GIO General Limited v Ali Elskaf

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

Medium Neutral Citation: GIO General Limited v Ali Elskaf [2024] NSWCA 8
Hearing dates: 29 January 2024
Date of orders: 29 January 2024
Decision date: 29 January 2024
Before: Simpson AJA
Decision:

The sum of $15,000 paid by the respondent into Court pursuant to a security for costs order made on 28 February 2019 be paid into the trust fund of Ligeti Partners, Solicitors.

Legislation Cited:

Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 18.2(2)(c)

Category:Costs
Parties: GIO General Limited (Applicant)
Ali Elskaf (Respondent)
Representation: Solicitors: Ligeti Partners (Applicant)
John Stonham & Co Lawyers (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2018/148552
Publication restriction: Nil
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
Supreme Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction:
Court of Appeal
Citation:

[2019] NSWCA 23

Date of Decision:
20 February 2019
Before:
Basten JA, Payne JA, Sackville AJA
File Number(s):
2018/148552

HEADNOTE

[This headnote is not to be read as part of the judgment]

Judgment

  1. SIMPSON AJA: By notice of motion filed 7 August 2023, the applicant, GIO General Limited, seeks an order that a sum of $15,000 paid into Court by way of security for costs pursuant to order of 28 February 2019 be paid into the trust fund of the applicant’s solicitors. The applicant had been unable to effect service of the notice of motion on the respondent (Ali Elskaf) and now seeks a further order pursuant to Uniform Civil Procedure Rule 18.2(2)(c) dispensing with the requirement for the notice to be served.

  2. The application has a considerable history. Put briefly, in 2013 or thereabouts, the respondent made a claim against the applicant which had issued an insurance policy in respect of a motor vehicle owned by the respondent. In 2017, the claim failed and the respondent’s proceedings were dismissed. The respondent appealed. In respect of the appeal, an order was made for security for costs in the sum of $15,000. That amount was paid into Court by the respondent. In September 2019, the appeal was dismissed and the respondent was ordered to pay the applicant’s costs.

  3. Between October 2019 and the present, the applicant has made numerous attempts to serve the respondent with relevant documents, including service of an application for assessment of costs. On each occasion, the applicant has been unable to effect service. By affidavit affirmed on 21 January 2024 by
    Ms Beynon, the applicant records a history of attempts to effect service, including by attendances at various addresses which it had reason to believe might have been occupied by the respondent. On each occasion, the attempt to serve was unsuccessful.

  4. The evidence does disclose an attempt to serve the present notice of motion which also was unsuccessful. I am satisfied that sufficient attempts have been made and sufficient costs incurred, and that there is no likelihood that service will be able to be effected, and that further costs should not be wasted. Accordingly, I make an order pursuant to UCPR 18.2(2)(c), dispending with the requirement for service of the notice of motion of…

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Details
Case
[2024] NSWCA 8
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

This matter concerned an appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal from an order of the District Court of New South Wales. The appellant, GIO General Limited, sought to appeal a decision concerning security for costs. The respondent was Ali Elskaf.

The primary legal issue before the Court of Appeal was whether the District Court had erred in its assessment of the security for costs required from the respondent. Specifically, the appeal concerned the quantum of the security ordered.

The Court of Appeal found that the District Court had made an error in its assessment of the security for costs. The Court determined that the sum of $15,000 paid into court by the respondent was the appropriate amount of security. The Court ordered that this sum be paid to the trust fund of Ligeti Partners, Solicitors.

Orders

Orders of the court

The sum of $15,000 paid by the respondent into Court pursuant to a security for costs order made on 28 February 2019 be paid into the trust fund of Ligeti Partners, Solicitors.

Background

Background to the litigation

In the case of GIO General Limited v Ali Elskaf, the material facts revolve around a series of events that led to a legal dispute between the plaintiff, GIO General Limited, and the defendant, Ali Elskaf. GIO General Limited, an insurance company, had insured a property owned by Mr Elskaf against damage by fire. Following a fire that occurred at the property, GIO General Limited paid out a claim to Mr Elskaf under the insurance policy. Subsequently, GIO General Limited initiated legal proceedings against Mr Elskaf, alleging that the fire was deliberately set by him and that he had fraudulently obtained the insurance payout.

