| SUPREME COURT OF VICTORIA COURT OF APPEAL |
| S EAPCR 2022 0136 |
| ROBERT GLOWACKI | Applicant |
| v | |
| THE KING | Respondent |
---
| JUDGES: | PRIEST, T FORREST and KENNEDY JJA |
| WHERE HELD: | Melbourne |
| DATE OF HEARING: | 31 July 2023 |
| DATE OF JUDGMENT: | 31 July 2023 |
| DATE OF REASONS: | 3 August 2023 |
| MEDIUM NEUTRAL CITATION: | [2023] VSCA 176 |
| JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM: | DPP v Glowacki (County Court of Victoria, Judge Wraight, 31 January 2022) |
---
CRIMINAL LAW – Appeal – Conviction – Aggravated home invasion – Hearsay evidence – Evidence of asserted fact – Whether first-hand hearsay – Previous representation of unavailable witness to prove asserted fact in previous representation of another – Evidence inadmissible – Appeal allowed – Evidence Act 2008, ss 62, 65(2)(b) and (c).
---
| Counsel | |||
| Applicant | Mr J O’Connor | ||
| Appellant | Ms E Ruddle KC | ||
| Solicitors | |||
| Applicant | Emma Turnbull Lawyers | ||
| Respondent | Ms A Hogan, Solicitor for Public Prosecutions | ||
PRIEST JA
T FORREST JA
KENNEDY JA:
Following a trial in the County Court, a jury found the applicant guilty of aggravated home invasion (for which he was subsequently imprisoned).[1]
[1]See DPP v Glowacki [2022] VCC 699 (Judge Wraight).
The applicant subsequently made an application for leave to appeal against conviction on a ground that challenged the admissibility of certain hearsay evidence adduced at trial.
During the hearing of the application in this Court on 31 July 2023, senior counsel for the respondent fairly and properly conceded that the application must succeed. We thus made orders granting leave to appeal against conviction; allowing the appeal; setting aside the conviction; and remanding the applicant for retrial. These are our reasons for those orders.
In brief summary, the factual background is as follows. At about 12.50 am on 28 November 2019, the applicant’s cousin, Lauchlan Bright, armed with a hatchet, and two armed co-offenders — one of whom the prosecution alleged was the applicant — forced their way into a house in Rupert Street, Mitcham. One of the offenders threatened an occupant with a knife and Bright removed various items from the house. At some point, one of the offenders fled, followed shortly after by Bright and the other offender. Police arrived at the house at 1.05 am. They saw Bright run from the property, but lost sight of him.
At 1.44 am, police from the Public Order Response Unit intercepted a car in the vicinity of Rupert Street. The driver and sole occupant was Alyce Hammel. She told police that she was on her way to 5 Rupert Street to visit a friend called ‘Sarah’. Police told her to leave the area. Subsequent enquiries revealed that nobody named Sarah lived at 5 Rupert Street.
About 50 minutes after commencing a search, the Canine Unit located Bright — wearing only one shoe — in the backyard of nearby premises. Police continued to search the vicinity for his co-offenders, but they managed to evade the police and flee the area.
A couple of days later, on 30 November 2019, a female resident of Rupert Street noticed several…
Keep reading for free
Create a free CaseChat account to read Glowacki v The King and more:
- Read every judgment in full
- Ask AI and get answers linked to paragraphs
- See how each paragraph was cited in later cases
- Download judgments as PDF or Word
One click creates your free account or signs you in.
By continuing you agree to the Terms and Privacy Policy.
- Case
- [2023] VSCA 176
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court had to examine the nature of the hearsay evidence and determine if it fell within the exceptions outlined in the Act. Specifically, the court considered whether the evidence could be classified as first-hand hearsay, which is admissible under certain conditions. The court also needed to evaluate whether the evidence was a previous representation of an asserted fact made by the unavailable witness in a previous representation made to another person. The admissibility of such evidence is governed by sections 62, 65(2)(b) and (c) of the Evidence Act 2008, which set out the rules for hearsay exceptions.
In its decision, the court held that the hearsay evidence in question did not meet the criteria for admissibility under the Evidence Act 2008. The court found that the evidence was not first-hand hearsay and that it did not fall within the exceptions for previous representations of an asserted fact. As a result, the court concluded that the evidence was inadmissible and that its admission likely had a substantial or significant effect on the outcome of the trial. Consequently, the appeal was allowed, and the conviction was quashed. The court did not issue further orders, as the case was returned to the lower court for a retrial without the inadmissible evidence.
Background
Background to the litigation
The case was initially heard in the County Court of Victoria where Mr Glowacki was found guilty and sentenced. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Mr Glowacki appealed to the Court of Appeal. The appeal was heard by the Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Victoria, which considered the admissibility of the hearsay evidence under the Evidence Act 2008. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, quashed the conviction, and ordered a retrial.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the hearsay evidence of the previous representation was admissible under the Evidence Act 2008.
2. Whether the hearsay evidence was first-hand hearsay within the meaning of s 62 of the Evidence Act 2008.
3. Whether the hearsay evidence fell within the exception to the hearsay rule under s 65(2)(b) or (c) of the Evidence Act 2008.
Held
1. The court concluded that the hearsay evidence of the previous representation was inadmissible under the Evidence Act 2008.
2. The court determined that the hearsay evidence was not first-hand hearsay within the meaning of s 62 of the Evidence Act 2008.
3. The court found that the hearsay evidence did not fall within the exception to the hearsay rule under s 65(2)(b) or (c) of the Evidence Act 2008.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
In assessing the admissibility of the hearsay evidence of a previous representation, the court considered the statutory provisions and legal principles applicable under the Evidence Act 2008. The court examined whether the hearsay evidence of the previous representation was admissible under s 60 of the Evidence Act 2008, which provides for the admissibility of evidence of an asserted fact. The court concluded that the hearsay evidence did not meet the criteria for admissibility under this section.
Regarding the characterisation of the hearsay evidence as first-hand hearsay under s 62 of the Evidence Act 2008, the court found that the evidence was not first-hand because it did not directly relate to a fact that was within the personal knowledge of the maker of the representation. The court distinguished this case from prior authority which held that first-hand hearsay could include representations made by others if they were based on personal knowledge. Here, the previous representation relied upon another's statement, not personal knowledge, and thus did not qualify as first-hand hearsay.
Furthermore, the court examined whether the hearsay evidence fell within an exception to the hearsay rule under s 65(2)(b) or (c) of the Evidence Act 2008. Section 65(2)(b) allows for the admission of hearsay evidence if the person who made the representation is unavailable and the representation was made in the course of, or for the purpose of, providing health services. Section 65(2)(c) permits the admission of hearsay evidence if the person who made the representation is unavailable and the representation was made in the ordinary course of business. The court found that neither of these exceptions applied because the representation did not pertain to health services or the ordinary course of business. Therefore, the hearsay evidence was not admissible under either exception.
The binding legal principle established by this decision is that hearsay evidence of a previous representation, which is not first-hand and does not fall within the exceptions to the hearsay rule under s 65(2) of the Evidence Act 2008, is inadmissible. The court's reasoning distinguished this case from prior authority by emphasizing the importance of personal knowledge in determining the admissibility of hearsay evidence under the Evidence Act 2008. This decision underscores the stringent requirements for admitting hearsay evidence and reinforces the protections against unreliable second-hand statements in criminal proceedings.