehension at the uncertain future of Alicia;
·clinical symptoms of depression such as loss of pleasure and interest;
·fear during the period after Shirley disappeared.

Ms Wong expresses the opinion that Ms Zhu has suffered deep bereavement and distress over the loss of her step‑daughter. I accept this opinion.

Whether concealment of the body was an aggravating circumstance

It was submitted for the applicant that his Honour was not entitled to treat the concealment of Ms Liang’s body as having aggravated the pain and suffering of Mr Liang or of Ms Zhu. It was said that the evidence simply did not support this conclusion.

In our view, this submission must be rejected. We have reviewed carefully the evidence given by the applicants and by the psychologist, Ms Wong, and are satisfied that it was well open to his Honour to make this finding. The following exchange took place during Mr Liang’s evidence-in-chief:

Q.       How did you feel during the time that her body wasn’t found?
A.       Very much predicament – distressful.
Q.       A funeral is an important Chinese custom?
A.       Yes.

Little more needed to be said. It verges on the self-evident that the anguish felt by parents on the death of a child will be exacerbated if they are unable to give the child a timely and appropriate burial. There is, we think, a relevant analogy with the circumstances in Josefski v Donnelly,[12] where the offender failed to stop, and failed to render assistance, after his motor vehicle was involved in an accident which resulted in the victim’s death. This Court upheld an award of compensation to the deceased’s parents and sister based in part on the ‘anguish caused to [them] by the fact that their son and brother was left to die without assistance.’[13] In concluding that the particular award was ‘well within range’, the Court referred to ‘the effects which as a matter of intuition and experience one might expect the offences to have had on the [family members]’.[14]
[12][2007] VSCA 6.
[13]Ibid [26] (Nettle JA, with whom Buchanan and Vincent JJA agreed).
[14]Ibid [22].

In our view, his Honour was fully entitled to treat this aspect of the matter as having inflicted ‘protracted suffering’ on Mr Liang and Ms Zhu and, hence, as being of particular significance in determining the quantum of the awards of compensation.

Complaint was made on behalf of the applicant that his Honour’s conclusion on this point had been affected by a misreading of the report from the general practitioner, Dr Chan. In referring to the report in his reasons,[15] his Honour erroneously identified the report’s date as 10 October 2006, instead of 6 April 2010, and attributed to Dr Chan the opinion that both Mr Liang and Ms Zhu ‘were depressed as their daughter was missing and a police investigation was under way to determine where she was’. In fact, the opinion expressed was that they were ‘depressed as their daughter … has been murdered and the court case has just concluded’.
[15]Reasons, [33]. See the highlighted extract in the passage quoted at [10] above.

It will be apparent from what we have already said that we consider this to have been an immaterial error. There was a firm foundation in the evidence for his Honour’s finding, irrespective of Dr Chan’s report.

Applicant’s financial circumstances and prospects of rehabilitation

As his Honour noted, under s 85H(1) the Court may

in determining the amount and method of payment of the compensation, take into account, as far as practicable, the financial circumstances of the offender and the nature of the burden that its payment will impose.

His Honour found that the applicant had assets to the value of $107,000. His Honour also noted the applicant’s claim to a 50 per cent beneficial interest in an apartment, the legal title to which is held by Ms Liang’s personal representatives. His Honour said:

The net value of that asset is not established by evidence before the Court, but it is apparent that it potentially adds a figure of some hundreds of thousands of dollars to the offender’s assets. The property was purchased for $244,500 in 2005. It is understood to be the subject of a bank mortgage which has in turn been the subject of payments from rental moneys received. The claim relating to the flat is the subject of separate civil proceedings. It is not possible to resolve the matters in issue in those proceedings for the purpose of determining this application.[16]

The parties agreed that the judge should proceed to determine the compensation application ‘having regard to the potential range of (but not yet established) the value of the offender’s assets.’[17]

[16]Ibid [9]–[10].

[17]Ibid [11].