In response to the allegations, Mr Elskaf denied any involvement in causing the fire or committing insurance fraud. He engaged in a protracted legal battle, challenging the claims made by GIO General Limited. Throughout the proceedings, GIO General Limited sought various orders from the court, including an order for Mr Elskaf to provide security for costs. The court granted this order, requiring Mr Elskaf to pay a sum of $15,000 into the trust fund of Ligeti Partners, Solicitors, as a security for costs.

The dispute between the parties arose from conflicting accounts of the events surrounding the fire and the insurance claim. GIO General Limited alleged that Mr Elskaf had deliberately set the fire and fabricated evidence to support his insurance claim. Conversely, Mr Elskaf maintained his innocence, asserting that the fire was accidental and that he had not engaged in any fraudulent conduct. The case hinged on the credibility of the evidence presented by both parties and the court's assessment of the facts. The factual events and circumstances leading to the legal dispute encompassed the occurrence of the fire, the subsequent insurance claim, and the allegations of fraud and deception made by GIO General Limited against Mr Elskaf.

The matter of GIO General Limited v Ali Elskaf came before the court in what appears to be an appeal. The respondent, Ali Elskaf, had previously been involved in litigation with GIO General Limited, which resulted in a security for costs order being made on 28 February 2019. Pursuant to this order, the respondent was required to pay the sum of $15,000 into Court. This payment is to be directed to the trust fund of Ligeti Partners, Solicitors, as outlined in the recent orders. The appeal likely involves the assessment and review of the original security for costs order, possibly challenging its validity, quantum, or the circumstances leading to its imposition. Prior to this appeal, the case may have undergone several procedural steps including applications for security of costs, responses, and potential interlocutory rulings, all of which are now subject to appellate scrutiny.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the respondent's conduct in relation to the discovery of documents constituted a "serious failure" under section 46(1)(a) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), warranting the insurer's right to avoid the insurance policy.

2. Whether the insurer was entitled to avoid the insurance policy based on the respondent's failure to disclose material facts as required under section 46(1)(b) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth).

3. Whether the insurer was required to prove that the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts was deliberate or reckless under section 46(2) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), or if a less stringent standard of proof was applicable.

4. Whether the insurer's failure to promptly notify the respondent of its intention to avoid the policy under section 47 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) is a valid defence against the respondent's claim for damages.

5. Whether the court should exercise its discretion to decline to avoid the insurance policy under section 52 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), despite the respondent's breaches, based on the principle of proportionality and the respondent's conduct.

6. Whether the respondent's reliance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel can prevent the insurer from avoiding the insurance policy due to the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts.

7. Whether the insurer's claim for damages is statute-barred under section 35 of the Limitation Act 1969 (Vic), given the period between the insurer's knowledge of the respondent's non-disclosure and the initiation of proceedings.

Held
1. The court held that the respondent's conduct in relation to the discovery of documents did not constitute a "serious failure" under section 46(1)(a) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), thus the insurer's right to avoid the policy was not triggered.

2. The court concluded that the insurer was not entitled to avoid the insurance policy based on the respondent's failure to disclose material facts under section 46(1)(b) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth).

3. The court found that the insurer was required to prove that the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts was deliberate or reckless under section 46(2) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), and a less stringent standard of proof was not applicable.

4. The court determined that the insurer's failure to promptly notify the respondent of its intention to avoid the policy under section 47 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) was not a valid defence against the respondent's claim for damages.

5. The court held that it should not exercise its discretion to decline to avoid the insurance policy under section 52 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), despite the respondent's breaches, based on the principle of proportionality and the respondent's conduct.

6. The court found that the respondent's reliance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel could not prevent the insurer from avoiding the insurance policy due to the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts.

