Gosper v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd

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JURISDICTION     :   DISTRICT COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CIVIL

LOCATION:   PERTH

CITATION:   GOSPER -v- PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD [2023] WADC 102

CORAM:   BURROWS DCJ

HEARD:   23 MARCH & 19 MAY 2023

DELIVERED          :   1 SEPTEMBER 2023

FILE NO/S:   APP 1 of 2023

BETWEEN:   JOSES GOSPER

Appellant

AND

PILBARA IRON COMPANY (SERVICES) PTY LTD

Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :   WORKERS' COMPENSATION ARBITRATION SERVICE

Coram:   ARBITRATOR WALLBRIDGE

File Number            :   A64434


Catchwords:

Claim by worker under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) as a result of injuries allegedly suffered at work - Definition of injury - Whether arbitrator biased - Whether worker denied natural justice - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA)

Result:

Leave to appeal on grounds 1, 2, 3 and 4 refused
Appeal dismissed

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant : In person
Respondent : Ms E Thuijs

Solicitors:

Appellant : Not applicable
Respondent : Jackson McDonald

Case(s) referred to in decision(s):

Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41

Atanasoska v Inghams Enterprises Pty Ltd [2009] WASCA 17

Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond [1990] HCA 33; (1990) 170 CLR 321

BHP Billiton Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Brady [2008] WASCA 250

Certain Lloyd's Underwriters v Cross [2012] HCA 56; (2012) 248 CLR 378

Charisteas v Charisteas (2021) 273 CLR 289

Cullen v Woodside Energy Ltd [2021] WADC 56

Duluxgroup (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chapple [2023] WASCA 83

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337

Gosper v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd [2021] WADC 47

Marks v Coles Supermarkets [2021] WASCA 176

Pacific Industrial Co v Jakovljevic [2008] WASCA 60

WKS v The State of Western Australia [No 4] [2020] WASCA 178

BURROWS DCJ:

Background

  1. The appellant, Mr Gosper, was employed by the respondent, Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd (PICS) primarily as a machine operator.  He also undertook other work including manual handling.  

  2. Mr Gosper alleges that during the course of such employment he suffered two injuries to his left shoulder, those injuries being subacromial bursitis and a tear of the subscapularis tendon.  The bursitis was identified and diagnosed following an ultrasound on 19 January 2019.  The subscapularis tendon tear was identified in an MRI on 6 June 2019 and the presence of bursitis was confirmed. 

  3. Mr Gosper made a claim against PICS dated 5 July 2019 for compensation under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) (the Act) in respect of the injuries. PICS disputed the claim.

  4. It is not in dispute that Mr Gosper suffered the physical injuries.  What is in dispute is whether those injuries are compensable under the Act.  

  5. Mr Gosper made an application for arbitration dated 21 October 2019.  Arbitrator Nunn dismissed Mr Gosper's claim by written reasons delivered on 30 July 2020 (the First Arbitration).  Mr Gosper appealed that decision to this court and on 25 May 2021 Lemonis DCJ, as he then was, delivered his reasons allowing the appeal…

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Details
Case
[2023] WADC 102
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gosper v Pilbara Iron Company (Services) Pty Ltd, the plaintiff, Mr Gosper, sought compensation under the Workers' Compensation and Injury Management Act 1981 (WA) for injuries he claimed to have sustained during his employment. The dispute centred on the interpretation of the term "injury" under the Act and whether the arbitrator's decision was biased and denied Mr Gosper natural justice. The case was heard in the Workers' Compensation Appeal Tribunal of Western Australia.

The legal issues before the court involved the interpretation of the statutory definition of "injury" under the Act and whether the arbitrator's reasons for decision were adequate. Specifically, the court had to determine if the arbitrator properly applied the legal test for establishing a compensable injury and if the reasons provided were sufficient to justify the decision. The court also had to examine whether the arbitrator's decision was influenced by bias and whether Mr Gosper was denied procedural fairness.

The court held that the arbitrator's decision was based on the correct legal test for establishing an injury under the Act, as outlined in Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic. The court emphasised that reasons for decision need only identify the facts accepted by the arbitrator and the law applied, without needing to cover all evidence or arguments. The court found that the reasons provided by the arbitrator were sufficient to disclose the path of reasoning to the decision and to enable an appeal court to determine if there was any error. The court also concluded that there was no evidence of bias or denial of natural justice.

The court's final orders were that the appeal by Mr Gosper was dismissed, and the decision of the arbitrator was upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

Full text does not contain this section.

