Grant v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Grant v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 173  

File number(s): QUD 180 of 2024
Judgment of: O’CALLAGHAN, MCEVOY AND NEEDHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 19 December 2024
Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) – review of objection decision – Tribunal failed to give proper regard to submissions and evidence under s 43(2B) of AAT Act – Tribunal made findings absent regard to evidence and submissions – Tribunal failed to give proper reasons – Tribunal erred in construction of s 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – whether Tribunal erred in finding it had no jurisdiction or power to review a refusal of the respondent to defer time at which tax liabilities became due and payable under s 255-10 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth) – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43(2B) 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IVA ss 97, 177A, 177C, 177F

Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) s 8AAG, Sch 1 s 255-10

Cases cited:

Blackman v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 43 FCR 449

Collie v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 172

Commonwealth Bank Officers Superannuation Corp Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (2005) 148 FCR 427

Copperart Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) ALD 377; (2013) 26 ATR 327

Dennis Willcox vFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Administrative Appeals Tribunal (2011) 191 FCR 400

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Apted (2021) 284 FCR 93

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 325

Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Futuris Corporation (2012) 205 FCR 274

Gomeroi People v Santos NSW Pty Ltd (No 2) (2024) 303 FCR 255

Grant v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] AAT 427

Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2018) 261 FCR 406

Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha (2018) 267 FCR 643

Paciocco v ANZ Banking Group Ltd (2016) 258 CLR 525

RCI Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 104; (2018) 84 ATR 785

Statham v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 463; (1988) 20 ATR 228

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 123
Date of hearing: 21 and 22 November 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: P Tucker
Solicitor for the Applicant: Merthyr Law
Counsel for the Respondent: A Wheatley KC with B McEniery
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 180 of 2024
BETWEEN:

STEVEN GRANT

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O’CALLAGHAN, MCEVOY AND NEEDHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 12 March 2024 be set aside.

3.The proceeding be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for the hearing and determination of the following questions:

(a)whether the applicant had assessable amounts in respect of…

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 173
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Grant v Commissioner of Taxation involves a dispute between Mr Grant, a solicitor, and the Commissioner of Taxation regarding tax liabilities arising from his involvement with Cleary Hoare, a law firm. The dispute was originally heard and decided by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT), and Mr Grant subsequently appealed the Tribunal's decision to the Federal Court. The primary issues in the appeal pertained to whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted the law and whether it properly considered the evidence and submissions presented by the parties.

The key legal issues in the case included whether the Tribunal gave proper regard to the submissions and evidence under section 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth), and whether it made findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based. Additionally, the court examined whether the Tribunal correctly interpreted section 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and whether it had the jurisdiction to review the Commissioner's refusal to defer tax liabilities under section 255-10 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth).

In its reasoning, the court found that the Tribunal failed to adequately consider the submissions and evidence, particularly in relation to the tax benefits derived by Mr Grant from his involvement with the law firm. The court held that the Tribunal did not make sufficient findings on material questions of fact and that it did not properly reference the evidence on which its findings were based. Consequently, the court determined that the Tribunal erred in its construction of the relevant statutory provisions and in its assessment of the tax liabilities. As a result, the appeal was allowed, and the decision of the Tribunal was set aside. The case was remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for reconsideration of specific issues regarding Mr Grant's assessable income for the relevant tax years.

In conclusion, the court ordered that the appeal be allowed, the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal be set aside, and the proceeding be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for the hearing and determination of the specified questions. The court also set timelines for the parties to file and serve written submissions on the question of costs, which would be determined on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 12 March 2024 be set aside.

3. The proceeding be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for the hearing and determination of the following questions:

(a) whether the applicant had assessable amounts in respect of the Cleary Hoare Practice Trust taxable income for the 1997 to 2002 tax years pursuant to Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 1936); and

(b) whether the applicant had assessable amounts in respect of the Income Earning Trusts taxable income for the 1997 to 2000 tax years pursuant to Part IVA of ITAA 1936.

