SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND
CITATION:
Gillam v State of Qld & Ors [2003] QCA 566
PARTIES:
GORDON WILLIAM GILLAM
(applicant/respondent)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND through Q BUILD
(first respondent)
WATPAC LIMITED ACN 010 562 562
(second respondent)
ALLDRILL PTY LIMITED ACN 010 899 528
(third respondent/applicant)
WORKCOVER QUEENSLAND
(fourth respondent)FILE NO/S:
Appeal No 6586 of 2003
DC No 2126 of 2003DIVISION:
Court of Appeal
PROCEEDING:
Application for leave s 118 DCA (Civil)
ORIGINATING COURT:
District Court at Brisbane
DELIVERED ON:
19 December 2003
DELIVERED AT:
Brisbane
HEARING DATE:
12 September 2003
JUDGES:
Jerrard JA and Dutney and Philippides JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Dutney and Philippides JJ concurring as to the orders made, Jerrard JA dissenting in partORDERS:
Application for leave granted1.
Appeal allowed to the extent of deleting from Order No 5 made 27 June 2003 all the words from “including as accompanied by” down and to the words “under the meanings of s.9 (5)” and inserting instead the words “including any reasonable excuse for the delay”2.
The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal3.
CATCHWORDS:
PROCEDURE – INFERIOR COURTS – QUEENSLAND – DISTRICT COURTS – CIVIL JURISDICTION – PRACTICE – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION AND PLEADINGS – where respondent failed to comply with notice provisions under s 9 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) within the time prescribed by the Act – where respondent did not provide a “reasonable excuse” for his delay – where appellant contends that the absence of such an explanation for the delay renders the grant of leave futile by reason of s 18(1) of the Act – whether learned primary judge erred in exercising the discretion under s 43 of the Act to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings
Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 9, s 18(1), s 43
COUNSEL:
S C Williams QC, with J H Dalton, for the applicant
G R Mullins for the respondentSOLICITORS:
Gadens Lawyers for the applicant
Scott’s Lawyers for the respondent
JERRARD JA: In this matter Alldrill Pty Ltd seeks leave to appeal pursuant to s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) from orders made in a judgment delivered on 27 June 2003. The respondent Gordon Gillam concedes that the appeal concerns the construction of sections of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“PIPA”), that the provisions to be construed are new, that there are no appellate decisions dealing with their construction, and that they are of general importance. Nevertheless, the respondent submits that the reasoning of the trial judge was correct; and that either leave to appeal should not be granted, or if granted, the appeal should be dismissed. Because of the concession made it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal.
General background matters
Mr Gillam was injured on 29 June 2000, when carrying out his duties as a Superintendent Representative for Project Services, a…
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- Case
- [2003] QCA 566
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court considered whether the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay rendered the grant of leave futile, as contended by the appellant. The appellant argued that the failure to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay meant that the leave to commence proceedings should not have been granted. The court analysed the statutory provisions and the discretion available to the District Court judge in granting leave under section 43 of the Act. It concluded that while the respondent did not provide a reasonable excuse for the delay, the judge did not err in exercising the discretion to grant leave, as the provision for a reasonable excuse was not a mandatory prerequisite for the grant of leave.
The court allowed the appeal to the extent of modifying the order to include the requirement for any reasonable excuse for the delay. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision clarified the scope of the discretion under section 43 of the Act and the role of a reasonable excuse in the context of granting leave to commence proceedings.
Orders
Orders of the court
Application for leave granted1.
Appeal allowed to the extent of deleting from Order No 5 made 27 June 2003 all the words from “including as accompanied by” down and to the words “under the meanings of s.9 (5)” and inserting instead the words “including any reasonable excuse for the delay”2.
The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal3.
Background
Background to the litigation
This matter has been through several stages of litigation before reaching this court. Initially, the respondent filed an application for leave to commence proceedings under the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). The appellant contested this application, arguing that the respondent had not provided a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing the required notice. The primary judge, however, exercised discretion under section 43 of the Act to grant the respondent's application for leave. The appellant then appealed to this court, challenging the primary judge's decision on the basis that the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay rendered the grant of leave futile.
Decision
Reasons for decision
1. Whether the learned primary judge erred in exercising the discretion under section 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings.
2. Whether the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing notice renders the grant of leave futile under section 18(1) of the Act.
Held
1. The court held that the learned primary judge did not err in exercising the discretion under section 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings. However, the court amended the terms of the leave to include a requirement for the respondent to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing notice.
2. The court found that the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay in providing notice does not necessarily render the grant of leave futile under section 18(1) of the Act, but it does affect the terms of the leave granted.
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
The court examined the discretionary power vested in the learned primary judge under section 43 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings. The court emphasised the importance of ensuring justice is served in personal injury cases, even if procedural rules are not strictly adhered to. In exercising this discretion, the primary judge considered the respondent's ability to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay in providing notice under section 9 of the Act. The court acknowledged that the primary judge's decision to grant leave was within the permissible bounds of the statutory discretion.
Regarding the second issue, the court analysed section 18(1) of the Act, which deals with the futility of granting leave in the absence of a reasonable excuse for delay. The court noted that while the absence of a reasonable excuse might affect the respondent's ability to fully meet the requirements of the Act, it does not automatically render the grant of leave futile. Instead, the court considered it appropriate to amend the terms of the leave to include a requirement for the respondent to provide a reasonable excuse for the delay. This approach ensures that the respondent has an opportunity to address the delay issue while maintaining the integrity of the statutory framework.
The court's decision highlighted the balance between procedural compliance and the overarching goal of achieving justice in personal injury cases. By amending the terms of the leave, the court provided a practical solution that allows the respondent to remedy the procedural shortcoming while ensuring the proceedings are not rendered futile. The ratio decidendi of this case is that while the absence of a reasonable excuse for delay does not necessarily render the grant of leave futile, it does necessitate a modification of the terms of the leave to accommodate the need for a reasonable explanation for the delay.