Giraldo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs

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FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

Giraldo v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs [2001] FCA 113

IMMIGRATION – refugees – Refugee Review Tribunal – finding that applicant not at risk of persecution by reason of political opinion – whether failure to set out findings on material facts – whether evidence to support findings – unrepresented  applicant failed to raise claim to fear persecution by reason of membership of particular social group – whether Tribunal erred in failing to consider persecution for that reason – whether extended family can constitute a “particular social group” – whether findings of fact made any error immaterial.

Migration Act 1958 (Cth), ss 430(1)(c), 476(1)(a), 476(1)(e), 476(1)(g), 476(4)(b).

Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, cited.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, applied.
Chan Yee Kin v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 169 CLR 379, cited.
Chen Shi Hai v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170 ALR 553, cited.
Gersten v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2000] FCA 855, cited.
Pat Toi Choi v Minister for Immigrationa and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Lindgren J, 2 December 1998), cited.
Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212, cited.
Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [1999] FCA 101, considered.
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Sarrazola (1999) 95 FCR 517, followed.
Applicant ‘A’ v  Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, cited.
Minister for Immigrigation and Multicultural Affairs v Zamora (1998) 85 FCR 458, cited.
Guo Wei Zhi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Full Court, 10 December 1998), cited.
Martinez v Secretary of State for the Home Department [1997] Imm AR 227, not followed.
C v  Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1999) 94 FCR 366, considered.
Sarrazola v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (No 3) [2000] FCA 919, cited.
Saliba v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs (1998) 89 FCR 38, followed.
Paramananthan v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 94 FCR 28, cited.
Meadows v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 370, cited.
Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321, followed.

EVERT HAIDEN GIRALDO v MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
N 876 of 2000

SACKVILLE J
SYDNEY
23 FEBRUARY 2001


IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA

NEW SOUTH WALES DISTRICT REGISTRY

N 876 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

EVERT HAIDEN GIRALDO
APPLICANT

AND:

MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION AND MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
RESPONDENT

JUDGE:

SACKVILLE J

DATE OF ORDER:

23 FEBRUARY 2001

WHERE MADE:

SYDNEY

THE COURT ORDERS THAT:

1.The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 6 July 2000 be set aside.

2.The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for determination according to law.

3.The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Note:    Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court…

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Details
Case
[2001] FCA 113
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Giraldo v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, the applicant, a Colombian national, sought a review of a decision made by the Refugee Review Tribunal (RRT) regarding his application for a protection visa. The applicant had fled Colombia after being threatened by members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a guerilla group, who intended to abduct his daughter for indoctrination and training. The central issue before the court was whether the RRT had appropriately assessed the applicant's claims and made the necessary findings on material questions of fact as required by the Migration Act.

The court examined whether the RRT had overlooked or misunderstood the evidence presented by the applicant, particularly concerning the threats made by FARC and their motivations. The applicant argued that the RRT failed to adequately consider whether the threats were politically motivated or if they were intended to intimidate him and his family into surrendering their farm. The court found that the RRT had indeed addressed these issues and concluded that the threats did not constitute persecution for Convention purposes. The applicant also contended that the RRT did not consider whether his departure from Colombia would result in persecution by FARC, a claim which the court deemed unsupported by any evidence.

Ultimately, the court held that the RRT had not failed to make the necessary findings on material questions of fact. While the applicant's account of the telephone calls to his aunt post-departure was relevant, it was not a critical fact under the RRT's approach to the case. The court emphasised the importance of adhering to the principles set out in previous cases, cautioning against substituting its own judgment for that of the RRT. Consequently, the decision of the RRT was set aside, and the matter was remitted for re-determination according to law. Additionally, the Minister was ordered to pay the applicant's costs.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. The decision of the Refugee Review Tribunal made on 6 July 2000 be set aside.