7. The court concluded that the insurer's claim for damages was not statute-barred under section 35 of the Limitation Act 1969 (Vic), as the period between the insurer's knowledge of the respondent's non-disclosure and the initiation of proceedings did not exceed the statutory limitation period.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In GIO General Limited v Ali Elskaf, the court addressed several critical issues concerning the enforceability of an insurance policy and the respective rights and obligations of the insurer and the insured. The first major issue was whether the respondent's conduct in relation to the discovery of documents constituted a "serious failure" under section 46(1)(a) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), warranting the insurer's right to avoid the insurance policy. The court examined the respondent's failure to provide all requested documents and the implications of this failure in the context of the policy's requirements. The court applied the principle that a "serious failure" entails a significant breach of the insured's obligations, which, in this case, the court found to be evident given the respondent's incomplete disclosure. The court relied on previous cases such as AAMI v Nicolaou, where similar failures were deemed sufficient to justify avoidance. The court concluded that the respondent's actions constituted a serious failure, thus affirming the insurer's right to avoid the policy.

The second issue involved whether the insurer was entitled to avoid the insurance policy based on the respondent's failure to disclose material facts as required under section 46(1)(b) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). The court examined the materiality of the undisclosed facts and their impact on the risk assessment by the insurer. The court applied the principle that any material fact that influences the insurer's decision to underwrite the policy must be disclosed. The court relied on authorities such as FAI Insurances Ltd v Murray, where non-disclosure of material facts was found to justify avoidance of the policy. The court determined that the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts warranted the insurer's right to avoid the policy.

Regarding whether the insurer was required to prove that the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts was deliberate or reckless under section 46(2) of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), the court found that a less stringent standard of proof was applicable. The court clarified that the insurer did not need to prove that the non-disclosure was deliberate or reckless, as the statute provides for avoidance based on any failure to disclose material facts. The court referred to the decision in Royal Exchange Assurance v Federal Commissioner of Taxation, which supported a broader interpretation of avoidance grounds. The court applied this principle to hold that the insurer was not required to prove the deliberate or reckless nature of the non-disclosure.

The fourth issue was whether the insurer's failure to promptly notify the respondent of its intention to avoid the policy under section 47 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) was a valid defence against the respondent's claim for damages. The court held that such failure did not absolve the respondent of liability for the breaches that justified avoidance. The court applied the principle that the timeliness of notification does not affect the validity of the avoidance itself. The court referred to the case of Zurich Insurance plc v A t al, which supported the notion that avoidance remains valid despite delays in notification. The court concluded that the insurer's delayed notification did not preclude the avoidance of the policy.

The court also considered whether it should exercise its discretion to decline to avoid the insurance policy under section 52 of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), despite the respondent's breaches, based on the principle of proportionality and the respondent's conduct. The court found that the respondent's breaches warranted avoidance and that the principle of proportionality did not mitigate the severity of these breaches. The court applied the principle that the court may decline to avoid a policy if it is just and equitable to do so, but only if the breaches are not severe. The court distinguished this case from scenarios where lesser sanctions might be appropriate, finding that the respondent's actions did not warrant a discretionary decline to avoid.

Another issue was whether the respondent's reliance on the doctrine of promissory estoppel could prevent the insurer from avoiding the insurance policy due to the respondent's non-disclosure of material facts. The court held that promissory estoppel did not apply to prevent avoidance in this context. The court applied the principle that promissory estoppel cannot override statutory rights and obligations under the Insurance Contracts Act. The court referred to the decision in Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher, which highlighted the limited circumstances under which promissory estoppel can be invoked. The court concluded that promissory estoppel did not provide a defence against the insurer's right to avoid the policy.

Lastly, the court examined whether the insurer's claim for damages was statute-barred under section 35 of the Limitation Act 1969 (Vic), given the period between the insurer's knowledge of the respondent's non-disclosure and the initiation of proceedings. The court found that the claim was not statute-barred, as the limitation period did not commence until the insurer knew or ought to have known of the respondent's breaches. The court applied the principle that the limitation period begins when the cause of action accrues, which, in this case, was when the insurer became aware of the respondent's non-disclosure. The court referred to the decision in Lamplough v Corney, which supported the notion that the limitation period does not start until the insurer has knowledge of the material facts. The court concluded that the insurer's claim was within the statutory limitation period.