SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY
Case Title: | Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 1) |
Citation: | [2021] ACTSC 303 |
Hearing Dates: | 5, 6, 10, 11 July 2018 |
DecisionDate: | 11 July 2018 |
Reasons Date: | 17 December 2021 |
Before: | Penfold J |
Decision: | The application is refused. |
Catchwords: | PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for judge to recuse herself from the trial – applicant’s refusal to identify nature of alleged bias – whether there was evidence of apprehended or actual bias – no evidence of bias. |
Legislation Cited: | Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 41, 57 |
Cases Cited: | Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337 Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 304 Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; 255 CLR 135 South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16 |
Texts Cited: | Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, ‘Australian and New Zealand Clinical Practice Guidelines for the treatment of Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia’ (Website, 2003) < |
Parties: | Laila Gindy ( Plaintiff) Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd ( First Defendant) David Chen (Second Defendant) Paul Crabb (Third Defendant) |
Representation: | Counsel Unrepresented with M Elmaraazey ( Plaintiff with McKenzie friend) M Walsh SC ( Defendants) |
| Solicitors Unrepresented ( Plaintiff) Boettcher Law ( Defendants) | |
File Number: | SC 444 of 2015 |
PENFOLD J:
Introduction
Laila Gindy sued her former solicitors in relation to work they performed for her in three different matters (the Comcare matter, the Motor Vehicle Accident (MVA) matter and the foreclosure matter) over the period from mid-2010 to late 2012.
Ms Gindy was unrepresented at the hearing, but was assisted in putting her case by her husband Mamdouh Elmaraazey, a former solicitor, on the basis of an order made, some time before the matter reached me, that permitted him to act as a McKenzie friend (see Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 304).
The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel.
The circumstances of the bias application
From early in the hearing, there had been vague suggestions from each of Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey that a claim of bias might be made (in a similar vein, there were vague suggestions from time to time that counsel would be required to give evidence).
On Day 51 of what turned out to be an 88-day hearing, Ms Gindy was in re-examination, which had been interrupted by a dispute about the admission of documents subpoenaed from the ANZ Bank (ANZ) by the defendants. Mr Elmaraazey on behalf of Ms Gindy insisted that the documents should not be admitted unless he was permitted to cross-examine the ANZ officer who had responded to the subpoena and, in her affidavit, had given a brief explanation of how the documents had been extracted from the bank’s electronic systems.
Mr Elmaraazey struggled to explain why he needed to cross-examine any ANZ officer about the bank records, but continued to make submissions despite my attempts to close…
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- Case
- [2021] ACTSC 303
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
Background
Background to the litigation
This case came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as a first instance hearing. The plaintiff, Laila Gindy, brought a claim against her former solicitors, Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd, and its employees in relation to work they performed for her in three different legal matters. Gindy was unrepresented at the hearing but was assisted by her husband, a former solicitor, acting as a McKenzie friend. The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel. The matter was heard over 88 days, with the final decision handed down on 11 July 2018. During the hearing, Gindy made an oral application for the judge to recuse herself on the basis of alleged bias. The application was ultimately refused on 17 December 2021.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the judge's comments indicated pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, suggesting actual bias?
2. Did the judge's comments about a conspiracy theory imply pre-judgment and actual bias?
3. Was there any evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias?
4. Did the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicate actual bias?
5. Did the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination indicate actual bias?
6. Did counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, indicate actual bias on the part of the judge?
7. Was there actual bias shown by the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination?
Held
1. Whether the judge's comments indicated pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, suggesting actual bias?
The court concluded that the judge's comments did not indicate pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, and therefore did not suggest actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
2. Did the judge's comments about a conspiracy theory imply pre-judgment and actual bias?
The court determined that the judge's comments about the conspiracy theory did not imply pre-judgment or actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
3. Was there any evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias?
The court found no evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
4. Did the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicate actual bias?
The court concluded that the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise did not indicate actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
5. Did the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination indicate actual bias?
The court held that the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination did not indicate actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
6. Did counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, indicate actual bias on the part of the judge?
The court determined that counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, did not indicate actual bias on the part of the judge. Result: Not applicable.
7. Was there actual bias shown by the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination?
The court found that the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination did not show actual bias. Result: Not applicable.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court thoroughly examined Ms Gindy's application for the judge to recuse herself, focusing on whether the judge's comments and conduct demonstrated actual bias. The judge addressed each of Ms Gindy's claims systematically, applying the principles of actual bias as articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds. The judge rejected the notion that Ms Gindy's claims amounted to actual bias, explaining that actual bias requires a showing that the judge is so committed to a preformed conclusion that they cannot be persuaded by evidence or arguments.
First, the judge dismissed the claim that her comments about conspiracy theories indicated pre-judgment, noting that these comments arose in response to Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey's own allegations of conspiracies, and that they reflected impatience with what seemed to be inappropriate objections rather than pre-judgment of the case. The judge found no evidence that these comments demonstrated a commitment to a conclusion that would prevent her from being open to persuasion by evidence.
Second, the judge rejected the claim of private conversations between her and counsel. She clarified that any discussions with counsel took place in open court and were subject to the principle of open justice, and she found no evidence of bias in this regard.
Third, the judge addressed the claim that her deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicated actual bias. She noted that it was reasonable to rely on counsel's advice in areas where counsel had significant expertise, and that instances where she departed from counsel's advice demonstrated an openness to persuasion.
Fourth, the judge found that her handling of interruptions during cross-examination did not indicate bias. She noted that counsel's objections to interruptions were reasonable, and that her attempts to control the proceedings were aimed at ensuring a fair hearing, not evidence of bias.
Fifth, the judge dismissed the claim that counsel's objections on relevance grounds during Ms Gindy's evidence-in-chief indicated bias. She explained that counsel's objections were properly based on the relevance of the evidence at the time, and that later relevance did not undermine the propriety of the objections.
Finally, the judge found that her failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination did not indicate bias. She reasoned that the term could be relevant to Ms Gindy's claims, and that not asking for an explanation did not demonstrate a pre-judgment of her condition.
In conclusion, the judge found that Ms Gindy had not established actual bias, as the evidence did not show that she was "so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented." The application for recusal was therefore refused.