4. On or before 4.00pm on 31 January 2025, the applicant is to file and serve written submissions not exceeding three pages on the question of costs.

5. On or before 4.00pm on 7 February 2025, the respondent is to file and serve responsive written submissions not exceeding three pages.

6. The question of costs of the appeal will be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Fourthly, the Tribunal then did not hand down its decision until 16 months later.THE FACTS Mr Grant is a solicitor. Between May 1992 and 30 June 1999 he was a partner at the law firm Cleary Hoare. The firm was run by the Cleary Hoare Practice Trust (CH Practice Trust or CHPT). Mr Grant, along with Messrs Hart, Cleary and Hoare, was a trustee of that trust, and the legal practice was under their control pursuant to the terms of the relevant trust deed. Mr Hart practised as a solicitor in tax matters. Mr Grant did not. Towards the end of the 1997 financial year, Mr Hart and others, being the other principals of Cleary Hoare, entered into two tax planning arrangements which involved a series of new trusts and transactions with no pattern of previous income distributions, each known as the “New Venture Income scheme” or NVI Scheme. The CH Practice Trust was a unit trust. The units were divided into ordinary units and special units. Trust entities associated with the firm’s principals were the ordinary unitholders; in Mr Grant’s case, Wood Duck Pty Ltd (Wood Duck) as trustee for the Sensitive New Age Guy Trust (SNAG Trust). Mr Grant was also a special unit holder of the CH Practice Trust. Separately, during the 1997 to 2000 income years, Cleary Hoare Corporate Pty Ltd (CHC) (as trustee for the CHC Discretionary Trust) carried on a business of marketing and facilitating tax planning arrangements and products, called “promotional activities”, as well as “employee welfare funds and non-complying super funds”. During those years, a series of so called “income earning trusts”, called the IETs, earned income in the form of fees in respect of that business. The IET business used Cleary Hoare to prepare documents and provide legal services in respect of those schemes. Between 1997 and 2000, there were a total of ten IETs that earned income. Each IET was a discretionary trust operated by a corporate trustee. In relation to six of the IETs, Mr Grant was not a director of the relevant corporate trustee. And three of the IETs were created after Mr Grant left the firm after having been told by Messrs Hart and Collie that if he did not resign then he would be excluded from the CH Practice Trust and IETs. In July 1999, Mr Grant commenced practice in his own firm, Grants Lawyers, and subsequently Merthyr Law. He had no further involvement with Cleary Hoare or the IETs. RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE ITAA 1936 Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA 1936) applies where a taxpayer participates in a “scheme” as defined in s 177A of the ITAA 1936 in order to obtain a “tax benefit”, as defined in s 177C of the ITAA 1936, where the scheme was entered into for the dominant purpose of obtaining the tax benefit. In this case, Mr Grant did not dispute the Commissioner’s contention before the Tribunal that the alleged schemes were schemes as defined in s 177A of the ITAA 1936, and he advanced no submissions on the question of dominant purpose.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

