Greco v Commissioner of Police , NSW Police Force

[2025] NSWCATAD 220

Civil and Administrative Tribunal

New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation:

Greco v Commissioner of Police , NSW Police Force [2025] NSWCATAD 220

Hearing dates:

28 May 2025

Date of orders:

02 September 2025

Decision date:

02 September 2025

Jurisdiction:

Administrative and Equal Opportunity Division

Before:

M Tibbey, Senior Member

Decision:

Leave to proceed refused.

Catchwords:

Disability and homosexuality discrimination – leave to proceed

Legislation Cited:

Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW)

Cases Cited:

Bassili v The Star Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 167

Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 282

Commission of Corrective Services v Aldridge [2000] NSWADTAP5

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1997) 80 FCR 7

Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 13

Ekermawi v ADT & Ors [2009] NSWSC 143

Hubbard v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2010] NSW ADT 99

Jones & Anor v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388.

Langley v Niland & Anor (1981) 2 NSWLR 104

Nicholls and Nicholls v Director General, Department of Education and Training (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 20

Prakash v Borg Enterprises Pty Ltd [1999] NSWADT 73 Commission of Corrective Services v Aldridge [2000] NSWADTAP5

Waters v Public Transport Corporation (1991) 173 CLR 349

Commission of Corrective Services v Aldridge [2000] NSWADTAP5

Texts Cited:

None cited

Category:

Principal judgment

Parties:

Giuseppe Greco (Applicant)
Commissioner of Police, NSW Police Force (Respondent)

Representation:

Levitt Robinson Solicitors (Applicant)
Kingston Reid (Respondent)

File Number(s):

2025/00045988

Publication restriction:

Nil

REASONS FOR DECISION

Background

1. On 25 August 2024, the applicant, Mr Greco ( who will be referred to in these Reasons for Decision as ‘the applicant’) made a complaint to Anti-Discrimination NSW in relation to alleged discriminatory conduct on 21 August 2024 by the NSW Police Force (now represented by the Commissioner of Police, who will be referred to here as ‘the respondent’) on the grounds of his homosexuality and disabilities. The claim was accepted for investigation.

2. On 26 October 2024, the applicant further complained that the respondent had victimised him within the meaning of the Anti-Discrimination Act, NSW 1977 ( ‘the Act’) on 26 October 2024 when they served two banning notices on him, banning him from attending Kentucky Fried Chicken (‘KFC’) premises in Dubbo, that is, Southern Restaurants premises. That claim was also accepted for investigation by Anti-Discrimination NSW.

3. On 30 January 2025, Anti-Discrimination NSW declined the applicant’s complaints as “lacking in substance.”

4. The applicant has sought leave to proceed with the complaint in the Tribunal.

Statutory framework for seeking leave

5. Section 92 of the Act provides (relevantly) that:

92 President may decline complaint during investigation

(1) If at any stage of the President's investigation of a complaint--

(a) the President is satisfied that--

(i) the complaint, or part of the complaint, is frivolous, vexatious, misconceived or lacking in substance……

the President may, by notice in writing addressed to the complainant, decline the complaint or part of the complaint..

(v) the subject-matter of the complaint has been, is being, or should be, dealt with by another person or body….

6. A complaint will be "lacking in substance" if it can be demonstrated that there exists no factual basis for the allegations or that the complaint is “not reasonably arguable”: Langley v Niland & Anor (1981) 2 NSWLR 104 at 107 and Chalker v Murrays Australia Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 282 at [22]. The Tribunal is obliged to consider the complainant’s evidence at its highest.

7. Having received the declination and reasons for it dated 30 January 2025 in the President’s Report, the complainant sought that his matter be referred to the Tribunal under s93A of the Act.

8. Section 96 of the Act provides that a complaint referred pursuant to section 93A is not permitted to proceed without the leave of the Tribunal.

9. The Tribunal has considered whether, whether the Tribunal should permit leave for the complainant to proceed with the claim.

