George Ghossayn v Roland Bleyer
[2009] NSWDC 86
•11 May 2009
CITATION: George Ghossayn v Roland Bleyer [2009] NSWDC 86 HEARING DATE(S): 16/12/08 - 18/12/08, 16/2/09 - 17/2/09 and 16/3/09
JUDGMENT DATE:
11 May 2009JURISDICTION: Civil JUDGMENT OF: Rolfe DCJ DECISION: Judgment for the Plaintiff against the Defendant in the amount of $33,500. CATCHWORDS: Claim under guarantee - Interpretation - Deed - Interpretation - Rectification - Purported Contract - Whether there was intention to create legal relations LEGISLATION CITED: Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW)
Civil Procedure Act 2005CASES CITED: Masterton Homes Pty Limited v Palm Assets Pty Limited (2008) NSW SC 274 paras 74-77
Greer v Kettle (1938) AC 156 at 171
Codelfa Construction Pty Limited v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337TEXTS CITED: Handley - Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2006) at 7-003 PARTIES: George Ghossayn (Plaintiff)
Roland Bleyer (Defendant)FILE NUMBER(S): 2801/07 COUNSEL: A di Francesco (Plaintiff)
D A McLure (Defendant)
JUDGMENT
1 The plaintiff in these proceedings, George Ghossayn, has brought various claims against the defendant, Roland Bleyer.
2 The plaintiff’s claims are pleaded in his further amended statement of claim (“FASOC”) filed in Court on 16 March 2009. A defence to the FASOC was also filed in Court on 16 March 2009.
3 In summary, the plaintiff’s claims are as follows.
4 First, the plaintiff claims that the defendant breached a contract of guarantee given by him to the plaintiff on 14 February 2001; see paragraphs 3-20 of the FASOC.
5 Secondly, the plaintiff claims in paragraph 21 that the defendant was unjustly enriched by receipt of monies arising under the first loan agreement referred to in paragraph 3 of the FASOC.
6 Thirdly, the plaintiff claims that the defendant failed to repay the amount of $20,000 lent to him by the plaintiff under the second loan agreement referred to in paragraphs 22-25 of the FASOC.
7 Fourthly, the plaintiff claims the defendant breached express and implied covenants in a deed dated 14 November 2001 between the parties and referred to in paragraphs 26-34 of the FASOC.
8 Fifthly, the plaintiff alleges that the defendant failed to repay monies to him in accordance with a contract made on or about 16 August 2001 and referred to in paragraphs 34A-34E of the FASOC.
9 Sixthly, in paragraphs 35-41 of the FASOC the plaintiff seeks to make a case out against the defendant based on promissory estoppel.
10 Finally, in paragraph 42 of the FASOC, the plaintiff claims damages against the defendant for misleading and deceptive conduct in breach of s 41 of the Fair Trading Act 1987 (NSW) (the “FTA”).
11 Mr di Francesco of counsel appeared for the plaintiff. His written submissions dated 26 March 2009, are attached to his instructing solicitor’s letter to the Court dated 27 March 2009.
12 Mr McLure of counsel appeared for the defendant. His written submissions are dated 16 March 2009.
Background
13 The plaintiff is a director of Kari & Ghossayn Pty Limited, a large earthmoving and civil construction company. My assessment of the plaintiff as a witness was that although he gave his evidence honestly, that evidence has to be approached with a degree of circumspection because I consider the plaintiff’s recollection of important events was sometimes poor.
14 The defendant is a company director who sought to give the Court the impression that he had been involved in the raising of substantial amounts of finance and was also involved in investment activities. The defendant was a most unsatisfactory witness. He was evasive in the witness box. He sought to argue with the cross-examiner. He did not answer questions directly and proceeded to make speeches. He paused for considerable periods of time before answering questions with a view, in my assessment, to giving whatever answer he could think of which would best assist him to win the case. Therefore, my approach to the defendant’s evidence on matters in dispute has been not to accept it, unless such evidence is corroborated by way of documentation or oral evidence of other witnesses.
15 I am satisfied that Mr Ghossayn met Mr Bleyer in about 1999 and that the defendant told the plaintiff he was well connected and could obtain a $50 million bank guarantee “by use of a AAA rated insurance bond” (exhibit B para 8). Mr Ghossayn told Mr Bleyer he knew nothing about “triple bonds”. In any event, after this discussion, Mr Ghossayn introduced a number of his associates to Mr Bleyer.
