Giles v Douglas

Case [2011] WASC 14

JURISDICTION     :   SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

IN CRIMINAL

CITATION:   GILES -v- DOUGLAS [2011] WASC 14

CORAM:   SIMMONDS J

HEARD:   1 DECEMBER 2010

DELIVERED          :   14 JANUARY 2011

FILE NO/S:   SJA 1091 of 2010

BETWEEN:   SHARON ANDREA GILES

Appellant

AND

TROY ANTHONY DOUGLAS
Respondent

ON APPEAL FROM:

Jurisdiction              :  MAGISTRATES COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA

Coram  :MAGISTRATE S R MALLEY

File No  :JO 2685 of 2010

Catchwords:

Criminal law and procedure - Appeal from magistrate - Adequacy of reasons

Criminal law and procedure - Appeal from magistrate - Offence under Criminal Code s 440A - Whether error in magistrate's approach to whether appellant had used restricted-access computer system other than in accordance with her authorisation

Criminal law and procedure - Appeal from magistrate - Whether magistrate had erred in his approach to whether Criminal Code s 24 applied

Criminal law and procedure - Appeal from magistrate - Whether magistrate had erred in his approach to whether to make spent conviction order

Legislation:

Criminal Code (WA), s 24, s 440A
Criminal Procedure Act 2004 (WA), s 120
Evidence Act 1903 (WA), s 32
Magistrates Court Act 2004 (WA), s 31
Police Act 1892 (WA), s 8, s 23, s 33L
Sentencing Act 1995 (WA), s 39, s 45

Result:

Appeal dismissed

Category:    B

Representation:

Counsel:

Appellant:     Ms K A Vernon

Respondent:     Mr M Seaman

Solicitors:

Appellant:     Carol Adams

Respondent:     Director of Public Prosecutions (WA)

Case(s) referred to in judgment(s):

AR v Wood [2008] WASC 119

Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430

Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASC 5

Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASCA 131

Joyce v Gee [2010] WASC 76

KK v Zanetti [2009] WASC 83

Koenig v Alizadeh [2002] WASCA 267

R v Tognini & McGuire [2000] WASCA 31; (2000) 22 WAR 291

Riggall v The State of Western Australia [2008] WASCA 69; (2008) 37 WAR 211

Riley v The State of Western Australia [2005] WASCA 190; (2005) 30 WAR 525

Stark v Plant [2010] WASCA 74

Warren v Coombes (1979) 142 CLR 531

SIMMONDS J: 

Introduction

  1. This is an appeal by leave against conviction and sentence in the Magistrates Court.  The conviction and sentence followed a trial for an offence of unlawful use of a restricted-access computer system.  The appeal against conviction is on three grounds: whether there had been a failure to give adequate reasons for the decision that the appellant had used the computer system she was authorised to use other than in accordance with her authorisation; whether there had been an error of fact or law involving a failure to apply adequately the test for such a decision where the evidence laid a 'proper foundation' for it; and whether there had been a failure to apply or apply adequately the defence of honest and reasonable but mistaken belief that she was acting in accordance with her authorisation when the evidence laid a 'proper foundation' for that defence.  The appeal against sentence concerns whether there was an error…

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Giles v Douglas [2011] WASC 14
Case
[2011] WASC 14
Decision Date

CaseChat Overview and Summary

The appeal in Giles v Douglas was brought from a decision made by the Magistrates Court of Western Australia. The appellant, Giles, was convicted of an offence under the Criminal Code and sought to appeal the decision on various grounds, including the adequacy of the reasons provided by the magistrate, the interpretation of the relevant sections of the Criminal Code, and the application of the spent conviction order provisions.

The legal issues central to the appeal involved the interpretation and application of sections 31 and 120(2) of the Magistrates Court Act and the Criminal Procedure Act, respectively. Specifically, the court needed to determine whether the magistrate's reasons for judgment were adequate under these provisions, whether there was an error in the magistrate's approach to the interpretation of the Criminal Code sections 440A and 24, and whether the magistrate had erred in his application of the spent conviction order provisions.

The Court of Appeal reviewed the magistrate's reasons for judgment and found that, while the reasons provided were not exhaustive, they were sufficient to satisfy the requirements of sections 31 and 120(2). The Court held that the magistrate had indeed considered the evidence and the applicable law, and that the reasons provided were adequate to identify the facts accepted and the law applied. The Court further found no error in the magistrate's approach to the interpretation of the Criminal Code sections 440A and 24, as the magistrate had correctly applied the law to the facts of the case. Additionally, the Court determined that the magistrate had not erred in his application of the spent conviction order provisions, as the evidence supported the conviction and the application of these provisions was not warranted.