10. Section 96(1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 gives the Tribunal an unfettered discretion to grant leave for a complaint to proceed: Jones & Anor v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at 58; Ekermawi v ADT & Ors [2009] NSWSC 143 at para 25. That discretion must be exercised having regard to the purpose of the legislative scheme established by the Act and be guided by the consideration that the refusal of leave will finally determine the complainant's rights under that scheme: Jones & Anor v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at 57 and Ekermawi v ADT & Ors [2009] NSWSC 143 at [32].

11. The question of leave involves evaluating whether it is fair or just to grant, or refuse leave in the particular circumstances of the case. Again, those two cases Jones & Anor v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at 58; Ekermawi v ADT & Ors [2009] NSWSC 143 are cited in support of that proposition.

12. In deciding whether or not to grant leave the Tribunal may have regard to the grounds which the president may take into account in declining a complaint under s 92 of the Act, and as stated in Jones v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at [60].

What would the applicant have to prove if the claim were permitted to proceed?

13. Section 49B of the Act makes it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the grounds of disability. It provides that:

(1) A person ("the perpetrator") discriminates against another person ("the aggrieved person" ) on the ground of disability if the perpetrator--

(a) on the ground of the aggrieved person's disability or the disability of a relative or associate of the aggrieved person, treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a person who does not have that disability or who does not have such a relative or associate who has that disability, or

(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have that disability, or who do not have a relative or associate who has that disability, comply or are able to comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), something is done on the ground of a person's disability if it is done on the ground of the person's disability, a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability or a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons who have that disability.

(3) For the purposes of, but without limiting, this section, the fact that a person who has a disability of or relating to vision, hearing or mobility has, or may be accompanied by, a dog which assists the person in respect of that disability, is taken to be a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability, but nothing in this Act affects the liability of any such person for any injury, loss or damage caused by the dog.

(3A) For the purposes of, but without limiting, this section, the fact that a person who has a disability--

(a) is accompanied by, or possesses, a palliative or therapeutic device, or other mechanical equipment, that provides assistance to the person to alleviate the effect of the disability, or

(b) is accompanied by an interpreter, a reader, an assistant, or a carer, who provides interpretive, reading or other services to the person because of the disability, or because of any matter related to that fact,

is taken to be a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability.

(4) A reference in this section to persons who have a disability ("the particular disability") is a reference to persons who have the particular disability or who have a disability that is substantially the same as the particular disability.

14. Section 49M of the Act provides, in relation to goods and services, as follows:

(1) It is unlawful for a person who provides, for payment or not, goods or services to discriminate against a person on the ground of disability--

(a) by refusing to provide the person with those goods or services, or

(b) in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services.

(2) Nothing in this section renders it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's disability if the provision of the goods or services would impose unjustifiable hardship on the person who provides the goods or services.

15. Section 49ZG of the Act provides, in relation to discrimination on the grounds of homosexuality as follows:

(1) A person ("the perpetrator" ) discriminates against another person (
"the aggrieved person" ) on the ground of homosexuality if the perpetrator--

(a) on the ground of the aggrieved person's homosexuality or the homosexuality of a relative or associate of the aggrieved person, treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a person who he or she did not think was a homosexual person or who does not have such a relative or associate who he or she thinks was a homosexual person, or

(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who are not homosexual persons, or who do not have a relative or associate who is a homosexual person, comply or are able to comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), something is done on the ground of a person's homosexuality if it is done on the ground of the person's homosexuality, a characteristic that appertains generally to homosexual persons or a characteristic that is generally imputed to homosexual persons.

16. Section 49ZG provides as follows:

It is unlawful for a person who provides, for payment or not, goods or services to discriminate against another person on the ground of homosexuality--

(a) by refusing to provide the person with those goods or services, or

(b) in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services.

17. Section 53 provides as follows:

(1) An act done by a person as the agent or employee of the person's principal or employer which if done by the principal or employer would be a contravention of this Act is taken to have been done by the principal or employer also unless the principal or employer did not, either before or after the doing of the act, authorise the agent or employee, either expressly or by implication, to do the act.

