FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Giraldo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 113
IMMIGRATION – refugees – Refugee Review Tribunal – finding that applicant not at risk of persecution by reason of political opinion – whether failure to set out findings on material facts – whether evidence to support findings – unrepresented applicant failed to raise claim to fear persecution by reason of membership of particular social group – whether Tribunal erred in failing to consider persecution for that reason – whether extended family can constitute a “particular social group” – whether findings of fact made any error immaterial.
Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 430(1)(c), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(e), 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b).
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, cited.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, applied.
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, cited.
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 ALR 553, cited.
Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 855, cited.
Pat Toi Choi v Minister for Immigrationa and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Lindgren J, 2 December 1998), cited.
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212, cited.
Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 101, considered.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (1999) 95 FCR 517, followed.
Applicant ‘A’ v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, cited.
Minister for Immigrigation and Multicultural Affairs v Zamora (1998) 85 FCR 458, cited.
Guo Wei Zhi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Full Court, 10 December 1998), cited.
Martinez v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] Imm AR 227, not followed.
C v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 366, considered.
Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 3) [2000] FCA 919, cited.
Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 38, followed.
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28, cited.
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370, cited.
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, followed.EVERT HAIDEN GIRALDO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 876 of 2000SACKVILLE J
SYDNEY
23 FEBRUARY 2001
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY
N 876 OF 2000
BETWEEN:
EVERT HAIDEN GIRALDO
APPLICANTAND:
MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENTJUDGE:
SACKVILLE J
DATE OF ORDER:
23 FEBRUARY 2001
WHERE MADE:
SYDNEY
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 6 July 2000 be set aside.
2.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for determination according to law.
3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court…
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- Case
- [2001] FCA 113
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined whether the RRT had overlooked or misunderstood the evidence presented by the applicant, particularly concerning the threats made by FARC and their motivations. The applicant argued that the RRT failed to adequately consider whether the threats were politically motivated or if they were intended to intimidate him and his family into surrendering their farm. The court found that the RRT had indeed addressed these issues and concluded that the threats did not constitute persecution for Convention purposes. The applicant also contended that the RRT did not consider whether his departure from Colombia would result in persecution by FARC, a claim which the court deemed unsupported by any evidence.
Ultimately, the court held that the RRT had not failed to make the necessary findings on material questions of fact. While the applicant's account of the telephone calls to his aunt post-departure was relevant, it was not a critical fact under the RRT's approach to the case. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the principles set out in previous cases, cautioning against substituting its own judgment for that of the RRT. Consequently, the decision of the RRT was set aside, and the matter was remitted for re-determination according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs.
Orders
Orders of the court
1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 6 July 2000 be set aside.
2. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for determination according to law.
3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Established by: SACKVILLE J
Whatever misgivings one might have about the RRT’s analysis of the facts, it is necessary to bear in mind the warning of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, at 272, per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, against“turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision”.To be fair to Mr Karp, he did not suggest otherwise.SECTION 430(1)(c) OF THE MIGRATION ACT Section 430(1)(c) of the Migration Act requires the RRT to prepare a written statement that “sets out the findings on any material question of fact”. The content of that obligation was spelled out by the majority of a five member Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, at 481-482:“Ordinarily, materiality is an objective concept. If the RRT fails to make a finding on a fact which is in truth, as a Court subsequently determines, a material fact, then s 430(1)(c) will not have been complied with, even though the RRT has recorded its findings in relation to the facts before it that it regarded as material.The generally accepted view in this Court has been that the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make. It must make findings on questions of fact that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it. In this respect, s 430 sets a standard of decision-making the RRT is required to observe.…[I]f a decision, one way or the other, turns upon whether a particular fact does or does not exist, having regard to the process of reasoning the Tribunal has employed as the basis for its decision, then the fact is a material one. But a requirement to set out findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based, is not to be translated into a requirement that all pieces of conflicting evidence relating to a material fact to be dealt with…Thus whilst materiality will not necessarily depend upon how an applicant chooses to present the issues, we do not agree that the only material facts are those on which the Tribunal is legally required to make findings…. A fact is material if the decision in the practical circumstances of the particular case turns upon whether that fact exists.”Two appeals raising the issue of the construction of s 430(1) have been heard by the High Court on 15 and 16 November 2000 but have not yet determined: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf ((1999) 95 FCR 506 (FC)); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Israelian ([1999] FCA 649 (FC)). For the moment, the principles laid down in Singh are binding on single judges of this Court. In my view, given the way the RRT approached the case (a matter to which I shall return), the applicant’s claim that his aunt had received threatening telephone calls after his departure from Colombia cannot be described as a “material fact”. The critical questions for the RRT, on its approach, were whether threats had been made to the applicant by the FARC guerillas, whether FARC intended to carry out the threats; and whether the threats had been made for a Convention reason (that reason being identified by the RRT as actual or imputed political opinion). The applicant’s account of the telephone call to the aunt was merely one piece of evidence for the RRT to consider, along with all the other evidence before it.