As a result of the Court's findings, the appeal was dismissed, and the conviction and sentence imposed by the magistrate were upheld.

Orders

Orders of the court

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Background

Background to the litigation

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Evidence

Evidence Before The Court

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Decision

Reasons for decision

Magistrates Court Act s 31 reads as follows:31. Judgments, content of(1)The Court's reasons for a judgment in a case -(a)need only identify the facts that the Court has accepted in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so;(b)need only identify the law that the Court has applied in coming to its decision and give the reasons for doing so;(c)need not canvass all the evidence given in the case; and(d)need not canvass all the factual and legal arguments or issues arising in the case.(2)The fact that a judgment is given orally or in accordance with subsection (1) is not of itself a ground for reversing or modifying it on an appeal. Criminal Procedure Act s 120(2) reads as follows:(2)The judgment of the judge in a trial by a judge alone must include the principles of law that he or she has applied and the findings of fact on which he or she has relied. In Bennett v Carruthers WASCA [23] ‑ [28], Mazza J said this:Section 31 had no statutory predecessor. Prior to its commencement on 1 May 2005, the duty of a magistrate to give reasons for decision and the content of that duty were derived from the common law. Justice Hall, at [14] - [21] of his reasons [in the decision appealed from, Bennett v Carruthers [2010] WASC 5], refers to many of the relevant cases and accurately states the rationale for the existence of the duty and its content. There is no need for me to repeat what his Honour has already said.Section 31 of the Act gives statutory voice to these common law principles. As much was stated in the Explanatory Memorandum to the Magistrates Court Bill 2003 WA in reference to cl 31, which later became s 31 of the Act:'[Clause 31] specifies the factual and legal components that are to be included in written reasons for judgment. The clause also requires that Court must also give reasons for judgment thus complying with the minimum requirements set by the Full Court regarding judgments. The purpose of the clause is to ensure consistency between the material content of the Court's judgments, to facilitate understanding by the parties affected and to aid determination of whether grounds of appeal exist. (emphasis added)'In order to gauge whether s 31 of the Act has been complied with, it is necessary to look at the reasons as a whole in the context of the evidence. The content of the obligation is not the same in every case and depends very much on the circumstances of the particular case: Tran v Claydon [2003] WASCA 318 [37] - [38] (McLure J).The question of compliance with s 31 of the Act and provisions such as s 120 of the Criminal Procedure Act raises questions of degree. In AK v The State of Western Australia [2008] HCA 8; (2008) 232 CLR 438 [84] Heydon J said in the context of s 120 of the Criminal Procedure Act:'In many cases the question of whether there has been compliance with the duty imposed by s 120(2) of the Criminal Procedure Act will raise questions of degree. Those questions will arise where a trial judge has stated various principles of law but has failed to state another, although it has obviously been assumed. They may arise where a judge has stated that numerous facts have been found, but has omitted to state a particular finding of fact. In many cases the question of whether there has been compliance with s 120(2) will also raise difficulties of distinguishing between, on the one hand, a defective statement of legal principle, an unconvincing factual finding, an invalid inference or a questionable application of principle to fact and, on the other hand, a failure to state a principle of law, make a finding of fact or expose the 'reasoning process linking' the principles of law to the findings of fact. Sometimes the statement of positive propositions coupled with the non-statement of others can satisfy s 120(2) because it amounts to a statement of the principles of law actually applied or the findings of fact actually relied on even though the omission reveals error in what was said; sometimes, on the other hand, the statement will not satisfy s 120(2).'The question of whether reasons are adequate may involve a consideration of what can be legitimately inferred from the reasons: Beale v Government Insurance Office of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430, 443 (Meagher JA). This proposition was criticised by Mr Richardson in his written submissions. Mr Richardson noted that Meagher JA cited Selvanayagam v University of the West Indies [1983] 1 WLR 585; [1983] 1 All ER 824 in support of this proposition, but submitted that this case did not, in fact, support it. With respect, this is incorrect. An issue before the Privy Council in that case was whether the trial judge had omitted to make specific factual findings fundamental to the issues in the case. In delivering the Board's judgment Lord Scarman said:'It is understandable that the Court of Appeal may have felt disposed to criticise the judgment at first instance as unstructured and prolix. But it is abundantly clear that the judge had the evidence, all of it, very much in mind. It is, of course, not necessary for a trial judge to make explicit findings on every disputed piece of evidence. If it is clear that he has the evidence in mind, it suffices for him to state his final conclusion … (826).'His Lordship was clearly speaking about what could be implied from reading the whole of the reasons and the trial judge's final conclusion. Selvanayagam v University of West Indies supports Meagher JA's proposition.

Ratio Decidendi

Legal Principle Established

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