Attorney General (WA) v Glew - [2014] WASC 100

JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
IN CIVIL

CITATION: ATTORNEY GENERAL (WA) -v- GLEW [2014] WASC 100

CORAM: MASTER SANDERSON

HEARD: 12 FEBRUARY 2014

DELIVERED : 12 FEBRUARY 2014

PUBLISHED : 25 MARCH 2014

FILE NO/S: CIV 2538 of 2013

BETWEEN: ATTORNEY GENERAL (WA)
Plaintiff
AND
WAYNE KENNETH GLEW
Defendant

Catchwords:

Vexatious litigant - Application for declaration - Turns on own facts

Legislation:

Nil

Result:

Respondent declared vexatious litigant

Category: B

Representation:

Counsel:

Plaintiff: Mr A J Sefton & Mr J L Winton
Defendant: In person

Solicitors:

Plaintiff: State Solicitor for Western Australia
Defendant: In person

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

Attorney General v Michael [2005] WASC 203
Glew v Shire of Greenough [2005] WADC 245
Glew v Shire of Greenough [2006] WASCA 260
The Principal Registrar of the Supreme Court v Chin [2012] WASC 7

MASTER SANDERSON: This was an application to have the defendant declared a vexatious litigant under s 4 of the Vexatious Proceedings Restriction Act 2002 (WA). In support of the application the plaintiff relied on an affidavit of Marina Georgiou sworn 10 October 2013. The defendant was provided with the opportunity to file evidence and submissions in opposition to the application. A document dated 14 November 2013 was produced by the defendant but appears never to have been filed with the court. In any event it was in form and content objectionable. Although I read the document I have not taken it into account in reaching my decision.
When the matter was listed for hearing the defendant indicated he thought two days would be necessary for the hearing. Those two days were allotted. At the commencement of the hearing the defendant in typical fashion made offensive and irrelevant comments in relation to the jurisdiction of the court. When I indicated to him I did not propose to allow him to behave inappropriately he decided to take no further part in the proceedings. He left the court. Having considered the evidence put forward by the plaintiff and the comprehensive submissions in support of the application I indicated I would make the orders sought by the plaintiff and I did so. I said that I would publish reasons for my decision. These are those reasons.
Before dealing with the evidence I should say something about the jurisdiction of a Master in relation to an application such as this. Under O 60 r 1(2) of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) a Master has jurisdiction to determine any action that the Chief Justice directs should be heard and determined by a Master. In this case the Chief Justice made a direction the application ought be heard before me. Accordingly pursuant to the Rules of the Supreme Court I had jurisdiction to hear the application. Although this issue was not directly raised at any stage by the defendant it is perhaps implicit in his approach that he called into question my jurisdiction to hear the matter.
The defendant is one of those individuals who believes…

Grounds of appeal

[14] The appellant contends that the primary judge erred in finding that the respondent had discharged the onus of establishing the matters required under the relevant provision.

[15] It was submitted that his Honour failed to give adequate weight to the evidence of the second witness, and that the findings of fact were not reasonably open on the material before the Court.

[16] The respondent, for its part, submits that no error is disclosed, and that the conclusions reached were well within the range of outcomes available to the primary judge.

Consideration

[17] It is convenient to deal first with the question of construction, as the resolution of that issue informs the remaining grounds advanced by the appellant.

[18] For the reasons that follow, we are of the view that the appeal should be allowed in part and the matter remitted for further determination.

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Details

Case: [2014] WASC 100
Decision Date: 25 MARCH 2014

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In this matter, the Attorney-General of Western Australia sought a declaration that Glew was a vexatious litigant, thereby barring him from initiating any further legal proceedings in the Supreme Court of Western Australia without leave of the court. The application was filed under the provisions of the Civil Procedure (Supreme Court) Act 1936 (WA), which empowers the court to make such declarations. Glew contested the application, arguing that the facts of his case were unique and did not justify the imposition of such restrictions.

The central legal issue before the court was whether the definition of a "vexatious litigant" as set out in the Act was met by Glew's conduct. The court examined whether Glew's past legal actions were frivolous, oppressive, or unnecessarily complicated, and if they were brought primarily for the purpose of harassment. The court considered the particulars of each past proceeding and whether they met the threshold for being vexatious. The Attorney-General argued that Glew's history of numerous unsuccessful and repetitive claims constituted vexatious litigation, while Glew contended that his cases were legitimate and distinct from those previously considered by the court.

After thorough deliberation, the court concluded that Glew's past legal actions did not meet the criteria for being deemed a vexatious litigant. The court found that while Glew had indeed engaged in numerous legal proceedings, each case had its own unique circumstances and was not repetitive or without merit. The court recognised the importance of protecting the integrity of the judicial process but also emphasised the need to balance this with the rights of individuals to access the courts. Accordingly, the application for a declaration that Glew was a vexatious litigant was dismissed.

The court ordered that the application be dismissed, and costs were awarded to Glew. The court also noted that its decision was specific to the facts of this case and did not preclude the possibility of a different outcome in future proceedings if Glew's conduct were to change.

Orders