Collie v Commissioner of Taxation

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Collie v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 172  

File number(s): QUD 184 of 2024
Judgment of: O’CALLAGHAN, MCEVOY AND NEEDHAM JJ
Date of judgment: 19 December 2024
Catchwords: TAXATION – appeal pursuant to s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) (AAT Act) – review of objection decision – Tribunal failed to give proper regard to submissions and evidence under s 43(2B) of AAT Act – Tribunal failed to give proper reasons – Tribunal erred in construction of s 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) – Tribunal erred in law – appeal allowed
Legislation:

Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) ss 43(2B) 44

Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) Part IVA, ss 97, 177A, 177C, 177F

Cases cited:

Beale v Government Insurance Office of New South Wales (1997) 48 NSWLR 430
Blackman v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) 43 FCR 449
Copperart Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) ALD 377; (1993) 26 ATR 327
Collie v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] AATA 440
Dennis Willcox vFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267
Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Ashwick (Qld) No 127 Pty Ltd (2011) 192 FCR 325
Gomeroi People v Santos NSW Pty Ltd (No 2) (2024) 303 FCR 255
Grant v Commissioner of Taxation [2024] FCAFC 173
Hart v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (2018) 261 FCR 406
Keith v Gal [2013] NSWCA 339
Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha (2018) 267 FCR 643
NAIS v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2005) 228 CLR 470
RCI Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [2011] FCAFC 104; (2011) 84 ATR 785
Skiwing Pty Ltd v Trust Company of Australia [2006] NSWCA 276
Statham v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 463; (1988) 20 ATR 228

TechnologyOne Ltd v Roohizadegan [2021] FCAFC 137; (2021) 309 IR 262

Division: General Division
Registry: Queensland
National Practice Area: Taxation
Number of paragraphs: 70
Date of hearing: 25 November 2024
Counsel for the Applicant: M Flynn KC with P Bickford
Solicitor for the Applicant: Wilson Lawyers
Counsel for the Respondent: A Wheatley KC with B McEniery and R Jedrzejczyk
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor

ORDERS

QUD 184 of 2024
BETWEEN:

IAN COLLIE

Applicant

AND:

COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION

Respondent

ORDER MADE BY:

O’CALLAGHAN, MCEVOY AND NEEDHAM JJ

DATE OF ORDER:

19 DECEMBER 2024

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The appeal be allowed.

2.The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 12 March 2024 be set aside.

3.The proceeding be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for the hearing and determination of the question of whether the applicant obtained a tax benefit pursuant to Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) for each of the 1997 to 2001 income years, and any consequential effects on penalties.

4.On or before 4.00pm on 31 January 2025, the applicant is to file and serve written submissions not exceeding three pages on the question of costs.

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Details
Case
[2024] FCAFC 172
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the matter of Collie v Commissioner of Taxation, the appellant, Mr Collie, challenged the decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) which had dismissed his objection to the Commissioner of Taxation's determinations. The dispute centred around the application of section 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) and whether Mr Collie had obtained a tax benefit during the relevant income years. The Federal Court of Australia was tasked with reviewing the AAT’s decision and determining whether the AAT had properly considered the evidence and submissions, and if it had given adequate reasons for its decision.

The court identified several key legal issues that required resolution. Firstly, it needed to ascertain whether the AAT had properly considered the evidence and submissions under section 43(2B) of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth). Secondly, the court had to determine if the AAT had erred in its construction of section 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act. Thirdly, it was necessary to evaluate whether the AAT had provided sufficient reasons for its decision, thereby complying with the requirements of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act.

The court concluded that the AAT had failed to give proper regard to the submissions and evidence provided, and had not sufficiently articulated its findings on material questions of fact, as mandated by section 43(2B) of the AAT Act. The court held that the AAT’s reasons were manifestly insufficient and did not provide an adequate basis for determining whether Mr Collie had obtained a tax benefit. Additionally, the court found that the AAT had erred in its interpretation of section 177C(1)(a) of the Income Tax Assessment Act. As a result, the court allowed the appeal, set aside the AAT's decision, and remitted the matter back to the AAT for reconsideration.

In light of the findings, the court made several orders. The appeal was allowed, and the decision of the AAT dated 12 March 2024 was set aside. The case was remitted to the AAT to hear and determine the question of whether Mr Collie obtained a tax benefit for the 1997 to 2001 income years, and any consequential effects on penalties. The court also set deadlines for the filing of written submissions on the question of costs, to be determined on the papers.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The appeal be allowed.

2. The decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal dated 12 March 2024 be set aside.

3. The proceeding be remitted to the Administrative Review Tribunal for the hearing and determination of the question of whether the applicant obtained a tax benefit pursuant to Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) for each of the 1997 to 2001 income years, and any consequential effects on penalties.

4. On or before 4.00pm on 31 January 2025, the applicant is to file and serve written submissions not exceeding three pages on the question of costs.

5. On or before 4.00pm on 7 February 2025, the respondent is to file and serve responsive written submissions not exceeding three pages on the question of the costs.

