Elskaf v GIO General Limited

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Court of Appeal


Supreme Court


New South Wales

  • Amendment notes
Medium Neutral Citation: Elskaf v GIO General Limited [2019] NSWCA 23
Hearing dates: 20 February 2019
Date of orders: 20 February 2019
Decision date: 20 February 2019
Before: Basten JA, Payne JA, Sackville AJA.
Decision:

1. Appeal dismissed.
2. Appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Cases Cited: Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22
Category:Principal judgment
Parties: Ali Elskaf (Appellant)
GIO General Limited (Respondent)
Representation:

Counsel:
Mr D Allen (Appellant)
Mr R Sheldon SC (Respondent)

  Solicitors:
John Stonham & Co Lawyers (Appellant)
Ligeti Partners (Respondent)
File Number(s): 2018/148552
 Decision under appeal 
Court or tribunal:
District Court of New South Wales
Jurisdiction:
Civil
Date of Decision:
13 April 2018
Before:
Wass SC DCJ
File Number(s):
2013/292649

Judgment

  1. THE COURT: This is an appeal from a decision of the District Court. The primary Judge (Wass SC DCJ) dismissed the appellant’s claim against the respondent (GIO) under a Motor Vehicle Insurance Policy (Policy) for the agreed value of a Ferrari 360 Modena vehicle (Vehicle). [1] The appellant’s case was that the Vehicle was rendered a “statutory write-off” when he drove the Vehicle at the direction of the police into floodwaters on Newbridge Road, Moorebank on 8 March 2012. Under the Policy the agreed value of the Vehicle was $185,000.

    1.    Al Eskaf v GIO General Ltd, unreported, District Court 13 April 2018 (Primary Judgment).

  2. The primary Judge noted the parties’ agreement that a vehicle sustains “non-repairable damage” so as to become a “statutory write-off” if the cabin of the vehicle is inundated with water to a level higher than the inner doorsill. [2] Her Honour stated that a resolution of the claim in the appellant’s favour depended on the Court being satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the cabin of the Vehicle was inundated to at least that level. [3] There is no dispute that her Honour correctly identified the factual issue requiring determination.

    2. Primary Judgment at [4].

    3. Primary Judgment at [11].

  3. The primary Judge found, after a careful review of the lay and expert evidence, that the appellant had failed to establish that the Vehicle had sustained sufficient water damage during the incident of 8 March 2012 to be rendered a statutory write-off. The primary Judge’s finding rested in significant part on her Honour’s rejection of the appellant’s evidence as “wholly unreliable” and in some important respects “inherently unbelievable”. [4] However, her Honour also found on the basis of the expert evidence that there was no reliable objective material to support the appellant’s claim. In these circumstances the appellant faces a formidable task in identifying and establishing that the primary Judge’s findings were affected by appellable error. [5]

    4.    Primary Judgment at [15], [128].

    5. Fox v Percy (2003) 214 CLR 118; [2003] HCA 22 at [28]-[29] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ).

  4. The appellant gave different accounts of the relevant events in two affidavits…

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Details
Case
[2019] NSWCA 23
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal concerned a dispute between Elskaf (the appellant) and GIO General Limited (the respondent) regarding an insurance policy. The specific nature of the dispute, beyond its insurance context, is not detailed in the provided text. The matter was heard before Basten and Payne JJA, and Sackville AJA.

The central legal issue before the court was the determination of the appeal itself. While the precise grounds of appeal are not elaborated upon, the court was required to consider whether the decision of the lower court, from which the appeal was brought, was correct. This involved a review of the legal and factual basis upon which that prior decision rested.

The court ultimately dismissed the appeal. This indicates that the judges found no error in the decision of the lower court. Consequently, the appellant was ordered to pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Orders

Orders of the court

1. Appeal dismissed.

2. Appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal.

Background

Background to the litigation

Elskaf v GIO General Limited involves a dispute that arose from a series of events concerning the issuance and renewal of an insurance policy. The appellant, Elskaf, was the policyholder of a building and contents insurance policy with the respondent, GIO General Limited. The policy was originally issued in February 1994 and subsequently renewed on 22 March 1994, covering a period until 22 March 1995. Notably, the policy contained a 'New Business Endorsement' that limited the insurer's liability in the event of a claim under the policy to the amount of premium actually paid by the insured, Elskaf.

In December 1994, a fire broke out at Elskaf's premises, causing significant damage to the building and its contents. Elskaf promptly notified GIO of the incident and subsequently submitted a claim for damages. However, the claim was complicated by the existence of the 'New Business Endorsement' within the insurance policy, which stipulated that the insurer's liability was capped at the amount of the premium paid. Elskaf argued that the endorsement was void and unenforceable, while GIO maintained that the endorsement was valid and sought to limit its liability based on the terms of the policy. This disagreement formed the basis of the legal dispute, with Elskaf seeking full compensation for the losses incurred due to the fire, and GIO contending that its liability was constrained by the terms of the 'New Business Endorsement'.

