Gillam v State of Queensland

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SUPREME COURT OF QUEENSLAND

CITATION:

Gillam v State of Qld & Ors [2003] QCA 566

PARTIES:

GORDON WILLIAM GILLAM
(applicant/respondent)
v
STATE OF QUEENSLAND through Q BUILD
(first respondent)
WATPAC LIMITED ACN 010 562 562
(second respondent)
ALLDRILL PTY LIMITED ACN 010 899 528
(third respondent/applicant)
WORKCOVER QUEENSLAND
(fourth respondent)

FILE NO/S:

Appeal No 6586 of 2003
DC No 2126 of 2003

DIVISION:

Court of Appeal

PROCEEDING:

Application for leave s 118 DCA (Civil)

ORIGINATING COURT:

District Court at Brisbane

DELIVERED ON:

19 December 2003

DELIVERED AT:

Brisbane

HEARING DATE:

12 September 2003

JUDGES:

Jerrard JA and Dutney and Philippides JJ
Separate reasons for judgment of each member of the Court, Dutney and Philippides JJ concurring as to the orders made, Jerrard JA dissenting in part

ORDERS:

Application for leave granted1.   

Appeal allowed to the extent of deleting from Order No 5 made 27 June 2003 all the words from “including as accompanied by” down and to the words “under the meanings of s.9 (5)” and inserting instead the words “including any reasonable excuse for the delay”2.   

The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal3.   

CATCHWORDS:

PROCEDURE – INFERIOR COURTS – QUEENSLAND – DISTRICT COURTS – CIVIL JURISDICTION – PRACTICE – PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL – COMMENCEMENT OF ACTION AND PLEADINGS – where respondent failed to comply with notice provisions under s 9 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) within the time prescribed by the Act – where respondent did not provide a “reasonable excuse” for his delay – where appellant contends that the absence of such an explanation for the delay renders the grant of leave futile by reason of s 18(1) of the Act – whether learned primary judge erred in exercising the discretion under s 43 of the Act to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings

Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld), s 9, s 18(1), s 43

COUNSEL:

S C Williams QC, with J H Dalton, for the applicant
G R Mullins for the respondent

SOLICITORS:

Gadens Lawyers for the applicant
Scott’s Lawyers for the respondent

  1. JERRARD JA: In this matter Alldrill Pty Ltd seeks leave to appeal pursuant to s 118(3) of the District Court of Queensland Act 1967 (Qld) from orders made in a judgment delivered on 27 June 2003. The respondent Gordon Gillam concedes that the appeal concerns the construction of sections of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld) (“PIPA”), that the provisions to be construed are new, that there are no appellate decisions dealing with their construction, and that they are of general importance.  Nevertheless, the respondent submits that the reasoning of the trial judge was correct; and that either leave to appeal should not be granted, or if granted, the appeal should be dismissed.  Because of the concession made it is appropriate to grant leave to appeal.

General background matters

  1. Mr Gillam was injured on 29 June 2000, when carrying out his duties as a Superintendent Representative for Project Services, a…

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Details
Case
[2003] QCA 566
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

In the case of Gillam v State of Queensland, the appellant, Gillam, challenged a decision of the District Court of Queensland, which allowed the respondent, the State of Queensland, to commence personal injury proceedings despite not complying with the notice provisions under section 9 of the Personal Injuries Proceedings Act 2002 (Qld). The primary issue before the court was whether the District Court judge erred in exercising the discretion to grant leave to the respondent to commence proceedings under section 43 of the Act, when the respondent had not provided a reasonable excuse for the delay in complying with the notice provisions.

The court considered whether the absence of a reasonable excuse for the delay rendered the grant of leave futile, as contended by the appellant. The appellant argued that the failure to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay meant that the leave to commence proceedings should not have been granted. The court analysed the statutory provisions and the discretion available to the District Court judge in granting leave under section 43 of the Act. It concluded that while the respondent did not provide a reasonable excuse for the delay, the judge did not err in exercising the discretion to grant leave, as the provision for a reasonable excuse was not a mandatory prerequisite for the grant of leave.

The court allowed the appeal to the extent of modifying the order to include the requirement for any reasonable excuse for the delay. The appellant was ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. This decision clarified the scope of the discretion under section 43 of the Act and the role of a reasonable excuse in the context of granting leave to commence proceedings.

Orders

Orders of the court

Application for leave granted1.

Appeal allowed to the extent of deleting from Order No 5 made 27 June 2003 all the words from “including as accompanied by” down and to the words “under the meanings of s.9 (5)” and inserting instead the words “including any reasonable excuse for the delay”2.

The appellant pay the respondent’s costs of the appeal3.

Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

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Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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