FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
Ginger Roger Pty Ltd v Parrella Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 128
Citation: Ginger Roger Pty Ltd v Parrella Enterprises Pty Ltd (No 2) [2010] FCA 128 Parties: GINGER ROGER PTY LTD (ACN 080 582 010) and KHIMJI TRIKAMJI v PARRELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 080 582 010), STEVEN ROBERT PARRELLA, FAMORE BUSINESS BROKERS PTY LTD (ACN 010 254 930) and SMILEY FREDLYN RADNOR SANSONI File number: QUD 150 of 2009 Judge: COLLIER J Date of judgment: 24 February 2010 Catchwords: PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – notice of motion for leave to amend defence – Order 13 rule 2 Federal Court Rules – principles in Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 258 ALR 14
Held: notice of motion allowed in part
Legislation: Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) s 51A
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) s 180
Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) ss 52, 82(1B), 87CB, 87CD
Federal Court Rules O 13 r 2Cases cited: Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 258 ALR 14 applied
BHPB Freight Pty Ltd v Cosco Oceania Chartering Pty Ltd (No 2) [2008] FCA 1656 cited
The Australian National University v Chubb Insurance Company of Australia Ltd [2007] ACTSC 82 citedDate of hearing: 22 February 2010 Place: Brisbane Division: GENERAL DIVISION Category: Catchwords Number of paragraphs: 28 Solicitor for the First and Second Applicants: Mr PG Lynch of Lynch Morgan Solicitor for the First and Second Respondents: Mr CL Kohler of Hollingworth and Spencer Counsel for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Mr S Couper QC Solicitor for the Third and Fourth Respondents: Carter Newell
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 150 of 2009
BETWEEN: GINGER ROGER PTY LTD (ACN 080 582 010)
First ApplicantKHIMJI TRIKAMJI
Second ApplicantAND: PARRELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 080 582 010)
First RespondentSTEVEN ROBERT PARRELLA
Second RespondentFAMORE BUSINESS BROKERS PTY LTD (ACN 010 254 930)
Third RespondentSMILEY FREDLYN RADNOR SANSONI
Fourth Respondent
JUDGE:
COLLIER J
DATE OF ORDER:
24 FEBRUARY 2010
WHERE MADE:
BRISBANE
THE COURT ORDERS THAT:
1.The Notice of Motion be allowed in part.
2.The third and fourth respondents have leave, pursuant to Order 13 rule 2 of the Federal Court Rules, to amend their Defence to the applicants’ claim by the addition of paragraphs 38A, 38B and 38C(a), (e), (f) and (g) as found in the document titled “DEFENCE OF THE THIRD AND FOURTH RESPONDENTS” in exhibit BJH1 to the Affidavit of Brett John Heath filed 18 February 2010.
3.Costs be reserved.
Note:Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with in Order 36 of the Federal Court Rules.
The text of entered orders can be located using Federal Law Search on the Court’s website.
IN THE FEDERAL COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
GENERAL DIVISION
QUD 150 of 2009
BETWEEN: GINGER ROGER PTY LTD (ACN 080 582 010)
First ApplicantKHIMJI TRIKAMJI
Second ApplicantAND: PARRELLA ENTERPRISES PTY LTD (ACN 080…
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- Case
- [2010] FCA 128
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the timing and reasons for the respondents' delay in filing the notice of motion. It noted that the applicants had already been aware of the issues through other documents and witness statements, which reduced the potential for surprise or significant prejudice. The court found that the respondents' solicitors had acted properly in ensuring the evidence supported the amendments before filing the notice of motion. Additionally, the court rejected the notion that the delay was part of a deliberate tactic to disadvantage the applicants, and concluded that the respondents had not breached any statutory obligations.
In conclusion, the court granted leave for the respondents to amend their defence, but disallowed certain proposed paragraphs that related to contributory negligence, concurrent wrongdoer status, and apportionment of liability. The court's decision balanced the need for fair litigation processes against the respondents' right to present their case, ultimately allowing the amendments that did not unfairly prejudice the applicants.
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Background to the litigation
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Evidence Before The Court
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Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Notwithstanding this material, the solicitors for the third and fourth respondents did not give notice to the applicants of a proportionate liability claim until 4 February 2010.Consideration In my view the notice of motion of the third and fourth respondents should be allowed in part. I refuse leave in respect of the material in proposed para 38C(b), (c) and (d) as set out earlier in my judgment. I form this view for the following reasons. First, it cannot be said that the proposed amendments to the Defence of the third and fourth respondents so far as relate to alleged contributory negligence of the first applicant, the issue of the second applicant being a concurrent wrongdoer, or apportionment of liability, take the applicants by surprise. This is so in light of the material in para 58(vi) of the Defence of the first and second respondents (which was filed on 11 August 2009). Second, it was common ground at the hearing before me in this matter last Monday that there is substantial factual overlap between the proposed amendments to the Defence and the material in the witness statements of Ms Tune, Ms Leverton and Mr Constable. Indeed this material has already been the subject of a reply statement by Mr Trikamji dated 9 February 2010. Whether the applicants will need to adduce further evidence to respond to the proposed amendments to the Defence of the third and fourth respondents is unclear. Such evidence may be completely unnecessary in light of the existing evidence filed in these proceedings. Accordingly the degree to which the applicants would suffer prejudice, substantial or otherwise, from the amendments to the Defence of the third and fourth respondents so far as concerns the issues of contributory negligence, concurrent wrongdoer and apportionment of liability, is not clear. Third, I am not persuaded that the third and fourth respondents have improperly delayed the filing of the notice of motion to amend the Defence. Although the notice of motion was not filed until 18 February 2010, it is common ground that the solicitors for the applicants were notified by letter, dated 4 February 2010 from the solicitors for the third and fourth respondents, of the intention of the third and fourth respondents to seek leave of the Court to amend the Defence in the terms currently before the Court. I note that between 4 February 2010 and 18 February 2010 the parties participated in mediation discussions in an attempt to resolve these proceedings, which discussions were unsuccessful. Fourth, I am not persuaded that the solicitors for the third and fourth respondents have in any way acted improperly in their conduct of the case of the third and fourth respondents, or in respect of the process by which a decision was reached to seek the leave of the Court to amend the Defence. In my view it was perfectly proper prior to the filing of a notice of motion seeking leave to amend the Defence that the solicitors for the third and fourth respondents should be satisfied that evidence in witness statements and an expert report supported an amendment to the Defence. I am not persuaded that the solicitors for the third and fourth respondents should have advised their clients as early as October 2009 that leave of the Court should be sought to amend the Defence. Further, I am not prepared to draw the inference in these proceedings that the timing of the notice of motion was part of a deliberate tactic of the third and fourth respondents to, for example, thwart the litigation or otherwise create an unfair advantage for their clients to the prejudice of the applicants at this stage of the proceedings. I am also not prepared to find at this stage that the third and fourth respondents have acted in breach of s 87CE of the Act, because I am not persuaded that the third and fourth respondent have acted otherwise than as soon as practicable for the purposes of s 87CE(1)(b).