Glew v Attorney General (WA) - [2014] WASCA 93

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

TITLE OF COURT : THE COURT OF APPEAL (WA)

CITATION: GLEW -v- ATTORNEY GENERAL (WA) [2014] WASCA 93

CORAM: NEWNES JA
MURPHY JA

HEARD: 17 APRIL 2014

DELIVERED : 17 APRIL 2014

PUBLISHED : 2 MAY 2014

FILE NO/S: CACV 22 of 2014

BETWEEN: WAYNE KENNETH GLEW
Appellant
AND
ATTORNEY GENERAL (WA)
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:
Jurisdiction              :  SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
Coram  :MASTER SANDERSON
Citation  :ATTORNEY GENERAL (WA) -v- GLEW [2014] WASC 100
File No  :CIV 2538 of 2013

Catchwords:

Practice and procedure - Whether grounds of appeal have any reasonable prospect of success - Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 43(2)(g)(i) - Appeal dismissed

Legislation:

Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), r 43(2)(g)(i)

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: Mr A J Sefton & Ms M Georgiou

Solicitors:

Appellant: In person
Respondent: State Solicitor for Western Australia

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General (WA) v Glew [2014] WASC 100
Glew v Shire of Greenough [2007] HCATrans 520

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an appeal against an order of the master, made on 12 February 2014, under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA). In substance, the master prohibited the appellant from instituting any proceedings, as defined in the Act, unless he first obtains the leave of a court or tribunal: Attorney General (WA) v Glew [2014] WASC 100.
As has been his custom, the appellant appeared in person both at first instance and in this court.
On 17 April 2014, we dismissed the appeal on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. We said we would provide reasons for our decision later. These are the reasons.

Background

The appeal comes before the court on a registrar's notice to attend to consider two matters. One is for the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to r 43(2)(g)(i) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. The other is an application, dated 18 March 2014, by the appellant for an order in the following terms:
All decisions of all State Courts involving Wayne Kenneth Glew and Kylie June Glew be set aside until the hearing of this appeal or it be moved to the High Court.
Notwithstanding the objection of the appellant, we considered it appropriate to deal first with the notice to the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed, as the appellant's application would necessarily fall away if the appeal were dismissed.
It is unnecessary to canvass the master's reasons for decision in any detail. As the master noted, the appellant has an entrenched belief that the Parliament of this State has no power to enact legislation, and the courts of this State do…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2014] WASCA 93
Decision Date: 2 MAY 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The case of Glew v Attorney General (WA) involved an appeal against an order made by the Master of the Supreme Court of Western Australia, which restricted the appellant, Mr Glew, from instituting any legal proceedings without first obtaining leave from a court or tribunal. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Western Australia (Court of Appeal) on the grounds that none of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. The appellant, Mr Glew, had a history of advancing arguments that the Parliament and courts of Western Australia lacked the power to enact legislation and administer the law, respectively, as they did not conform to the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and the Commonwealth Constitution. These arguments had been consistently rejected by the courts in various legal actions.

The legal issues the court had to decide were whether the grounds of appeal presented by the appellant had a reasonable prospect of success, particularly in light of the appellant's history of advancing similar arguments in multiple legal actions. The court had to determine whether the appellant's arguments were legally and factually sound and whether the Master's decision to restrict the appellant's ability to institute legal proceedings was justified. The court also had to consider the appellant's application for an order to set aside all decisions of all State Courts involving the appellant and his wife until the hearing of the appeal or the appeal being moved to the High Court.

The court found that the appellant's grounds of appeal were based on the same arguments that had been consistently rejected by the courts in previous legal actions. The court held that the appellant's belief that the Parliament and courts of Western Australia lacked the power to enact legislation and administer the law, respectively, was unfounded and that the Master's decision to restrict the appellant's ability to institute legal proceedings was justified. The court also found that the appellant's application for an order to set aside all decisions of all State Courts involving him and his wife was not warranted.