The argument for the applicant was that his Honour had failed to address properly the financial burden which the compensation award would impose on him, and the impact it would have on his prospects of rehabilitation. According to the written submission:

Once the learned judge decided to consider Mr Chalmers’ prospects of rehabilitation, there was nothing in the circumstances of the offence, or in the evidence led by the applicants, which should have led to the conclusion that all Mr Chalmers’ assets should go to compensate the applicants for their grief. In circumstances where a lengthy term of imprisonment has been imposed on an offender of limited means, proper consideration of the prospects of rehabilitation (including the financial burden required to be considered under s 85H) required the learned judge to reach an equitable balance between the interests of the applicants and of Mr Chalmers.
In taking account of the offender’s rehabilitation, the court must weigh the potential benefit to the community at the time of the offender’s release by leaving him with some assets. First, taking all the offender’s assets may lead him to re-offend. The England and Wales courts, in relation to s 1(4) of the Criminal Justice Act 1972 (UK), have expressly recognized that it is counter-productive to the community to make compensation orders that do not take account of the financial circumstances of the offender upon release because an order that leaves an offender with no means upon release may result in the offender committing further offences. Second, it may, depending upon his age and job prospects, leave him an ongoing burden upon society. In addition, the court must consider whether taking the offender’s assets may have the indirect effect of punishing the offender for the remainder of his life.

His Honour dealt with this issue in these terms:

In so finding I acknowledge that when released from the term of imprisonment to which I have sentenced him, the offender will have limited earning capacity and may have minimal assets. Nevertheless in the present case the claims of the applicants outweigh these considerations. If the offender succeeds in his civil claim, the awards I propose will not exhaust his present assets. If he fails in that claim despite the potential consequences for the offender, then the amounts I have awarded are in my view the minimum which it would be proper to award having regard to the pain and suffering which the applicants have endured and continue to suffer.[18]

[18]Reasons, [57].

The difficult task of balancing the need to compensate Mr Liang and Ms Zhu, on the one hand, and the public interest in the applicant’s rehabilitation, on the other, was quintessentially a matter for the judge to resolve. Appellate intervention would only be warranted if it could be shown that his Honour had acted on a wrong principle or had arrived at a result which was not reasonably open if due regard were given to the significance of rehabilitation. No such ground is made out here. With respect, we consider that his Honour’s analysis is unimpeachable.

Manifest excess

A number of specific complaints were made about the amount of compensation awarded to Mr Liang, namely that:

(a) he was not entitled to compensation for pain and suffering attributable to age and infirmity;

(b) the evidence did not establish that he had a close relationship with his daughter;

(c) the award should have been discounted to reflect his reduced life expectancy at the age of 82; and

(d) he had failed to lead ‘cogent evidence about the gravity of his pain and suffering’ and, in particular, had failed to differentiate between his pre-existing depression attributable to his ill-health, which was not compensable, and depression properly attributable to the murder.

In our view, the findings which the judge made about Mr Liang’s relationship with his daughter, and about the effect on him of her death and of the subsequent events, were well open on the evidence before him. As at the date of the order, Mr Liang had been experiencing what the judge described as ‘very great and continuing grief’ for more than four and a half years. In those circumstances, his advanced age was not a factor of any great significance, in our view. So far as his pre-existing condition was concerned, the judge accepted ‘the fundamental truth’ of Mr Liang’s statement that his illness had ‘further intensified and worsened’ since his daughter’s murder. No more precise ‘disentangling’ was either possible or necessary in the circumstances of the case.[19]
[19]Kaplan v Lee-Archer (2007) 15 VR 405, 412 [30]–[32] (Buchanan JA).

Reference was made to awards in a number of other cases. They are set out in the table attached to these reasons, which was supplied by counsel for the applicant. While the awards in the present case were well above some of the awards in the table, they are comparable to others. We are not persuaded that the award to Mr Liang was outside the range reasonably open in the circumstances.