16 On 25 February 2000 Mr Ghossayn incorporated the company known as Magicglow Pty Limited (“Magicglow”).
17 On 29 January 2001 there was a meeting of directors of Magicglow at the offices of Mr Bobb, who was Mr Ghossayn’s accountant. The minutes of the meeting are behind tab 3 of exhibit B. They disclose that Mr Bleyer was present together with Mr Bobb and Mr Merrick Smart, who worked with Mr Bobb. The minutes record discussions about the potential development of properties at Hurstville and Pyrmont.
18 The minutes record the following next to the heading “Interim Funding”:
“The Chairman advised that an entity associated with him would provide $600,000 to the company. Some discussion took place as to whether the funding would be in the form of equity of debt. IT WAS RESOLVED that the funding would be in the form of debt and the special conditions in relation to the provision of this debt would be as follows:
IT WAS FURTHER RESOLVED that once the Chairman procured these funds by way of interest free on demand, unsecured debt to the company, Richard A. Bobb would be instructed to receive the said funds into their trust account.”. Interest free
. On demand
. Unsecured
19 I am satisfied that, at or about the time of the meeting, or shortly thereafter, Mr Ghossayn and Mr Bleyer had a discussion in which Mr Bleyer told Mr Ghossayn that he could “raise an insurance bond or bank guarantee worth USD$50 million to bring to Australia” to assist with the developments. Mr Bleyer told Mr Ghossayn that he had an attorney in the United States, Robert Masud, who had a lot of contacts with banks. Mr Bleyer told Mr Ghossayn that to raise the insurance bond they would need about USD$300,000. I am satisfied that Mr Bleyer told Mr Ghossayn that he would personally guarantee that Mr Ghossayn would get his money back if the insurance bond could not be obtained. Mr Ghossayn asked Mr Bobb, who was present at the discussion, to prepare the necessary paperwork. Solicitors were not involved.
20 Mr Ghossayn also told Mr Bleyer that he could perhaps raise about $600,000. Mr Bleyer said he would deal with it and would make sure no one could touch any of the money without his instructions or approval. He told Mr Ghossayn it would take a maximum of six weeks to obtain the insurance bond.
21 Following this discussion, Mr Ghossayn took steps to raise the $600,000. The evidence establishes that two separate amounts of $480,000 and $120,000 were deposited into the account of Bobb Nominees Pty Limited (see exhibit B tabs 4,5, 5A, 6, 6A, 7 and 8). It would seem this was a trust account controlled by Mr Bobb.
22 On 14 February 2001 Mr Bleyer executed the guarantee by way of letter addressed to Mr Ghossayn (exhibit B tab 10). Omitting formal parts, the document stated:
You have requested that I provide you with my personal written guarantee with regard to an amount of no less than $A575,000 of $A600,000 advanced by you (or one of your related entities) to Magicglow Pty Ltd A.C.N. 091 766 059 (hereinafter referred to as “Magicglow”).“Dear Mr Ghossayn
1. I hereby irrevocably, unreservedly and unconditionally personally guarantee to you (or your related entity) that an amount of $A575,000 will be repaid to you (or your related entity) in the event that the said funds are not used for the purposes of acquiring an insurance company bond.
3. In the meantime, funds will be retained in the trust account of Mr Robert Masud (attorney at law) and will not be released by the said Mr Robert Masud without my prior written instructions to him . The only purpose for which a release will be issued to Mr Masud is, as stated above, for the purchase of an insurance bond from an insurer with a rating of no less than AA.2. Any insurance company bond which will be acquired by Magicglow will be acquired from only an insurance company with a rating of no less than AA, such rating to have been provided by Standards and Poor (a well known rating agency based in the United States of America).
In the event that you have satisfied yourself in relation to my representations, as set out herein, I would appreciate if you would issue written instructions to Mr Bobb so that he may disburse the sum of $A600,000 as follows:Robert Masud trust account *(MagicGlow Trust Account) $575,000
Richard A. Bobb *(Accounting Fees & Expenses) 25,000
Total $615,000”Roland Bleyer *(Expenses for Intermediator) 15,000
*These sections are in the handwriting of Mr Bleyer
The document contained a notation at the bottom which is not relevant for present purposes.
