Grapes v AAI Limited

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Grapes v AAI Limited [2024] QSC 267

PARTIES:

SONIA LAURA GRAPES

(applicant)

v
AAI LIMITED TRADING AS SUNCORP INSURANCE
ACN 005 297 807

(first respondent)

STATE OF QUEENSLAND

(second respondent)

BRAD ALLEN

(third respondent)

FILE NO/S:

BS 10962 of 2024

DIVISION:

Trial Division

PROCEEDING:

Application

ORIGINATING COURT:

Supreme Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

6 November 2024

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

4 October 2024

JUDGE:

Copley J

ORDER:

Application dismissed.

CATCHWORDS:

LIMITATION OF ACTIONS – EXTENSION OR POSTPONEMENT OF LIMITATION PERIODS – EXTENSION OF TIME IN PERSONAL INJURIES MATTERS – GENERALLY – where the applicant was a paramedic with the Queensland Ambulance Service – where the applicant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder from a motor vehicle accident that occurred on 2 September 2018 – where the applicant filed an application and seeks an extension of time order for her to commence proceedings claiming damages for personal injuries against the respondents pursuant to s 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) – where the applicant alleges that she did not know the nature and extent of her psychological injury and that the psychological injury was caused by attending the accident until December of 2022 – where the applicant submits that she did not know of the identity of the first and third respondents until 8 November 2023 – whether the facts relied on were material facts – whether any of the material facts were of a decisive character – whether the applicant knew or had it within her means of knowledge to know of those facts – whether an extension of time should be granted for the applicant to commence proceedings for damages against the respondents

Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld), ss 30, 31
Motor Accident Insurance Act 1994 (Qld), ss 37, 39, 52, 57

Motor Accident Insurance Regulation 2018, reg 16, 17

Castillon v P&O Ports Limited (No 2) [2008] 2 Qd R 219; [2007] QCA 364, cited
Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234; [1984] HCA 17, cited
Moriarty v Sunbeam Corporation Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 325, cited
NF v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 110, cited
Pikrt v Hagemeyer Brands Australia Pty Ltd [2006] QCA 112, cited
Pizer v Ansett Australia Limited [1998] QCA 298, cited

Star Aged Living Limited v Lee [2024] QCA 1, cited

COUNSEL:

B F Charrington KC, with S McNeil, for the applicant

S J Williams KC for the first and third respondents

P Telford for the second respondent

SOLICITORS:

Denning Insurance Law for the applicant
Moray & Agnew Lawyers for the first and third respondents

Crown Law for the second respondent

  1. By application filed on 21 August 2024 the applicant seeks a number of orders.

  2. Pursuant to s 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Act’) she applies for an order that the time limit for her to commence proceedings claiming damages for personal injuries…

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Details
Case
[2024] QSC 267
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

Ms Denning, a paramedic for the Queensland Ambulance Service, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder after attending a motor vehicle accident on 2 September 2018. She applied for an extension of time to commence proceedings claiming damages for her injuries against various respondents, under section 31(2) of the Limitation of Actions Act 1974 (Qld). Ms Denning argued that she did not know the nature and extent of her psychological injury or that it was caused by attending the accident until December 2022, and she only discovered the identity of the first and third respondents on 8 November 2023. The central legal issues were whether the facts relied on were material, whether any of those material facts were of a decisive character, and whether Ms Denning knew or had it within her means of knowledge to know those facts.

The court examined whether the facts relied on by Ms Denning were material. It determined that the nature and extent of the personal injury, the fact that negligence caused the injury, and the identity of the person against whom a right of action lies, were indeed material facts. Ms Denning argued she did not know these facts until certain dates in 2022 and 2023, which she substantiated with medical reports and documentary evidence. The court found these facts were relevant and material to her claim. However, the decisive question was whether Ms Denning knew or had it within her means of knowledge to know these facts before the limitation period expired. The court concluded that the facts were not of a decisive character and were not within Ms Denning's knowledge or means of knowledge before the limitation period expired.

The court ultimately dismissed the application for an extension of time. It found that the material facts were not of a decisive character and were not known to Ms Denning or within her means of knowledge before the limitation period expired. Therefore, an extension of time was not warranted.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application dismissed.