There were also specific complaints made about the award to Ms Zhu, namely that:

(a) part of her pain and suffering was from dealing with the fact that Mr Liang was a ‘very difficult spouse’;

(b) the evidence did not establish that Ms Zhu had a close relationship with her step-daughter;

(c) no account was taken of the fact that Ms Zhu was aged 75; and

(d) Ms Zhu failed to lead evidence that the offence caused her any serious loss of enjoyment of life or any ongoing psychological condition.

The first of these matters was specifically raised by counsel for the applicant in cross-examination of Ms Wong. The psychologist acknowledged that Ms Zhu had mentioned that ‘part of her pain and suffering was to deal with the fact that her husband, Mr Liang, was a very difficult spouse’. Ms Wong then explained:

I think she was referring more to how, when Mr Liang is angry, she is actually acknowledging her empathy that she recognised that comes from his powerlessness and loss of control … [T]he wife actually did say that, you know, she felt that he did externalise a lot of anger and the anger was about his helplessness. And I think it would make sense for me as a therapist to say that when people cannot articulate that pain, they articulate it in not so helpful way.

In other words, the effect on Ms Zhu was the direct result of Mr Liang’s distress at the loss of his daughter.

Once again his Honour’s conclusions were well open on the evidence, in our view. In Ms Wong’s opinion, Ms Zhu was a very caring step-mother, who had built a relationship with Ms Liang. On the uncontested evidence, she had been actively involved in the process of trying to locate Ms Liang’s body. Ms Zhu said herself that she had had a good relationship with Ms Liang right up to the time of her death. This had included active involvement in looking after Ms Liang’s daughter, which ceased after Ms Liang’s death.

In our view, the award to Ms Zhu was within the range reasonably open to his Honour in the circumstances of the case.

In the circumstances, we think the proper course is to grant leave to appeal, but dismiss the appeal.

