Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection

Link copied
Case Copied 35 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2016] FCA 682

File number: TAD 29 of 2015
Judge: TRACEY J
Date of judgment: 9 June 2016
Catchwords: MIGRATION – application for review of decision made by the Minister personally to cancel applicant’s visa pursuant to s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) – where Minister found that the applicant failed the character test under s 501(6)(b) – whether the Minister exercised his power to cancel the applicant’s visa on the erroneous footing that the applicant would have a meaningful opportunity to make representations seeking the revocation of the decision – whether invitation to make representations futile because applicant could not pass the character test because he had been sentenced to a term of imprisonment of more than 12 months
Legislation: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 501, 501(3), 501(5), 501(6)(a), 501(6)(b), 501(6)(d)(v), 501(7)(c), 501A, 501A(3), 501C, 501C(1)(b), 501C(2), 501C(3), 501C(3)(b), 501C(4)(b), 501CA, 501CA(2)
Cases cited:

Applicants M1015/2003 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 1309 – cited

NBMW v Minister for Immigration (No 2) (2014) 222 FCR 376 – distinguished

Picard v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2015] FCA 1430 – cited

Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs; Ex parte Lam (2003) 214 CLR 1 – cited

Re Patterson; Ex parte Taylor (2001) 207 CLR 391 – applied

Tanielu v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2014) 226 FCR 154 – followed

Vella v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2015) 230 FCR 61 – cited

VHAP of 2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs (2004) 80 ALD 559 – cited

Date of hearing: 16 December 2015
Registry: Tasmania
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 77
Counsel for the Applicant: Mr P Hanks QC and Mr J Forsaith
Solicitor for the Applicant: Nicholas W.J. Rolfe & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: Dr S Donaghue QC and Mr G Hill
Solicitor for the Respondent: Australian Government Solicitor
Table of Corrections
6 April 2018 At paragraph 59, the words “of”, “liability of an” and “who” have been deleted.

ORDERS

TAD 29 of 2015
BETWEEN:

AARON GRAHAM

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND BORDER PROTECTION

Respondent

JUDGE:

TRACEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

9 JUNE 2016

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent quashing his decision made on 15 June 2015 to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

2.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Note:    Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

TRACEY J:

  1. The applicant, Mr Aaron Graham, is a citizen of New Zealand.  He came to Australia in 1976 at the age of 10.  He has resided here since then.

  2. Since 1985 he has accumulated a long list of convictions for offences including theft, drug possession, the possession of an…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2016] FCA 682
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In Graham v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection, the applicant, Mr Graham, sought judicial review of a decision made by the Minister for Immigration and Border Protection to cancel his visa under section 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). The Minister had found that Mr Graham did not pass the character test under section 501(6)(b) of the Act, leading to the decision to cancel his visa. The primary legal issues for the court to determine were whether the Minister exercised his power to cancel Mr Graham’s visa based on an erroneous understanding that Mr Graham would have a meaningful opportunity to make representations seeking the revocation of the decision, and whether the invitation to make such representations was futile given that Mr Graham could not satisfy the character test due to his prior criminal convictions.

The court examined the Minister’s reasons for the decision and found that the Minister’s reasoning exposed a jurisdictional error. The Minister had exercised his power under section 501(3) on the mistaken belief that Mr Graham would have a meaningful opportunity to seek revocation of the cancellation decision. This misconception meant that there was only a purported, rather than a real, exercise of power. The court also noted that Mr Graham had a substantial criminal record, which made it clear that the precondition for revocation of the cancellation decision under section 501C(4)(b) could never be satisfied. The Minister’s failure to acknowledge this legal reality in his reasons further underscored the jurisdictional error.

Ultimately, the court quashed the Minister’s decision to cancel Mr Graham’s visa and ordered the Minister to pay Mr Graham’s costs. The decision underscored the importance of correctly understanding and applying legal principles when exercising discretionary powers, particularly in the context of visa cancellation under the Migration Act.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. A writ of certiorari issue directed to the respondent quashing his decision made on 15 June 2015 to cancel the applicant’s visa under s 501(3) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).

2. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

On 20 July 2015 Mr Graham filed an application for review of the Minister’s decision to cancel his visa. A further amended application was filed on 26 October 2015. The application contained a number of grounds including allegations that the Minister had constructively failed to exercise his power under s 501(3) of the Act and that his decision was irrational and unreasonable. THE MINISTER’S DECISION TO CANCEL The Minister’s decision to cancel Mr Graham’s visa was made after he had considered written submissions made to him by his Department. The paper referred to a briefing, given to the Minister in January 2015, “on progressing s501 character considerations for … Outlaw Motor Cycle Gangs (OMCG) members.” Mr Graham was identified as one of those members. The Minister was advised that Mr Graham held a visa. The submission continued:“5.Subsection 501(3)(b) provides that you may cancel a visa that has been granted to a person if you reasonably suspect that the person does not pass the character test and you are satisfied that the cancellation is in the national interest. This power may only be exercised by you personally. You can exercise this power to cancel a visa without giving the person concerned advance notice of your intention to consider cancellation or an opportunity to be heard before you make your decision. If you were to cancel Mr GRAHAM’s visa under s501(3), your decision would be subject to judicial review, but not merits review.6.A decision to cancel under s501(3) may be revoked by you under s501C if the cancellee makes representations to you after your decision (within the period, and in the manner, set out in the decision notification) and satisfies you that they pass the character test.…9.On 8 May 2009, Mr GRAHAM was convicted in the Supreme Court of Tasmania of three counts of assault for which he was sentenced to 15 months imprisonment. Mr Graham was subsequently considered for visa cancellation under s 501(2) by the then Minister’s delegate Mr Thomas Wodak on the basis of this conviction. Mr GRAHAM has criminal convictions dating back to January 1982, commencing from the age of 15, including assault, driving offences, stealing, drug possession, firearms, property, and other offences.10.On 11 July 2011 a delegate, Mr WODAK exercised his discretion not to cancel Mr GRAHAM’s visa and warned him. The delegate considered that countervailing factors including Mr GRAHAM’s links to the community through his long residence in Australia since his formative years, his three adult children, his minor biological child, partner and minor stepchild “narrowly tilted the scale” when weighed against the risk of any further offending by Mr GRAHAM.…12.Since being warned in 2011, Mr GRAHAM has reoffended and received further convictions including common assault, use abusive language to a police officer, threatening words to provide a breach of the peace in a public place, fail to carry Australian drivers licence and drive motor vehicle whilst a prescribed illicit drug is present in your blood.”(Original emphasis.)

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Graham submitted that the Minister’s reasons exposed the jurisdictional error. The effect of the cancellation decision was a matter that could influence or affect the exercise of the Minister’s discretion. In the words of Gummow and Hayne JJ in Re Patterson, “there will have been a constructive failure to exercise the power reposed in [the Minister] by section 501(3)…if [the Minister] precluded [himself] from exercising the power according to law; [he] will have done so if [he] misconceived what in law was involved in the exercise of that power.” The Minister’s reasons revealed, so it was said, that he had exercised his power under s 501(3) on the erroneous footing that Mr Graham would be given a meaningful opportunity to seek revocation of the decision and this misconception meant that there was only a purported and not a real exercise of power.CONSIDERATION The Minister made two relevant decisions. The first was to cancel Mr Graham’s visa. The second was not to revoke the cancellation decision. Mr Graham has sought judicial review of the Minister’s first (cancellation) decision. It was common ground that Mr Graham did not pass the character test because he had a substantial criminal record. Cancellation for this reason does not appear to have been suggested to the Minister because, in 2011, a delegate of the then Minister had considered but declined to cancel Mr Graham’s visa because of the sentence of imprisonment for 15 months. Having considered the information with which he was provided the Minister reasonably suspected that Mr Graham did not pass the character test because the Minister “reasonably suspected that [Mr Graham was] a member of a group and that group [was] involved in criminal conduct.” It was for this reason that the Minister exercised his power under s 501(3) of the Act. Having made the cancellation decision the Minister promptly acted, as he was required to do, under s 501C(3) of the Act. He provided Mr Graham with a notice setting out his decision, particulars of relevant information on which he had relied and extended an invitation to Mr Graham to make representations to him about revocation of the cancellation decision. The notice advised Mr Graham that the Minister had power to revoke his cancellation decision if Mr Graham was able to satisfy him that he passed “the character test which is defined in s 501(6) of the Migration Act …”. The notice continued: “You will note s 501(6)(b) was the relevant ground of the character test, however you may wish to note the other grounds in s 501(6).” Mr Graham made a timely response to the invitation contained in the notice. Had the Minister cancelled Mr Graham’s visa under s 501(3) because he had a substantial criminal record the case would have been indistinguishable from Re Patterson and Tanielu. Prior to making his cancellation decision the Minister was not advised that any subsequent invitation under s 501C(3) would be an exercise in futility because the precondition, prescribed by s 501C(4)(b), for revocation could never be satisfied and his reasons made no reference to this legal reality.