23 On 23 February 2001, Mr Bobb transferred the amount of AUD$575,000 to an account in the name of Robert Masud, Mr Bleyer’s attorney in the United States. The balance of the funds, $25,000, seems to have been used to pay accounting fees owing to Mr Bobb.
24 The evidence relating to the disbursement of the funds received by Mr Masud will be dealt with later in this judgment. For present purposes, it is sufficient to record that no insurance bond was procured and of the amount of the $575,000 the plaintiff was only reimbursed in the amount of $280,516.14.
25 At this point it is convenient to deal with the defendant’s submission that Mr Ghossayn is not the proper plaintiff.
Proper Plaintiff
26 The defendant submits that Mr Ghossayn is not the proper plaintiff. To make good the submission the defendant relies, in particular, on the plaintiff’s letter dated 14 March 2003 (exhibit 1) in which there is reference to “$30,000 was from my personal funds and the $575,000 was contributed from one of my companies”.
27 First of all, Mr Ghossayn did not sign the letter. Secondly, in all the circumstances, I take the reference in the letter to “the $575,000 was contributed from one of my companies” as a reference to the payment of monies into Mr Masud’s account by Magicglow. It is nothing more than that.
28 Separately and apart from the above, I am comfortably satisfied on the evidence that the amount of $480,000 deposited into Mr Bobb’s trust account was sourced from Mr Ghossayn’s personal account with the Arab Bank (exhibit B tab 5A). There is no evidence to support the submission made by the defendant that Mr Ghossayn operated this account “as the nominee or trustee of one of his companies”.
29 As to the remainder of the $600,000 paid into Mr Bobb’s account in the amount of $120,000, the evidence establishes that these funds were transferred from the account of Kari & Ghossayn Pty Limited with St George Bank (exhibit A 22-28). In this respect, Mr Ghossayn conceded in cross-examination that the money came from the account of Kari & Ghossayn Pty Limited: see his evidence on Day 1 at T 60. Although the plaintiff sought to rely on the documents in exhibit A at 88-89, 113-114, 117-118, 128 and 133, none of the documents was contemporaneous with the loan transaction, the first having been brought into existence some four months later. In truth, insofar as the documents suggest that the $120,000 was advanced by Mr Ghossayn personally, there is a simple explanation, namely, as is clear from the transcript on Day 1 at T 60, Mr Ghossayn treated his companies’ monies as his own. To the extent that there is a reference in Mr Bobb’s file note at exhibit A 117 to Mr Ghossayn personally advancing the sum of $600,000 to Magicglow, this was clearly an error made by Mr Bobb when he prepared his file note.
30 The last sentence in the letter of 16 August 2001 (exhibit A 133) does not assist the plaintiff because the defendant was merely repeating what the plaintiff was telling him at or around about that time. I am not satisfied that Mr Bleyer in fact knew the precise source in each case of the payments of $480,000 and $120,000 made into the trust account of Mr Bobb.
31 Although the plaintiff sought to rely on the liquidator’s reports (exhibit E), these do not advance his case because he believed that the company’s money was his money and therefore this explains why there is no record of any money having been loaned to him by Kari & Ghossayn Pty Limited.
32 Accordingly, with respect to the amounts claimed by the plaintiff against the defendant, I am satisfied that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover the sum of $120,000 because the money was advanced to Magicglow by Kari & Ghossayn Pty Limited.
Claim Under Guarantee
33 As mentioned above, the amount of AUS$575,000 was transferred to an account in the United States controlled by Mr Masud, the attorney instructed by Mr Bleyer. The funds were deposited by Mr Masud with Citizens Bank in Boston (the “Masud account”) and the beneficiary was noted as Magicglow (exhibit A 60, 65). When converted into US dollars, the amount received by Mr Masud on behalf of Magicglow was USD$300,035.
34 The evidence establishes that in around May/June 2001 USD$50,000 was paid from the Masud account to Downing & Co, a firm of merchant bankers. The defendant says this relates to Downing & Co’s professional fees in seeking to procure the insurance bond for Magicglow. Mr Masud was responsible for instructing Downing & Co on this transaction.
35 The evidence also establishes that in May/June 2001 USD$25,000 was paid from the Masud account to Mr Masud. The defendant says these monies were paid to Mr Masud as professional fees for work done in attempting to procure the insurance bond.
