FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA
(DIVISION 2)
Grant v Williams, in the matter of Williams [2025] FedCFamC2G 430
File number(s): SYG 872 of 2023 Judgment of: JUDGE LAING Date of judgment: 27 March 2025 Catchwords: BANKRUPTCY – Application for an extension of time in which to seek review of orders made by a Registrar, including a sequestration order – associated application seeking joinder and orders amending a bankruptcy notice and creditor’s petition, or substitution of a creditor – where the review application was filed nearly 11 months out of time – where delay not adequately explained – where action had been taken over that period and costs incurred on faith of the sequestration order – merits of the proposed review application do not outweigh the considerations against extending time – where necessity of orders sought in belatedly filed associated application has not been sufficiently demonstrated – extension of time application and associated application dismissed Legislation: Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) ss 40, 49, 52, 256 & 306
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (Bankruptcy) Rules 2021 (Cth) rr 2.02 & 7.05
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia (Division 2) (General Federal Law) Rules 2021 (Cth) r 7.01
Federal Circuit and Family Court of Australia Act 2021 (Cth) ss 190, 191 & 256
Probate and Administration Act 1898 (NSW) ss 61 & 73
Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW) rr 7.10 & 39.1
Cases cited: Abigroup v Abignano [1992] FCA 567; (1992) 39 FCR 74
Ashwood v Ashwood [2024] FedCFamC2G 88
Bollinger v Bell; Estate of Late Colin Bell [2022] NSWSC 486
Cawood v Cawood [2000] FCA 1786; (2000) 27 Fam LR 403
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Horvath (Junior) [1999] FCA 143; (1999) 161 ALR 441
Cvitkovic v Dillon [2023] VSC 701
Elyard Corp Pty Ltd v DDB Needham Sydney Pty Ltd [1995] FCA 1387; (1995) 133 ALR 206
Fang v Lin [2024] FedCFamC2G 747
Gooley v Gooley [2020] NSWSC 798
Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 2) [2020] NSWSC 1288
Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 3) [2021] NSWSC 1
Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 4) [2022] NSWSC 106
Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 5) [2022] NSWSC 773
Grant v Grant; Grant v Grant (No. 6) [2022] NSWSC 714
McInerney, in the matter ofGhougassian v Ghougassian [2020] FCA 1230
Meyappa Chetty v Supramanian Chetty [1916] 1 AC 603
O’Meara v Hitwise Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 114; (2007) 160 FCR 518
Paterson v Commonwealth [1990] FCA 316; (1990) 23 FCR 412
Philips Electronics Australia Ltd v Roberts [2006] FMCA 911; (2006) 201 FLR 359
Re Moss; Ex parte Tour Finance Limited (1968) 13 FLR 101
Re Pannowitz; Ex parte Wilson (1975) 38 FLR 184
Re Refugee Review Tribunal; Ex parte Aala [2000] HCA 57;
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- Case
- [2025] FedCFamC2G 430
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
It follows that the significant delay in this matter has not been adequately explained. This weighs against the extension of time.ACTIONS TAKEN ON THE FAITH OF THE SEQUESTRATION ORDER AND POTENTIAL PREJUDICE Mr Connor submitted that, on the faith of the sequestration order, Seth has brought a notice of motion in the Probate proceedings seeking to have those proceedings dismissed. Kashaya resists the relief sought in that notice of motion. Seth has given evidence that his costs of those proceedings since Kashaya was made a bankrupt are $156,451.53, including disbursements: Seth’s Affidavit dated 18 September 2024 at [8]. Relying upon an affidavit of Christopher Palmer dated 16 September 2024, Mr Connor submitted that the Trustees are not presently funded. Work has been undertaken in the administration of the bankrupt estate, to the value of $94,164.59 (ex GST), none of which has been paid. The Trustees have also incurred legal expenses, the unbilled value of which was indicated to be $37,192 (ex GST) at the time of the affidavit. Mr Connor observed that in Fang at [39], the debtor accepted that inherent in applications for review of sequestration orders is general prejudice to the body of creditors and the administration of the bankrupt estate. He submitted that this principle applies to the present case, where the Trustees are presently unfunded and their remuneration and expenses will be wasted if the sequestration order is set aside. The evidence relied upon by Seth in this regard has some limitations. It has not been demonstrated that all of the costs identified are attributable to Kashaya’s delay (as opposed to costs associated with proceedings more generally, including the review sought of the sequestration order). However, I accept that substantial costs have been incurred by the Trustees and Seth on faith of the sequestration order that are attributable to the delay. So much is obvious, and not unexpected given the magnitude of the delay under consideration. There is no evidence before me that Kashaya proposes, or is able, to meet those costs. There was some suggestion from Ms Nolan that such costs ought to be met by Seth. This hardly seems fair, in circumstances where costs have been occasioned by what has been found to have been a significant and inadequately explained delay on Kashaya’s part. Ms Nolan submitted that I should also take into account the potential effect upon Kashaya of declining to extend time. Kashaya’s bankruptcy stands in the way of her contestation of the applicable will in the Probate proceedings. This may affect other beneficiaries and also the public interest in testamentary intentions being carried out. Ms Nolan also submitted that the bankruptcy has stood in the way of a family provision claim, although did not develop this submission with specificity by reference to law. I accept that the effect upon Kashaya and her ability to prosecute other proceedings is a matter that may be taken into account. Kashaya’s continued bankruptcy is a potential impediment at least in relation to the Probate proceedings. I note that Kashaya seeks alternative orders in the Interim Application under the Act bearing upon the ability to contest matters relevant to the Probate proceedings. This is in the event that the extension of time or the review application are unsuccessful. However, the parties have chosen not to address me on that part of the application at this stage of the proceeding.