The appeal was dismissed, and the order made by the Master was upheld. The court held that none of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success and that the appellant's history of advancing similar arguments in multiple legal actions did not warrant a different outcome. The court also found that the appellant's application for an order to set aside all decisions of all State Courts involving him and his wife was not warranted and did not affect the outcome of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT: This is an appeal against an order of the master, made on 12 February 2014, under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA). In substance, the master prohibited the appellant from instituting any proceedings, as defined in the Act, unless he first obtains the leave of a court or tribunal: Attorney General (WA) v Glew [2014] WASC 100. As has been his custom, the appellant appeared in person both at first instance and in this court. On 17 April 2014, we dismissed the appeal on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal had a reasonable prospect of success. We said we would provide reasons for our decision later. These are the reasons. The appeal comes before the court on a registrar's notice to attend to consider two matters. One is for the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to r 43(2)(g)(i) of the Supreme Court (Court of Appeal) Rules 2005 (WA), on the basis that none of the grounds of appeal has a reasonable prospect of success. The other is an application, dated 18 March 2014, by the appellant for an order in the following terms:All decisions of all State Courts involving Wayne Kenneth Glew and Kylie June Glew be set aside until the hearing of this appeal or it be moved to the High Court. Notwithstanding the objection of the appellant, we considered it appropriate to deal first with the notice to the appellant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed, as the appellant's application would necessarily fall away if the appeal were dismissed. It is unnecessary to canvass the master's reasons for decision in any detail. As the master noted, the appellant has an entrenched belief that the Parliament of this State has no power to enact legislation, and the courts of this State do not have jurisdiction to administer the law, because neither institution accords with the provisions of either or both of the Constitution Act 1889 (WA) and the Commonwealth Constitution. Over the years, the appellant has advanced various arguments in support of those propositions in a number of legal actions in which he has been involved. When, inevitably, his arguments have failed at first instance he has taken the matter on appeal. He has done so although the same arguments have been emphatically rejected, time and again, by every court to which they have been put. The master referred, without attempting to be exhaustive, to seven different proceedings since 2006 in which those same propositions have been advanced by the appellant. In each case, the appellant failed at first instance and on appeal to this court. On one occasion, the appellant pursued, unsuccessfully, an application for special leave to appeal to the High Court: Glew v Shire of Greenough [2007] HCATrans 520. The master found that the appellant was a vexatious litigant and made the order referred to above. The appellant appealed against that decision by an appeal notice filed on 28 February 2014. The appellant relies on the following grounds of appeal:1.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he refused to abide by the challenge to his ability to constitute a court as he has not been selected by and sworn in by the Governor in Council as required by the State of Western Australia Constitution and a decision of the High Court of Australia No HCA 9 of 1991 which states 'a Master must be sworn in by the Governor'.2.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he decided he could ignore the fact that the State of Western Australia Constitution as being used in the State of Western Australia since Federation was a fraud with 32 sections missing and was not the correct Constitution put in place with Letters patent by Queen Victoria on January the 1st 1901 that the appellant tried to show him, He dismissed it as a nonsense.3.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he failed to see that the Letters Patent putting in place the Office of the Governor of Western Australia issued on 29th October 1900 by Queen Victoria was being ignored by the Parliament of Western Australia and therefore Western Australia did not have a lawful Governor.4.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he failed to see that the Attorney General of Western Australia had not been selected by and been sworn in as an Officer of the Crown and could not sit in State Parliament because of provisions of Chapter 2 of the Commonwealth Constitution 1901.5.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he removed the appellant from the Court and after adjourning the Court, went back into the Court and heard the case against the appellant contrary to section 51 ss 24 of the Commonwealth Constitution 1901.6.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he denied me a trial by jury in relation to the Constitutional issues after I refused to allow him to deal with the issues in summary jurisdiction.7.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he changed the affidavits of the appellant to submissions and then ignored them knowing that they contained several Constitutional issues that he was incapable of deliberating on even if he was a lawful Master of the Supreme Court because of Chapter 111 of the Commonwealth Constitution 1901.8.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he ignored the affidavits of the appellant and he then became party to those offences.9.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he ignored the affidavits of the appellant where it stated that all laws passed in the Commonwealth of Australia must comply with the Commonwealth Constitution 1901 and any laws passed contrary to the Commonwealth Constitution 1901 are therefore invalid.10.Master Sanderson was wrong in law and fact when he failed to see that if the Governor signed a law that did not comply with the Commonwealth Constitution 1901 then the law does not bind the Crown and the law is invalid.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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