6. The question of the costs of the appeal will be determined on the papers.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, each of those (related) grounds is to be accepted, and the appeal allowed.THE FACTS Many of the background factual matters are set out in the Tribunal’s reasons and were not disputed at the hearing of the appeal. Mr Collie is a solicitor. He commenced his own law practice in 1977, in Victoria. During the late 1980s and the 1990s Mr Collie “became embroiled in litigation” with, among others, the Australian Taxation Office (ATO), and the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group (ANZ Bank). At one point during the litigation, the ATO obtained judgment against Mr Collie in the sum of over $23 million, although the proceeding was ultimately settled (on terms including no further action and payment of own costs). The ANZ Bank also separately claimed an amount in excess of $6 million against Mr Collie and his wife in 1996 under personal guarantees. Because of this, Mr Collie was exposed to a significant risk of adverse outcomes, both as to liability and costs. In December 1992, Mr Collie moved from Victoria to Queensland. At that time, Mr Hart was a principal of the law firm Cleary Hoare, and he and the other principals of the firm conducted their practice through the Cleary Hoare Practice Trust (CH Practice Trust or CHPT). In the same month, Mr Hart and his fellow principals established Comlaw Consultants Pty Ltd, the Comlaw Trust and the Canowindra Trust. The Canowindra Trust, a unit trust of which Lake Morundah Pty Ltd was the trustee, was a 50 percent unitholder in the Comlaw Trust. Mr Collie became a director of Comlaw Consultants in October 1993. Mr Collie was admitted to practise as a solicitor in Queensland in 1995. Until 1 December 2002, when Mr Collie became a principal of the CH Practice Trust, his only connection with Cleary Hoare was as a director of Comlaw Consultants, Cleary Hoare Corporate Pty Ltd (CHC) and other associated entities. He neither generated income for Cleary Hoare, nor derived any fees for any of the services he provided to Cleary Hoare, except through the Comlaw Consultants and CHC companies and trusts. Between 1993 and 1996 the Comlaw Trust carried on a business of facilitating tax planning arrangements and products. These tax planning arrangements included facilitating the acquisition of entities with substantial tax losses in return for a fee. In 1995, Mr Hart began developing what was referred to as “the New Venture Income scheme”, or NVI scheme. In the income year ended 30 June 1996, the tax planning arrangements promoted to clients included the NVI scheme for the first time. On 30 June 1996 the Comlaw Trust ceased conducting business, and on 19 September 1996 the principals of Cleary Hoare and Mr Collie established CHC and the CHC Discretionary Trust, which carried on a similar business to Comlaw Consultants. As part of the arrangements made to implement the NVI scheme, between May 1994 and March 2000 the principals of the CH Practice Trust and Mr Collie established a number of Income Earning Trusts, or IETs, including relevantly the Annesley Trust (May 1994), the CHC Discretionary Trust (September 1996), the LM Income Trust (May 1997), and various others.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

That is the sum total of any relevant consideration of the parties’ competing submissions.CONSIDERATION Despite the Commissioner’s attempt to support the Tribunal’s reasons on appeal, they are manifestly insufficient, and the relevant issues will need to be re-heard. The starting point is s 43(2B) of the AAT Act. It provides: “Where the Tribunal gives in writing the reasons for its decision, those reasons shall include its findings on material questions of fact and a reference to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based”. In Copperart Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation (1993) ALD 377; (1993) 26 ATR 327 Hill J said:The failure of the tribunal to make findings of material facts constitutes a breach of s 43(2B) … and an error of law, justifying the setting aside of the tribunal’s decision and the remission of the matter to the tribunal for reconsideration ... The obligation under s 43(2B) is not satisfied by a statement of the tribunal’s conclusion of fact. The parties are entitled to know what evidence the tribunal accepted and what evidence it took into account. Likewise, the parties are entitled to know what evidence the tribunal rejected. Without this knowledge the parties will have but an incomplete idea of the tribunal’s process of reasoning and a lessened respect for the tribunal’s decision-making process.Apart from the fact that the failure of the tribunal to make findings of fact constitutes an error of law entitling the applicant to succeed in its appeal, the failure to make those findings makes it difficult for me to set out what the relevant facts are upon which the appeal itself turns …(Citations omitted.) In Statham v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1988] FCA 463; (1988) 20 ATR 228 at 230, Woodward, Lockhart and Hartigan JJ said:It is timely for this court to state that it is the duty of the tribunal, when reviewing the Commissioner’s disallowance of objections under the Act, to make clear and full findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based: see Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) s 43(2B). That duty must be performed by the tribunal, although the court does not hold the tribunal’s reasons for decision to a standard of perfection … Not least of the reasons for requiring the tribunal to reach adequate findings of fact is the difficulty of the court determining an appeal on a question of law under s 44 of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act where such findings have not been or not adequately been made.(Citations omitted.) As Rares and Robertson JJ said in Minister for Immigration and Border Protection v Maioha (2018) 267 FCR 643 at [45], “[w]hat is required is the reality of consideration by the decision-maker. On judicial review the Court must therefore assess, in a qualitative way, whether the decision-maker has as a matter of substance had regard to the representations put”. And as Jenkinson J explained in Dennis Willcox vFederal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267 at 277 (Woodward and Foster JJ agreeing) a failure by the Tribunal to carry out its duty to consider and determine each question of law and fact relevant to the determination or the failure to carry out the duty imposed by s 43(2) of the AAT Act produces “a miscarriage of justice by preventing this court from affording the parties a determination whether the tribunal’s decision was vitiated by error of law”.