Green and Repatriation Commission
[2006] AATA 397
•8 May 2006
Administrative
Appeals
Tribunal
DECISION AND REASONS FOR DECISION [2006] AATA 397
ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS TRIBUNAL № V2005/347
VETERANS' AFFAIRS DIVISION
Re: MILAGROS GREEN
Applicant
And: REPATRIATION COMMISSION
Respondent
DECISION
Tribunal: Mr Egon Fice, Member
Date:8 May 2006
Place:Melbourne
Decision:The Tribunal sets aside the decision under review and in substitution decides that the veteran's death was war-caused.
The Tribunal remits the matter to the respondent for the purpose of calculating the pension payable to the applicant.
(sgd) Egon Fice
Member
VETERANS' AFFAIRS – entitlements - war widows' pension – malignant neoplasm of the larynx - suicide caused or contributed to by throat cancer - suicide of veteran war-caused - absence of any medical records or evidence of medical diagnosis – whether factors in Statement of Principles are raised by material before Tribunal – whether reasonable hypothesis raised connecting death with war service
Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 ss 5C(1), 7(1), 11, 120, 120A. 175
Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 64 ALD 411
McKenna v Repatriation Commission (1999) 86 FCR 144
Repatriation Commission v Budworth (2001) 116 FCR 200
Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 90 FCR 307
Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82
REASONS FOR DECISION
8 May 2006 Mr Egon Fice, Member
1. Mrs Milagros Green is the widow of Mr Wallace Henry Green. Mr Green took his own life on 29 May 1992. He was 69 years old. According to Mrs Green, Mr Green was suffering from throat cancer which caused intense depression, prolonged agonising pain, and the feeling that there was no hope of recovery, which finally caused him to take his own life. Mrs Green claimed a war widow's pension on the basis that her husband's throat cancer could be attributed to his operational service. Her claim was rejected by the Repatriation Commission (the Commission) and subsequently the Veterans’ Review Board (VRB) in a decision made on 18 January 2005. Mrs Green now seeks a review of the VRB decision pursuant to s 175 of the Veterans' Entitlements Act 1986 (the VE Act).
BACKGROUND
2. Mr Green enlisted in the Australian Army (Army) on 23 July 1942 when he was 18 years old. He saw operational service in the South West Pacific Area between December 1943 and February 1945. He was discharged from the Army on 23 October 1945.
3. Mr Green enlisted in the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) on 1 June 1949 where he served until 26 October 1956. Between 1 March 1953 and 31 May 1954, Mr Green saw operational service in Japan and Korea. His mustering was engine fitter. Upon discharge, he held the rank of corporal. The only disability mentioned on Mr Green's Medical Examination Prior to Discharge is the fact that he suffered pneumonia in December 1953 while in Korea.
4. Mr Green did not lodge any claims for disability pension and he had no medical conditions accepted or rejected as war‑caused. He was not in receipt of any disability pension prior to his death.
5. Mrs Green first met Mr Green in 1979. They commenced living together. On 21 April 1989 Mrs Green gave birth to their child. She married Mr Green on 15 May 1990, Mr Green having previously divorced his first wife.
6. According to Mrs Green, Mr Green committed suicide as a result of suffering from constant pain from what she believed was cancer of the throat. Mr Green did not have sufficient money to see a specialist in the Philippines; and therefore, no formal diagnosis was made. Mr Green committed suicide by cutting his own throat.
CONSIDERATIONS
7. Section 13 of the VE Act provides that where the death of a veteran was war‑caused, the Commonwealth is, subject to the VE Act, liable to pay a pension by way of compensation to the dependants of the veteran. There is no question that Mr Green falls within the definition of veteran, as set out in s 5C(1) and s 7(1) of the VE Act. There is also no question about the fact that Mrs Green is a dependant as defined under s 11 of the VE Act.
8. Section 120 of the VE Act sets out the standard of proof which must be established to enable a determination to be made that the injury, disease or the death of the veteran was war‑caused. Section 120(1) of the VE Act requires a finding, where operational service was rendered by the veteran, that the injury, disease or the death of the veteran was war‑caused unless the Commission is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for making that determination. Given that Mr Green rendered operational service, s 120(1) applies to Mrs Green's claim for the purpose of establishing the causal connection between Mr Green's war service and his death.
