Grant v Williams, in the matter of Williams

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FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA

(DIVISION 2)

Grant v Williams, in the matter of Williams [2025] FedCFamC2G 430

File number(s): SYG 872 of 2023
Judgment of: JUDGE LAING
Date of judgment: 27 March 2025
Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for an extension of time in which to seek review of orders made by a Registrar, including a sequestration order – associated application seeking joinder and orders amending a bankruptcy notice and creditor’s petition, or substitution of a creditor – where the review application was filed nearly 11 months out of time – where delay not adequately explained – where action had been taken over that period and costs incurred on faith of the sequestration order – merits of the proposed review application do not outweigh the considerations against extending time – where necessity of orders sought in belatedly filed associated application has not been sufficiently demonstrated – extension of time application and associated application dismissed
Legislation:

Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 49, 52, 256 & 306

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 2.02 & 7.05

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 7.01

Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 190, 191 & 256

Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) ss 61 & 73

Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 7.10 & 39.1

Cases cited:

Abigroup v Abignano [1992] FCA 567; (1992) 39 FCR 74

Ashwood v Ashwood [2024] FedCFamC2G 88

Bollinger v Bell; Estate of Late Colin Bell [2022] NSWSC 486

Carr v Swart [2008] FCA 1495

Cawood v Cawood [2000] FCA 1786; (2000) 27 Fam LR 403

Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Horvath (Junior) [1999] FCA 143; (1999) 161 ALR 441

Cvitkovic v Dillon [2023] VSC 701

Elyard Corp Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 1387; (1995) 133 ALR 206

Fang v Lin [2024] FedCFamC2G 747

Gooley v Gooley [2020] NSWSC 798

Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 2) [2020] NSWSC 1288

Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 3) [2021] NSWSC 1

Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 4) [2022] NSWSC 106

Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 5) [2022] NSWSC 773

Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 6) [2022] NSWSC 714

McInerney, in the matter ofGhougassian v Ghougassian [2020] FCA 1230

Meyappa Chetty v Supramanian Chetty [1916] 1 AC 603

O’Meara v Hitwise Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 114; (2007) 160 FCR 518

Paterson v Commonwealth [1990] FCA 316; (1990) 23 FCR 412

Philips Electronics Australia Ltd v Roberts [2006] FMCA 911; (2006) 201 FLR 359

Re Estate of Maria Zbrozek; Duszyk v Morgan - Interim Administrator of Estate of late Maria Zbrozek [2020] NSWSC 1591

Re Moss; Ex parte Tour Finance Limited (1968) 13 FLR 101

Re Pannowitz; Ex parte Wilson (1975) 38 FLR 184

Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57;

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Details
Case
[2025] FedCFamC2G 430
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the Federal Circuit Court, Seth Grant has brought an application for an extension of time to seek a review of orders made by a Registrar, including a sequestration order, against Kashaya Williams. The application also seeks joinder and orders amending a bankruptcy notice and creditor’s petition, or substitution of a creditor. The sequestration order was made almost 11 months after the relevant time limit, and the delay has not been adequately explained. Various actions have been taken over that period, and costs have been incurred on the faith of the sequestration order. The court must decide whether the merits of the proposed review application outweigh the considerations against extending time and whether the orders sought in the associated application are necessary. The court found that the significant delay in this matter has not been adequately explained, and this weighs against the extension of time. Additionally, there are substantial costs that have been incurred by the Trustees and Seth on faith of the sequestration order that are attributable to the delay, and there is no evidence that Kashaya proposes, or is able, to meet those costs. The court dismissed the extension of time application and the associated application.

