FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 682
File number: TAD 29 of 2015 Judge: TRACEY J Date of judgment: 9 June 2016 Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision made by the Minister personally to cancel applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Minister found that the applicant failed the character test under s 501(6)(b) – whether the Minister exercised his power to cancel the applicant’s visa on the erroneous footing that the applicant would have a meaningful opportunity to make representations seeking the revocation of the decision – whether invitation to make representations futile because applicant could not pass the character test because he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501(3), 501(5), 501(6)(a), 501(6)(b), 501(6)(d)(v), 501(7)(c), 501A, 501A(3), 501C, 501C(1)(b), 501C(2), 501C(3), 501C(3)(b), 501C(4)(b), 501CA, 501CA(2) Cases cited: NBMW v Minister for Immigration (No 2) (2014) 222 FCR 376 – distinguished
Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430 – cited
Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 – cited
Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 – applied
Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 226 FCR 154 – followed
Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 61 – cited
VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 – cited
Date of hearing: 16 December 2015 Registry: Tasmania Division: General Division National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 77 Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Hanks QC and Mr J Forsaith Solicitor for the Applicant: Nicholas W.J. Rolfe & Associates Counsel for the Respondent: Dr S Donaghue QC and Mr G Hill Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Table of Corrections 6 April 2018 At paragraph 59, the words “of”, “liability of an” and “who” have been deleted. ORDERS
TAD 29 of 2015 BETWEEN: AARON GRAHAM
Applicant
AND: MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION
Respondent
JUDGE:
TRACEY J
DATE OF ORDER:
9 JUNE 2016
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent quashing his decision made on 15 June 2015 to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
TRACEY J:
The applicant, Mr Aaron Graham, is a citizen of New Zealand. He came to Australia in 1976 at the age of 10. He has resided here since then.
Since 1985 he has accumulated a long list of convictions for offences including theft, drug possession, the possession of an…
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- Case
- [2016] FCA 682
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the Minister’s reasons for the decision and found that the Minister’s reasoning exposed a jurisdictional error. The Minister had exercised his power under section 501(3) on the mistaken belief that Mr Graham would have a meaningful opportunity to seek revocation of the cancellation decision. This misconception meant that there was only a purported, rather than a real, exercise of power. The court also noted that Mr Graham had a substantial criminal record, which made it clear that the precondition for revocation of the cancellation decision under section 501C(4)(b) could never be satisfied. The Minister’s failure to acknowledge this legal reality in his reasons further underscored the jurisdictional error.
Ultimately, the court quashed the Minister’s decision to cancel Mr Graham’s visa and ordered the Minister to pay Mr Graham’s costs. The decision underscored the importance of correctly understanding and applying legal principles when exercising discretionary powers, particularly in the context of visa cancellation under the Migration Act.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent quashing his decision made on 15 June 2015 to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).
2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Mr Graham submitted that the Minister’s reasons exposed the jurisdictional error. The effect of the cancellation decision was a matter that could influence or affect the exercise of the Minister’s discretion. In the words of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Re Patterson, “there will have been a constructive failure to exercise the power reposed in [the Minister] by section 501(3)…if [the Minister] precluded [himself] from exercising the power according to law; [he] will have done so if [he] misconceived what in law was involved in the exercise of that power.” The Minister’s reasons revealed, so it was said, that he had exercised his power under s 501(3) on the erroneous footing that Mr Graham would be given a meaningful opportunity to seek revocation of the decision and this misconception meant that there was only a purported and not a real exercise of power.CONSIDERATION The Minister made two relevant decisions. The first was to cancel Mr Graham’s visa. The second was not to revoke the cancellation decision. Mr Graham has sought judicial review of the Minister’s first (cancellation) decision. It was common ground that Mr Graham did not pass the character test because he had a substantial criminal record. Cancellation for this reason does not appear to have been suggested to the Minister because, in 2011, a delegate of the then Minister had considered but declined to cancel Mr Graham’s visa because of the sentence of imprisonment for 15 months. Having considered the information with which he was provided the Minister reasonably suspected that Mr Graham did not pass the character test because the Minister “reasonably suspected that [Mr Graham was] a member of a group and that group [was] involved in criminal conduct.” It was for this reason that the Minister exercised his power under s 501(3) of the Act. Having made the cancellation decision the Minister promptly acted, as he was required to do, under s 501C(3) of the Act. He provided Mr Graham with a notice setting out his decision, particulars of relevant information on which he had relied and extended an invitation to Mr Graham to make representations to him about revocation of the cancellation decision. The notice advised Mr Graham that the Minister had power to revoke his cancellation decision if Mr Graham was able to satisfy him that he passed “the character test which is defined in s 501(6) of the Migration Act …”. The notice continued: “You will note s 501(6)(b) was the relevant ground of the character test, however you may wish to note the other grounds in s 501(6).” Mr Graham made a timely response to the invitation contained in the notice. Had the Minister cancelled Mr Graham’s visa under s 501(3) because he had a substantial criminal record the case would have been indistinguishable from Re Patterson and Tanielu. Prior to making his cancellation decision the Minister was not advised that any subsequent invitation under s 501C(3) would be an exercise in futility because the precondition, prescribed by s 501C(4)(b), for revocation could never be satisfied and his reasons made no reference to this legal reality.