9. Section 120(3) of the VE Act, which applies to s120(1), requires the Commission to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for determining that an injury, disease or death was war‑caused if, after consideration of the material before it, the Commission is of the opinion that the material before it does not raise a reasonable hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. A hypothesis, according to the 3rd Edition of the Australian Concise Oxford Dictionary, is a proposition made as a basis for reasoning without the assumption of its truth. In order for that proposition to be reasonable, for claims made on or after 1 June 1994, s 120A of the VE Act applies. In particular, section 120A(3) provides that, for the purposes of s 120(3) of the VE Act, a hypothesis connecting an injury, disease or death of a person with the circumstances of any particular service rendered by the person is reasonable only if there is in force a Statement of Principles (SoP) determined under s 196B(2) or (11) of the VE Act which upholds the hypothesis. However, s 120A(3) does not apply in relation to a claim in respect of the death of a person if the Repatriation Medical Authority has neither determined a SOP under s 196B(2) nor declared that it does not propose to make a SOP in respect of the kind of death met by the person (s 120A(4)).
10. The method by which s 120(1), 120(3) and 120A(3) are to be applied was explained by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Repatriation Commission v Deledio (1998) 83 FCR 82 (at 97‑98). There Beaumont, Hill and O'Connor JJ said:
1. The Tribunal must consider all the material which is before it and determine whether that material points to a hypothesis connecting the injury, disease or death with the circumstances of the particular service rendered by the person. No question of fact finding arises at this stage. If no such hypothesis arises, the application must fail.
2. If the material does raise such a hypothesis, the Tribunal must then ascertain whether there is in force an SoP determined by the Authority under s 196B(2) or (11). If no such SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and, in consequence, the application must fail.
3. If an SoP is in force, the Tribunal must then form the opinion whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. It will do so if the hypothesis fits, that is to say, is consistent with the "template" to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised before it must thus contain one or more of the factors which the Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist, and be related to the person's service (as required by ss 196B(2)(d) and (e)). If the hypothesis does contain these factors, it could neither be said to be contrary to proved or known scientific facts, nor otherwise fanciful. If the hypothesis fails to fit within the template, it will be deemed not to be "reasonable" and the claim will fail.
4. The Tribunal must then proceed to consider under s 120(1) whether it is satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the death was not war-caused, or in the case of a claim for incapacity, that the incapacity did not arise from a war-caused injury. If not so satisfied, the claim must succeed. If the Tribunal is so satisfied, the claim must fail. It is only at this stage of the process that the Tribunal will be required to find facts from the material before it. In so doing, no question of onus of proof or the application of any presumption will be involved.
11. Before following the Deledio steps, I should mention that it is now accepted that the Full Court in Deledio was incorrect, in part, when it said that where no SoP is in force, the hypothesis will be taken not to be reasonable and that the application must fail. It is clear that the Full Court did not consider the effect of s 120A(4) (see Repatriation Commission v Gosewinckel (1999) 59 ALD 690).
12. In applying the first step in Deledio, I am required to consider all of the material before me to enable me to determine whether it points to a hypothesis connecting Mr Green's death with the circumstances of his operational service. The material before me reveals that Mrs Green said that her husband suffered from throat cancer. However, because of financial difficulties, Mr Green was unable to obtain medical treatment for his condition. Mrs Green claimed that it was Mr Green's work as an engine fitter with the RAAF which caused him to work in an atmosphere laced with chemicals and toxic substances. She claimed that this affected his lungs, throat and voice and that, finally, he developed cancer of the throat. Mrs Green said that her husband was diagnosed several times with a malignant tumour in “the neck”.
13. At the VRB hearing Ms Baful, a Legacy Advocate who appeared on behalf of Mrs Green, said that she had spoken with Mr Green's only known treating doctor, Dr Nestor Laigos in California. Apparently Dr Laigos confirmed that Mr Green was a heavy smoker and would consume approximately 200 cigarettes per week. Dr Laigos said that he treated the veteran for chronic laryngitis and, as his condition became severe, he recommended that the Mr Green consult a specialist. Mr Green was unable to do so because of his financial situation. Dr Laigos continued to treat Mr Green with painkillers. He confirmed that Mr Green was depressed because of his illness.