Orders

Orders of the court

Background

Background to the litigation

For the following reasons, I have found that the Interim Application ought to be dismissed insofar as it concerns the relief sought at [1] and [2] of that application. The Associated Application ought similarly to be dismissed.BACKGROUND The first and second respondents to the Interim Application are stated to involve Mr Seth Grant (Seth) in two capacities. The first is “Alan Grant by his Tutor Seth Garran Niels Grant”. The second is “Seth Garran Niels Grant as Representative of the Estate of Alan Grant”. As Grant is a name common to certain persons that are the subject of this proceeding, I will adopt the practice of identifying certain persons by their given names. I intend no disrespect in doing so. I note that this practice has also been adopted in the related Supreme Court proceedings considered below. Seth is the son of Dr Alan Grant (Dr Grant). Seth, as his father’s tutor, brought Supreme Court proceedings no. 2017/316190 on his father’s behalf in 2017 (estate recovery proceedings). Those proceedings sought recovery of money said to have been removed from his father’s bank accounts by Kashaya’s mother (Nerez) whilst she was acting under a power of attorney. Recovery was also sought regarding title to a property in Killcare (Killcare Property) that had been transferred to Kashaya the month before the power of attorney was revoked. Following objection to Seth acting as his father’s tutor, orders were made for the NSW Trustee and Guardian to manage Dr Grant’s financial affairs. In related proceedings no. 2018/139174 (family provision proceedings), Nerez sought provision out of the estate of her late mother. Dr Grant died on 7 November 2019. On 21 November 2019, an order was made pursuant to r 7.10 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) (UCPR) appointing Seth as representative of Dr Grant’s estate in the estate recovery proceedings. Judgment was delivered in the estate recovery proceedings and family provision proceedings on 24 September 2020: Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 2) [2020] NSWSC 1288. In the estate recovery proceedings, orders were made setting aside the transfer of real estate to Kashaya as well as a lease involving Kashaya and Nerez. Nerez was ordered to pay compensation to Dr Grant’s estate. In the family provision proceedings, Nerez’s claim was dismissed. Associated costs orders were made. Seth’s capacity in the estate recovery proceedings was described in the judgment as “Representative of the Estate of Alan Grant: Seth Grant”. Judgment on an indemnity costs application was delivered on 5 January 2021: Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 3) [2021] NSWSC 1. In the estate recovery proceedings, Kashaya and Nerez were ordered “to pay the costs of the plaintiff, Seth Grant, as the representative of the estate of the late Alan Grant on the indemnity basis”. Indemnity costs were ordered against Nerez in the family provision proceedings. On 9 December 2021, orders were made in the estate recovery proceedings extending Seth’s role to allow him to take possession of and perform certain functions in relation to the Killcare Property.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In summary, I understand Kashaya contends that the sequestration order ought to be set aside on the following bases:(a)Seth’s role is misdescribed in the Bankruptcy Notice; (b)the underlying judgments were stayed, with the result that Seth was unable to enforce them without leave;(c)Seth was not empowered to seek issue of the Bankruptcy Notice;(d)there is a possible cross-claim; and(e)there is a potential issue with service of the Creditor’s Petition.Misdescription of Seth’s role in the Bankruptcy Notice and the contended stay of the judgments In written submissions dated 2 September 2024, Ms Nolan contended that the power to enforce the judgments “vested in Seth Grant as the Special Administrator appointed to the Estate of the Late Alan Grant”. She contended that “Alan Grant by his Tutor Seth Garran Niels Grant” was therefore unable to enforce the judgments that are the subject of the Bankruptcy Notice and Creditor’s Petition. Ms Nolan observed that a bankruptcy notice was unable to be issued except on application of a creditor who has obtained against the debtor a final judgment or final order within the meaning of s 40(1)(g) of the Act, “being a judgment or order the execution of which has not been stayed”. She referred to various authorities for the proposition that the requirement that execution on the judgment not be stayed has been consistently construed to mean that a person who may issue and serve a bankruptcy notice in compliance with the Act is a judgment creditor who has the immediate right to issue execution on the judgment. Such authorities included Abigroup v Abignano [1992] FCA 567; (1992) 39 FCR 74 (Abigroup) at 80. Ms Nolan observed that the judgment creditor must be able to issue execution on the judgment at the time of issue of the bankruptcy notice and that right must continue up to the time of service: Re Moss; Ex parte Tour Finance Limited (1968) 13 FLR 101; Re Schekeloff; Ex parte Schekeloff v Hopkins Group Pty Ltd [1989] FCA 122; (1989) 86 ALR 645 and Paterson v Commonwealth [1990] FCA 316; (1990) 23 FCR 412. Ms Nolan observed that where the judgment creditor is not in a position to issue immediate execution, execution is deemed to be stayed: Re Pannowitz; Ex parte Wilson (1975) 38 FLR 184 at 188; Re Richards; Ex parte Sommers (1947) 14 ABC 112; Abigroup at 80; Cawood v Cawood [2000] FCA 1786; (2000) 27 Fam LR 403 (Cawood). I accept that an immediate ability to issue execution, without requiring leave or such other intermediate step, is necessary in order for s 40(1)(g) of the Act to be met. The question, then, is whether the judgments were relevantly stayed or whether Seth was otherwise unable to issue execution at the time the Bankruptcy Notice was issued and served. Ms Nolan submitted that at this time, “Alan Grant by his Tutor Seth Garran Niels Grant” could not commence or carry on proceedings for the enforcement of the relevant judgment debts. This is because Dr Grant was deceased. Seth was no longer his tutor but acting in a different capacity on behalf of his estate. Ms Nolan submitted that the judgments were effectively stayed by reference to r 39.1(1) of the UCPR, which provided:39.1 Circumstances in which issue of writ requires leave (cf SCR Part 44, rule 2)(1)A writ of execution may not be issued in the following circumstances except by leave of the court—(a)if there has been any change in the persons entitled or liable to execution under the judgment, whether by assignment, death or otherwise,(b)if the judgment is against the assets of a deceased person coming to the hands of an executor or administrator after the judgment took effect, and the writ is against those assets or any of them,(c)if a person’s entitlement under the judgment is subject to fulfilment of a condition,(d) if the writ is a writ for the possession of land,(e)if the writ is against property in the hands of a receiver appointed by the court,(f) if the writ is against property in the hands of a sequestrator,(g) if the writ is in aid of another writ of execution.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