Background

Background to the litigation

On 20 September 2023 Ms Denning had an inquiry made with the Department of Transport to obtain information about how one might obtain a person’s motor vehicle registration number if only utilising a name and address. The Department of Transport advised her that she would need to contact the Police Service. The Police Service disclosed a document in response to her right to information request on 12 October 2023, however, that document did not contain the registration details of the motor vehicle. Further efforts to obtain the registration number through CITEC proved fruitless. On 30 October 2023 Ms Denning wrote a letter to Crown Law asking for WorkCover to utilise a memorandum of understanding it apparently had with the Police Service to obtain the information about the vehicle. Finally, on 6 November 2023 Crown Law disclosed Police Service records which revealed the registration number of the vehicle involved in the accident. On 8 November 2023 Ms Denning caused a search to be conducted with CITEC to identify the compulsory third-party insurer of the vehicle. Later that day, CITEC disclosed to her that the first respondent was the compulsory third-party insurer of the vehicle at the time of the accident.Were the facts relied on material facts? Material facts include the nature and extent of the personal injury.[6] The applicant contends that there is information in Dr Mungomery’s report which relates to the nature and extent of her injury. This report contained evidence that the injury was permanent and unlikely to be improved with further treatment, and that the applicant would not be able to return to work as a paramedic. The applicant says that she did not know the nature and extent of her injury until told of Dr Mungomery’s opinion on 6 December 2022. [6]Section 30(1)(a)(iv). Material facts also include the fact that the negligence caused the personal injury.[7] The applicant contends that Dr Mungomery’s report contained evidence that the accident caused the PTSD. She says she did not know the accident caused her injury until told of Dr Mungomery’s opinion on 6 December 2022.[7]Section 30(1)(a)(iii). Also, the identity of the person against whom a right of action lies is a material fact.[8] The applicant contends that she only became aware of the identity of the third respondent which then enabled her, through her solicitor, to become aware of the identity of the first respondent, on 6 November 2023 when Crown Law disclosed documents to her solicitor. By 8 November 2023 her solicitor knew the identity of both the first and third respondents.[8]Section 30(1)(a)(ii). Counsel for the first and third respondents did not direct any written or oral submissions towards the issue of whether any of the facts relied on were material. Rather, his submissions were directed to whether any of the facts relied on were of a decisive character and, more particularly, whether any were known to the applicant or within the means of her knowledge. Counsel for the second respondent did not argue that Dr Mungomery’s opinion was not relevant to the nature and extent of personal injury and causation between the accident and the injury. He too directed his oral submissions to whether the facts were of a decisive character and to what the applicant knew or what was within the means of her knowledge. Although the second respondent’s written submissions contained the assertion that the report of Dr Mungomery was “not a material fact”,[9] this assertion was allied to the submission that the facts were “not new or material” to the applicant. I regard that submission to be relevant to the next two issues to consider, whether the material facts are of a decisive character and knowledge. [9]Written Submissions of the Second Respondent, paragraph 17.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

In relation to a provision analogous to s 31 of the Act, Dawson J said:[2]“The form of the legislation requires, I think, a step-by-step approach. The first step is to inquire whether the facts of which the appellant was unaware were material facts: … If they were, the next step is to ascertain whether they were of a decisive character: … If so, then it must be ascertained whether those facts were within the means of knowledge of the appellant before the specified date: …” (Reference to statutory provisions omitted). [2]Do Carmo v Ford Excavations Pty Ltd (1984) 154 CLR 234 at 256.Summary of relevant evidence The applicant had been employed as a paramedic with the Queensland Ambulance Service from 2007. On the evening of 2 September 2018 she attended the scene of a single vehicle motor vehicle accident which had occurred at Mount Tamborine in her capacity as a paramedic with the Ambulance Service. It was necessary for her to remain with an injured young male passenger for about an hour. His arm had been almost completely amputated in the accident. The applicant retrieved his humerus bone from where it was lodged in a tree several metres from the vehicle. The applicant’s ability to cope with work as a paramedic deteriorated from the period September/October 2018. On some days she had to go home from work early due to panic attacks. On some occasions on the drive to work she was overcome with panic and nausea and called in sick. Up to December 2018 she took 14 days off. On Christmas Eve 2018 she attended on Dr Norman, her general practitioner. She complained to her of anxiety attacks and fatigue. Dr Norman then, and on subsequent occasions prior to January 2021, considered that her symptoms related to perimenopause. Dr Norman issued a certificate for the applicant to take time off work until 7 January 2019. In the period between January 2019 and April 2019, the applicant took 100 hours sick leave. On or about 29 April 2019 when the matter of the extent of her sick leave was raised with her, the applicant broke down. She asked if she could reduce her work to part-time work or if she could work on a job share basis. On 7 May 2019 she told Dr Norman that her symptoms of fatigue, anxiety, agitation and low moods were worse than they had been in December 2018. She told the doctor she did not want to open work emails and was on “edge” during her shifts. Her officer in charge became concerned for her welfare and a job share arrangement was implemented for the applicant from 19 August 2019. Notwithstanding that she was then sharing her job with another officer, she was still required to work on a fulltime basis when that other officer was on leave. On 6 November 2019 she told Dr Norman that in the preceding 10 days she had had severe anxiety and found it hard to leave her bedroom. The applicant said that up until December 2020 she had many days off, struggled to cope with anxiety and with ruminations she had about traumas she had faced in her work. During 2020 her officer in charge suggested she might not be suitable to continue as a paramedic. On 11 August 2020 she complained to Dr Norman about having had extreme fatigue and that she had been confined to bed for two and a half days.

Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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