14. Mrs Green's evidence to the VRB was that she met her husband in late 1979 or early 1980. They lived together until his death. She said that during their time together, Mr Green suffered from poor health and he complained about his throat from about 1988. She said that all she could do was to buy medication for him and she provided him with Strepsils and Amoxicillin for his throat. She also said that, as time went on, his voice became weaker and he complained about his throat, saying that he thought that the disease had spread. Sometimes, when he would spit, the mucous would be stained with blood. In addition, there was also an affidavit sworn by Mansueta G. Campos, who said she was next door neighbour of Mr and Mrs Green in the Philippines. Ms Campos swore that in 1988 or 1989, Mr Green's pain in his neck became prominent and she assisted Mrs Green in attending to the needs of her husband, particularly when he went to hospital from time to time. Ms Campos said that she witnessed the painful attacks that Mr Green suffered on a daily basis. Another affidavit was provided by Mr Roberto Ramos and Mr Rodrigo Catayong who said they were close family friends and neighbours of Mr and Mrs Green. They both said that Mr Green told them that his ailment was the result of exposure to toxic fumes when he was in the RAAF. Attempts by the Commission to obtain medical records from the hospital at which Mr Green was treated have been unsuccessful.
15. In another affidavit, sworn 23 July 2005, Mrs Green also said that Mr Green told her that he started smoking in 1942 when he was in the Army. However, she said that he was not a chain smoker and would only consume around two packets of cigarettes weekly. She also said that he stopped smoking completely a few years before his death in 1992.
16. There is no mention in the report of the post-mortem, which was carried out on Mr Green's body on 29 May 1992, that Mr Green suffered from throat cancer or from any other complaint. The evidence of Mr Green's throat condition is limited to the material which I have set out above. However, this material is adequate for me to find that there is a hypothesis connecting Mr Green's death with the circumstances of his operational service.
17. The Repatriation Medical Authority referred me to a SoP, being Instrument № 71 of 1996, which concerns suicide or attempted suicide. That Instrument was subsequently amended by Instrument № 177 of 1996, which, in so far as it is material, substituted a new definition for the term severe psychosocial stressor, as set out in paragraph 7 of the first Instrument. As is stated in Instrument № 71 of 1996, the factors set out in at least one of the paragraphs in clause 5 must be related to any relevant service rendered by the person. Factor 5(h) refers to:
[E]xperiencing a severe psychosocial stressor or stressors within the two years immediately before the suicide or attempted suicide.
The definition of severe psychosocial stressor in SoP 177 of 1996 is as follows:
'severe psychosocial stressor' means an identifiable occurrence that evokes feelings of substantial distress in an individual, for example, being shot at, death or serious injury in a close friend or relative, assault (including sexual assault), severe illness or injury, experiencing a loss such as divorce or separation, loss of employment, major financial problems or legal problems;
18. Given that I have found that the material before the Tribunal points to a hypothesis connecting Mr Green's death with the circumstances of his operational service, and that there is in force a SoP under s 196B(2) or (11) of the VE Act, I am required to form an opinion as to whether the hypothesis raised is a reasonable one. As was stated in Deledio, the hypothesis will be reasonable if it fits or is consistent with the template to be found in the SoP. The hypothesis raised must contain one or more of the factors which the Repatriation Medical Authority has determined to be the minimum which must exist and be related to the person's service. The material before me suggests the possibility that Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx or some other severe illness.Therefore, it is clear that the hypothesis fits within the template and is therefore a reasonable one.
19. Because it is said that Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx, and a SoP is in existence concerning that illness, it is apparent that in order to connect Mr Green's war service with his illness, it must be necessary for Mrs Green to establish the existence of one of the factors set out in paragraph 1 of the SoP. The SoP dealing with a malignant neoplasm of the larynx may be called a sub‑hypothesis as it was in McKenna v Repatriation Commission (1999) 86 FCR 144 where the Full Court of the Federal Court said, when dealing with two hypotheses relied upon by the veteran, that neither of those hypotheses could be said to be upheld unless the sub‑hypothesis was also upheld (at 152).