(2) If both the principal or employer and the agent or employee who did the act are subject to any liability arising under this Act in respect of the doing of the act, they are jointly and severally subject to that liability.

(3) Despite subsection (1), a principal or an employer is not liable under that subsection if the principal or employer took all reasonable steps to prevent the agent or employee from contravening the Act.

(4) For the purposes of subsection (1), the principal or employer of a volunteer or unpaid trainee who contravenes Part 2A is the person or body on whose behalf the volunteer or unpaid trainee provides services.

18. The provisions of the Act in relation to disability discrimination include Section 49B, which states as follows:

(1) A person ("the perpetrator" ) discriminates against another person (
"the aggrieved person" ) on the ground of disability if the perpetrator--

(a) on the ground of the aggrieved person's disability or the disability of a relative or associate of the aggrieved person, treats the aggrieved person less favourably than in the same circumstances, or in circumstances which are not materially different, the perpetrator treats or would treat a person who does not have that disability or who does not have such a relative or associate who has that disability, or

(b) requires the aggrieved person to comply with a requirement or condition with which a substantially higher proportion of persons who do not have that disability, or who do not have a relative or associate who has that disability, comply or are able to comply, being a requirement which is not reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case and with which the aggrieved person does not or is not able to comply.

(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) (a), something is done on the ground of a person's disability if it is done on the ground of the person's disability, a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability or a characteristic that is generally imputed to persons who have that disability.

(3) For the purposes of, but without limiting, this section, the fact that a person who has a disability of or relating to vision, hearing or mobility has, or may be accompanied by, a dog which assists the person in respect of that disability, is taken to be a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability, but nothing in this Act affects the liability of any such person for any injury, loss or damage caused by the dog.

(3A) For the purposes of, but without limiting, this section, the fact that a person who has a disability--

(a) is accompanied by, or possesses, a palliative or therapeutic device, or other mechanical equipment, that provides assistance to the person to alleviate the effect of the disability, or

(b) is accompanied by an interpreter, a reader, an assistant, or a carer, who provides interpretive, reading or other services to the person because of the disability, or because of any matter related to that fact,

is taken to be a characteristic that appertains generally to persons who have that disability.

(4) A reference in this section to persons who have a disability ("the particular disability") is a reference to persons who have the particular disability or who have a disability that is substantially the same as the particular disability.

19. They also include Section 49M, which reads as follows:

(1) It is unlawful for a person who provides, for payment or not, goods or services to discriminate against a person on the ground of disability--

(a) by refusing to provide the person with those goods or services, or

(b) in the terms on which he or she provides the person with those goods or services.

(2) Nothing in this section renders it unlawful to discriminate against a person on the ground of the person's disability if the provision of the goods or services would impose unjustifiable hardship on the person who provides the goods or services.

20. In relation to victimisation, Section 50 of the Act states as follows:

(1) It is unlawful for a person (
"the discriminator”) to subject another person (
"the person victimised") to any detriment in any circumstances on the ground that the person victimised has--

(a) brought proceedings against the discriminator or any other person under this Act,

(b) given evidence or information in connection with proceedings brought by any person against the discriminator or any other person under this Act,

(c) alleged that the discriminator or any other person has committed an act which, whether or not the allegation so states, would amount to a contravention of this Act, or

(d) otherwise done anything under or by reference to this Act in relation to the discriminator or any other person,

or by reason that the discriminator knows that the person victimised intends to do any of those things, or suspects that the person victimised has done, or intends to do, any of them.

(2) Subsection (1) does not apply to the subjecting of a person to a detriment by reason of an allegation made by the person if the allegation was false and not made in good faith.

What is required in order to establish discrimination?

21. In order to establish a claim of discrimination, the applicant needs to establish that at least one of the reasons he was treated less favourably than others in the same or similar position (sometimes referred to as ‘differential treatment’) was “on the grounds of” his disability (sometimes referred to as ‘the causation question’).