In the latter case, s 13(1) of the Coronavirus Economic Response Package (Payments and Benefits) Act 2020 (Cth) expressly provided as follows:13 Review of the Commissioner’s decision(1)An entity who is dissatisfied with a decision covered by subsection (2) may object against the decision in the manner set out in Part IVC of the Taxation Administration Act 1953.(2)This subsection covers the following decisions of the Commissioner under this Act:(a)a decision that the entity is not entitled to a Coronavirus economic response payment for a period;… So that case fell within the first category identified in Federal Commissioner of Taxation v AAT, viz as one involving a “taxation decision” against which a person who is dissatisfied may object in the manner set out in Pt IVC of the TAA. As we have explained, absent such a provision here, the case falls within the second category, such that the AAT did not have jurisdiction or power to review it. Ground 15 in Mr Grant’s amended supplementary notice of appeal must therefore be rejected.DISPOSITION It follows that the proceeding will have to be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal (ART) for rehearing of two issues: (1)whether Mr Grant had assessable amounts in respect of the CH Practice Trust taxable income for the 1997 to 2002 tax years pursuant to Part IVA of the ITAA 1936; and(2)whether Mr Grant had assessment amounts in respect of the IET taxable income for the 1997 to 2000 tax years pursuant to Part IVA of ITAA 1936. To be clear, all other issues are beyond the scope of the remitter, and the findings made by the Tribunal in respect of such issues will not be re-opened. These issues include, but are not limited to, the issue of dominant purpose, the findings set out at [116] below, and the assessment of penalty applied to the corrected shortfalls in tax payable by Mr Grant. The only order that the Tribunal made was that “[t]he objection decisions under review are set aside and remitted to the Commissioner to be remade in accordance with these reasons”. The order was in those terms because Mr Grant had been partially successful. The Tribunal accepted Mr Grant’s submission that at least some of the amounts received by the entities associated with him as part of the Practice Trust Scheme and IET Schemes were loans which were released when he departed from Cleary Hoare in 1999, and that these entities also made loans to Mr Grant. The Tribunal also accepted that Mr Grant did not earn income by way of distributions from the CH Practice Trust or SNAG Trust in the years 1994 to 1999, and the accrued personal losses were still available to him in the 1997 tax year. The parties agreed that if the appeal was allowed, and the proceeding remitted, the remitter will oblige the ART to consider the remitted questions afresh. The hearing is not to be a continuation of the hearing before the Tribunal. That means that no party will be bound by how they conducted their case before the Tribunal and that, subject to the views of the ART, either party would be permitted to adduce further evidence or make further submissions.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That is the sum total of any relevant consideration of the parties’ competing submissions.CONSIDERATION Tax benefit There was no dispute about the principles that govern the nature and content of a Tribunal’s obligation to give reasons, and its obligation to have regard to material evidence and submissions. The starting point is s 43(2B) of the AAT Act. It provides: “Where the Tribunal gives in writing the reasons for its decision, those reasons shall include its findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based”. In Copperart Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) ALD 377; (1993) 26 ATR 327, Hill J said the following about the obligation of a tribunal under s 43(2B):The failure of the tribunal to make findings of material facts constitutes a breach of s 43(2B) … and an error of law, justifying the setting aside of the tribunal’s decision and the remission of the matter to the tribunal for reconsideration ... The obligation under s 43(2B) is not satisfied by a statement of the tribunal’s conclusion of fact. The parties are entitled to know what evidence the tribunal accepted and what evidence it took into account. Likewise, the parties are entitled to know what evidence the tribunal rejected. Without this knowledge the parties will have but an incomplete idea of the tribunal’s process of reasoning and a lessened respect for the tribunal’s decision-making process.Apart from the fact that the failure of the tribunal to make findings of fact constitutes an error of law entitling the applicant to succeed in its appeal, the failure to make those findings makes it difficult for me to set out what the relevant facts are upon which the appeal itself turns …(Citations omitted.) In Statham v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 463; (1988) 20 ATR 228 at 230, Woodward, Lockhart and Hartigan JJ said:It is timely for this court to state that it is the duty of the tribunal, when reviewing the Commissioner’s disallowance of objections under the Act, to make clear and full findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based: see Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(2B). That duty must be performed by the tribunal, although the court does not hold the tribunal’s reasons for decision to a standard of perfection … Not least of the reasons for requiring the tribunal to reach adequate findings of fact is the difficulty of the court determining an appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act where such findings have not been or not adequately been made.(Citations omitted.) As Rares and Robertson JJ said in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha (2018) 267 FCR 643 at [45], “[w]hat is required is the reality of consideration by the decision-maker. On judicial review the Court must therefore assess, in a qualitative way, whether the decision-maker has as a matter of substance had regard to the representations put”.