20. In this matter, the Commission has indicated that, due to Mr Green's smoking habit, it was prepared to accept that the smoking was related to his operational service and that Mr Green would meet the smoking factor set out in paragraph 1 of the SoP. However, that does not resolve Mr Green's problem because the Tribunal must first find that, as a minimum, Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx.
21. There is a question as to which standard of proof should be applied when determining whether a veteran is suffering from a disease. This was dealt with by the Full Court of the Federal Court in Repatriation Commission v Budworth (2001) 116 FCR 200 where the court adopted what was said by Whitlam J in Benjamin v Repatriation Commission (2001) 64 ALD 411 (at 417), namely:
… In my opinion, it should be borne in mind that a claim for a pension under Pt II of the Act is required by s 14(5) to be made in respect of incapacity from “a particular injury or disease”. That means for present purposes that it is first necessary to determine whether the veteran contracted the disease “as claimed”. That important qualification is acknowledged in the language of s 19(7)(a) of the Act.
22. The Full Court in Repatriation Commission v Cooke (1998) 90 FCR 307 also made it clear that the standard of proof to be applied in determining the existence of the disease claimed is that set out in s 120(4) of the VE Act, which requires the Commission to decide the matter to its reasonable satisfaction. The Full Court was responding to an example given by Counsel who suggested that there may be some anomaly where a veteran made a claim in respect of a disease, which claim was disputed, and he committed suicide before the hearing of that dispute. Counsel suggested that there would be a separate standard of proof to be applied to the veteran’s claim from that which would be applied to the widow's claim. Counsel suggested that the Commission or the Tribunal would make a decision as to whether the disease existed to its reasonable satisfaction. However, the question whether a disease existed to meet the hypothesis of death by suicide as a result of the disease which in turn resulted from war service would be governed by a combination of s 120(1) and (3). The Full Court responded by saying (at 312):
…
In our view there are two answers to those contentions. First, the language of s 120(1) and (3) is so clear as to not raise any doubt on the point. Secondly, any suggested illogicality disappears when one focuses on the task in hand. In the example given above, the task at hand when deciding the incapacity claim is, initially, whether there is or was a disease. The evidence is far more readily available on that issue (in the main medical evidence, one would suppose) than matters of war‑causation which involve assessment of events which may have taken place as long ago as half a century. It makes very good sense, in our opinion, to apply, as s 120(4) of the Act requires, a civil standard of proof to the former question and the more liberal reverse criminal standard of proof to the latter question.
23. Unfortunately, in this case, the medical evidence as to whether Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx is not readily available. Nevertheless, in accordance with the reasons given by the Full Court in Cooke, I am bound to apply the civil standard of proof, that being on the balance of probabilities, in determining whether Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx or from some other severe illness. In its statement of facts and contentions, the Commission has conceded that if the Tribunal were to find that Mr Green did suffer from cancer of the throat and that the type of cancer were neoplasm of the larynx, then it would concede that Mr Green had a war‑related smoking habit sufficient to meet the SoP factor for malignant neoplasm of the larynx. However, the Commission submits that in the absence of any medical records or evidence of a medical diagnosis having been made, the material before the Tribunal does not raise a reasonable hypothesis that Mr Green suffered from cancer of the larynx or of any other kind of cancer. In my view, this submission conflates the requirement to establish the existence of the disease with the need to connect that disease, if found to exist, with the veteran’s war service. A hypothesis is reasonable for the purposes of s 120(3) of the VE Act if there is in force a SoP dealing with the claimed disease which upholds the hypothesis (s 120A(3)). As I understand the Commission's position, provided that the existence of a malignant neoplasm of the larynx can be established on the balance of probabilities, then the connection between that disease and Mr Green's war service is conceded as a consequence of his war‑related smoking habit.
24. The possibility also exists that Mr Green suffered from some other severe illness which affected his throat. This possibility arises because of the nature of Mr Green’s suicide. In my opinion, there is, on the face of it, a strong connection between the fact that Mr Green cut his own throat and that he suffered from severe pain in his throat for three or four years prior to his suicide.