22. In Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSWADT 133 at [60] – [65], the Tribunal discusses how the question of whether or not there has been “less favourable treatment” of the applicant “than others in the same or similar position” where the comparator is a hypothetical comparator, as it is in this case. This case is similar to Dutt in that, as stated in Dutt:

The only fact that it is possible to determine is the ground or grounds on which the applicant was actually refused service. Only when this is known can we say whether a hypothetical comparator would have been refused service in the same circumstances. The applicant could, for example have been refused service on perverse or irrational grounds, or solely on a ground unrelated to race: it is not until the ground for the actual treatment is known that it is possible to say whether a hypothetical person not of the applicant’s race would have been treated differently.”

23. The words “on the grounds of” have been paraphrased as “because of”, “due to,” “a real” reason, a “genuine” reason or “true reason” for the treatment alleged to have been discriminatory (Nicholls and Nicholls v Director General, Department of Education and Training (No 2) [2009] NSWADTAP 20 at [28]).

24. A person may also experience indirect disability discrimination if a requirement operates differentially on a person with a disability. That may also constitute indirect disability discrimination.

25. The applicant bears the onus of proof that he was treated less favourably “on the grounds of”, “because of” or “due” (at least in part) to his disability (Hubbard v Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW [2010] NSW ADT 99 at [56]).

26. If there is no actual comparator with whom to compare the applicant, then a hypothetical comparator may be considered (Dutt v Central Coast Area Health Service [2002] NSW ADT 133 at [59] – [65]; Commission of Corrective Services v Aldridge [2000] NSWADTAP5; Bassili v The Star Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCATAD 167 at [23].)

27. It is not the case that because a person has a particular disability and/or is or perceived to be homosexual and experiences something he or she perceives as “adverse” to him/herself, that the conduct is discriminatory simply because the person has that disability or is, or perceived to be homosexual. The person needs to prove on the civil standard that the conduct impugned occurred “on the ground of”, “due to” or “because of” the disability and/or homosexuality of the person or that was one of the reasons for the conduct. To put it another way, the applicant is required to prove that a real reason, or the real reason, for the conduct impugned is the disability and/or homosexuality of the person.

What if an allegedly discriminatory act is done for more than one reason?

28. Section 4A of the ADA provides that:

If—

(a) an act is done for 2 or more reasons, and

(b) one of the reasons consists of unlawful discrimination under this Act against a person (whether or not it is the dominant or a substantial reason for doing the act),

then, for the purposes of this Act, the act is taken to be done for that reason.

Why did Anti-Discrimination NSW decline the Complaint?

29. The reasons set out in the Report of the President of Anti-Discrimination NSW for the declining of the complaint on 30 January 2025 pursuant to s 92(1)(a)(i) as “lacking in substance” are stated as follows:

“The complainant’s allegations of homosexuality discrimination, disability discrimination and victimisation against the respondent lack substance for the following reasons:

1. Homosexual discrimination. Even if the complainant was able to establish that the respondent refused to provide him with a service by failing to investigate his complaints against the KFC staff, he provides no information to support an allegation that their failure to do so was on the grounds of his homosexuality.

2. Disability discrimination. The respondent’s requirement that complaints against police officers must be made in writing applies to all complainants, irrespective of whether they have a disability. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the requirement to put a complaint in writing is unreasonable and more difficult to comply with for a greater proportion of complainants who have a hearing disability than those who don’t. While the complainant found Sergeant Clegg’s demeanour and words offensive, these go to the manner in which the service was provided and is not covered by the Anti-Discrimination Act, 1977 (NSW).

3. Victimisation. Other than timing, the complainant provides no information to support his allegation that he was being victimised by the respondent when they served him banning notices on behalf of Southern Restaurants.

30. On 30 January 2025, the President’s delegate referred the applicant’s complaint to the Tribunal, in accordance with section 93A (1) of the Anti-Discrimination Act.