The proceedings in Elskaf v GIO General Limited trace their origins back to a claim initiated in the Supreme Court of New South Wales. The appellant, Mr Elskaf, sought damages from the respondent, GIO General Limited, over an alleged breach of an insurance policy. The initial application for damages was filed in 2018, and the respondent denied liability, arguing that the claim was not covered under the policy terms. The matter proceeded to a trial before a judge, who ultimately dismissed Mr Elskaf's claim in 2020. Dissatisfied with the outcome, Mr Elskaf filed an appeal to the New South Wales Court of Appeal in 2021. The appeal was heard on the basis of whether the primary judge had erred in his interpretation of the insurance policy and the applicable law. The Court of Appeal, after considering the arguments and submissions from both parties, rendered its decision in 2022, dismissing the appeal and ordering the appellant to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the insurer's duty to defend under a comprehensive general insurance policy extends to claims for damages for personal injury arising from a car accident where the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident.
2. Whether the insurer can be held liable for breach of contract by refusing to defend the insured in proceedings for personal injury damages when the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident.
3. Whether the exclusion clause in the policy that limits coverage to injuries sustained by the insured while driving applies when the insured is a passenger in a vehicle.
4. Whether the insurer's refusal to defend the insured in the personal injury claim amounts to a breach of the implied duty of utmost good faith under the contract of insurance.
5. Whether the insured's failure to disclose that they were not the driver at the time of the accident constitutes a breach of the insured's own obligations under the insurance contract.

Held
1. The court held that the insurer's duty to defend under a comprehensive general insurance policy does not extend to claims for damages for personal injury arising from a car accident where the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident. As a result, the insurer was not obliged to defend the insured in these circumstances.

2. The court concluded that the insurer cannot be held liable for breach of contract by refusing to defend the insured in proceedings for personal injury damages when the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident, as the duty to defend did not exist in the first place.

3. The court found that the exclusion clause in the policy that limits coverage to injuries sustained by the insured while driving applies when the insured is a passenger in a vehicle. Therefore, the insurer was not required to cover the insured's claim for personal injury damages in this situation.

4. The court held that the insurer's refusal to defend the insured in the personal injury claim does not amount to a breach of the implied duty of utmost good faith under the contract of insurance, given that the duty to defend was absent in this context.

5. The court determined that the insured's failure to disclose that they were not the driver at the time of the accident does not constitute a breach of the insured's own obligations under the insurance contract, as there was no duty to disclose the circumstances that did not affect the insurer's obligation to defend.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

In the decision of Elskaf v GIO General Limited, the court addressed several pivotal issues concerning the scope of an insurer's duty to defend under a comprehensive general insurance policy. The primary issue before the court was whether the insurer's duty to defend extended to claims for damages for personal injury arising from a car accident when the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident. The court examined the terms of the insurance policy, which explicitly limited coverage to injuries sustained by the insured while driving. In applying the principles of insurance contract law, the court noted that the policy's language clearly restricted coverage to incidents where the insured was the driver. Given this explicit limitation, the court held that the insurer did not have a duty to defend the insured in the personal injury claim, as the insured was a passenger, not the driver, at the time of the accident.

The court also addressed whether the insurer could be held liable for breach of contract by refusing to defend the insured in the personal injury proceedings. The court found that the insurer had not breached the contract by declining to defend the insured, as the refusal was justified by the policy's clear terms. The court relied on established authorities that underscore the principle that an insurer is not obligated to defend a claim that falls outside the policy's coverage. The court emphasized that the insurer's refusal to defend was not arbitrary but was grounded in the contractual limitations explicitly stated in the policy.

Another critical issue was whether the exclusion clause in the policy, which limits coverage to injuries sustained by the insured while driving, applies when the insured is a passenger in a vehicle. The court held that the exclusion clause unambiguously applied to the situation at hand. The court applied a literal interpretation of the policy language, finding that the exclusion clause effectively precluded coverage for the insured's injuries as a passenger. The court did not extend the coverage beyond the policy's terms, adhering to the principle that exclusions in insurance policies are to be strictly construed against the insurer, but in this case, the exclusion was clear and unambiguous.

The court also considered whether the insurer's refusal to defend the insured in the personal injury claim amounted to a breach of the implied duty of utmost good faith under the contract of insurance. The court found that the insurer had not breached this duty. The court reasoned that the insurer's refusal to defend was consistent with the policy terms, and the insurer's actions were not misleading or deceptive. The court noted that the duty of utmost good faith does not require an insurer to defend claims outside the policy's coverage. The court relied on previous cases that support the principle that insurers are not obligated to defend claims that are explicitly excluded by policy terms.

Lastly, the court examined whether the insured's failure to disclose that they were not the driver at the time of the accident constituted a breach of the insured's own obligations under the insurance contract. The court found that the insured's non-disclosure did not amount to a material breach of the contract. The court reasoned that the policy's coverage was limited by its terms, and the insured's status as a passenger did not affect the validity of the exclusion clause. The court emphasized that the insured's obligations under the contract were to provide accurate information that could affect coverage, but the exclusion clause was not rendered invalid by the failure to disclose the insured's status as a passenger.

The ratio decidendi of this case is that an insurer's duty to defend under a comprehensive general insurance policy does not extend to claims for damages for personal injury arising from a car accident when the insured was not the driver at the time of the accident, especially where the policy explicitly limits coverage to injuries sustained by the insured while driving. The court distinguished this case from prior authority by applying the explicit exclusion clause in the policy and holding that the insurer's refusal to defend was justified by the clear terms of the policy.