25. It appears that Mr Green was never diagnosed with any malignant cancer. The reason is, and I accept the evidence given by Mrs Green to the VRB about this, that although Dr Laigos who treated Mr Green for a throat problem recommended that he be examined by a specialist, Mr and Mrs Green simply did not have the financial resources to have Mr Green examined by a specialist. However, Mrs Green did explain the symptoms that she witnessed were evident just prior to her husband's death. She made the following statement to the VRB:
...In the early 1980s he [Dr Laigos] started treating the late veteran for chronic laryngitis.
…
All I do is buy him medicine for his throat like Amoxicillin and Strepsil for his throat. I thought that is only a sore throat, that is way I always buy Strepsil, gave him Strepsil for him. It takes a long time, one year, before I notice his 0 the way he speak, it get smaller and smaller - - -
…
He always complaining about his throat. He is saying it is…then – he said, I think it is already spread, the disease, that is what he always complaining to me about his throat. Then whenever he spit have something like spot, the black spot whenever he spit.
…
He had this black spot come out of his mouth.
In her letter to the Commission dated 9 September 2002 she said that she personally witnessed his bitterness and desperation, the pain and physical weakness he suffered. She also said that her husband was diagnosed several times with a malignant tumour in the neck, which I understand to mean the throat, but there is no evidence of this diagnosis.
26. There is nothing that I am aware of in the VE Act which requires a diagnosis of an illness to be made by a medical practitioner. Quite clearly, were there such a diagnosis, it would undoubtedly carry substantial weight. However, its absence, does not, contrary to the submissions made by the Commission, preclude the possibility that a disease existed. Whitlam J in Benjamin said (at 417) that the first step following a claim for a pension under Part II of the VE Act was to determine whether the veteran contracted the disease as claimed. In dealing with that expression, the Full Court in Budworth said (at 207‑208):
The expression "as claimed" in s 19(7) to which Whitlam J drew attention in the passage from Benjamin which we have just cited, qualifies the whole clause to which it is attached, namely, "that the veteran suffered the injury or contracted the disease". This means, we consider, that the decision-maker has to identify the collection of relevant symptoms which he or she is satisfied constituted the disease which the veteran contracted.…Once the decision-maker has identified, to his or her reasonable satisfaction, the collection of relevant symptoms from which an applicant suffers, the question of whether those symptoms were war-caused has to be resolved by imposing on the Commission the reverse onus of proof on the criminal standard in accordance with s 120(1) as qualified by s 120(3).
27. Because there was no medical evidence of Mr Green's claimed malignant neoplasm of the larynx, I consulted two authorities: the 3rd edition of Pathologic Basis of Disease by Ramzi S. Cotran MD, Stanley L. Robbins MD and Vinay Kumar MD, 1984, and the InteliHealth website < the content of which has been reviewed by the Faculty of the Harvard Medical School. These authorities were provided to the Commission for its comments.
28. The authorities to which I have referred make the following general comments about malignant neoplasms of the larynx:
(a)this form of cancer is usually found in adults beyond the fourth decade of life and are considerably more common in males than females;
(b)most throat cancer begins on the vocal cords and later spreads to the voice box (larynx);
(c)clinically, cases usually first become apparent with the onset of resistant, progressive hoarseness, followed possibly by pain, difficulty in swallowing, hemoptysis, and eventually even respiratory distress;
(d)an early symptoms of throat cancer is unexplained hoarseness in the voice;
(e)smokers are at high risk of throat cancer;
(f)cancer is less common among people under age 55; and
(g)the first symptom is a change in the sound of your voice, especially a persistent rasp or hoarseness.
Other symptoms of throat cancer include:
(i)painful or difficult swallowing;
(ii)persistent sore throat;
(iii)a sense of a lump in the throat or a need to swallow;
(iv)swelling or pain in the neck;
(v)enlarged glands (lymph nodes) in the neck;
(vi)a persistent cough;
(vii)wheezing or raspy breath;
(viii)unexplained weight loss; and
(ix)coughing up blood.
29. Although Mrs Green did not use the terminology used in the medical authorities, it is abundantly clear that the symptoms which she described are all symptoms of throat cancer. I have no reason to doubt that Mrs Green was being absolutely forthright and accurate in describing the symptoms of which she witnessed.
