Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 1)

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SUPREME COURT OF THE AUSTRALIAN CAPITAL TERRITORY

Case Title:

Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 1)

Citation:

[2021] ACTSC 303

Hearing Dates:

5, 6, 10, 11 July 2018

DecisionDate:

11 July 2018

Reasons Date:

17 December 2021

Before:

Penfold J

Decision:

The application is refused.

Catchwords:

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE – Application for judge to recuse herself from the trial – applicant’s refusal to identify nature of alleged bias – whether there was evidence of apprehended or actual bias – no evidence of bias.

Legislation Cited:

Evidence Act 2011 (ACT) ss 41, 57

Cases Cited:

Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [2000] HCA 63; 205 CLR 337

Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 304

Isbester v Knox City Council [2015] HCA 20; 255 CLR 135

South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds [2007] NSWCA 16

Texts Cited:

Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Psychiatrists, ‘Australian and New Zealand Clinical Practice Guidelines for the treatment of Panic Disorder and Agoraphobia’ (Website, 2003) <

Parties:

Laila Gindy ( Plaintiff)

Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd ( First Defendant)

David Chen (Second Defendant)

Paul Crabb (Third Defendant)

Representation:

Counsel

Unrepresented with M Elmaraazey ( Plaintiff with McKenzie friend)

M Walsh SC ( Defendants)

Solicitors

Unrepresented ( Plaintiff)

Boettcher Law ( Defendants)

File Number:

SC 444 of 2015

PENFOLD J:

Introduction

  1. Laila Gindy sued her former solicitors in relation to work they performed for her in three different matters (the Comcare matter, the Motor Vehicle Accident (MVA) matter and the foreclosure matter) over the period from mid-2010 to late 2012.

  1. Ms Gindy was unrepresented at the hearing, but was assisted in putting her case by her husband Mamdouh Elmaraazey, a former solicitor, on the basis of an order made, some time before the matter reached me, that permitted him to act as a McKenzie friend (see Gindy v Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd (No 2) [2021] ACTSC 304).

  1. The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel.

The circumstances of the bias application

  1. From early in the hearing, there had been vague suggestions from each of Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey that a claim of bias might be made (in a similar vein, there were vague suggestions from time to time that counsel would be required to give evidence).

  1. On Day 51 of what turned out to be an 88-day hearing, Ms Gindy was in re-examination, which had been interrupted by a dispute about the admission of documents subpoenaed from the ANZ Bank (ANZ) by the defendants. Mr Elmaraazey on behalf of Ms Gindy insisted that the documents should not be admitted unless he was permitted to cross-examine the ANZ officer who had responded to the subpoena and, in her affidavit, had given a brief explanation of how the documents had been extracted from the bank’s electronic systems.

  1. Mr Elmaraazey struggled to explain why he needed to cross-examine any ANZ officer about the bank records, but continued to make submissions despite my attempts to close…

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Details
Case
[2021] ACTSC 303
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The plaintiff, Laila Gindy, sued her former solicitors, Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd and two of its employees, David Chen and Paul Crabb, in relation to work they performed for her in three different matters over the period from mid-2010 to late 2012. The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel. Ms Gindy was unrepresented at the hearing, but was assisted in putting her case by her husband Mamdouh Elmaraazey, a former solicitor, on the basis of an order made, some time before the matter reached the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory, that permitted him to act as a McKenzie friend. Penfold J heard the matter over 88 days and ultimately refused Ms Gindy’s application for the judge to recuse herself on the grounds of apprehended or actual bias. Ms Gindy’s application was based on six grounds: (a) that the judge had pre-judged her case because she had referred on a couple of occasions to the apparent belief of Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey that there was a conspiracy against both of them (the conspiracy theory claim); (b) that Ms Gindy suspected that there had been conversations between the judge and counsel for the defendants outside the courtroom (the private conversations claim); (c) that on a number of occasions the judge had made comments to the effect that counsel “will know better than I do” about a procedural matter that had arisen, and that accordingly, Ms Gindy believed, the judge would accept anything that counsel says or writes (the deference to counsel claim); (d) that on a number of occasions counsel had objected to having his cross-examination interrupted by Mr Elmaraazey’s objections, and Ms Gindy wondered whether there is a law against interrupting cross-examination (the cross-examination claim); (e) that counsel had taken over control of the proceedings: Ms Gindy claimed in particular that throughout her evidence-in-chief, most, if not all, of counsel’s objections on relevance grounds (whether to questions or to the tendering of evidence), related to matters that then turned out to be relevant in her cross-examination (the relevance objections claim); and (f) that during cross-examination, counsel asked a question referring to Ms Gindy’s “agoraphobia”, a word which Ms Gindy did not understand (the agoraphobia claim). In refusing the application, Penfold J noted that Ms Gindy did not identify what might have led her to decide her case “other than on its legal and factual merits”, or to identify any “interest” that the judge might have in the litigation, or to refer to what “a fair-minded lay observer” might have believed about the judge’s attitude to the matter. The judge was satisfied that the application was a claim of actual bias. The judge was also satisfied that Ms Gindy had not established actual bias. Ms Gindy had not even offered evidence that could, if accepted, have been adequate for a finding of apprehended bias. Accordingly, the bias application was refused.

