Goyal, in the matter of Cape Technologies Pty Ltd (administrators appointed)

Link copied
Case Copied 18 min read

FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Goyal, in the matter of Cape Technologies Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2021] FCA 1654   

File number: NSD 1159 of 2021
Judgment of: YATES J
Date of judgment: 11 November 2021
Catchwords: CORPORATIONS – application by administrators for an order, pursuant to s 90-15 of Sch 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), that they would be justified in causing the sale of the second plaintiff’s assets.
Legislation:

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ss 435A, 437A(1)(c)

Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) Schedule 2, Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) s 90–15

Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 37AF

Cases cited:

Hill, in the matter of Autocare Services Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2021] FCA 167

In the matter of Ansett Australia Ltd and Korda (No 3) [2002] FCA 90; 115 FCR 409

Killer, in the matter of North Coast Wood Panels Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2011] FCA 776

Re Advanced Medical Institute Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2011] NSWSC 574

Re Eisa Ltd (administrators appointed) [2000] NSWSC 940; (2000) 35 ACSR 394

Re Keystone Group Holdings Pty Ltd (administrators appointed) [2016] NSWSC 1604

Reidy, in the matter of eChoice Ltd (administrators appointed) [2017] FCA 1582

Division: General Division
Registry: New South Wales
National Practice Area: Commercial and Corporations
Sub-area: Corporations and Corporate Insolvency
Number of paragraphs: 30
Date of hearing: 11 November 2021
Counsel for the Plaintiffs: Mr D Stack
Solicitor for the Plaintiffs:  Quinn Emanuel Urquhart & Sullivan

ORDERS

NSD 1159 of 2021

IN THE MATTER OF CAPE TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) ACN 644 524 336

RAHUL GOYAL AND CATHERINE MARGARET CONNEELY AS JOINT AND SEVERAL ADMINISTRATORS OF CAPE TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) ACN 644 524 336

First Plaintiff

CAPE TECHNOLOGIES PTY LTD (ADMINISTRATORS APPOINTED) ACN 644 524 336

Second Plaintiff

ORDER MADE BY:

YATES J

DATE OF ORDER:

11 NOVEMBER 2021

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.Pursuant to section 90-15 of Part 3 of Division 90 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the first plaintiffs (Administrators) would be justified in causing the second plaintiff (Company) to complete the sale of the assets (Assets) of the Company on the terms or substantially the terms of the conditional agreement (Heads of Agreement), a copy of which appears at pages 161 to 163 of the confidential exhibit to the affidavit of Rahul Goyal affirmed on 9 November 2021, marked confidential exhibit RG-01, in circumstances where:

(a)the Administrators have not publicly advertised the Assets for sale;

(b)the period in which the Assets have been offered for sale has been limited;

(c)the purchaser of the Assets is a company owned and controlled by two of the directors of the Company;

(d)the Administrators have not put the sale of the Assets to the Company’s creditors for a vote; and

(e)the transaction contemplated by the Heads of Agreement is not proposed as part of a deed of company arrangement.

2.Subject to the order sought in paragraph 3 below, orders, pursuant to sections…

CaseChat AU logo

Keep reading for free

Create a free CaseChat account to read Goyal, in the matter of Cape Technologies Pty Ltd (administr... and more:

  • Read every judgment in full
  • Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
  • See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
  • Download judgments as PDF or Word
Continue with Google

One click creates your free account or signs you in.

By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.

Details
Case
[2021] FCA 1654
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The administrators of Cape Technologies Pty Ltd sought orders under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) to justify the sale of the company’s assets on certain terms. The company, which had been established to develop a financial operating system, did not have any sources of revenue or funding. The administrators argued that without other funding, they would not be able to realise any material returns from the sale of the company’s assets. They further sought orders to prevent the publication or access of certain documents, except pursuant to an order of the Court, on the basis that it was necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice.

The court had to decide whether the administrators would be justified in selling the company’s assets on the terms proposed and whether the documents should be marked confidential and not published or accessed, except pursuant to an order of the Court. The court found that the administrators have a discretion to sell the company’s assets on acceptable terms, and the order proposed by the administrators was justified. The court also found that the order to mark the documents confidential was too wide, certainly as to the length of the restraint that is sought. The court held that there must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision.