Consideration

31. Both parties presented their cases orally before the Tribunal. The applicant submitted proposed Points of Claim, if he were permitted to proceed with the claim in the Tribunal, his own witness statement and submissions and a witness statement by Mr MacKay. He also supplied a USB of his interactions with police whilst at KFC premises.

32. The respondent made written submissions and provided the statements of Senior Constable Liam McNeight, Leading Senior Constable Stuart Moore and that of Sergeant Nathan Clegg. Kingston Reid, on behalf of the respondent, also submitted two USB’s containing footage captured on body-worn videos.

33. The applicant alleges that he is homosexual, has a hearing and speech disability and wears a hearing aid that was visible at the time of the alleged conduct on 21 August 2024. He also states that his partner, Mr Matthew Mackay, purchased takeaway food at a KFC restaurant. Mr Mackay was wearing a ‘rainbow pride’ yarmulke (skullcap). They ate the food in the car. Mr Greco alleges that Ms Lewis, a KFC employee, knocked on their car window and said, “pick up your rubbish faggot”. In the video footage that the applicant supplied, he says that she said, “pick up your fucking rubbish” and also “faggot”. Police later interviewed Ms Lewis, who denies saying those words. A short verbal dispute ensued.

34. Ms Lewis called the Police who attended and interviewed Mr Greco, Mr Mackay and Ms Lewis. The step taken by the police was to issue a ‘move-on order’ to Mr Greco. The applicant alleges that they took no other steps to address the alleged homophobic insult and that this constituted less favourable treatment than would have been accorded to others without such a disability and/or who were not homosexual or perceived to be homosexual.

35. Senior Constable Stuart Moore provided a statement dated 13 March 2025. He says that Mr Mackay denied throwing rubbish out the car window, claiming that it fell out when the door was opened. Senior Constable Moore states that during the interaction:

“Mr Greco was belligerent and combative, demanding the business’s ABN and that criminal action be taken against Ms Lewis. Mr Greco’s confrontational approach and refusal to engage in a constructive dialogue diminished the reliability of his allegation against Ms Lewis”.

36. I viewed the USB footage supplied by the applicant that recorded the interactions between police, himself and Mr Mackay at KFC premises. I find that the footage does not support the proposition that police acted towards Mr Greco in a discriminatory manner in those interactions. They appeared to be interacting with the applicant as they would any other member or the public about whose conduct they had been called. They were not unduly hostile and spoke reasonably to the applicant and his partner, if firmly. There was no indication of less favourable treatment of the applicant due to his sexuality or any disability.

37. Senior Constable Moore states that he was “satisfied that Mr Greco’s and Mr Mackay’s ongoing presence was “causing fear of likely to cause fear to another person” so issued a moving along direction. Mr Greco initially refused to move on and argued with this but eventually moved on.

38. After the applicant and Mr Mackay had left, Senior Constable Moore states that:

“I spoke again with Ms Lewis, who consistently repeated her initial assertion. Several other staff members also witnessed the initial littering incident. Ms Lewis denied making any remarks towards Mr Greco and Mr Mackay, including using the word ‘faggot’, touching the vehicle, or being aggressive. Given Ms Lewis’s calm and professional demeanour throughout my interactions with her and the corroboration of her statement by other staff members, I believed Ms Lewis to be truthful”.

39. Thus, although the applicant would not have been aware of it at the time he complied with the move on order and left the KFC premises, further enquiries were made by the respondent of Ms Lewis and other KFC staff, to further investigate what had occurred. On the basis of having heard the differing versions of events from the applicant and from KFC staff, the Senior Constable formed the view that no further action was required.

40. Later that evening, the applicant attended Dubbo Police Station, wanting to make a statement and complaint against the police. He was told that any complaint against the police must be made in writing. He claims that Senior Constable Moore, at Dubbo Police Station, made gestures mocking his hearing aids.

41. The statement of Sergeant Nathan Clegg dated 13 March 2025 states that he had not had any contact with the applicant prior to 21 August 2024. On that night, when the applicant attended the police station with his partner, and wanted to make a complaint about police conduct, Sergeant Clegg advised him that complaints against police needed to be made in writing. His statement also states that this is standard procedure.