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APPENDIX

Table of comparable cases

Case	Offence	Special Circumstances	Evidence	Compensation Order	Orders pursuant to the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996	Financial circumstances of offender
Gregory v Gregory (2000) 112 A Crim R 19	Murder (20-year-old stepdaughter); ICSI (wife) by shooting through the head.	The offences committed in a building occupied by a 13 year old child, who witnessed the aftermath and sought help. Father of the murder victim suffered from post traumatic stress disorder; the victim of the ICSI offence suffered significant brain impairment.	A report from a psychologist was relied on by the father of the murder victim; various medical reports were relied on by the wife.	Wife, $50,000; father of the murder victim $25,000.	None.	Approx $80,000 (being a half interest in a $150,000 property - subject to a $50,000 mortgage - and other items valued at $33,000).
R v Scarborough [2000] VSC 255	Random shooting attacks.	Nine applicants for compensation including three police officers and a detective.	Material filed.	Wounded victims $45,000 & $25,000; 3 victims $10,000 each; 4 victims $6,000 each.	None.	Approx $50,000 which was forfeited as proceeds of trafficking in heroin.
DPP (Vic) v Parsons [2000] VSC 327	Murder of wife by husband, outside the Family Court.	Brutal stabbing murder. Applicants were children of the murder victim (aged 13 and 9 years) and sister of the victim (aged 50 years).	Reports by psychiatrist and grief counsellor. Judge found no need for detailed reports.	Children $125,000 each; sister $75,000.	None.	Assets in excess of $1 million.
Schloss; Re Farfalla [2002] VSC 385	Murder of 18 year old girl.	All 3 applicants (mother, father and sister aged 14) diagnosed with post traumatic stress disorder.	Reports by a psychologist.	Each parent $60,000; sister $40,000.	None.	Liabilities likely to exceed equity in only asset.
DPP (Vic) v Energy Brix Australia Corporation Pty Ltd (2006) 14 VR 345	Industrial accident. Victim buried and burned beneath an inferno of red hot ash and burning char.	Serious industrial accident causing death. Applicants were daughter of the deceased, aged 21 years, and son, aged 22 years.	Evidence of psychiatrist.	Daughter $20,000, increased on appeal to $50,000; son $15,000, increased on appeal to $35,000.	None.	Not Relevant.
Josefski v Donnelly [2007] VSCA 6	Failure to stop and to render assistance after motor vehicle accident. Provide false information in an attempt to pervert the course of justice.	Accident ultimately resulted in the death of the other motorist Sentenced, following an appeal by the DPP, to 2 years and 3 months' imprisonment with a non-parole period of 18 months.	Not referred to on the appeal.	$20,000 to each applicant (being $50,000 to each parent and $55,000 to the sister, less the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 compensation).	Parents $30,000 each; sister $35,000.	Offender’s financial circumstances unclear, other than $30,000 in Court and $39,000 held by parents to pay capital gains tax.
DPP (Vic) v Esso Australia Pty Ltd [2003] VSC 222	Explosion at Esso's Longford gas processing facility.	21 applicants comprising workers from the Longford gas facility and their partners and children. Applicants ranged in age from 21 years to 63 years. Applicant workers suffered from varies degrees of post traumatic stress disorder. Partners and children of applicant workers suffered various degrees of anxiety.	Reports by psychiatrists and psychologists.	Eight applicant workers: $100,000. Secretary to one killed victim: $150,000. Victim knocked unconscious : $150,000. Members of the victims' families: between $20,000 and $50,000 each.	None.	Not Relevant.
Kaplan v Lee-Archer (2007) 15 VR 405	Convicted of 53 counts of theft from a commercial nursery conducted at the Waverly campus of the Holmesglen Institute of TAFE.	The offender was the manager of the campus. The victim was involved by the offender in the offending and suffered post traumatic stress disorder.	Evidence from psychologist and psychiatrist.	$40,000.	None.	Offender had independent means and no need to work.
RK v Mirik (2009) 21 VR 623	Vicious beating and rape.	Applicant left with shocking internal and psychological injuries. Compensation order discounted by 25% to avoid impairing prospects for rehabilitation.	Evidence given at the hearing of the charge, including statements by the prosecutor and documents within ambit of s85F(2) of the Sentencing Act 1991.	Cetin Mirik ordered to pay $$113,600; Metin Mirik to pay $26,525 (net of Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 compensation).	$8,000.	No assets.
DPP (Vic) v Farquharson; Ex parte Gambino [2009] VSC 186	Murder, by father, of three children by drowning in a dam.	Murder victims were children aged 10, 7 and 2.	Affidavit evidence from the mother of the murdered children. Medical reports relied on to the extent they reveal extensive grief and grief-like suffering.	Compensation of $225,000 ordered (being $75,000 in respect of each murdered child).	None.	The offender's only asset was $66,000 held in trust.
Stevens v Baxter [2009] VSC 257	Murder of mother by father in the family home when the two children (aged 8 and 12 years) were present.	Brutal stabbing. Daughter heard mother's screams. Offender sentenced to 20 years with a minimum of 16 years. Applicants were the two children of the deceased.	Reports by psychologist.	Compensation of $420,000 ordered (being $240,000 to each child, less the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 compensation).	$30,000 to each child.	Current assets of $550,000, including interest in house and superannuation.
Liang v Chalmers [2010] VSC 241	Murder of woman by partner. Subject of the current appeal.	Body concealed for 17 months.	Report from treating doctor. Report and viva voce evidence from treating psychologist.	Liang (father) $90,000 and Zhu (step-mother) $30,000 (being respectively $120,000 and $60,000 less the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 compensation).	$30,000 to each applicant.	Restrained assets amounting to $107,000 and a claim to beneficial ownership of half a property registered in the murder victim’s name.
Tanner v Smart [2010] VSC 463	Manslaughter of 21 year old mother of two, whose body has not been found.	Applicants were the mother, father and brother of the deceased.	Each applicant gave viva voce evidence.	Each parent $110,000 and the brother $72,500 (being respectively $120,000 and $80,000 less the Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 compensation).	$10,000 to each parent; $7,500 to the brother.	Approx $84,000 (being a legal half interest in a property with an estimated value of $280,000 that is subject to a $115,000 mortgage and a small bank balance).

[2011] VSCA 439

16 December 2011