The court made orders that the administrators would be justified in causing the company to complete the sale of the assets on the terms proposed, subject to certain conditions. The court also made orders that the documents be marked confidential and not published or accessed, except pursuant to an order of the Court, but this order did not prevent the administrators, their legal representatives and/or their servants, agents or employees, from disclosing, publishing, or accessing the documents and the information contained therein. The court further ordered that the administrators’ costs of and incidental to the originating process be costs in the administration of the company.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Pursuant to section 90-15 of Part 3 of Division 90 of Schedule 2 to the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), the first plaintiffs (Administrators) would be justified in causing the second plaintiff (Company) to complete the sale of the assets (Assets) of the Company on the terms or substantially the terms of the conditional agreement (Heads of Agreement), a copy of which appears at pages 161 to 163 of the confidential exhibit to the affidavit of Rahul Goyal affirmed on 9 November 2021, marked confidential exhibit RG-01, in circumstances where:

(a) the Administrators have not publicly advertised the Assets for sale;

(b) the period in which the Assets have been offered for sale has been limited;

(c) the purchaser of the Assets is a company owned and controlled by two of the directors of the Company;

(d) the Administrators have not put the sale of the Assets to the Company’s creditors for a vote; and

(e) the transaction contemplated by the Heads of Agreement is not proposed as part of a deed of company arrangement.

2. Subject to the order sought in paragraph 3 below, orders, pursuant to sections 37AF(1)(b), 37AG(1)(a), and 37AJ of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth), on the ground that the order is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice, that the following documents (Documents) are to be marked “confidential” on the electronic Court file and are not to be published or accessed, except pursuant to an order of the Court, until such time as the sale of the Assets, pursuant to the Heads of Agreement, is completed:

(a) the confidential affidavit of Rahul Goyal affirmed on 9 November 2021;

(b) confidential exhibit RG-01 to the confidential affidavit of Rahul Goyal affirmed on 9 November 2021; and

(c) the Administrators’ outline of submissions dated and filed on 10 November 2021.

3. The order in paragraph 2 above, does not prevent the Administrators, their legal representatives and/or their servants, agents or employees, from disclosing, publishing, or accessing the Documents and the information contained therein.

4. The Administrators’ costs of and incidental to the originating process filed on 10 November 2021 be costs in the administration of the Company.

Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.

Background

Background to the litigation

As part of the present application, the administrators seek orders under s 37AF of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) that Mr Goyal’s affidavit, Confidential Exhibit RG–1, and the plaintiffs’ written submissions filed in support, not be published or accessed, except pursuant to an order of the Court, until the administration and/or winding up of the company has been finalised. This order has been sought on the basis that it is necessary to prevent prejudice to the proper administration of justice. As discussed during the hearing, I consider that proposed order to be too wide, certainly as to the length of the restraint that is sought.BACKGROUND FACTS The company was established to develop a new financial operating system targeted at small and medium-sized businesses in Australia. It is planned that this system will include a cash management platform tied to prepaid cards and credit cards with integrations made to major Cloud accounting software to automate financial administrative tasks. While a number of its components have been developed, the development of the system is a work in progress. The company does not have any sources of revenue or funding. The evidence discloses that, as at 25 October 2021, the company’s assets included tangible assets (comprising cash at bank) and intangible assets (comprising work-in-progress associated with the development of the financial operating system, including the underlying code, and rights, undertakings, and licenses owned or used by the company in carrying out its activities). The company previously commissioned a valuation report of its market value as at 30 June 2021. The valuation was made on certain assumptions, including that the company’s business will continue as a going concern. Mr Goyal has reviewed the valuation and is not satisfied that it holds true in the current circumstances where the company has been placed into administration; it does not have any source of funding to commercialise its underlying product; and the ability of the company to continue as a going concern is in peril. In Mr Goyal’s opinion, the administrators will not be able to realise any material returns from the sale of the company’s assets, in the absence of other funding to provide for the ongoing operations of the business pending a brief sales campaign, or the purchase of the business immediately. In this connection, I note that the ongoing monthly operating costs of the company are in the vicinity of $150,000 per month. The evidence is that, in the absence of any sources of revenue or funding, the administrators will have insufficient funds to meet the ongoing operational costs of the company and the costs of the administration, and will be required to cease the company’s operations imminently. This would result in, amongst other things, the termination of the company’s existing employment contracts (and, consequently, the crystallisation of employee entitlements) and the termination of various other contracts, with an estimated value of $523,530. Unless the business of the company is sold on acceptable terms, or funding is forthcoming, the administrators will be required to take immediate steps to realise any remaining value from the company’s assets, which Mr Goyal says would be minimal. Based on the current financial position of the company, Mr Goyal does not consider that the realisable value of the company’s assets would exceed the costs of the administration. There would be no funds available for distribution to creditors, including employees, in the liquidation of the company.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Decision