42. In relation to the alleged slur about using his ears, Sergeant Clegg states that:

“Mr Grego continued to express dissatisfaction with the earlier interaction at KFC and claimed that the requirement to submit a written complaint was against his human rights. He stated that he would take the matter to the Human Rights Commission and the Professional Standards Command.

During the interaction, Mr Greco frequently interrupted and spoke over me, and made threats, stating that the actions of police that night were “on me”.

Given Mr Greco’s aggressive demeanour and frequent interruptions, I requested Mr Greco to “use his ears for a moment and not his voice” to ensure he understood the process being explained to him. At no time was I aware that Mr Greco was hearing impaired, no did I make any reference to his hearing. I made this statement because of Mr Greco’s frequent interruptions and aggressive demeanour and not for any other reasons.

…..

At the time, I was not aware of Mr Greco’s hearing impairment or homosexuality…”

43. I have viewed the USB footage of that interaction and find that, taken at its highest, there is no evidence that the actions of Sergeant Clegg were taken because of, or due to, either the homosexuality or hearing or speech disability of the applicant. The applicant was wearing a head covering as it was winter and it was not clear from the footage that he wore a hearing aid.

44. There were no words used by police officers that referenced the applicant being homosexual. It was not otherwise apparent from the footage that either the homosexuality or hearing or other disability of the applicant were known to the police on duty at that time or that the applicant was treated less favourably because of those characteristics than a person without those characteristics would have been. One police officer did say words to the effect of “use your ears for a moment and not your voice” in the face of the applicant being quite vocal, cutting across what others were saying and not listening attentively to the explanation that the officer was giving. He denies being aware of any hearing disability of the applicant or of having prior contact with him. There is no evidence that he was aware of his hearing disability or aware as to whether he had had prior contact with the applicant.

45. Nor is there evidence of any requirement that was in place that impacted to a greater degree on Mr Greco than others (‘indirect discrimination’). The requirement to put a complaint against police in writing applied to everyone and there is no evidence that it impacted more on the applicant due to his sexuality and/or disabilities (see Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission (1997) 80 FCR 7).

46. I find that that, on the evidence provided for the leave hearing, investigation of the events by the respondent appears to have been dispassionate and not tainted by discriminatory conduct. The available evidence would not, even taken at its highest, be likely to provide a sufficient factual basis for findings that the applicant was treated the applicant less favourably than others would have been treated, either due to his hearing or speech disability or his sexuality. If the factual basis could not be established on the balance of probabilities, even taken at its highest, then the case is not reasonably arguable.

Taken at its highest, given:

1. the corroboration by other KFC staff of what had occurred that led to police being called,

2. that the version of events provided by the applicant as to what occurred at KFC early in the evening is contested both by KFC staff and then by several police officers

3. the footage taken by the applicant at KFC does not disclose discriminatory behaviour by the respondent;

4. the footage taken by the respondent as to what occurred at Dubbo Police Station does not support the assertions of discriminatory behaviour by the respondent

the available evidence does not support the allegations of discrimination on the ground of either homosexuality or a hearing or other disability such that there is an arguable case.

47. It is not necessary to determine whether or not “services” were provided, given the findings above.

48. As to victimisation, banning notices were issued by KFC requiring that the applicant not enter either of the Dubbo KFC outlets. They were served by the police at Mr Greco’s residence on 26 October 2024. There is no evidence, beyond assertion, that they were issued “in retaliation” for complaints of discrimination having been made by the applicant and the requirements of Section 50 of the Act are not likely to be satisfied, on the balance of probabilities.

49. For the reasons set out above, I find that it would not be fair or just to permit this application to proceed in the Tribunal: Jones & Anor v Ekermawi [2009] NSWCA 388 at 58; Ekermawi v ADT & Ors [2009] NSWSC 143.

Orders

1. Leave to proceed is refused.    

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I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales.

Registrar

Decision last updated: 02 September 2025