Background

Background to the litigation

Laila Gindy, an unrepresented litigant, sued her former solicitors, Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd, in relation to work they performed for her in three different matters over the period from mid-2010 to late 2012. Ms Gindy was assisted by her husband, Mamdouh Elmaraazey, who was a former solicitor and was permitted to act as a McKenzie friend. The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel. During the 88-day hearing, there were vague suggestions from Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey that a claim of bias might be made against the judge. On Day 51 of the hearing, while Ms Gindy was in re-examination and there was a dispute about the admission of documents subpoenaed from the ANZ Bank by the defendants, Mr Elmaraazey insisted that the ANZ officer who had responded to the subpoena should give evidence in person. After the judge declined to entertain this application, Ms Gindy made an oral application for the judge to recuse herself from the trial, claiming that the judge had prejudged her case before hearing the evidence. Mr Elmaraazey also submitted that the judge had prejudged the case because she had referred to Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey's apparent belief that there was a conspiracy against both of them. The judge allowed Mr Elmaraazey and Ms Gindy until after lunch the following day to provide details of the claim of bias, but Mr Elmaraazey declined to identify whether Ms Gindy alleged actual or apprehended bias. On Day 52, Mr Elmaraazey submitted that Ms Gindy believed that the judge had prejudged her case, suspected that there had been conversations between the judge and counsel for the defendants outside the courtroom, believed that the judge would accept anything that counsel says or writes, wondered whether there is a law against interrupting cross-examination, and claimed that counsel had taken over control of the proceedings. After reviewing the transcript references provided by Mr Elmaraazey, the judge found that Ms Gindy had not established actual bias and that she had not even offered evidence that could, if accepted, have been adequate for a finding of apprehended bias. Accordingly, the bias application was refused.

This case came before the Supreme Court of the Australian Capital Territory as a first instance hearing. The plaintiff, Laila Gindy, brought a claim against her former solicitors, Capital Lawyers Pty Ltd, and its employees in relation to work they performed for her in three different legal matters. Gindy was unrepresented at the hearing but was assisted by her husband, a former solicitor, acting as a McKenzie friend. The defendants were represented by Senior Counsel. The matter was heard over 88 days, with the final decision handed down on 11 July 2018. During the hearing, Gindy made an oral application for the judge to recuse herself on the basis of alleged bias. The application was ultimately refused on 17 December 2021.

Decision

Reasons for decision

Issues
1. Whether the judge's comments indicated pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, suggesting actual bias?
2. Did the judge's comments about a conspiracy theory imply pre-judgment and actual bias?
3. Was there any evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias?
4. Did the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicate actual bias?
5. Did the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination indicate actual bias?
6. Did counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, indicate actual bias on the part of the judge?
7. Was there actual bias shown by the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination?

Held
1. Whether the judge's comments indicated pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, suggesting actual bias?
The court concluded that the judge's comments did not indicate pre-judgment of Ms Gindy's case, and therefore did not suggest actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

2. Did the judge's comments about a conspiracy theory imply pre-judgment and actual bias?
The court determined that the judge's comments about the conspiracy theory did not imply pre-judgment or actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

3. Was there any evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias?
The court found no evidence of private conversations between the judge and counsel that suggested actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

4. Did the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicate actual bias?
The court concluded that the judge's deference to counsel's procedural expertise did not indicate actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

5. Did the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination indicate actual bias?
The court held that the judge's handling of interruptions during cross-examination did not indicate actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

6. Did counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, indicate actual bias on the part of the judge?
The court determined that counsel's objections on relevance grounds, which later appeared relevant in cross-examination, did not indicate actual bias on the part of the judge. Result: Not applicable.

7. Was there actual bias shown by the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination?
The court found that the judge's failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination did not show actual bias. Result: Not applicable.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

The court thoroughly examined Ms Gindy's application for the judge to recuse herself, focusing on whether the judge's comments and conduct demonstrated actual bias. The judge addressed each of Ms Gindy's claims systematically, applying the principles of actual bias as articulated in Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy and South Western Sydney Area Health Service v Edmonds. The judge rejected the notion that Ms Gindy's claims amounted to actual bias, explaining that actual bias requires a showing that the judge is so committed to a preformed conclusion that they cannot be persuaded by evidence or arguments.

First, the judge dismissed the claim that her comments about conspiracy theories indicated pre-judgment, noting that these comments arose in response to Ms Gindy and Mr Elmaraazey's own allegations of conspiracies, and that they reflected impatience with what seemed to be inappropriate objections rather than pre-judgment of the case. The judge found no evidence that these comments demonstrated a commitment to a conclusion that would prevent her from being open to persuasion by evidence.

Second, the judge rejected the claim of private conversations between her and counsel. She clarified that any discussions with counsel took place in open court and were subject to the principle of open justice, and she found no evidence of bias in this regard.

Third, the judge addressed the claim that her deference to counsel's procedural expertise indicated actual bias. She noted that it was reasonable to rely on counsel's advice in areas where counsel had significant expertise, and that instances where she departed from counsel's advice demonstrated an openness to persuasion.

Fourth, the judge found that her handling of interruptions during cross-examination did not indicate bias. She noted that counsel's objections to interruptions were reasonable, and that her attempts to control the proceedings were aimed at ensuring a fair hearing, not evidence of bias.

Fifth, the judge dismissed the claim that counsel's objections on relevance grounds during Ms Gindy's evidence-in-chief indicated bias. She explained that counsel's objections were properly based on the relevance of the evidence at the time, and that later relevance did not undermine the propriety of the objections.

Finally, the judge found that her failure to ask counsel to explain the term "agoraphobia" during cross-examination did not indicate bias. She reasoned that the term could be relevant to Ms Gindy's claims, and that not asking for an explanation did not demonstrate a pre-judgment of her condition.

In conclusion, the judge found that Ms Gindy had not established actual bias, as the evidence did not show that she was "so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration, whatever evidence or arguments may be presented." The application for recusal was therefore refused.