Reasons for decision

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The evidence before me is that the administrators have given notice, by email communications, of the hearing of the present application to the directors, shareholders, and creditors identified in the originating process. Two email communications were the subject of non-delivery notifications. The originating process has also been published on the KordaMentha website, identifying the date and time of the hearing of the present application. No person has come forward to oppose the making of the orders that are sought.CONSIDERATION The principles to be applied on the present application are helpfully summarised in the plaintiffs’ written submissions. I do not propose to survey those principles in any detail in these reasons. They are not controversial. There is no doubt that the power under s 90-15 of the Insolvency Practice Schedule (Corporations) extends to the giving of judicial advice and direction. However, this power is not appropriately exercised where the Court is being asked to do no more than sanction the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision in respect of which no particular legal issue is raised or in respect of which there is no potential to bring into question the propriety or reasonableness of the decision. As explained by Goldberg J in In the matter of Ansett Australia Ltd and Korda (No 3) [2002] FCA 90; 115 FCR 409 at [65] – [66] in relation to the former s 447D(1) of the Act (which conferred the power to give directions): 65… the prevailing principle adopted by the courts, when asked by liquidators and administrators to give directions, is to refrain from doing so where the direction sought relates to the making and implementation of a business or commercial decision, either committed specifically to the liquidator or administrator or well within his or her discretion, in circumstances where there is no particular legal issue raised for consideration or attack on the propriety or reasonableness of the decision in respect of which the directions are sought. There must be something more than the making of a business or commercial decision before a court will give directions in relation to, or approving of, the decision. It may be a legal issue of substance or procedure, it may be an issue of power, propriety or reasonableness, but some issue of this nature is required to be raised. It is insufficient to attract an order giving directions that the liquidator or administrator has a feeling of apprehension or unease about the business decision made and wants reassurance. There must be some issue which arises in relation to the decision. A court should not give its imprimatur to a business decision simply to alleviate a liquidator’s or administrator’s unease. There must be an issue calling for the exercise of legal judgment.66The administrators may be correct in their submission that there is no rule of law and no fixed principle that a consideration of commercial issues is precluded, as the jurisdiction of the Court to give directions under provisions such as s 447D and s 479(3) of the Act is discretionary. The exercise of that discretion will vary depending upon the nature and novelty of the matters and issues which are brought before the Court. From time to time, the Court is necessarily drawn into a consideration of commercial issues where there is a matter giving rise not only to the need to make a business or commercial decision, but also to issues of propriety, power, reasonableness of conduct, contested issues of legal principle or procedure or challenges to the decision made by the liquidator or administrator. Such a situation arose, for example in Re Codisco Pty Ltd (supra), Sanderson v Classic Car Insurances Pty Ltd (supra) and Re Addstone Pty Ltd (in liq) (supra). Nevertheless, there is the well‑established principle to which I have referred, namely that a court will not give directions approving of a commercial or business decision made by a liquidator or administrator where the decision is within the power of the liquidator or administrator, and there is no challenge to it or other issue arising in relation to it such as propriety or reasonableness, or calling for the exercise of legal judgment.