30. The Commission consulted Dr FJ Morgan regarding the authorities provided to it dealing with malignant neoplasm of the larynx. According to the Commissioner’s response, Dr Morgan agreed that the symptoms described by Mrs Green are consistent with throat cancer. However, he also said that the symptoms are consistent with other chronic laryngeal conditions such as non-malignant tumours (eg. laryngeal nodules and squamous papillomas) and chronic infections such as TB and Candida. They did not point to any specific laryngeal condition.
31. That, however, does not end the matter. I have also examined information obtained from the internet site of CancerHelp UK regarding non-cancerous growths in the voice box and the Cornell University site dealing with laryngeal papillomatosis, vocal nodules and laryngitis. All of these conditions have smoking as one of the possible causes. No SoP exists for these diseases and the Repatriation Medical Authority has not given notice under s 120A (2) that it does not intend to make a SoP for these diseases. As for chronic infections such as TB and Candida, the symptoms which are described on the InteliHealth website do not match the symptoms so graphically described by Mrs Green I have therefore formed the view that these infections, although an “outside possibility”, are unlikely to have been the cause of Mr Green’s problem.
32. I have also considered s 119(1)(h) of the VE Act. That requires the Commission to take into account any difficulties that, for any reason, lie in the way of ascertaining the existence of any fact, matter, cause or circumstance, including any reason attributable to the effects of the passage of time, including the effect of the passage of time on the availability of witnesses and the absence of or a deficiency in relevant official records. Given Mrs Green's financial circumstances, which were also set out in a letter dated 19 September 1983 from Mr Green to the Deputy Commissioner of the Department of Veterans' Affairs, I have no reason to doubt that Mrs Green's statement that she did not have the money to take Mr Green to a specialist in order to allow a diagnosis to be made and for treatment to be undertaken is true. I also accept Mrs Green’s evidence that Mr Green was treated at the Martinez Maternity and Lying‑in Hospital in San Fernando City, La Union, Philippines. Despite the name of the hospital, one of the doctors who practises there, Dr Marvin S. Martinez, purports to specialise in eye, ear, nose and throat diseases. It is regrettable that that hospital could not produce any medical records of Mr Green’s treatment.
33. Despite the lack of medical records, the symptoms described by Mrs Green in her own words bear such a close resemblance to those described in the medical authorities to which I have referred that I have come to the conclusion, on the balance of probabilities, that Mr Green did suffer from a severe laryngeal condition immediately before his suicide..
CONCLUSION
34. Quite clearly this is a most difficult and unusual case. The difficulty arises because Mr and Mrs Green were unable to either seek a diagnosis or proper medical treatment. Nevertheless, because of the way in which Mrs Green has described Mr Green's symptoms just before he committed suicide, and because they bear such a close resemblance to the symptoms set out in respected medical authorities, I am satisfied, on balance, that Mr Green suffered from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx or another severe laryngeal condition. The Commission conceded that if I were to find that Mr Green did suffer from a malignant neoplasm of the larynx, then it would concede that Mr Green had a war‑caused smoking habit sufficient to meet the SoP factor for malignant neoplasm of the larynx. Even if Mr Green suffered from another form of chronic laryngeal disease such as those described by Dr Morgan, because there is no SoP in existence for those diseases, and the Repatriation Medical Authority has not given notice under s 120A (2), it is open to me to find that, on the balance of probabilities, Mr Green suffered from a severe illness which was smoking related. This would satisfy a reasonable hypothesis connecting Mr Green’s illness with his war service. It follows, in my opinion, given that the sub‑hypotheses support the hypothesis linking Mr Green's death with his operational service, the hypothesis must be reasonable. In the circumstances, I cannot be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there is no sufficient ground for determining that Mr Green's death was war‑caused.
35. Therefore, the decision of the Commission to refuse to grant a pension to Mrs Green must be set aside and the matter remitted to the Commission for the purpose of calculating the pension payable to Mrs Green.
I certify that the thirty‑five [35] preceding paragraphs are a true copy of the reasons for the decision of:
Mr Egon Fice, Member
(sgd) Catherine Thomas
Clerk
Date of hearing: Hearing on the papers
Date of decision: 8 May 2006
Advocate for the applicant: Self-represented
Advocate for the respondent: Mr R. FergussonSolicitor for the respondent: Advocacy Section, Department of Veterans’ Affairs
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