GPV18 v Minister for Home Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

GPV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCA 393

Appeal from: Application for leave to appeal: GPV18 v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCCA 1563
File number: NSD 971 of 2019
Judge: WIGNEY J
Date of judgment: 26 March 2020
Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – application for leave to appeal – whether substantial injustice would result if leave were refused assuming decision at first instance was wrong – whether decision at first instance was attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal – whether primary judge was correct to find that applicant’s proposed grounds of review had no apparent merit or demonstrated an arguable case for relief sought – where applicant failed to identify any arguable ground of appeal in relation to dismissal of application by primary judge – where no meaningful submissions advanced in support of application – application dismissed

MIGRATION – application for leave to appeal from decision of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia – where primary judge dismissed judicial review application of decision by Immigration Assessment Authority – where Immigration Assessment Authority affirmed decision to refuse a protection visa – application dismissed

Legislation:

Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) rr 13.03C(1)(c), 16.05(2)(c)

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 24(1A)

Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r 35.12(2)(d)

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) ss 473BB, 473CA, 473CB, 473CC, 473DA, 473DB, 473DC, 473DC(1), 473DC(2), 473DC(3), 473DD, 473DF, 473EB, 473EB(3), 473FA(1), 473FA(2), 473GA, 473GB, 476, 476(1), 477, 477(2)(a), Pt 7AA Div 3

Cases cited:

BVD17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 261 FCR 35; [2018] FCAFC 114

CCQ17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2018] FCA 1641

Décor Corporations Pty Ltd v Dart Industries Inc (1991) 33 FCR 397

DPI17 v Minister for Home Affairs (2019) 366 ALR 665; [2019] FCAFC 43

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Rajalingam (1999) 93 FCR 220; [1999] FCA 719

Tonmoy v Minister for Home Affairs [2019] FCA 145

Date of hearing: 21 November 2019
Registry: New South Wales
Division: General Division
National Practice Area: Administrative and Constitutional Law and Human Rights
Category: Catchwords
Number of paragraphs: 73
Counsel for the Applicant: The applicant appeared in person
Solicitor for the First Respondent: Ms K Morris of Clayton Utz
Counsel for the Second Respondent: The second respondent filed a submitting notice save as to costs

ORDERS

NSD 971 of 2019
BETWEEN:

GPV18

Applicant

AND:

MINISTER FOR HOME AFFAIRS

First Respondent

IMMIGRATION ASSESSMENT AUTHORITY

Second Respondent

JUDGE:

WIGNEY J

DATE OF ORDER:

26 MARCH 2020

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The applicant’s application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2.The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note:   Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.


REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

WIGNEY J:

  1. This is an application for leave to appeal from an interlocutory judgment and order made by a judge of the Federal Circuit Court of Australia.  The primary judge dismissed the applicant’s application to set aside…

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Details
Case
[2020] FCA 393
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The applicant, a national of Sri Lanka, filed an application for leave to appeal against the dismissal of his judicial review application by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia. The primary issue before the court was whether the primary judge was correct to find that the applicant's proposed grounds of review had no apparent merit or demonstrated an arguable case for relief sought. The court was also required to determine whether the primary judge's decision was attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal. The applicant had failed to identify any arguable ground of appeal in relation to the dismissal of his application by the primary judge, and no meaningful submissions were advanced in support of the application.

The court found that the applicant's application for leave to appeal should be dismissed with costs. The court held that the primary judge's decision to dismiss the applicant's judicial review application was correct. The court found that the Authority's decision to affirm the decision to refuse the applicant's visa application was not attended with sufficient doubt to justify its reconsideration on appeal. The court held that the primary judge was correct to find that the applicant's proposed grounds of review had no apparent merit or demonstrated an arguable case for relief sought. The court held that the applicant's failure to identify any arguable ground of appeal in relation to the dismissal of his application by the primary judge, and the lack of meaningful submissions advanced in support of the application, were sufficient grounds to dismiss the application for leave to appeal.

The final orders of the court were that the applicant's application for leave to appeal be dismissed and that the applicant pay the first respondent's costs. The court held that the applicant's failure to identify any arguable ground of appeal in relation to the dismissal of his application by the primary judge, and the lack of meaningful submissions advanced in support of the application, were sufficient grounds to dismiss the application for leave to appeal. The court further held that the costs should be awarded to the first respondent as the applicant's application for leave to appeal was unsuccessful.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The applicant’s application for leave to appeal be dismissed.