36 Further payments were made to Downing & Co and Mr Masud in August 2001 in the amounts of USD$50,000 and USD$25,000 respectively. Again the defendant says these payments were made for professional work done by Downing & Co and Mr Masud in procuring the insurance bond.
37 Mr Masud travelled to Australia to give evidence. His evidence was that all the amounts referred to had been paid to each of Downing & Co and his firm for professional work done by them in attempting to procure the insurance bond for Magicglow. In this respect, I am satisfied that Mr Masud received the instructions to make the payments from the Masud account from Mr Bleyer.
38 Mr Masud is an experienced commercial lawyer whose practice includes finance transactions. It was obvious that he had been involved on many occasions in the procurement of insurance bonds, the most likely equivalent of which are referred to in Australia as performance bonds.
39 Mr Masud gave his evidence in a straightforward way and I am satisfied that he told the truth. He was asked in cross-examination whether the work was done for some other unrelated purpose and he categorically denied this. Moreover, it was not put to him by the cross-examiner that his evidence was incorrect. As well, there was no basis for suggesting that Mr Masud would have used the money in the Masud account for any other purpose. He was following Mr Bleyer’s instructions.
40 Mr Masud was not able to produce contemporaneous records because, as part of his usual procedure, his file documents had been destroyed. This occurred at a point in time when Mr Masud was totally unaware of the litigation in this Court. In this respect, the plaintiff left it until the last minute to contact Mr Masud about the transactions.
41 The plaintiff sought to make something out of the documents in exhibit A 137-157, because they include references to Union Financial Services Corporation, the company controlled by Mr Bleyer. This was nothing more than speculation on the plaintiff’s part that the funds from the Masud account had been used for purposes other than that about which Mr Masud gave evidence. Indeed, the document at exhibit A 141 supports the defendant’s position, not that of the plaintiff.
42 Although the plaintiff submitted that, on this aspect of its claim, the Court should draw an adverse inference from Mr Bleyer’s failure to produce documents in answer to notices to produce (exhibit H and exhibit A 168), I am satisfied that this simply occurred because Mr Bleyer did not bother to retain copies of relevant documents.
43 Although the plaintiff sought to submit that the fees in question may have been used on another transaction involving Magicglow Cancer Research Foundation, I am not satisfied that the evidence supports this submission.
44 In terms of the proper construction of the guarantee, the plaintiff’s submissions are set out in paragraphs 55 and 56 of counsel’s written outline. I do not accept these submissions.
45 In my opinion, the natural and ordinary meaning of the words which appear in Clause 1 of the guarantee “… in the event that the said funds are not used for the purposes of acquiring an insurance company bond” (with reference to the amount of $575,000) necessarily includes amounts paid to Downing & Co and Mr Masud for work which each of them did on behalf of Magicglow to procure the insurance bond. I accept the defendant’s submission in this respect that it does not matter whether the insurance bond was procured, so long as the Court is satisfied, which it is, that the funds were used for the purpose of acquiring it. In this respect, I do not consider there is any ambiguity in the operation of the guarantee. Notwithstanding, I am satisfied that the extrinsic material referred to in paragraph 13 of the defendant’s counsel’s written submissions support the Court’s construction of the guarantee. It was never the case that Mr Ghossayn required a guarantee that all of the money which he advanced would be repaid, even if some of it had been disbursed for the purpose of procuring the bond when those attempts made to obtain it were unsuccessful; or, indeed, if Mr Masud’s instructions to obtain the bond were withdrawn before it could be obtained.
Deed
46 On 14 November 2001 the plaintiff and defendant entered into a Deed, a copy of which is at tab 34 of exhibit B.
47 Clauses 6 and 7, in which the defendant was referred to as the “borrower” and the plaintiff was referred to as the “Lender”, were in the following terms:
7. The borrower covenants that he will procure the repayment by Union of the amount advanced no later than 28th November 2001.”“6. The borrower covenants that the Lender advanced to Union Financial Services Corporation (“Union”) at the request of the borrower the amount of $320,000.00. The borrower covenants that he is able to exercise sufficient control over Union to procure the repayment by Union of the amount advanced and covenants that he shall retain that degree of control until such time as the amount advanced is fully repaid.