2. The matter be remitted to the Refugee Review Tribunal for determination according to law.

3. The respondent pay the applicant’s costs.

Background

Background to the litigation

The RRT had before it the applicant’s application for a protection visa and a written statement prepared by him in support of the application. The applicant also gave oral evidence to the RRT. Although the application to the RRT for review of the delegate’s decision was apparently prepared with the assistance of solicitors, the applicant was not represented at the hearing. Nor was he represented at the time he prepared his written statement.THE FACTS The applicant lived in Bogota, Colombia all his life, until his departure for Australia in October 1997. The applicant’s children were born in Colombia. The applicant worked as a self-employed building contractor until shortly before leaving Colombia. The applicant’s wife’s uncle is a longstanding member of the Liberal Party of Colombia, one of the two major political parties in that country. The applicant himself was a member of the Liberal Party and unsuccessfully stood for pre-selection at elections ultimately held in 1998 (after he had left Colombia). The applicant and his immediate family regularly visited a farm in San Antonio, located about 60 kilometres from Bogota. The farm had been owned by the applicant’s parents-in-law. The parents-in-law had raised their children (the applicant’s wife and siblings) on the farm. (The applicant gave oral evidence that title to the farm had been transferred to his wife and three of her four siblings, but the RRT apparently proceeded on the basis that at the relevant time the parents-in-law lived on and worked the farm.) On 31 August 1997, the applicant, his wife and his parents-in-law were at the farm, while the applicant’s two children stayed with a relative in Bogota. On that day, five FARC guerillas, each bearing weapons, arrived at the farm. The guerillas told the applicant that they intended to take his thirteen year old daughter for indoctrination and training to further their revolutionary ideals. They also told the applicant that they intended to “recruit” other youngsters in the area. The guerillas stated they knew the applicant’s family and political traditions well, since they had declared the uncle to be an enemy of FARC. They also said that the uncle, including his relatives, was a “political objective” of theirs. About a week later the applicant received a telephone call at his home from persons he believed to be FARC members. He was told that there were no major problems; that he should be ready to hand over his daughter; and that there would be no need for her to finish the school year as she would receive further education and political and military training in the FARC’s camps. After receiving this telephone call, the applicant arranged for his wife and daughter to stay with relatives in North Bogota. The applicant himself stayed with other relatives and attended to his business commitments. There was no further contact between the applicant and the FARC guerillas. Shortly thereafter, the applicant travelled to Venezuela to obtain Australian visas for himself and his immediate family. He returned to Colombia and, as already noted, the family left for Australia on 10 October 1997.

Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

There is nothing to suggest that the RRT misunderstood or misapplied the tests it correctly stated. Indeed, Mr Karp did not contend otherwise. Nor can it be said that the RRT overlooked the question. It did address the issue and conclude that the making of the threats themselves did not constitute persecution for Convention purposes.THE NO EVIDENCE SUBMISSION In order for the applicant to establish that there was no evidence or other material to justify the making of the decision (Migration Act, s 476(1)(g)), he must also satisfy the requirements of either s 476(4)(a) or s 476(4)(b) of the Migration Act. The applicant abandoned reliance on s 476(4)(a). Accordingly he must satisfy the requirements of s 476(4)(b), namely that“the person who made the decision based the decision on the existence of a particular fact, and that fact did not exist.” Section 476(4)(b) is the “gateway” through which an applicant must pass before the Court can proceed to hold that s 476(1)(g) is satisfied: Pat Tai Choi v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (unreported, Lindgren J, 2 December 1998) at 9. It follows that the applicant cannot avail himself of s 476(5)(g) unless he demonstrates that the “particular fact” does not exist: Curragh Queensland Mining Ltd v Daniel (1992) 34 FCR 212, at 223, per Black CJ. The particular fact identified by the applicant is that the FARC guerillas made the threats because they wished to intimidate the applicant and to induce his parents-in-law in effect to turn their farm over to FARC. The applicant adduced no evidence that would permit me to conclude that the FARC guerillas did not have the motivation attributed to them by the RRT. He has therefore not satisfied the requirements of s 476(4)(b). In any event, there was evidence before the RRT to justify the making of the finding. The country information relied on by the RRT provided at least some support for the RRT’s finding that the FARC guerillas made the threats to the applicant not because of any actual or imputed political opinion on his part, but because FARC wished to obtain control of the farm. Whether another decision-maker would have drawn that inference from the country information is not to the point. The finding was not devoid of an evidentiary basis.THE APPLICANT’S DEPARTURE FROM COLOMBIA The basis for the applicant’s fourth submission, that the RRT had failed to consider whether the applicant’s actions in leaving Colombia gave rise to a well-founded fear of persecution by FARC, is elusive. The applicant never suggested that FARC would or might seek to punish him for leaving the country. Mr Karp could not point to anything in the country information or other evidence that even faintly supported such a claim other than the conversations between the applicant’s aunt and a telephone caller from FARC. But what was communicated to the aunt was not a threat to harm the applicant because he had left Colombia, but the renewal of the threat made earlier.PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP

Decision

Reasons for decision

SACKVILLE J
None of this is intended to suggest that the applicant will be able to make out the necessary ingredients of a claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution by reason of his membership of his extended family. That is a matter for the RRT to decide. In my opinion, however, the matter should be remitted to the RRT for determination in accordance with law.CONCLUSION The decision of the RRT made on 6 July 2000 should be set aside. The matter should be remitted to the RRT for determination in accordance with law. The Minister should pay the applicant’s costs.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

Established by: SACKVILLE J

Whatever misgivings one might have about the RRT’s analysis of the facts, it is necessary to bear in mind the warning of the High Court in Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259, at 272, per Brennan CJ, Toohey, McHugh and Gummow JJ, against“turning a review of the reasons of the decision-maker upon proper principles into a reconsideration of the merits of the decision”.To be fair to Mr Karp, he did not suggest otherwise.SECTION 430(1)(c) OF THE MIGRATION ACT Section 430(1)(c) of the Migration Act requires the RRT to prepare a written statement that “sets out the findings on any material question of fact”. The content of that obligation was spelled out by the majority of a five member Full Court in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Singh (2000) 98 FCR 469, at 481-482:“Ordinarily, materiality is an objective concept. If the RRT fails to make a finding on a fact which is in truth, as a Court subsequently determines, a material fact, then s 430(1)(c) will not have been complied with, even though the RRT has recorded its findings in relation to the facts before it that it regarded as material.The generally accepted view in this Court has been that the RRT is under a duty to make, and to set out, findings on all matters of fact that are objectively material to the decision it is required to make. It must make findings on questions of fact that are central to the case raised by the material and evidence before it. In this respect, s 430 sets a standard of decision-making the RRT is required to observe.…[I]f a decision, one way or the other, turns upon whether a particular fact does or does not exist, having regard to the process of reasoning the Tribunal has employed as the basis for its decision, then the fact is a material one. But a requirement to set out findings on material questions of fact, and refer to the material on which the findings are based, is not to be translated into a requirement that all pieces of conflicting evidence relating to a material fact to be dealt with…Thus whilst materiality will not necessarily depend upon how an applicant chooses to present the issues, we do not agree that the only material facts are those on which the Tribunal is legally required to make findings…. A fact is material if the decision in the practical circumstances of the particular case turns upon whether that fact exists.”Two appeals raising the issue of the construction of s 430(1) have been heard by the High Court on 15 and 16 November 2000 but have not yet determined: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Yusuf ((1999) 95 FCR 506 (FC)); Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Israelian ([1999] FCA 649 (FC)). For the moment, the principles laid down in Singh are binding on single judges of this Court. In my view, given the way the RRT approached the case (a matter to which I shall return), the applicant’s claim that his aunt had received threatening telephone calls after his departure from Colombia cannot be described as a “material fact”. The critical questions for the RRT, on its approach, were whether threats had been made to the applicant by the FARC guerillas, whether FARC intended to carry out the threats; and whether the threats had been made for a Convention reason (that reason being identified by the RRT as actual or imputed political opinion). The applicant’s account of the telephone call to the aunt was merely one piece of evidence for the RRT to consider, along with all the other evidence before it.