2. The applicant pay the first respondent’s costs.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

For the reasons that follow, the application for leave to appeal is to be dismissed with costs.BACKGROUND The applicant is a national of Sri Lanka. On 17 November 2016, he applied for a visa known as a Safe Haven Enterprise (subclass 790) Visa. That application was refused by a delegate of the first respondent in this proceeding, the Minister for Home Affairs. The Minister’s decision was a “fast track reviewable decision” as defined in s 473BB of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth). It was accordingly referred to the Authority pursuant to s 473CA of the Act. The Authority was required to review the decision pursuant to s 473CC of the Act. To that end, the Secretary of the Department was required to give the Authority certain material, referred to as the “review material”, as specified in s 473CB of the Act.THE AUTHORITY’S CONDUCT OF THE REVIEW Division 3 of Pt 7AA of the Act contains provisions in relation to the conduct of a review by the Authority. Relevantly, for present purposes, s 473DA provides that Div 3 of Pt 7AA, together with ss 473GA and 473GB, “is taken to be an exhaustive statement of the requirements of the natural justice hearing rule in relation to reviews conducted by the Immigration Assessment Authority.” Sections 473GA and 473GB are not relevant to the issues raised by this application. Section 473DB of the Act provides, in effect, that the review conducted by the Authority is a review “on the papers”. It is in the following terms:(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority must review a fast track reviewable decision referred to it under section 473CA by considering the review material provided to the Authority under section 473CB:(a) without accepting or requesting new information; and(b) without interviewing the referred applicant.(2)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may make a decision on a fast track reviewable decision at any time after the decision has been referred to the Authority. Sections 473DC and 473DD provide for the circumstances in which the Authority may seek and consider “new information”. They are in the following terms:473DC Getting new information(1)Subject to this Part, the Immigration Assessment Authority may, in relation to a fast track decision, get any documents or information (new information) that:(a)were not before the Minister when the Minister made the decision under section 65; and(b) the Authority considers may be relevant.(2)The Immigration Assessment Authority does not have a duty to get, request or accept, any new information whether the Authority is requested to do so by a referred applicant or by any other person, or in any other circumstances.(3)Without limiting subsection (1), the Immigration Assessment Authority may invite a person, orally or in writing, to give new information:(a) in writing; or(b)at an interview, whether conducted in person, by telephone or in any other way.473DD Considering new information in exceptional circumstancesFor the purposes of making a decision in relation to a fast track reviewable decision, the Immigration Assessment Authority must not consider any new information unless:(a)the Authority is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances to justify considering the new information; and(b)the referred applicant satisfies the Authority that, in relation to any new information given, or proposed to be given, to the Authority by the referred applicant, the new information:(i)was not, and could not have been, provided to the Minister before the Minister made the decision under section 65; or(ii)is credible personal information which was not previously known and, had it been known, may have affected the consideration of the referred applicant’s claims.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

There is nothing in the Authority’s Reasons to suggest that it exercised its discretion in s 473DC to get any other information that was not before the Minister when the decision to refuse the applicant’s visa application was made by the Minister’s delegate.THE AUTHORITY’S DECISION It is unnecessary for the purposes of this application to consider the Authority’s Reasons in any detail. It suffices to note that, on the basis of the review material, the Authority was not satisfied that the critical events or circumstances that founded the applicant’s claim to meet the criteria for the Visa occurred or existed. It is abundantly clear that the Authority formed the view that the applicant’s claims were not credible, plausible or believable. The Authority gave detailed reasons for why that was so. The Authority also made a number of factual findings concerning the political and security situation in Sri Lanka based on the review material. Those findings were also relevant to whether the applicant met the essential criteria for the Visa. Ultimately, the Authority was not satisfied that the applicant met the criteria for the Visa and affirmed the decision under review.PROCEEDINGS IN THE CIRCUIT COURT Subsection 476(1) of the Act provides that, subject to that section, the Circuit Court has the same original jurisdiction in relation to migration decisions as the High Court of Australia has under paragraph 75(v) of the Constitution. The applicant sought to invoke the Circuit Court’s jurisdiction referred to in s 476 of the Act. He did not, however, file his application in the Circuit Court within the 35 day time limit provided in s 477 of the Act. He accordingly applied for an extension of time in which to file an application pursuant to subs 477(2)(a) of the Act. It would appear to be common ground that the reason that the applicant had not filed his application within the 35 day time limit was that the Authority had sent its Reasons to an old email address of the applicant’s. The applicant accordingly did not receive notice of the Authority’s Reasons in sufficient time for him to file his application within the prescribed time period. It would also appear that the Minister had accepted that explanation and was prepared to consent to an extension of time on that basis. When the applicant filed his application for an extension of time, the application was given a first court date of 31 January 2019. The Minister’s solicitor also sent emails to the applicant which notified him of the first court date. The applicant did not, however, appear at the first court date. A registrar of the Circuit Court dismissed the applicant’s application pursuant to r 13.03C(1)(c) of the Federal Circuit Court Rules 2001 (Cth) on the basis of the applicant’s non-appearance. That rule provides that if a party to a proceeding is absent from a hearing, including a first court date, the court or a registrar may, amongst other things, dismiss the application.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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