48 The plaintiff relies on Clauses 6 and 7 but says that, in Clause 6, the first reference to “Union Financial Services Corporation” should in fact be read as a reference to “Magicglow”.
49 Mr Ghossayn agreed that he did not lend $320,000 to Union Financial Services. His evidence was that if he could correct the Deed he would do so by noting that he lent $600,000 to Magicglow (T 83.1-85.48). Mr Bleyer said essentially the same thing.
50 Counsel for the plaintiff conceded that, in the event the Court concluded that it was necessary for the Deed to be rectified, then the plaintiff’s claim based on the Deed would not be successful in this Court. However, counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the first reference to “Union Financial Services Corporation” in Clause 6 was an error that was purely a matter of interpretation.
51 Specifically, counsel for the plaintiff submitted (written outline dated 26 March 2009):
“18. The Court should find that the reference to USFC in the first sentence of Clause 6 is the only reference to USFC that should have read Magicglow.
20. The interpretation of Clauses 6 and 7 of the Deed contended by Mr Ghossayn above is purely one of interpretation and not one requiring an application for rectification of the Deed (Masterton Homes Pty Limited v Palm Assets Pty Limited (2008) NSW SC 274 at paragraphs 74-77).”19. In any event, the Court should find that the intention of the parties was that Clause 7 of the Deed was intended to refer to USFC and does not contain any mistake.
52 I do not accept the submissions made by counsel for the plaintiff. In my opinion, the Court cannot simply read “Union Financial Services” where it is first mentioned in Clause 6 of the Deed as a reference to “Magicglow” for the following reasons.
53 Clauses 6 and 7 of the Deed consist of the following elements:
(a) An agreement that the plaintiff advanced $320,000 to Union Financial Services.
(b) A representation by the defendant that he was able to exercise sufficient control over Union Financial Services to procure the repayment of the loan to that company.
(d) A promise by the defendant that he would procure the repayment by Union Financial Services of the loan by 28 November 2001.(c) A promise by the defendant that he would retain sufficient control over Union Financial Services until the loan was repaid and,
54 I accept the submission made by counsel for the defendant that the elements referred to in paragraphs (b) – (d) above are inextricably linked to the erroneous acknowledgement of debt in paragraph (a). The entire premise of Clause 6 and 7 was that money had been lent to Union Financial Services, a premise which both parties acknowledged was a common mistake of fact. The mistake had a legal effect, because it made Union Financial Services responsible for the debt. That being so, the plaintiff’s remedy was to seek an order for rectification: see Greer v Kettle (1938) AC 156 at 171 per Lord Maugham; see also Handley Estoppel by Conduct and Election (2006) in which the author concludes at 7-003:
“The enforcement of an estoppel by deed is subject to equitable restraints. If the recital or other statement was the result of a common mistake and the deed could be rectified the estoppel cannot be enforced.”
55 Accordingly, no estoppel arises in this case.
56 Insofar as the plaintiff sought to rely on an implied covenant in the Deed that the defendant would indemnify the plaintiff “for the amount of the (Union Financial Services) loan”, there is no basis for the implication of such a term bearing in mind the principles stated by the High Court in Codelfa Construction Pty Limited v State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337.
57 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim under the Deed to recover funds advanced by him to Magicglow fails.
Second Loan Agreement
58 The plaintiff claims that on or about 5 November 2001 he advanced $10,000 to the defendant by giving him two cheques in the sum of $5,000. The plaintiff also says that on or about 14 November 2001 he advanced a further amount of $10,000 to the defendant.
59 The matter is not touched upon in the written submissions made by counsel for the defendant and provided to the Court.
60 First of all, I am comfortably satisfied that the first advance was made by the plaintiff to the defendant on or about 5 November 2001: the advance is recorded in a letter of that date signed by the defendant (exhibit A 158).
61 I am also satisfied that a further amount of $10,000 was advanced on or about 14 November 2001: see the acknowledgement in the deed dated 14 November 2001 between the plaintiff and the defendant (exhibit A 159-160).
62 As I understood the defendant’s case, he claimed to have repaid the $20,000 in March 2003. In this respect, as stated earlier, the defendant was an unsatisfactory witness and I did not believe him when he gave evidence about the purported repayment of the $20,000.