It follows that the significant delay in this matter has not been adequately explained. This weighs against the extension of time.ACTIONS TAKEN ON THE FAITH OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER AND POTENTIAL PREJUDICE Mr Connor submitted that, on the faith of the sequestration order, Seth has brought a notice of motion in the Probate proceedings seeking to have those proceedings dismissed. Kashaya resists the relief sought in that notice of motion. Seth has given evidence that his costs of those proceedings since Kashaya was made a bankrupt are $156,451.53, including disbursements: Seth’s Affidavit dated 18 September 2024 at [8]. Relying upon an affidavit of Christopher Palmer dated 16 September 2024, Mr Connor submitted that the Trustees are not presently funded. Work has been undertaken in the administration of the bankrupt estate, to the value of $94,164.59 (ex GST), none of which has been paid. The Trustees have also incurred legal expenses, the unbilled value of which was indicated to be $37,192 (ex GST) at the time of the affidavit. Mr Connor observed that in Fang at [39], the debtor accepted that inherent in applications for review of sequestration orders is general prejudice to the body of creditors and the administration of the bankrupt estate. He submitted that this principle applies to the present case, where the Trustees are presently unfunded and their remuneration and expenses will be wasted if the sequestration order is set aside. The evidence relied upon by Seth in this regard has some limitations. It has not been demonstrated that all of the costs identified are attributable to Kashaya’s delay (as opposed to costs associated with proceedings more generally, including the review sought of the sequestration order). However, I accept that substantial costs have been incurred by the Trustees and Seth on faith of the sequestration order that are attributable to the delay. So much is obvious, and not unexpected given the magnitude of the delay under consideration. There is no evidence before me that Kashaya proposes, or is able, to meet those costs. There was some suggestion from Ms Nolan that such costs ought to be met by Seth. This hardly seems fair, in circumstances where costs have been occasioned by what has been found to have been a significant and inadequately explained delay on Kashaya’s part. Ms Nolan submitted that I should also take into account the potential effect upon Kashaya of declining to extend time. Kashaya’s bankruptcy stands in the way of her contestation of the applicable will in the Probate proceedings. This may affect other beneficiaries and also the public interest in testamentary intentions being carried out. Ms Nolan also submitted that the bankruptcy has stood in the way of a family provision claim, although did not develop this submission with specificity by reference to law. I accept that the effect upon Kashaya and her ability to prosecute other proceedings is a matter that may be taken into account. Kashaya’s continued bankruptcy is a potential impediment at least in relation to the Probate proceedings. I note that Kashaya seeks alternative orders in the Interim Application under the Act bearing upon the ability to contest matters relevant to the Probate proceedings. This is in the event that the extension of time or the review application are unsuccessful. However, the parties have chosen not to address me on that part of the application at this stage of the proceeding.