SUPREME COURT OF SOUTH AUSTRALIA
(Criminal: Application)
GD v COMMISSIONER OF POLICE
[2020] SASC 2
Judgment of The Honourable Justice Parker
15 January 2020
CRIMINAL LAW - SENTENCE - SENTENCING ORDERS - ORDERS AND DECLARATIONS RELATING TO SERIOUS OR VIOLENT OFFENDERS OR DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDERS - DANGEROUS SEXUAL OFFENDER - REGISTRATION, REPORTING AND LIKE MATTERS
Application for suspension of reporting obligations pursuant to s 37 of the Child Sex Offenders Registration Act 2006 (SA).
In 2003 the applicant pleaded guilty to three counts of indecently assaulting his daughter when she was aged nine years. He was sentenced to imprisonment for 12 months with a non-parole period of six months. The sentence was suspended upon the applicant entering into a bond to be of good behaviour for two years. He complied with the terms of that bond. In the absence of an order suspending his reporting obligations, the applicant is subject to a lifelong reporting obligation under s 34(1) of the Act because he has been found guilty of three or more class 2 offences.
The applicant has sought to make contact with women in his age group through the use of the dating site RSVP. He believes that an order under s 38(2) will relieve him from statutory disclosure obligations that will hinder the development of a relationship.
The applicant disclosed his use of the RSVP site in an interview with a clinical psychologist commissioned to undertake a forensic psychological assessment of him. As the applicant had not previously reported his use of this site, the Crown Solicitor’s Office referred the matter to the police for investigation. This resulted in the applicant being charged with and pleading guilty to the offence of failing to comply with his reporting obligations without a reasonable excuse. The Magistrate recorded a conviction and placed the applicant on a bond to be of good behaviour for 12 months.
Each of the three requirements under s 37(2) are satisfied. Two questions remain. First, whether the Court is satisfied, as required by s 38(2) of the Act, that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. Secondly, whether the Court should exercise the discretion to make an order under s 38. In considering that question the Court must take into account each of the matters specifically identified in 38(3) together with any other matter the Court considers relevant.
Held, Per Parker J, dismissing the application:
(1) In view of the very positive opinion expressed by the expert, combined with the fact that the applicant has not offended against a child in the past 19 years, his apparent personal stability over that time and the remorse he has shown, I am satisfied that the applicant does not pose any appreciable risk to the present or future safety and well-being of any child or children.
(2) The applicant has misconceived the extent of his reporting obligations. When properly understood, the obligations to which he is currently subject are less likely…
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- Case
- [2020] SASC 2
- Decision Date
CaseChat Overview and Summary
The court examined the statutory framework and previous case law to interpret the phrase "does not pose a risk" in section 38(1) of the Act. The court found that this phrase should be interpreted to mean "does not pose a risk and will not pose a risk in the future." The court also noted that the assessment required by section 38(2) was evaluative rather than adversarial, requiring the court to consider both current and future risk based on the applicant's history, current circumstances, and expert evidence. The court found that GD met the statutory criteria for suspension as he had been sentenced over 15 years ago and satisfied other requirements of the Act. However, the court was not satisfied that GD did not pose an appreciable risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children, thus denying the application for suspension.
The court's reasoning was based on a detailed examination of the statutory language and previous judicial interpretations. The court concluded that GD's risk assessment indicated that he remained a person who should continue to be subject to reporting obligations. The court's decision was grounded in the need to protect children from potential harm, as outlined in the Act. As a result, the court denied GD's application for suspension of his registration obligations. The court's decision underscores the importance of a thorough risk assessment in determining the suitability of suspension for registered sexual offenders.
Orders
Orders of the court
Background
Background to the litigation
Evidence
Evidence Before The Court
Decision
Reasons for decision
Ratio Decidendi
Legal Principle Established
Nicholson J concluded his analysis with the observation that the risk envisaged by s 38(2) will be appreciable if it is such that the Court concludes the applicant remains a person who should continue to be subject to the reporting obligations notwithstanding their satisfaction of all the other mandatory statutory requirements for suspension of those obligations, the identification of favourable discretionary considerations and the lack of any unfavourable discretionary considerations. Consideration While I have found that the applicant is a serious registrable offender, that does not mean that he is not also a registrable offender. It is clear from the terms of the Act that serious registrable offenders are a sub-set of registrable offenders who may potentially be the subject of an application under s 15A and who are subject to an additional reporting obligation under s 66L(2). A serious registrable offender may make application under s 37. Close to 17 years have passed since the applicant was sentenced on 25 February 2003. Thus, he meets the threshold requirement of 15 years since sentencing prescribed under s 37(2) of the Act. The Commissioner also accepts that the applicant satisfies the other two requirements of s 37(2). As each of the three requirements under s 37(2) are satisfied, the further question is whether the Court is satisfied that the applicant “does not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children”. I approach this question on the following basis. I agree with the conclusion by Nicholson J in C, M that the words “does not pose a risk …” in s 38(1) must be interpreted as meaning “does not pose a risk and will not pose a risk in the future”.[13] As his Honour observed in that case, the object of the Act is to protect children from harm caused by the registrable offender. Thus, the inquiry under s 38(2) is directed to the assessment of both current and future risk. [13] (2014) 121 SASR 106 at [17]. I also respectfully agree with the suggestion by Hinton J in K, MP, which was later endorsed by Nicholson J in L, R, that it is not a question of applying any particular standard of proof but rather that the Court must be satisfied that the applicant does not pose a risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. In my view, that approach is required for two reasons. The first reason is to give proper effect to the words used in s 38(2). The second reason is that the Court is being required to make an evaluative judgment rather than to decide adversarial proceedings. As Nicholson J observed in C, M, in deciding whether the required state of satisfaction has been reached, it is necessary to consider the matters listed in s 38(3) and also circumstances of the offending, the applicant’s history, his current circumstance and the expert evidence. Additionally, I agree with the conclusion reached by Nicholson J in L, R that s 38(2) requires the Court to be satisfied that the applicant does not pose an appreciable risk to the safety and well-being of any child or children. I also agree with Nicholson J that the observations made by Stanley J in Grosser (see [67] above) concerning the meaning of “appreciable”, albeit in a different statutory context, are apposite to the interpretation of s 38(2).