63 The defendant relied on a note made on a copy of the deed of 14 November 2001 written by his partner, Ms Mervat Zailaa (exhibit 5 annexure A).
64 In her evidence Ms Zailaa asserted that she wrote “paid 20/03/03” on the second page of the copy deed because it was the date on which $20,000 was paid by Mr Bleyer to Mr Ghossayn. However, even in her evidence in chief Ms Zailaa could not recall Mr Bleyer making the payment to Mr Ghossayn at a coffee shop meeting or if it had been paid a few days before the coffee shop meeting.
65 My assessment of Ms Zailaa when she gave her oral testimony was that, because she was Mr Bleyer’s partner, she was prepared to say anything in the witness box to assist his case. In this respect the defendant produced nothing other than the document referred to in Ms Zailaa’s evidence. I am therefore satisfied that Ms Zailaa wrote “paid 20/03/03” on the document at some later stage, probably after the commencement of the proceedings, to assist Mr Bleyer in defeating this part of the plaintiff’s claim. I have come to this conclusion particularly having regard to the failure of the defendant to produce any other documents and taking into account his concession in cross-examination that he could not remember how the amount of $20,000 was repaid to Mr Ghossayn.
66 On the other hand, I have found the plaintiff’s evidence about the transaction convincing and I am satisfied, based on his evidence, that the defendant has not repaid the amount of $20,000.
67 Accordingly, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on this aspect of his claim.
Letter dated 16 August 2001
68 The plaintiff alleges that a loan contract arose from the defendant’s letter dated 16 August 2001 (exhibit A 133).
69 The plaintiff’s contention is that the letter of 16 August 2001 constituted an offer that if Mr Ghossayn provided his consent to Mr Masud deducting his and Downing & Co’s fees from the money held in the Masud account, that Mr Bleyer would personally pay Mr Ghossayn the difference between $575,000, being the amount deposited in the Masud account, and the amount refunded after the deduction of Downing & Co’s fees and Mr Masud’s fees.
70 The plaintiff alleges that he accepted the offer by signing the documents in exhibit A 138-147.
71 I accept the defendant’s submission that the plaintiff did not intend to enter into legal relations with the defendant. As the evidence of the plaintiff at T 66-67 and T 72-73 discloses, Mr Ghossayn signed the documents on the basis that Mr Masud would refund the whole $575,000. Moreover, Mr Ghossayn stated categorically that he never agreed that any part of the money could be transferred to someone else. In this respect, I reject the submission made by counsel for the plaintiff that the evidence given by the plaintiff against his interest on this issue should be treated as “responses from a witness who was somewhat confused while giving evidence, had language difficulties (and) had troubles with recollection” (para 36 of counsel’s written submissions). I have rejected the submission because Mr Ghossayn, whilst confused about some matters, was absolutely clear in his evidence to the Court about the letter of 16 August 2001: he repeatedly said he never agreed to Mr Masud making deductions from the Masud account in respect of his own fees or the fees of Downing & Co.
72 Accordingly, for the reason advanced by the defendant, the plaintiff fails in his claim under the 16 August 2001 letter.
Unjust Enrichment
73 In paragraph 4 of the prayer for relief and in paragraph 21 of the FASOC the plaintiff seeks an order for restitution on the basis of unjust enrichment. Counsel for the plaintiff made no submissions in support of this part of the plaintiff’s claim. In the circumstances I accept the submissions made by counsel for the defendant in paragraph 29 of his written submissions.
Promisory Estoppel
74 No submission was made to the Court by counsel for the plaintiff in support of this claim. In the circumstances I accept the submissions made by counsel for the defendant in paragraphs 33 and 34 of his written submissions.
FTA Claim
75 The representations relied on by the plaintiff are set out in paragraphs 62 and 63 of counsel for the plaintiff’s written submissions. The representations are as to future matters and, on the evidence, were true.
76 I am satisfied that the money was safe and secure in the Masud account and was used for the purpose of obtaining an insurance bond.
77 Accordingly, the plaintiff’s claim under the FTA fails.
Conclusion
78 There will be a verdict for the plaintiff against the defendant in the amount of $20,000.
79 The plaintiff is entitled to interest in accordance with s 100 of the Civil Procedure Act 2005. I will stand the matter down so the parties can do the calculations.
80 I will then hear the parties on costs.
81 I direct that the exhibits be returned.
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