Background

Background to the litigation

Full text does not contain this section.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

Full text does not contain this section.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Section 213(4) of the Act governs the form and content of reasons to be provided by an arbitrator under the Act and is in the following terms: 213.Decisions and reasons, form and content of…(4)The reasons for an arbitrator's decision -(a)need only identify the facts that the arbitrator has accepted in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(b)need only identify the law that the arbitrator has applied in coming to the decision and give the reasons for doing so; and(c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and(d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case.… The principles relevant to evaluating the adequacy of reasons were recently set out in Duluxgroup (Australia) Pty Ltd v Chapple [2023] WASCA 83. In that decision the Court of Appeal examined the adequacy of reasons given under s 31(1) Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA) which is in near identical terms to s 213(4) of the Act. The court set out at [46] ‑ [48]: 46The generally applicable principles dealing with the adequacy of reasons are well‑established. In evaluating the adequacy of reasons for decision the critical question is whether the essential path of reasoning to the impugned conclusion is disclosed in sufficient detail and with sufficient certainty to meet the twin objects that: (1) the litigant knows why he or she was unsuccessful; and (2) an appeal court may determine whether the decision involved appellable error.47As was stated in Browne v Browne:The principles relevant to an evaluation of the adequacy of reasons are well established and include the following:(1)Reasons for decision need not be lengthy or elaborate.(2)Reasons should disclose the intellectual process that led to the decision in sufficient detail and with sufficient certainty to enable the litigant to know why they were unsuccessful and to enable an appeal court to determine whether the decision involved appellable error.(3)It is certainly not necessary to refer to every submission advanced by a party. However, a tribunal or court must engage with the central element(s) of a losing party's case and explain why that case fails. Considering that party's submissions is an aspect of what procedural fairness requires.(4)In determining the adequacy of the reasons, the reasons must be read as a whole, and, if necessary, considered in the context of the evidence. An appellate court may take into account what can legitimately be inferred from the reasons. Whether reasons are adequate will depend upon the circumstances of the case and the matters that arose for the judge's consideration. 48As to the last point, the authorities accept that the content and detail of reasons will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the court is exercising and the particular matter the subject of the decision.(citations omitted) The nature of the jurisdiction being exercised in this particular matter affects the practical content of the decision in the following ways:(a)This is a decision made by an arbitrator under the Act, the purpose of which is relevantly set out in s 3(1) as: 3.PurposesThe purposes of this Act are -…(c)to provide for the resolution of disputes under this Act; and(d)to make provision for the hearing and determination by the dispute resolution authorities of disputes between parties involved in workers' compensation matters in a manner that is fair, just, economical, informal and quick.(b)Section 213(4) of the Act as set out above provides statutory recognition for what will constitute sufficient reasons.(c)There is a limited right to appeal against the learned arbitrator's decision as set out at [15] ‑ [19] above. An important function of providing reasons under the Act is to facilitate a statutory right to appeal, the potential grounds on which such an appeal might be brought ought to be recognised. Importantly there is no right to appeal on the merits of the decision, or when alleging an error of fact.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Mr Gosper in ground 2 contends that the learned arbitrator found there was no specific event which caused his injuries and therefore Mr Gosper had not suffered an injury as defined in s 5(1)(a) of the Act. The learned arbitrator set out at [52] of his written reasons the correct legal test to be applied referring to Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v Srdic (1982) 66 FLR 41 per Toohey J at [41] as:1.The question whether there has been personal injury by accident is a question distinct from, and logically anterior to, the question whether what has happened arose in the course of the relevant employment. The questions have not always been kept distinct.2.The expression personal injury by accident is a compound one. It is not necessary to show, first, that something to be described as an accident happened and secondly, that something else, namely an injury, was brought about or caused by that accident. The use of the term 'accident' points up the unexpected nature of the event constituting the injury.3.It is no longer necessary to prove that some external event or some action of the worker caused a sudden physiological change to happen when it did. That necessity arose from the requirement to establish that injury by accident had arisen out of and in the course of the employment.4.Personal injury by accident may exist where there is no more than an actual internal physical injury such as the rupture of an aneurism or of an oesophagus, not attributable to any external injury but resulting from some force or pressure exerted within the body.5.Where the personal injury by accident relied upon is an internal physical injury, it is no answer to a claim for compensation that there was a pre‑disposing physical condition. The employer must take the worker as he finds him.6.A worker does not suffer personal injury by accident arising in the course of his employment where he suffers, at his place of employment, a sudden and distinct physiological change as the product of the inevitable development of a progressive disease from which he is suffering and where such change can in no way be attributable to or associated with some incident of his employment.7.Where incapacity results not from an actual physical injury, external or internal, but from the development or culmination of a pre-existing and progressive morbid physical condition, the disease and the condition in which it culminated (for instance thrombosis or occlusion) is autogenous. In the absence of any particular incident or activity of the worker accelerating or contributing to the condition, there is no personal injury by accident.8.Personal injury by accident arises in the course of employment so long as it occurs while the worker is performing his duties or doing something incidental to the actual performance of those duties, or, put another way, where he is engaged in his employment. There need be no causal connexion between the injury and the employment.9.The traditional view that a physiological change, sudden or otherwise, is not an injury by accident arising in the course of the employment unless it is associated with some incident of the employment cannot be pressed beyond the case of physiological change which is produced by the development of a progressive disease.(citations omitted)